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Abstract 
The thesis provides a comparative analysis of British and German government 
positions on key European issues. It is based on an examination of the major theories 
of European integration in terms of the significance of national government 
approaches and the domestic political environments of the member states in the 
present setting of the European Union. 
Apart from the basic information provided by key texts, periodicals, and newspaper 
articles, the core analysis of the thesis rests on the study of empirical sources. These 
include government policy documents, official statements made by government 
representatives, in addition to interviews with British and German elites, which were 
conducted throughout the investigation. German quotations have been translated into 
English by the author of this thesis. 
The aIm of the thesis is to determine correspondences in British and German 
European policy approaches, and to assess them regarding their significance for the 
future of the European Union. It provides the first comprehensive comparative 
analysis of British-German European policy positions, which takes into account the 
full first terms of the German red-green coalition and the New Labour administration 
in Britain, including the discussions within the Convention on the Future of Europe. 
After more than 50 years of economic and political integration, the decision- and 
policy-making framework of the European has become a dense network of interaction 
between a variety of actors from the supranational, national and regional level. 
Member states and their governments have continued to determine the essential 
course of the integration process. Simultaneously and as a result of the voluntary 
pooling of national sovereignty on the Community level, national governments had to 
realise that they have lost exclusive control over the outcomes of decisions and 
policies in a number of areas. It therefore makes sense to describe the European 
Union in its current setting as a system of mixed governance. 
lV 
Under this system, member state governments remain in control of the fundamental 
strategic decisions on the future of the Community, but have to share decision- and 
policy-making powers with a multiplicity of other players with regard to the micro 
level of day-to-day decision-making. 
In a European Union of 25 member states after the next wave of enlargement in 2004, 
a single bilateral leadership constellation, like the Franco-Gennan alliance, will no 
longer be able to dominate the agenda like it could in the first forty years of the 
integration process. Decisions and policies will increasingly be influenced by flexible 
working partnership between a multiplicity of member states. 
Gennan unification has altered the power balance within the fonner motor of 
integration, and has made it obviously difficult for both France and Gennany to 
maintain their institutionalised system of bilateral European policy co-ordination, 
based on mutual compromise. Consequently, they will have to open their partnership 
to other member states in order to maintain influence. 
Britain and Gennany have both undergone profound changes regarding their 
European policies. As part of the process of 'nonnalisation' and the ending of its pre-
1990 semi-sovereign status, Gennany has become a more self-confident and 
pragmatic player in the European Union and has abandoned its traditional reluctance 
towards full military burden sharing. However, its influence in the Community is at 
risk if it does not initiate a process of fundamental economic and military refonn. 
Britain has been much more positively engaged in the European Union under the New 
Labour government, and has led on a number of issues including economic refonn 
and defence. The amount of influence it will have in a Community of 25 or more will 
strongly depend on whether the country decides to join the eurozone and to end its 
ambiguous stance between Europe and the United States. 
British-Gennan co-operation on major issues like institutional and economic reform, 
defence and further enlargement are likely to have a profoundly progressive effect on 
the European Union as a whole, provided both countries resolve their domestic 
constraints. 
v 
An effective working partnership between Britain and Germany is unlikely to ever 
reach the status of the former Franco-German alliance. It nevertheless has the 
potential to become an influential and transparent promoter of progress in the 
European Union, which could supplement other existing partnerships, including that 
between France and Germany. 
Vl 
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Introduction 
The aim of the thesis is to present a comparative study on possible areas for co-
operation between Britain and Germany within the European Union. It is based on a 
theoretical assessment of the scope of influence the domestic preferences of member 
states have under the European Union's current institutional and procedural setting. 
The research question in this respect is, to what extent member state government 
representatives manage to maintain their national domestic interests in a European 
Union of 15 member states, which faces a further wave of enlargement towards 
Central and Eastern Europe in 2004. In more than 40 years since it came into 
existence, the European Union has developed an increasingly complex institutional 
framework, where decision- and policy-making takes place amongst a multiplicity of 
different levels. The thesis therefore examines the extent to which member state 
governments are able to influence the strategic decisions that determine the future of 
the integration process. 
This thesis is based on an evaluation of the development and the current weaknesses 
of the Franco-German partnership, which has significantly influenced the progress of 
European integration since the end of the Second World War. It investigates the 
impact that co-operation between Britain and Germany could develop in the enlarged 
European Union. The areas considered for co-operation are institutional and 
procedural reform, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), economic and social 
issues, foreign policy and defence, and the process of enlargement itself. On the 
condition that member states still maintain an essential influence on the future of the 
European Union, the objective of the research is to determine whether sufficient 
common interests in these crucial areas exist between Britain and German. The result 
of it will determine the ability of the two countries to form a working partnership, that 
could lead a progressive agenda in the areas where Germany and France have failed to 
do so. 
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Consequently, the core of the examination consists of a comparative case study of 
British and German domestic interests and government positions on major European 
issues. It is based on an outline of the two countries post-Second World War interests 
in Europe with a special emphasis on the more recent changes. 
The primary sources for the case study are official government papers, statements and 
media interviews given by government representatives and officials and personal 
interviews held with political elites in Britain and Germany. As government ministers 
and civil servants approached were reluctant to be interviewed and instead referred to 
official government positions, the selected interviewees are mainly non-government 
representatives. Instead political actors who are closely linked to their domestic 
political environment, but at the same time behold a profound knowledge of decision-
making processes on the European Union level have been chosen for the interviews. 
Hence the majority of the participants have close links with their domestic 
governments and parties, but are also operating in Brussels. They were able to provide 
additional interesting information to the research results gained from the detailed 
study of the other primary sources. Monographies, articles in academic journals and 
newspaper articles, also provided a useful source of information regarding the 
assessment of British and German European policy developments. 
The thesis is divided into five different chapters. Chapter one looks at the changes in 
German European policy by comparing the role of the Federal Republic of West 
Germany, which was limited in its sovereignty through the reserved rights of the 
Western Allied Powers before 1989, with the gradual process of normalisation the 
unified fully sovereign Germany underwent post-1990. The second chapter outlines 
Britain's historical difficulties with its continental neighbours, the concept of 
European integration and assesses the changes that occurred after the end of the 
Conservative era in 1997. Chapter three describes the alternating balance in the 
Franco-German alliance and the reasons behind its recent difficulties, which have 
made it more important to take into account other possible partnerships between the 
larger member states. The case study in chapter four, which represents the core of the 
thesis, analyses British and German policy positions on major European issues in 
respect of their compatibility. The significance of the results of the case study for the 
future of an enlarging European Union is then assessed in the final chapter. 
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The examination of the major approaches in European integration theory in respect of 
the importance of intergovernmental co-operation in the European Union can be 
found in the appendix. 
4 
Literature review 
1. Theory 
The most valuable and up-to-date basic reference on the theoretical discussion about 
the nature of European integration is by Rosamond (2000), who deals with the major 
approaches. Rosamond not only provides a detailed explanation and analysis of the 
two major contrasting strands of European integration theory, intergovernmentalism 
and functionalismlneofunctionalism, but also looks at more modern approaches (such 
as multi-level governance), which try to find a middle way between the traditional 
analysis. Moreover, Rosamond's book includes a section on the meaning of 
federalism, a crucial concept in the contemporary debate about the future of European 
integration. What makes his account valuable, is that he is unbiased and rather 
chooses to provide a critical assessment of the various theories. Rosamond concludes 
that no integration theory has been able to fully explain the complex nature of the 
European integration process and especially stresses the weaknesses of the traditional 
debate (state-centric versus supranational). For him, the more contemporary middle-
of-the way approaches, like multi-level governance, come closest to the rather 
heterogeneous entity the EU has become today. 
A similiarly good account, although slightly dated, is by O'Neill (1996). He shares 
Rosamond's assessment that European integration analysts have traditionally found it 
hard to establish theories able to explain the full complexity of the Community and its 
policy-making framework. Like Rosamond, O'Neill dedicates a large part of his 
analysis to the two major strands of European integration theory, state-centrism and 
functionalismlneofunctionalism. His criticism focuses especially on the latter. For 
O'Neill the functionalist argument has traditionally tended to predict outcomes for the 
integration process, which emphasise an unrealistic transfer of national autonomy and 
loyalities of domestic actors to the supranational level. On the other hand, in his 
opinion, state-centric approaches have also failed to explain the more complex 
decision-making structures, which emerged as integration processed further. 
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O'Neill is therefore also very balanced in his analysis and includes discussions about 
federalism and confederalism, which make his book an indispensable guide to the 
theories of European integration. 
The neofunctionalist school, which had dominated the theoretical debate about 
European integration in the wake of the Second World War, is based on the 
functionalist writings of David Mitrany. His reflections on a system of global 
institutions, which would be able to provide peace and stability, had been strongly 
influenced by the impact of the two World Wars (Mitrany, 1943). Mitrany considered 
the nation state as the source of the evils of nationalism and violent conflict. 
As a result, he predicted the inevitable decline of the nation state as the centre of 
attention. From his point of view, the succeeding establishment of functional 
international organisations, based on the loyalties of a borderless, global society, were 
the only way to secure peace and prosperity for the world. Mitrany's vision was too 
focused on the global level in order for him to have been able to seriously consider a 
regional entity, like an integrated Europe. Hence he failed to develop his approach 
into a proper theory of European integration, and only marginally dealt with the 
emerging European framework (Mitrany, 1965 and updated in 1975). 
Nevertheless his writings were nevertheless important for the theoretical debate and 
were taken up by Ernst Haas, who developed the neofunctionalist approach. Haas 
(1968) interpreted the emerging European integration as a process of 'spill-over', 
through which more sectors of national autonomy would gradually transfer to an 
expanding supranational Community framework. He concluded that due to this 
process, the loyalties of national actors would be reorientated towards the 
supranational level, which as a result would eventually turn the nation state into a 
fonner shadow of itself. Although Haas and his followers, such as Lindberg, became 
more critical towards their own tendency to jump to conclusions about the final 
... 
outcome of the integration process (Haas, 1971), his interpretation of the nature of the 
integration process adequately describes the development from the Coal and Steel 
Community in 1951 towards the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 
6 
Haas's neofunctionalist predictions on the inevitable decrease of the importance of the 
nation states and their governments provoked the emergence of a contrasting school 
of thought on European integration. The rather rigid intergovernmental ism of Stanley 
Hoffmann fundamentally contradicted the neofunctionalist notion that national 
influence would inevitably decline as part of the integration process. In his early 
writings on the future of the nation state (Hoffmann, 1966), Hoffinann rejected the 
(neo)functionalist argument and claimed that in contrast to neofunctionalist 
predictions, national governments had remained in full control of the integration 
process. He believed that the nation states remained the 'pace-setters' of European 
integration and any supranational institution would strongly depend on them. 
Like Haas, Hoffinann became more balanced with time and later accepted that the 
institutional change of the 1980s had indeed weakened the influence of national 
governments and had resulted in a situation, in which they were no longer fully in 
control of all aspects of Community decision- and policy-making (Keohane and 
Hoffinann, 1991). 
Hoffmann's state-centrist approach became the basis for the liberal intergovernmental 
theory of Andrew Moravcsik. Moravcsik provided intergovernmentalists with 
important empirical research on the negotiations which led to the Single European Act 
(SEA) in 1987 (Moravcsik, 1991). In the study, Moravcsik argued that the end of the 
period of stagnation in the integration process, which had dominated the 1970s, could 
only be achieved because the three big member states, Britain, France and Germany 
were all led by governments which shared a common interest in the further economic 
liberalisation of the Common Market. Thatcher, Kohl and Mitterand were therefore 
ready to deepen political and economic integration in co-operation with the Delors 
Commission. Moravcsik successively elaborated his fmdings into a liberal 
intergovernmental two-level theory of European integration (Moravcsik, 1993). The 
liberal intergovernmental approach defines the integration process as a two-level 
game, where nation states first develop their interests in a process of preference 
formation on the domestic level, which is strongly influenced by growing economic 
interdependence. Member state government representatives would then try to defend 
these national preferences on the Community level in a process of interstate 
bargaining. 
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In his latest work (Moravcsik, 1998), Moravcsik used his theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism to analyse the integration process from the Messina conference 
up to the Maastricht Treaty, and to show how the domestic member state preferences 
have influenced crucial developments in the Community. 
Alan Milward takes a similar empirical approach and has based his analysis of 
European integration since 1945 on a reversal of the neofunctionalist argument. Like 
Moravcsik, his work is strongly based on Hoffmann's theory that national 
governments basically remain in control of the integration process (Milward, 1984). 
Milward argues that the member states make sure that the institutional framework of 
the Community remains limited in its ability to determine strategic outcomes. 
From Milward's point of view, national governments only give away limited control 
in areas, where they have realised that the pooling of sovereignty on the supranational 
level might produce better outcomes than retaining it nationally. Milward agrees with 
the neofunctionalist notion that national governments had to accept that their states 
would not be able to survive in an increasingly globalised environment. However, in 
contrast to neofunctionalists, he concludes that they had managed to use the pooling 
of sovereignty as part of the integration process in order to save their nation states 
from decline (Milward, 1993). 
Stephen George (1996) is also firmly on the intergovernmental side and emphasises 
that the predictions neofunctionalists made with regard to the outcome of 'spill-over 
processes' were incorrect. He states that the neofunctionalist notion of transnational 
orientation of national actors and interests groups towards the Community level has 
not occurred. He also claims that the Commission has not outweighed the Council in 
its importance as the central decision-maker. George consequently thinks that the 
main focus regarding integration would remain on the nation states and their 
preferences. 
Other supporters of the intergovernmentalist approach have taken a more balanced 
view and accepted that states have indeed lost control over a number of policy areas. 
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Hix (1999) agrees with the intergovernmental argument that states were able to fend 
off the substantial threat to their existence, which had been predicted by the 
(neo )functionalist approach. He nevertheless stresses that the control of national 
decision-makers has weakened significantly, because national governments are 
increasingly dependent on the expert knowledge of supranational institutions like the 
Commission. However, in a recent publication, Hix confirms once again that he 
basically supports the state-centrist argument believing that national institutions and 
actors remain crucial for the integration process (Hix and Goetz, 2001). 
Wessels (1999) also views national interests as crucial for the development of the 
European Union, because the Council in which national governments try to defend 
their national interests as part of interstate bargains, would still remain the 'decision-
making centre'. Wessel nonetheless points out the fact that, even though the Council 
would continue to determine the strategic direction of the EU, member state 
governments increasingly had to take into account other actors, such as the European 
Parliament and the Commission, in a Community framework which has become much 
more complex than it was in its initial stages. 
Wall ace (2000) accepts that nation states are still in full control of the strategic long-
term decisions on the future development of the EU, but are only one actor among a 
multiplicity of others concerning the micro-level of day-to-day policy-making. 
Wallace thinks that the main authority still rests with the member states but points out 
that, in order to make the EU effective as a 'collective political system', member state 
governments have to accept the sharing of substantial parts of control over a number 
of policy areas. From his point of view, this has turned the EU into a system of 
'collective governance' in which governments play a crucial role but are no longer the 
only significant actors, which makes them less sovereign than they were before they 
entered the integration process. His book also contains an interesting account of the 
development of Economic and Monetary Union by Loukas Tsoukalis, who argues that 
the Single Currency is likely to lead to the further deepening of economic and 
political integration in the future. 
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Pierson (1998), who is not an intergovernmentalist, but approaches European 
integration from a historical-institutional angle, shares the view of more balanced 
intergovernmentalists. He points out that, although neofunctionalists have rightly 
described processes of 'spill-over' from national policy sectors to the Community 
level, national government representatives have managed to maintain the essence of 
their national state sovereignty by agreeing to increased co-operation on the EU level. 
The more balanced interpretation of the integration process put forward by the 
contemporary supporters of intergovernmental ism can also be found in the multi-level 
governance approach, which attempts to go beyond the limits of the traditional debate 
between state-centrists and neofunctionalists. Multi-level governance approaches tend 
to accept that the substance of the nation state has not disappeared, as predicted by 
neofunctionalists. However, they still see nation states and their governments bound 
into an increasingly dense and complex Community framework, a process through 
which they would inevitably lose substantial parts of their national autonomy. 
Marks, Hooghe and Blank (1996), who have been promoting the interpretation of the 
EU as a system of multi-level governance, argue in this respect that the process of 
collective decision-making within the EU involves a significant loss of national 
control. The authors lean towards the neofunctionalist argument when they claim that 
national actors would no longer focus their activities exclusively on the national level, 
but would progressively bypass it and interact directly with the Community 
institutions. accept that the national governments still maintain essential influence 
within the EU through the Council, but stress that the influence of other Community 
institutions, like the Commission and the European Parliament, as well as sub-
national actors (like e.g. the Lander in Germany), have become significantly more 
important. This would therefore result in a complex network of decision-making 
between supranational, national and regional actors, in which state influence has not 
become completely irrelevant, but nonetheless significantly weakened. 
Sandholtz and Sweet (1998) argue that, although the process of interstate bargaining, 
as described by intergovernmentalists is still important for many areas of EU policy-
and decision-making, it takes place within a framework of Community rules, which 
go beyond national control. 
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Member states would therefore no longer be able to determine the outcome of 
decision- and policy-making, and would have to face an increasing domestic and 
transnational demand for the expansion of the supranational framework as part of the 
formation of a 'transnational society'. In a transnational environment Sandholtz and 
Sweet see an increasing scope of action for Community institutions like the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice, which would result in decisions and 
policy outcomes nation states had not originally intended. 
While the main approaches of European integration theory primarily question who is 
in control of decision-making in the EU, it is also interesting to look at publications, 
which deal with the constitutional aspects of European integration. 
Weiler (1999), who has published a collection of essays on European integration, 
analyses the integration process from a legal perspective and argues that the EU 
resembles a confederation, which could turn into a federal system if the deepening of 
integration continues. Weiler sees the nation state's identity modified by the 
integration process, because the individual citizen would no longer see it as the 
exclusive reference point for its personal interests. He provides an interesting chapter 
on the influence of the European Court of Justice on the domestic political system of 
the member states, where he argues that the Court and the member states have found 
ways of co-operating, and respect each other's authority. The ECJ would exercise a 
rather modest influence on the implementation of EU regulations and policies on the 
national level, while the member states had not avoided direct confrontation with the 
Court's authority, and had accepted its value as an independent moderator between 
the various interests within the EU. 
The concept of federalism or confederalism has traditionally played a significant part 
in the post-war discussion about the nature of the European Community. Especially in 
Britain, where a federal design for Europe is usually portrayed by Eurosceptics and 
the right-wing tabloid press as the horror vision of an all-subsuming superstate. 
Hence, control would be increasingly centred on the federal level in Brussels. 
Therefore it is important to look at what a federal design is comprised of. 
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F orsyth (1981) argues that a federal structure for a supranational organisation would 
mean that' a number of separate states raise themselves by contract to the threshold of 
being one state'. In a more up-to-date analysis of the constitutional design of the 
European Union (Forsyth, 1994), he argues that a federal system or state does not 
necessarily imply that all powers are centred on the federal level. On the contrary, a 
federal organisation would make sure that the regional level kept substantial powers. 
F orsyth, who, in contrast to the common definition, defines a confederation as a much 
more integrated entity than a federation, thus sees the European Union as a federal 
system with an economic confederation, which is likely to spill over into other crucial 
sectors (such as defence and security). 
Pinder (1993) sees the creation of the Single European Market as an almost inevitable 
step towards federal union in Europe. He considers a 'federation', which he considers 
being looser than a 'federal union' and argues that in a 'federation', the federal 
institutions take over certain policy areas, but the essential power still rests with the 
lower level, e.g. the member states in a federation of nation states. In contrast, in a 
'federal union', federal institutions would be much more powerful and not only 
exercise control over substantial policy areas, but also be in full control of the 
military. From Pinder's point of view, the EU has set out to turn from a 'federation' 
into a 'federal union', because it intends to deepen monetary and economic 
integration as part of EMU, and wants to create a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. 
Vandamme (1998) supports Forsyth's VIew of federalism as a constitutional 
arrangement, which aims at decentralisation rather than at the absorption of power in 
a single centre. He characterises the European Union as a system of 'co-operative 
federalism' , which means that the domestic level of the member state and 
supranational Community level are closely inter linked rather than being separated 
from one another. Vandamme nevertheless distinguishes between a federal union and 
a federal state, with the latter requiring the most important areas of decision-making 
to be transferred to the federal level. For Vandamme, the EU might move this way if 
its member states decide to fully integrate further crucial areas of national decision-
making, like taxation or foreign policy at EU level. 
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With regard to the present setting, however, such a move towards a federal state 
would still remain 'idealistic', as Vandamme points out. 
2. Germany 
2.1. German publications 
The two standard reference books on Germany's political and constitutional system 
are by Rudzio (2000), and Hesse and Ellwein (1997). Both publications are regularly 
updated and deal with major aspects of Germany's domestic political system, 
including the roles of the federal government, Lander, Federal Constitutional Court, 
as well as the party system and political culture. Hesse and Ellwein's book is more 
comprehensive then Rudzio's, as it includes a section on Germany's foreign policy 
and an introductory chapter on the structure of the two German states before 
reunification. Furthermore, Hesse and Ellwein comprises two volumes, the first one 
containing the main analysis of Germany's political system and the second one 
providing the essential original constitutional documents and treaties for each chapter 
of the main text. These make the book a valuable resource for students of German 
politics. 
The best analysis of the German constitution and its basic law (Grundgesetz) can be 
found in Maunz and Zippelius, the standard textbook on German constitutional law. 
Maunz and Zippelius explain the development and structure of the German state as a 
Federal Republic based on party democracy, the rule of law, and basic social 
standards. They including the changes that occurred when the two German states were 
reunified. The book also includes a section on the constitutional basis for Germany's 
engagement in international organisations like the European Union. 
Rauschnig (1989) provides a valuable collection of the essential documents on West 
Germany's legal position under international law from 1945 to 1989, which includes 
the various bilateral treaties signed by West German leaders with countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe, as part of the Ostpolitik. Rauschnig' s collection creates an 
awareness of what the semi-sovereign status of the Bonn republic really implied. 
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The most detailed publication on the foreign policy of West Germany is by Hanrieder 
(1991), originally published in English in 1989. Hanrieder shows how the Bonn 
republic was constrained by its semi-sovereign status in terms of its foreign policy, 
but was still able to exercise a relatively high amount of influence through its deep 
integration into Western Europe and the transatlantic Alliance. His work contains a 
very informative analysis of the attempts of consecutive West German governments 
to work towards peaceful reunification of the two German states, which was one of 
the main motives behind the development of the Ostpolitik in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Hanrieder shows how West Germany became the leading force for 
reconciliation between East and West in Europe. He also deals with the influence of 
the domestic political and economic situation each West German government had to 
face with regard to its foreign policy. Hanrieder, who sadly passed away in 1995, was 
able to finish an updated edition of his book in the same year, which included an 
analysis of the initial post-unification years. 
The other indispensable account of (mainly West German) foreign policy is provided 
by Hacke (1997). His book, which was first published in 1993, goes beyond most 
other publications on German foreign policy because it deals with each of Germany's 
post-war administrations individually, starting with Adenauer up to the final years of 
the Kohl government. Hacke' s very detailed account had a strong impact on the 
discussion about Germany's post-unification foreign policy debate. He criticised the 
continuation of the policy of semi-engagement and public denial of national interests 
of the KohllGenscher administration in the years following reunification. 
Hacke argued that the German leaders would have to live up to Germany's increased 
political weight in Europe by taking on greater responsibilities and by openly 
admitting that the united Germany has indeed national interests of its own, beyond the 
support for European integration. This is a point, which Hacke had already stressed in 
a contribution to the groundbreaking analysis of the major aspects of Germany's post-
unification foreign policy edited by Kaiser and Krause (Hacke, 1996). 
Hacke also published a study of the motives based upon CDU/CSU opposition 
towards the new Ostpolitik developed by the SPDIFDP coalition under the leadership 
of Willy Brandt in the 1960s. 
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Hacke (1975) shows the internal disagreements amongst the two sister parties, with 
the Bavarian CSU under the leadership of Franz Josef StrauB taking a more hardline 
stance than most member of the CDU. Hacke's work is an illustration of the fears 
amongst the CDU/CSU that the BrandtlScheel administration would pursue a new 
policy of neutrality, which would endanger the West's containment policy towards 
Soviet expansionism and risk the long-term prospects of German reunification. 
An excellent analysis of the development of German Ostpolilik post-WWl can be 
found in Griffith (1981), originally published in English in 1978. Griffith shows the 
changes in the relations between Germany and the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, including the Soviet Union over the decades since WWl and dedicates a 
large part of his account to the new Oslpolilikofthe Bono republic, which had already 
been cautiously prepared by the grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD 
(1966-69), and was then fully developed by the first SPDIFDP coalition after 1969. 
Another very good survey of West German foreign policy can be found in pfetsch 
(1993). Pfetsch accounts for the period between 1949 and 1992, and therefore 
includes the reunification process. He also looks at the institutional framework of 
German foreign policy-making, including all the major German state institutions and 
the Foreign Office. Although Pfetsch's analysis is not as comprehensive as Hanrieder 
or Hacke, it still adds interesting aspects to the analysis of the post-war foreign policy 
of the Bono republic. 
Although personal memoirs usually have to be treated with caution, as they often tend 
to offer a rather biased picture of events, they can still be very useful to come to a 
better understanding of the personal motives of leading political actors. 
For the pre-unification period, the memoirs of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the longest 
serving Foreign Minister in Germany's post-war history (1974-1992) are especially 
interesting. Genscher (1995) illustrates the motives for the FDP's change of coalition 
from the CDU to the SPD in 1969 so that both parties could develop a new policy 
towards Eastern Europe. He also played a crucial role in the negotiations which led to 
the reunification of the two German states and shows how he and Chancellor Kohl 
used the historic opportunities in the negotiations with the Allied Powers. 
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Furthermore, Genscher tries to defend himself against the widespread criticism of his 
post-unification foreign policy principles, which continue to avoid the open pursuit of 
national interests and remained lukewarm towards active German military 
engagement. 
Of equal importance are the memoirs of Germany's first post-war SPD Chancellor, 
Willy Brandt (Brandt, 1990). Brandt, whose name is inseparably linked with the 
Ostpolitik, explains that his motives for the reconciliation with Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union were driven by a desire to ease the tensions of the Cold War and to 
make life easier for Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain. He stresses that it had 
never been his intention to weaken Germany's integration into the West. Brandt 
believed that the only way to keep the option of a peaceful unification of the two 
Germanys open was to supplement the existing policy of integration into the West 
with new openness towards the East. 
Helmut Schmidt, who succeeded Brandt in office in 1974, has made a name for 
himself as an internationally respected commentator on European and global affairs. 
Schmidt has written a wide range of publications on domestic German, European and 
global issues. He published his foreign policy memoirs in two volumes, in which he 
assesses the personal relationships he established with European and international 
leaders during his period in office. The first volume (Schmidt, 1987) deals with the 
three big powers in the 1970s, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. 
His second volume (Schmidt, 1990) focuses on West Germany's relations with its 
European partners, including a very interesting account of Schmidt's strong personal 
friendship with French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing, which had pushed the 
Franco-German partnership to new heights. In this respect, it is also important to 
consider Schmidt's personal memoirs (Schmidt, 1996), in which he discloses even 
more details of the Franco-German entente between Giscard and himself. Throughout 
the 1990s, Schmidt was a close observer of German domestic and European policies. 
He had been one of the leading critics of Chancellor Kohl's post-unification economic 
policies, which included a substantial criticism of the 'monstrous' Maastricht Treaty, 
which was negotiated between Kohl and French president Mitterrand (Schmidt, 1993 
and 1996). 
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The best account of the international aspects of the unification negotiations can be 
found in Kaiser (1993a), also summarised in an article he wrote for the annual edition 
of Internationale Politik 1989/90 (Kaiser, 1993b). Kaiser explains the prudent 
negotiation strategy of the KohllGenscher administration, which not only managed to 
overcome scepticism among the Western partners (mainly Britain and France), but 
also convinced Soviet leaders that a unified Germany would pose no threat to the 
security of Europe. Kaiser also analyses the interests of each of the Allies in the 2+4 
process and includes the most important documents, speeches and interviews in a 
separate section. which makes his book essential for research on the German 
reunification process. 
Diehl (1993) provides an important analysis of how the new foreign policy approach 
of Soviet general secretary Gorbachev enabled the changes in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the reunification of the two German states. He shows how Gorbachev put 
his 'new thinking' on foreign policy into practice when he abolished the Brezhnev 
doctrine of legitimate intervention into the domestic affairs of the Warsaw Pact 
countries and announced the principle of 'freedom of choice'. Diehl also explains 
Gorbachev's crucial concept of a 'common European house', which provided the 
basis for the fall of the Iron Curtain in Europe. 
The earliest and currently the most comprehensive analysis of foreign policy interests 
and resources of the united Germany was published in four volumes and edited by 
Kaiser et al. between 1995 and 1998. Volume one deals with the basic features of the 
foreign policy of the larger Germany, volume two analyses the challenges, volume 
three assesses interests and strategies, and volume four looks at the institutional 
framework and the resources of German foreign policy. Especially volume three 
contains a number of interesting contributions to the discussion about German foreign 
policy since 1990, amongst them is an article by Janning (1996) on Germany's role in 
an enlarged European Union. Janning argues that through reunification, Germany has 
become the central power in Europe and would become even more important, once 
the EU has enlarged into Central and Eastern Europe. He stresses that Germany is in 
an incomparably advantageous position in the EU, as it is the only member state 
which benefits both from the deepening and enlargement of the Union. 
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Janning warns that Germany should only attempt to exercise leadership in alliance 
with other member states, and stop to promote the model of a federal state for the EU 
if it wants to prevent the emergence of fears amongst its partners in Europe. Janning 
concludes that through unification, a new chapter in German European policy has 
opened, in which Germany continues to be a strong advocate of European integration, 
albeit with a stronger emphasis on its national interests. The third volume of the series 
on Germany's new foreign policy also contains an article by Hacke (1996), in which 
he confirms his call on German leaders to admit that the unified Germany has its own 
national interests, which determine the shape of its foreign policy. Hacke stresses that 
as part of such a redefinition of German foreign policy priorities, German leaders 
would have to be ready to accept greater responsibility for their country, especially in 
terms of military engagement, in order to live up to the expectations of Germany's 
partners regarding the increased political weight of the country. 
Schwarz (1994) substantially influenced the post-unification domestic discussion 
about foreign policy in Germany by introducing the notion that the country had 
moved into a 'central power' position in a Europe which faced imminent enlargement. 
As shown, Janning and other analysts have repeatedly taken a critical look at 
Schwarz's concept and have either supported it or dismissed it as an example of a new 
German hegemonic self-perception. 
Hacker (1995) published a distinctive account of the united Germany's standing in 
Europe. Hacker, who has a substantial publication profile on the legal aspects of 
German foreign policy, offers a very valuable study of the path towards German 
unification before 1989, with a strong emphasis on the constraints of West Germany's 
semi-sovereign status. He bases his work on an excellent analysis of the changes in 
Soviet European policy under Gorbachev. He also gives a detailed account of the 2+4 
negotiations, which led to the unification of the two German states, including the 
inner-German unification process and its legal implications. The second part of 
Hacker's book is committed to the discussion of the role of the larger Germany in 
international organisations such as the V.N., NATO and the EV. It includes a 
thorough assessment of the impact the German Federal Constitutional Court's 
decision on military engagement had for the country's foreign policy. 
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Hacker calls for a redefinition of German foreign policy priorities on the basis of the 
continuing strong integration into multilateral organisations and strong values aimed 
at military burden sharing and the avoidance of power politics. 
A regular and constantly updated analysis of developments in German foreign and 
especially European policy is made available by the Centre for applied political 
research at Munich University. Its director Wemer Weidenfeld has edited many 
significant publications on Germany's post-unification European policy, among them 
reference books on the major EU treaties, like the Treaty of Amsterdam (Weidenfeld, 
1998) and Nice (Weidenfeld, 2001). Weidenfeld co-edited the indispensable reference 
handbook on German reunification (Weidenfeld and Korte, 1999), which combines 
essential information on all the major aspects of the unification process in a number of 
short but very comprehensive articles. The book contains an article by Dieter Bingen 
on the crucial bilateral treaties between West Germany and the major Warsaw Pact 
countries, which constituted the basis of the new Ostpolitik of the 1970s. 
Bingen manages to summarise the wide-ranging content of the various treaties on 
few pages only without missing any vital information which makes his contribution 
an essential resource for any research on German Ostpolitik Josef Janning, one of the 
most prominent members of the Munich research centre and an analyst of European 
integration in Germany, contributed an article on the integration of united Germany 
into the European Union. He points out that German unification would have opened 
up new opportunities for German European policy, which would have to be based on 
a clear determination of its own national interests in order to be able to exercise a 
leadership role in an enlarged Europe. Janning has also published proposals on how 
to make German European policy more effective, in which he argues that the larger 
Germany would have to concentrate its foreign policy resources. He calls for the 
creation of a ministry for European integration, which would exclusively deal with 
European affairs and have to co-ordinate German European policy priorities in co-
operation with the Chancellory. Janning sees good prospects for a leading German 
role in the EU, as long as German European policy would become more self-confident 
and would accept the responsibilities that come with such a role. 
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Weidenfeld has edited a collection of studies on options for a more effective 
European policy for the united Germany. An especially interesting contribution to the 
book is the one offered by Glaab, Gros, Korte and Wagner (1998), who see 
Germany's post-unification European policy caught between the conflict of growing 
external and internal expectations. German leaders consequently have to accept that 
their country's European partners expected the larger Germany to take on greater 
responsibilities, while the German public's scepticism towards the further deepening 
of political and economic integration in Europe would have risen since Maastricht. 
The Munich centre has also published a very informative reference book on Europe 
(Weidenfeld, 1999), which deals with the interests and policies of each of the 15 
member states individually. It includes a special chapter on the German role 10 
Europe, consisting of three articles. Thomas Paulsen deals with the changes 10 
Germany's role in Europe since 1990 and basically supports Schwarz's definition of 
the German status as a 'central power' with key influence. Paulsen nonetheless points 
out that fears of a new German dominance would be completely unfounded, because 
Germany would continue to pursue a policy of multilateral ism. For Paulsen, no single 
country would be able to exercise a hegemonial role in the modem Europe, mainly 
because of a complex system of interdependence which is aimed at maintaining a 
'balance of power'. He therefore sees the major problem to be the lack of German 
economic and financial resources to fulfil a leadership role, rather than in an 
accumulation of German power. 
Werner Link analyses Germany's role as a European power from the creation of the 
first German nation state in 1871, and shows how (West) Germany's deep integration 
into the multilateral frameworks of NATO and the EU became an essential 
prerequisite for a more independent German foreign policy. Link emphasises that 
Germany remains deeply embedded in the Community, and is the leading advocate 
for an expansion of NATO and the EU into Central and Eastern Europe. He also sees 
the larger Germany in the role of a 'central power' in Europe. Above all, he stresses 
that it would not be in accordance with reality if German leaders pretended that their 
country would naturally support the deepening of European integration. Link 
therefore calls for a more honest admission that Germany's interests in Europe are 
indeed defined by its own national interests. 
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Patrick Meyer focuses on the development of German post-1945 European policy and 
shows the crucial stages of Germany's integration into Europe. With regard to the 
situation after the unification of the two Germanys, Meyer sees Germany's European 
policy constrained by a renewed fear of German dominance among its European 
partners. He also notices a new generation in power in the larger Germany, which 
approaches European issues with a greater pragmatism than the previous generation 
of leaders. From Meyer's point of view, the future of German European policy will 
be characterised by a continuation of its traditional engagement, enriched by a greater 
emphasis on the country's own national interests. 
The Europe handbook also contains an interesting analysis of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union by Olaf Hillenbrand, which describes the path towards monetary 
integration and explains in detail the implications of the stability pact, on which the 
Kohl government had insisted as part of the Maastricht package. With regard to public 
perceptions of European integration in Germany, the article by the leading German 
opinion pollster Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann outlines the changes in the German 
public' s perception of the integration process since reunification. She detects a 
general continuing support for European integration in Germany, but also points out 
that the German public increasingly complain about the lack of understanding of the 
EU's complex decision- and policy-making framework. Manuela Glaab offers the 
European perspective and supports Noelle-Neumann's findings by stressing that the 
citizens in all of the 15 EU member states have become more disillusioned with and 
critical towards the EU's institutions and the integration process as a whole. Glaab 
sees the development of the complex institutional and procedural framework created 
after Maastricht to be the main reason why the individual citizen would fail to 
identify himself or herself with the EU. 
Another very useful and informative publication by the Munich centre is the pocket 
reference book on European integration (Weidenfeld and Wessels, 1997), which 
provides short explanations of the development and role of the main Community 
institutions and policies. In the book, Christian Jung summarises the complicated 
regulations of the Treaty of Maastricht in a very comprehensible way. Claus Giering 
does the same with the Amsterdam Treaty and points out its failure to adequately 
revise and clear up the leftovers of Maastricht. 
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A very important and at the same time controversial contribution to the debate about 
the future of the EU was made by the CDU Europe experts Wolf gang Schauble and 
Karl Lamers in 1996. Their joint reflections on European policy, reprinted in Nelsen 
and Stubb (1998) were critically perceived in France, because they showed a new 
self-confidence in the approach of the unified Germany towards European issues. 
Schauble and Lamers call for the establishment of a hard core of members within the 
European Union to agree to proceed faster than others in terms of the deepening of 
integration. Schauble and Lamers argue that the core should work towards the 
establishment of a 'federal state' based on the principle of subsidiarity. No other 
member state should be allowed to block this process through its veto. The core 
would have to be based on the Franco-German partnership, which should be 
strengthened further. Schauble and Lamers also emphasise that they expect France to 
become more open towards the deepening of European integration instead of focusing 
on the preservation of national sovereignty. In principle, Schauble and Lamers would 
like to see an open partnership between France and Germany, which leaves room to 
include Britain, as soon as the latter would finally decide to adopt a more pro-
European course. 
Regarding the changes in Germany's European policy since the end of the Kohl era 
and the election of a younger generation of leaders in 1998, it is interesting to look at 
the publications by the three leading political figures, who have made possible the 
election victory of the first red-green coalition in Germany's history. The book 
published by 10schka Fischer (1995), when his Green party was still in opposition, 
shows the attitude the current German Foreign Minister had towards the notion of a 
'normalisation' of German post-unification foreign policy only three years before he 
came into office. Once in government, Fischer became the leading advocate for full 
German military engagement in the bombing raids on Serbia during the 1998/99 
Kosovo crisis and the post-September 11 th military campaign in Afghanistan. In 1995 
he still warned about moves towards the 'militarisation' of German policy. 
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Oskar Lafontaine, who stepped down as SPD leader and fmance minister in March 
1998 in protest against the government's economic and foreign policy, never changed 
his views and thus published an open reckoning with the government (Lafontaine, 
1999). In his book, he personally criticises Chancellor Schroder for neglecting the 
Franco-German partnership in favour of closer ties with the British Labour 
government. He also calls for a more interventionist economic policy. Lafontaine's 
assessment of the government's policy is therefore an important testimony of the 
inner tensions which formed the basis of the red-green coalition's initial period in 
office. 
Chancellor Schroder published a collection of open letters in the run-up to the 1998 
German general election. The book contains open letters by SchrOder addressed to a 
number of senior German elites (including the then leader of the Green party, Joschka 
Fischer), and each letter addresses a different subject of German domestic and foreign 
policy. Especially interesting is Schroder's letter to Frederick Forsyth, the British 
writer, in which he outlines his European policy priorities. SchrOder stresses that the 
EU would have to become more transparent in order to counter ordinary people's 
fears about an increasing centralisation of power in Brussels. He calls for the 
establishment of a leadership 'triangle' between France, Britain and Germany, which 
would have to work towards the development of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, and bring forward common initiatives on other major policy issues. 
For a coherent assessment of German European policy it is important to consider the 
relatively strong influence of regional actors. Within the federal system of Germany, 
the Lander have acquired a growing influence on foreign policy matters since 
reunification, and therefore play a substantial part in the development of German 
foreign policy priorities. Rudolf Hrbek has published a study on how the principle of 
subsidiarity within Germany's federal system guarantees the consideration of Lander 
interests as part of Germany's European policy. Hrbek's work is especially aimed at a 
comparison of the position of the Llinder with other regions in Europe. 
The book contains an interesting chapter by Degen (1999). He shows how the German 
Lander use the EU's Committee of the Regions to make their interests heard. Degen 
argues that the Llinder have found ways of using the Committee to bypass the federal 
government and exercise a 'shadow European policy'. 
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In many case Liinder representatives would consequently avoid the necessity to lobby 
the German federal government and make their interests heard directly on the 
Community level. 
The leading German foreign policy journal Internationale Politik regularly publishes 
journals which deal with the changes in German foreign and European policy. Many 
of the foreign policy experts hence contribute to the journal, which makes it a 
valuable resource for up to date developments. 
Karl-Rudolf Korte (IP 2/1997) analysed the perception of the unified Germany's 
foreign policy among the country's European partners. He concludes that Germany's 
post-unification policy is gradually being brought into line with those of other 
European countries, which have traditionally followed a more self-centred approach 
than the semi-sovereign Bonn republic before 1989. Korte points out that such a 
process of 'normalisation' is accepted by Germany's neighbours as part of an 
inevitable consequence of reunification. 
William E. Paterson and Charlie Jeffery from the Institute for German Studies at the 
University of Birmingham offer an assessment of Germany's post-1990 European 
policy from a British perspective (IP 1111999). The authors see an obvious change in 
the Franco-German alliance under the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, 
mainly due to a more self-confident German attitude and a perception on the 
Chancellor's part that the Franco-German partnership's value is most technical. As 
short-term issue-related working partnerships between various states would become 
ever more important in an enlarged EU, Paterson and Jeffery see a good chance for 
Britain to play a more influential role. This would however require British 
participation in Economic and Monetary Union. 
In the same edition of Internationale Politik, which also includes the article by 
Schwarz on Germany's 'central power' position in Europe mentioned earlier, Daniel 
Vernet provides a French assessment of the changes in German European policy after 
the red-green coalition's first year in office. Vemet argues that the SchroderlFischer 
administration has basically continued the traditional German European policy 
approach. 
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He nonetheless emphasises that Chancellor SchrCider has shown a more pragmatic and 
self-confident approach to European issues than his predecessors, which was balanced 
out by Foreign Minister Fischer's insistence on continuity. Vemet concludes that, 
from his point of view, the greater self-confidence and emphasis on Germany's own 
interests represented a return to normality, which did not exist in the first 40 years of 
West German glorification of European integration. 
Laux (2000) has assessed the changes in Germany's European policy during the first 
year of the red-green coalition's first term in office. She sees a new generation of 
leaders at work, who have developed a more pragmatic attitude towards European 
issues, but still remain deeply embedded in the German policy tradition. Laux 
nevertheless criticises the lack of definition of Germany's national interests on the 
European level, even under the leadership of the red-green coalition. She therefore 
calls on the leaders in Berlin to make up their mind about Germany's European policy 
priorities. 
Lees (2000) has written about the politics and personalities of the red-green coalition, 
which, although he only deals with the first few months in office, is especially 
interesting to gain an understanding of the initial tensions within the SchrCider 
government. Lees describes how the disagreements on domestic and foreign policy 
issues (especially the Franco-German partnership) between Chancellor SchrCider and 
the then Finance Minister and SPD leader Oskar Lafontaine prevented the 
government from steering a clear course and led to Lafontaine's resignation in March 
1999. Lees also analyses the pressure of events around the Kosovo crisis, which left 
the red-green coalition no other choice but to initiate the most fundamental change in 
Germany's post-war history, when it decided to deploy German forces for the 
bombing raids on Serbia in 1998/99. 
The most recent edition of Internationale Politi/c, which deals exclusively with 
Germany's role in Europe, was published in September 2002 (IP 9/2002). It contains 
a review of the red-green coalitions' foreign policy in its first term in office between 
1998 and 2002. 
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Janning sees the red-green foreign policy characterised by continuity, but also points 
out its weaknesses, including the decline of the Franco-German partnership, the lack 
of military spending and reform, and in addition, to the failure to build on the initially 
promising relations with Britain under New Labour. For Janning, the most important 
achievement of the SchroderlFischer administration is that it has managed to maintain 
Germany's traditional post-war role as the promoter of the deepening of European 
integration, both through the Foreign Minister's Humbold speech, and the Europe 
paper passed at the 2001 SPD party conference in Nuremberg. 
Michael Mertes looks at what happened to the prediction of a 'German Europe', 
which was predominant at the time of reunification within Germany itself and among 
many of its European neighbours. Mertes stresses that after unification, German 
leaders found it increasingly difficult to pretend towards their partners that Germany 
would not pursue its own national interests in Europe. As a result, German foreign 
policy became more self-confident, but also more willing to take on greater 
responsibilities in military terms. Mertes remarks that, because of its weak economic 
performance, Germany ironically is rather a threat to the economic prosperity of the 
eurozone, than a serious candidate for a hegemonial role. 
Stephan Martens offers a very brief, but nevertheless important analysis of the current 
state of Franco-German relations. He sees a growing gap between the reality and 
public display of harmony between France and Germany. Martens warns that both 
countries would have to make serious efforts in order to maintain their influence in an 
enlarged EU, where one bilateral partnership is unlikely to dominate the agenda in the 
way France and Germany traditionally used to after 1945. 
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2.2. English publications 
German foreign policy and its role in Europe is widely discussed in British political 
science, mainly because of the country's growing political weight after unification in 
1990. 
An indispensable reference for students of German politics is the regularly updated 
series on the Developments in German Politics, edited by Gordon Smith, William E. 
Paterson and Stephen Padgett. Although the latest edition is already dated (Paterson 
and Padgett, 1996), it still provides important basic information about the political 
system of the united Germany, including its domestic and foreign policies. It includes 
an analysis of the changes in Germany's European policy after reunification by Emil 
Kirchner. He indicates that both Germany's partners, as well as the majority of 
German elites, had expected the unification of Europe to be concluded before the 
unification of the two German states would take place. Kirchner detects a culture of 
'good Europeanism' among the German society. but also a greater reluctance to agree 
to further integrative steps on the European level without criticism. Like most other 
analysts. he stresses that Germany has shown a greater emphasis on financial matters, 
mainly because of the financial burden of reunification. Kirchner advises German 
leaders to stop promoting a federal structure for Europe and to instead push towards 
further democratisation of the EU. 
In general. however. he sees no danger of a new German hegemony, as German 
leaders would realise that their country benefits from permanent integration into the 
multilateral framework of the EU. 
George (1996) has included an analysis of the three largest member states. Germany, 
France and Britain in his standard reference book on EU politics and policy. In the 
section about Germany, he explains the political and economic structure of the 
country and assesses German European policy since 1945. George sees a stable 
development of Germany's role in Europe since the end of WW2, but the institutional 
pluralism of the German domestic political system often makes it for German 
governments to pursue a stable line in Europe. 
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A very interesting discussion of the German role in Europe is offered in the 
publication edited by Peter Katzenstein (1997). In the introductory chapter of the 
book, Katzenstein examines how reunification has altered Germany's standing in 
Europe. He argues that even before unification, the European policy of the Bonn 
republic was not simply based on idealistic motives. Instead, West German leaders 
were able to use their country's engagement in the multilateral framework of the 
Community in order to pursue their own national interests. He argues that the 
similarity between the German domestic political system and that of the European 
Union made it easier for the country to integrate, and as a result, exercise a greater 
influence than any other member state. In spite of this, he detects a stronger emphasis 
on 'hard' financial issues in Germany's European policy after reunification, which 
would not substantially weakened Germany's commitment to European integration. 
In the same book, Simon Bulmer provides a remarkable analysis of German power in 
Europe. He bring to attention that, in contrast to other member states, such as France 
and Britain, Germany would avoid exercising unilateral power politics, which aim at 
the promotion of self-interests and instead chose to exercise multilateral, consensus-
orientated 'soft' power. Bulmer sees this 'soft' multilateral preference deeply 
embedded in the foreign policy approach of the majority of German political elites. 
He divides the 'soft' power influence Germany exercises in the EU into two 
categories: First, 'indirect institutional power', where Germany influences changes in 
the EU's institutional setting along the lines of the domestic German political 
structures, and consequently makes it easier for German elites to influence EU 
decisions and policies on a permanent basis. Bulmer gives the negotiations on 
Economic and Monetary Union as an example where Germany was able to push 
through a European Central Bank model based on the setting of the German 
Bundesbank. Secondly, 'unintentional power', which emerges from Germany's 
political and economic weight in Europe and leads to consequences for Germany's 
European partners, which are not actively pursued by German elites. Here, Bulmer 
presents the high interest rate policy of the German Bundesbank in the aftermath of 
reunification as the most striking example. 
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In general, due to the similarities between the EU framework and the domestic 
German political system, through which German elites have gained experience with 
multilateral co-operation, Bulmer considers it much easier for Germany than for any 
other member states to exercise influence within the EU. Thus he sums up Germany's 
role in Europe as that of a 'gentle giant', i.e. a country which has strong influence but 
avoids to use it in an unscrupulous way, and instead prefers to seek multilateral co-
operation with its partners. 
In the third chapter of the book, Jeffrey J. Anderson analyses Germany's changing 
role in Europe. He believes that the main change in Germany's European policy after 
reunification is a greater emphasis on financial issues and a cost-benefit analysis of 
the integration process. Anderson stresses that before 1989, West Germany was ready 
to accept the role of the paymaster in Europe. This became the case because Gennan 
leaders were mainly interested in deepening the multilateral framework of the 
European Community, in order to help Germany regain a democratic reputation in 
Europe and elsewhere. Moreover, German leaders perceived it as the only way to 
gradually regain the sovereignty over their country's internal and external affairs. 
Anderson does not see a fundamental change in Germany's European approach 
towards Europe since 1990, but still emphasises that the difficult financial and 
economic situation of the unified Germany forced German leaders to adopt a more 
realistic and pragmatic approach towards further integration. 
Anderson has expanded his analysis of the impact of German reunification on the 
country's European policy in a book about unification (Anderson, 1999). He studies 
the changes in the wake of unification in a number of policy areas, including, trade, 
energy and environment, competition policy, structural funds and CAP. Furthermore, 
he returns to look at the role of the united Gennany in Europe and detects a European 
policy, which is not only characterised by continuity, but also by a much greater focus 
on distributive issues. In general, Anderson sees a greater variety of domestic interests 
in the larger Germany, which would force German leaders to take them further into 
account than before 1990. 
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A constant examination of developments in German domestic and foreign policies is 
undertaken by the Institute for German Studies at the University of Birmingham. 
Members of the institute have published a number of very useful studies of German 
European policy. Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson have written an article for 
International Affairs (72/1996), in which they examine Germany's post-1990 role in 
Europe. They underline that through reunification Germany has shed its foreign 
policy constraints, which made its foreign policy initiatives strongly dependent on the 
consent of the Allied Powers. Bulmer and Paterson observe a continuation of the pre-
1989 denial of national interests in the early years following reunification, but 
indicate that in addition, the German public has become more sceptical towards the 
deepening of integration, especially since Maastricht. 
The authors also focus on the increased influence of the Lander in the post-Maastricht 
period, especially through the changes of German law under article 23 of the German 
Grundgesetz. Bulmer and Paterson see a liberating effect on German European policy 
as a result of unification, which will allow the larger Germany, currently at the heart 
of an enlarging EU, a greater role in the future developments ofthe Union. 
The Birmingham institute regularly publish discussion papers on German affairs, 
including new developments in Germany's foreign policy. Two of these papers are of 
particular interest for research on the changes in German European policy since 1990. 
Charlie Jeffery and Vladimir Handl (1999) examine the changes in Germany's 
European policy after the end of the Kohl era. They see the 1998 general election not 
only as the end of the 18 years of continuous rule by Helmut Kohl, but also detect a 
major generational change. Germany would therefore now be governed by a new 
post-war generation of leaders, who were politically socialised in the left-wing 
political environment of the 1960s. In spite of this Jeffery and Handl emphasise that 
the red-green coalition had continued the traditional post-war European policy 
approach, albeit based on a more self-confident attitude. This greater pragmatism 
could be seen in calls for an end to Germany's role as the biggest net contributor 
within the EU in the run-up to enlargement, and in demands for the reform of costly 
policies and practices, such as the Common Agricultural Policy. They also detect 
changes in the partnership with France, whose importance had diminished for the 
Schroder administration than it had been for its predecessors. 
30 
With regard to the greater willingness to accept military burden sharing, Jeffery and 
Handl argue that this would be a process of gradual 'normalisation', through which 
the last remains of Germany's pre-1989 foreign policy constraints would be removed. 
In another Birmingham paper, Jeffery and Paterson (2000) point out that Germany's 
post-war role as the leading promoter of multilateral integration had allowed it to 
influence the nature of the EU profoundly, without substantially worrying its partners 
in Europe. They see the 'normalisation' process of German foreign policy, which had 
finally been put into concrete form under the leadership of the red-green coalition to 
be deeply embedded in traditional German post-war multilateralism. Although this 
process has made Germany more 'self-regarding', the authors still do not see a 
substantial 'deliberate' increase in German power, and stress that German leaders 
prefer to continue to seek multilateral solutions and compromises. 
Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson have combined their research in an important 
publication on Germany's post-1990 European diplomacy (Bulmer, Jeffery and 
Paterson, 2000). Their study includes an assessment of Germany's domestic 
institutional framework, bilateral relations with other EU member states and German 
interests with regard to EMU and eastward enlargement. They see the development of 
European policy priorities as 'a process of managing institutional pluralism', relating 
mainly to the multiplicity of actors who influence foreign policy decision in Germany 
(including the Bundestag and the Lander). The federal government would 
consequently have been weakened in terms of its independent decision-making 
powers on foreign policy matters. The authors underline that the German commitment 
to multilateral ism had survived the changes of unification, which results in a general 
support for further integration among German elites. Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson 
also see a greater openness on the German part towards new potential partnerships in 
the EU. The Franco-German alliance remains important, but would no longer be the 
only option for the larger Germany in the run-up to enlargement. The authors 
therefore think that the British-German relations will significantly increase in 
importance in a larger EU. They conclude that German power is deeply linked to 
further European integration, which would mean that although the German weight had 
increased through unification, it is likely to increase further after enlargement, a 
process which is hence strongly supported by Germany. 
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Hyde-Price, also from Birmingham University, has published a book on Germany's 
role on the restructuring of the post-Cold War security framework in Europe. Hyde-
Price (2000) focuses especially on the enlargement of NATO and the European 
Union, and considers Germany to be in a classic 'central position' dilemma, being 
situated between the existing Western European framework and the aspiring member 
states in Central and Eastern Europe. He perceives Germany's priorities in the 
successful enlargement of NATO and the EU to Central and Eastern Europe to 
establish an area of security and democracy, which would need to be supported by a 
strong partnership with Russia. From Hyde-Price's point of view, the major problems 
for German leaders with regard to this process are the differences in speed between 
NATO and EU enlargement, and the growing perception of enlargement as an 'elitist' 
project among the German electorate. Hyde-Price stresses that any German 
dominance in Central and Eastern Europe is likely to occur as part of the multilateral 
frameworks of NATO and EU only based on a policy of mutual trust rather than of 
power politics. For him, the new German self-confidence, which has replaced the 
former policy of modesty, is therefore not aimed at unilateral ambitions but on a 
policy of multilateral promotion of civilian morals. The united Germany would 
consequently have turned into a 'normal' civilian power which would be mature 
enough to promote its interests and values. 
The Institute for German Studies has also supported Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl 
Kaiser to combine the findings of the research published in their four German 
volumes on Germany's new foreign policy in a single English publication. The book 
(Eberwein and Kaiser, 2001) is essential for students of German foreign policy as it 
provides the most detailed account to date of the domestic institutions and actors that 
shape German foreign policy. The study includes an analysis of the impact of federal 
government institutions, societal actors and the media, as well as the German secret 
service. It therefore discusses in detail the impact of Germany's institutional pluralism 
with regard to its foreign policy-making, which is only touched on by other people's 
accounts. Especially interesting are the contributions by former Foreign Office 
minister Werner Hoyer on the domestic decision-making structures regarding 
European policy issues, the analysis of the role of the Liinder by Michele Knodt, and 
the Bundestag by Joachim Krause. 
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Hoyer stresses the complexity of the German foreign policy-making framework, 
based on fixed constitutional regulations and laws, and the need for compromise 
between the involved federal institutions, including the Bundesrat, where the interests 
of the regional units, the Lander, are represented. Hoyer sees the Chancellory and the 
Foreign Office as the principal actors in the shaping of foreign policy, but also shows 
out that both the Lander and the Bundestag influence has increased significantly in 
recent years. As Hoyer emphasises, both have gained influence especially through the 
inclusion of the new article 23 into the German basic law, which guarantees a right of 
participation on essential foreign policy matters for the Bundestag and Bundesrat. 
Knodt and Krause support his analysis. Knodt argues that the Ltinder have gained the 
capabilities to exercise a 'parallel foreign policy', which is no longer dependent on 
agreement with the federal government. The Ltinder would hence be able to use their 
guaranteed influence through the Bundesrat, as well as their representation in the EU 
Committee of the Regions in order to promote their own interests. Krause explains 
that the Bundestag had substantially influenced German foreign policy in recent years 
and he provides the examples of the deployment of military forces and the shaping of 
European Monetary Union based on the Stability Pact. He argues that the Bundestag's 
committee on EU affairs enjoys far-reaching powers, including the right to question 
ministers and Foreign Office officials, which has turned the German parliament into a 
senior actor in the process of foreign policy-making. 
Webber (2001) edited the most up-to-date and probably the most informative 
compilation of discussions on Germany's foreign policy since reunification. 
His book deals with the various aspects of change in German foreign policy in the 
1990s. In the introductory chapter, Webber analyses the changes in Germany's post-
1990 European policy in comparison with those of the semi-sovereign West German 
republic. Webber thinks that the Bonn republic was characterised by the irreversible 
integration into the West, a strong focus on Europe, a preference for multilateralism, 
and a civilian approach to the resolution of conflicts. With regard to the changes since 
1990, Webber argues that all these foundations of German foreign policy principally 
remain, apart from the civilian approach, which had been replaced by a greater 
readiness to accept the need for military conflict resolution. 
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In the second chapter of the book, Hyde-Price asks if Germany remains a 'civilian 
power' after the events of Kosovo. He describes the developments that led to the 
German involvement in the military campaign in Kosovo, which had its origins in the 
1994 sanctioning of German military engagement through the German Constitutional 
Court. Hyde-Price concludes by restating the claim already made earlier, that 
Germany would remain a 'civilian power', but one which had become more 'normal' 
in that it accepted that the use of military force might be necessary in some cases. 
He bases his claim on the view that a 'civilian power' would not necessarily have to 
renounce the use of force in principle, but would have to generally aim at the 
protection of human rights and values. 
Harnisch shares Hyde-Price's view when he emphasises that a 'civilian power' would 
in principle have to support a civilised global framework, based on preventive 
peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms, the rule of law, interdependence and social 
justice. Harnisch suggests that the continuing German support for conflict resolution 
within multilateral frameworks like the United Nations and the OSCE based on the 
securing of human rights, shows that it had largely continued to adhere to its pre-1989 
'civilian' principles. He concludes that the changes regarding German military 
engagement in the 1990s would only amount to a modification of the traditional 
'civilian power' approach. This would be clearly shown by the way it contrasts with 
other countries that Germany still preferred to base any military engagement on a 
clear U.N. mandate. 
Baumann and Hellmann examine Germany's attitude towards the use of military force 
and observe that the West German Federal Republic was characterised by a culture of 
anti-militarism, multilateralism and a strong desire to promote European integration. 
The authors emphasise that the Kohl administration would have already made 
cautious attempts towards greater German military engagement in the early 1990s, but 
were held back by a persistently sceptical German public. The full military 
engagement in the bombing raids on Serbia during the Kosovo crisis is seen as a 
logical result of a gradual process of 'normalisation' by Baumann and Hellmann, 
which had started with the German AWACs surveillance flights over Bosnia-
Hercegovina in 1993 and continued with the participation in IFOR and SFOR 
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missions. Hence they conclude that Kosovo was a turning point in Germany's post-
unification foreign policy, as the military engagement had been decided by the 
essentially pacifist red-green coalition and had also for the first time been accepted by 
the majority of the German public. 
Wessels focuses on the fears of Germany's European neighbours about the extent of 
German power in Europe. He points out that the Bonn republic had managed to 
convince its European partners through the deep integration into the framework of the 
European Community, that German power would never again become a threat for the 
European continent. However, after the end of the Cold War, the old fears of renewed 
German hegemonial ambitions had again re-emerged among many European 
countries. Wessels stresses that such fears were completely unfounded, as Germans 
had become far too occupied with their post-unification domestic problems to be able 
to seek a dominant position in Europe. 
German leaders would therefore avoid any unilateral approach and instead support the 
expansion of the multilateral frameworks of NATO and the EU, in order to avoid a 
situation where Germany would be stuck in a permanent 'frontline status' between 
East and West in Europe. The greater willingness to take on military risks is assessed 
by Wessels as an attempt by Germany to become a 'normal state' in Europe. 
This essentially multilateral orientation would nevertheless remain. 
Le Gloannec offers a French perspective on the power of the larger Germany in 
Europe. She argues that Germany would remain fundamentally orientated towards 
multilateralism but had managed to liberate itself from the pre-1990 political 
constraints and had consequently become more like any other EU member state. 
Le Gloannec emphasises that fears of a new German unilateralism were unrealistic, as 
it would deprive the country of the influence it has within multilateral frameworks 
like NATO and the EU. She also indicates that Germany has already lost the its 
strongest former power asset, the Deutsche Mark, due to the European Economic and 
Monetary Union. Before the Maastricht Treaty and EMU, Germany (especially 
through the Bundesbank) would have been able to dominate the economic agenda 
within the European Community, which amounted to a kind of 'semi-hegemony', 
especially in the monetary area. 
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Le Gloannec detects a more short-term approach towards European issues under the 
red-green coalition, which would also affect the Franco-German partnership. She 
stresses that in a larger Europe, where multiple alliances will become more important, 
Germany would focus less on the single bilateral partnership with France than it did 
before. 
In the final chapter of Webber's compilation, Bulmer, Maurer and Paterson attempt to 
assess the effectiveness of Germany's European policy-making framework. 
They believe that the post-war West German European policy had been dominated by 
a deliberate neglect of national interests in favour of supranational integration. 
The authors stress that in institutional terms, the Ministry of Economics was the 
dominant actor in German foreign policy-making up to 1989, which was neither 
fundamentally challenged by a relatively weak Foreign Office, nor by a non-existing 
independent European Ministry. 
However, after the election victory of the SPD and the Green Party in 1998 the then 
finance minister Lafontaine managed to gain significant European policy 
competences from the Ministry of Economics, which has turned the Ministry of 
Finance into the crucial actor with regard to European affairs. Moreover, co-
ordination between the different ministries in Germany would be traditionally weak 
and complicated further by a relatively strong position of the Chancellor on European 
policy matters. The necessity to form coalition governments and the growing 
influence of the Lander would also contribute to the diffusion of German European 
policy. Nevertheless Bulmer, Maurer and Paterson suggest that the foreign ministry 
had improved its standing under the leadership of Joschka Fischer. Overall, the 
authors see a rather difficult and slow process of foreign policy-making within an 
institutional framework, in which power is diffused between many different actors. 
They stress that the German European policy in the 1990s was based on continuity, 
albeit with a greater focus on domestic interests. 
The question whether Germany continues to remain a 'civilian power' after the 
'normalisation' of its active military engagement under the red-green coalition 
continues to dominate the current discussion about German foreign and European 
policy. 
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Hamisch and Maull (2001) have published a whole book on the question, in which 
they argue that in spite of the changes that had been necessary to fulfil the larger 
Germany's obligations towards its allies, Germany still essentially remains a 'civilian 
power'. They believe that the German domestic system which promotes the need to 
find broad consensus on foreign policy issues and the continuing orientation of 
German foreign policy towards peaceful and multilateral conflict resolution has not 
moved away from the 'civilian power' ideal type. They hence conclude that Germany 
had turned into a 'modified civilian power' instead of a classic realist state. The book 
also contains an interesting documentation of the post-1990 path towards greater 
military engagement by Maull, where he explains the changes the individual parties, 
especially the SPD and the Green Party, have undergone regarding their opposition 
towards any active military Bundeswehr involvement after unification. 
In another chapter, Frenkler looks at German European diplomacy at Maastricht and 
asks if the German approach was indeed 'civilian'. He concludes that despite the 
uncompromising German position on the EMU stability pact, which many saw as a 
sign of a new power politics approach, Germany remains mainly 'civilian' in its 
attitude, as it fails to pursue a clear course of national interest. 
Gunter Hellmann, who contributed to Webber's book, has also looked at this issue in 
a more comprehensive paper published as part of the discussion papers of the Institute 
for German Studies in Birmingham. He supports the argument of Harnisch and Maull 
that the willingness to take on greater military responsibilities was almost a necessity 
for the larger Germany to meet the growing expectations among its partners that a 
larger Germany would play a more important role in Europe. For Hellmann, this 
'normalisation' of the German role in Europe consequently amounts to a more self-
confident attitude, which will not always be to the liking of Germany's partners, but 
had not changed Germany's general 'civilian' orientation. 
Lees (2000) has written a general analysis of the red-green coalition and its leading 
personalities, which offers an assessment on the first two years of the SPD and the 
Green Party whilst in power. His account is already quite dated, but is still useful with 
regard to understanding the government's initial difficulties in coming to a clear 
course on domestic and foreign policy issues. 
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Due to the permanent rivalry between Chancellor Schroder and Finance Minister 
Oskar Lafontaine. Lees also shows how the Schroder administration was almost 
forced to accept the results of Germany's greater political weight by the Kosovo 
crisis, which made a German military commitment indispensable for the country not 
to snub its allies. 
David Marsh (2002) has written an interesting review of the impact of Germany's 
increasing economic troubles on its position in the EU. In his article contributed to the 
German-British forum, he warns that the German economic weakness might not only 
endanger German influence within the EU, but also undermine the eurozone as a 
whole. For this reason Marsh advises German leaders that they are in danger of losing 
Germany's traditional post-war status as an economic role model in Europe to other 
EU member states. 
The most recent publication on German European policy studies how it is perceived 
in other European countries, including those of Central and Eastern Europe (Jopp, 
Schneider and Schmalz, 2002). Therefore it offers a different perspective on 
Germany's post-1990 European policy. Key importance in this respect is the point of 
view of Germany's two largest EU neighbours, France and the United Kingdom. 
Guerin-Sendelbach and Schild assess the German role in Europe from the French 
perspective, and emphasise that the partnership between France and Germany has 
never the same after 1990. They confirm that the French saw the Maastricht Treaty 
mainly as a means to contain the political and economic power of the larger Germany. 
Interestingly, Guerin-Sendelbach and Schild show that the French perception of the 
German negotiation style at Maastricht and afterwards had been conceived as an 
indication of a new German 'triumphalism'. French leaders would for this reason 
clearly noticed the greater German emphasis on domestic interests which reached its 
peak at Nice, where they met German opposition against their own reform proposals. 
Guerin-Sendelbach and Schild explain that Nice had been the turning point for French 
leaders, where they had to realise that Germany had become politically equal. With 
regard to the future of the EO, both authors emphasise that France continues to be 
driven by fears that Germany might exploit its increased influence in an enlarged EU. 
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In a later chapter, Paterson offers the British perspective of the changes in German 
European policy since 1990. He stresses that before German reunification, the British 
perceived Germany as the junior partner in the Franco-German leadership tandem. As 
a result, they had little fear of renewed German domination in Europe. However, this 
situation changed, as the prospect of unification became more realistic in 1989, and a 
larger Germany was suddenly perceived as a 'potential hegemon' again. 
Paterson points out that this view changed completely when the essentially pro-
European Blair administration ended the 18 years of Eurosceptic Conservative reign 
in 1997. In contrast to the Conservatives, the new British government would welcome 
a more self-confident German approach in Europe, as part of a process of 
'normalisation'. Therefore Paterson believes there to be a generally positive 
perception of German power in Europe predominating in Britain under New Labour, 
which sees Germany's deep integration into the multilateral framework of the EU as 
an irreversible fact. He argues, in contrast to other European countries, Britain would 
consequently welcome the end of Germany's formerly limited political role in Europe 
as a possible prerequisite for greater British-German co-operation on issues of 
common interest. 
The book also contains views from the three leading Central and Eastern European 
countries, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, who will join the EU in 2004. 
Buras and Cickocki (Poland), Handl (Czech Republic) and Kiss (Hungary) all 
emphasise that initial fears within their countries about the influence of the larger 
Germany in Europe have been replaced to a more positive assessment of the German 
role as a promoter of the enlargement process, and an advocate of the interests of the 
CEE countries within the EU. 
3. Britain 
For the essential orientation on the nature of British foreign policy after the Second 
World War, Sanders (1990) offers a valuable account of post-war British interests and 
strategies in each of the three concentric circles of foreign policy interest set out by 
Churchill. He explains that for British leaders, the European circle was perceived as 
having less importance than the safeguarding of the economically important relations 
within the British Commonwealth and the 'special relationship' with the United 
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States, which, at least from the British perspective, would continue to maintain 
Britain's role as a great power. The chapter on Britain's gradual movement towards 
Europe in the late 1950s, in which George explains this development mainly on the 
basis of Britain's increasing economic troubles and the weakening of its former 
Empire, is crucial for the understanding of Britain's post-war relations with the 
European continent. Sanders criticises the post-war tendency by successive British 
governments to hold on to the belief that their country is still a Great Power, which 
had led to a foreign policy of 'imperial overstretch' and a chronic neglect of Britain's 
relations with Europe. This in turn had seriously undermined British influence in the 
shaping of the European framework. 
Britain's frequent difficult relations with continental Europe have been widely 
discussed among British historians and political scientists, as they continue to pose an 
unsolved challenge for the country's foreign policy. The most influental account of 
British post-war relations is certainly by George, now available in the third edition 
(George, 1998). George's 'awkward partner' thesis tends to present Britain as a 
special case in Europe which found itself in a different position than most of the 
continental European countries after the end of WW2. He argues that British leaders 
had found it hard to limit their traditionally global foreign policy perspective to the 
regional entity of Europe, and would have preferred to leave the post-war supervision 
of Europe to the United States, rather than to the Europeans themselves. George 
indicates that Britain was moving its focus towards Europe in the late 1950s mainly 
for economic reason, but that the British did never really give up their reservations 
towards the integration project. 
George has also edited a volume on British European policy (George, 1992), in which 
Bulmer characterizes the British attitude towards European integration as a rather 
confused mixture of partial engagement and a general unwillingness to accept the 
reality of change. 
In addition, George has contributed to another very important compilation of 
assessments of Britain's relations with Europe after 1945 by Brivati and Jones (1993), 
where he summarizes his 'awkward partner' considerations. 
40 
The book includes an assessment of the importance of the British Commonwealth by 
Butler, who points out that the decline of economic importance of the Commonwealth 
in the late 1950s/early 1960s led to a redefinition of British foreign policy priorities. 
Hibbert, who had been involved in the British application negotiations between 1961 
and 1973, provides a witness account. 
He stresses that, in the aftermath of WW2, British leaders had failed to realise that 
Britain's global role was starting to change. As Hibbert argues, they therefore failed 
to take part in the initial stages of the European integration process, and followed the 
illusion that they could maintain an Empire 'on which the sun never sets'. In another 
chapter, Donoughue studies how, the Wilson government was forced to push towards 
the renegotiation of the British membership terms, after the third and finally 
successful British accession bid in 1973. Donoughue outlines the pressures the Wilson 
government was under from within the left wing of his own party, which still 
perceived the EEC as a 'capitalist club' and advocated withdrawal. 
This is also stressed by Kavanagh (1996), who believes that the main reason for the 
failure of the UK to make positive use of its EC membership after 1973 was the 
continuing hostility on the part of the left-wing of the Labour party, and the trade 
unions throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. 
The succeeding public referendum on Britain's EC membership in 1975, only two 
years after Britain's accession, is covered by Worcester (2000). He analyses how the 
Wilson government managed to convince a majority of the rather sceptical British 
public to vote for staying inside the Community. Worcester argues that the campaign 
had largely been won because the government, especially the Prime Minister, 
provided strong leadership throughout the campaign. He also emphasises that the 
1975 referendum was comparatively easy to win, as voters had to decide on whether 
to reverse a decision already made. From Worcester's point of view, this made it 
fundamentally different from a possible referendum on the euro, in which the British 
public will be asked to agree to abandon their currency and to join a monetary union 
of which they have little experience. 
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A rather dated evaluation of British EC membership can be found in Bulmer, George 
and Scott (1992), where Nicholls has written a summary of the historical background 
of British membership of the European Community. He explains that both main 
British parties, Labour and the Conservatives had been sceptical towards British 
involvement in the process of European integration after WW2. 
He argues that even after Britain had become a member in 1973, British leaders had 
largely perceived their country's membership as a means to establish a leading 
position in Europe rather than to genuinely engage in the Community framework. 
As Nicholls underlines, an 'us and them' culture would consequently persist m 
Britain's relations with the rest of Europe. 
Greenwood (1992) offers a comprehensive introduction to Britain's post-war attitude 
towards European integration after 1945. In his introduction he emphasises the 
difficulties Britain's late entry brought for British engagement after 1973. In this 
respect, especially Greenwood's description of Margaret Thatcher's hardline 
bargaining stance on the Community level is interesting. He shows how Thatcher 
perceived the conditions of British membership as unjust and consequently demanded 
a rebate, and how she was generally sceptical towards the further deepening of 
European integration. 
The same is true for the account on Britain and Europe by May (1999), who places 
emphasis on how British leaders failed to lead in Europe and were unable to prevent 
their country from having to follow many unwanted developments. 
Ludlow (1997) focuses especially on the first British attempt to join the EEC in 1961 
and describes in detail the reasons behind the failure of the first application attempt. 
He believes the main reasons for the rejection of the first British application to be 
obviously cautious attitude on both the part of the British negotiators and the five 
EEC member states, who were reluctant to challenge President de Gaulle's veto. 
The book is a crucial contribution for a better understanding of the British failure to 
join early, as it is based on various previously undisclosed sources. 
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Barzini (1983) provides a more cultural interpretation of the British difficulties with 
Europe. In his book about the cultural differences between the countries of Europe, 
Barzini describes the British as 'imperturbable' in their conviction that they could 
deal with their own problems independently from mainland Europe, which they had 
traditionally perceived as dominated by sinister influences. He therefore perceives 
Britain's attitude towards Europe to be characterised by a feeling of 'superiority', and 
a desire to limit their engagement on the continent enough to make sure that a 
'balance of power' would be maintained. Barzini reckons that this 'superior' attitude 
would gradually vanish in contemporary Britain. He concludes that the problems 
mainly stem from the fact that the British shows a general reluctance to become 
engaged in 'vast political designs', and would usually only join them when it becomes 
inevitable. 
This view is also supported by Varsori (1995), who underlines that Britain's post-war 
relations with the rest of Europe were dominated by a British self-perception of being 
'diverse' in comparison to the defeated countries on the European continent. As 
Varsori argues, Britain still had its Empire and the supposedly 'special relationship' 
with the United States, which it saw as the foundation for the preservation of a global 
role. However, he also makes an important observation when he hints at the British 
disappointment with regard to the loss of influence in Washington after it had become 
clear that Britain would leave the leadership in Europe to France and Germany. 
Varsori critically remarks that even in the 1980s and early 1990s, British leaders 
failed to abandon the myth of Britain's 'diversity', which resulted in seriously 
hampering their standing in the European Community. 
Denman (1997), a former British diplomat, sums up Britain's approach towards 
Europe after 1945 as a history of 'missed chances' in establishing a leading position 
for itself within the European Community. He argues that Britain had failed to break 
with its imperial past and continued to follow an unrealistic self-perception. 
For Denman, this is mainly due to the fact that, in contrast to the continental 
experience, no fundamental break in British history had occurred. An 'old-fashioned 
society' would therefore resist any fundamental changes in British foreign policy, 
supported by a British political class, who perceive the Community to be a threat to 
their own domestic position. 
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Peterson (1995) has contributed a chapter on Britain and Europe to the regularly 
updated series Development in British Politics, which analyses changes in British 
domestic and foreign policies, including the British state structure. He supports many 
analysts in the view that the British position in Europe suffers from a lack of domestic 
political leadership, which leaves the debate about Europe predominantly to the 
tabloids. For Peterson, the decline in Britain's importance on the global level could 
only be reversed if Britain became actively engaged in the EU, a regional entity which 
is becoming an ever more important actor in world politics. 
Smith (1996) identifies the main reason for Britain's difficulties with European 
integration to be the British pragmatism, which would be different from the visionary 
approach of continental Europeans. He argues that the British tend to take things as 
they come and are sceptical towards long-term visions for the future. In contrast, on 
the continent a tendency to produce detailed plans for any future eventualities would 
be predominant. Hence Britain would find it harder than any other member state to 
accept the set rules and procedures of the European Union. 
The Commission on Britain and Europe of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
published its final report in 1997, which analyses Britain's future role in Europe. 
The report calls for a more active British role in Europe and expresses hope that such 
a stance will prevail under the newly elected Labour government. It examines the 
contributions Britain could make in areas such as institutional and economic reform, 
defence, enlargement and justice and home affairs. The report is an interesting piece 
of evidence about the redefinition of British European policy which was attempted by 
New Labour after the 18 years of Conservative scepticism towards engagement in 
Europe. 
The most detailed account of British-European relations to date has been published by 
Hugo Young (1998). Young limits himself to the discussion of general developments 
in British European policy since 1945, but describes the individual policies of every 
single post-war British government in individual chapters. His work includes an in-
depth analysis of the successful final application negotiations under the Heath 
government, and an extensive chapter on the reasons behind Margaret Thatcher's 
Euroscepticism. 
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Young even included an early assessment of the changes under the Blair 
administration, which, in retrospect seems slightly too optimistic in its expectations. 
He claims that Britain had persistently seen integration into Europe as a 'defeat' and 
an end to its superior position with regard to its continental neighbours. 
A long-term observer of British relations with Europe and British foreign policy is 
John W. Young. Young did analyse the perspectives for British foreign policy in the 
21 th century (Young, 1997) and concludes that Britain made a fatal mistake in 
assuming that it could influence events in Europe, whilst at the same time maintaining 
its global role. He also published a very detailed account of Britain and European 
integration between 1945 and 1999 (Young, 2000), which included the first two years 
of the first term of the Blair administration. He criticizes Stephen George' s claim that 
the UK had pursued a 'special way' in its European policy. Instead he argues that 
British leaders did nothing else than follow their country's foreign policy tradition 
which has been more globally orientated and less focused on the need to pool 
sovereignty in comparison to those of the countries on the European continent. 
Nevertheless Young criticises British leaders for engaging in Europe too late, and for 
missing the chance to profoundly influence the shape of the European institutional 
framework. As Young points out, the result is a persistent uneasiness regarding the 
idea of Europe among British elites, the media and the public. 
Young's criticism of George's 'awkward partner' approach is shared by Kaiser 
(1999), who gives a foreign view of the British role in Europe. Kaiser argues that 
those who claim that Britain pursued a 'special way' in Europe tend to neglect the fact 
that Britain had no urgent need to engage in the process of European integration 
immediately after WW2. He hence judges the British reluctance to integrate into a 
supranational European framework as part of its traditional reluctance to join long-
term permanent alliances and to prefer to pursue a 'balance of power' approach in 
Europe. On the other hand, Kaiser makes it clear that British leaders did make a 
serious misjudgement when they assumed that once Britain was a member, they could 
shape the Community along the lines of their interests, even when it had already been 
in existence for more than twenty years. 
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Marr (1999) discusses the British view of Europe in his widely acclaimed book on the 
'death' of Britain. He emphasises that the British will continue to use the European 
Union as a scapegoat for many domestic problems. For Marr, the British cultural self-
perception is closer to the United States than to the European neighbours. 
He argues that due to the refusal by the majority of the British to believe the obvious 
benefits an increased engagement in Europe would bring, European integration is still 
mainly perceived as a threat to British independence and state sovereignty. 
Keens-Soper, who includes a chapter on British European policy in her book on the 
role of the EU in world politics (Keens-Soper, 2000), warns that a continuation of 
Britain's role as an 'exclusive Albion' would sooner or later not only undermine the 
British position in Europe, but more so threaten the country's influence on a global 
level. Keens-Soper predicts that Britain would only be able to maintain its influence 
in Washington and elsewhere if it became an actively engaged member of the EU, and 
would otherwise lose out to other large European countries, especially Germany. 
A very useful compilation of original source documents on Britain's relations with 
Europe between 1945 and 1998 was published by Gowland and Turner (2000). The 
book provides short summaries of the major periodical developments at the beginning 
of each section, followed by important speeches, treaties and other source material. 
As it is relatively up to date, it represents an essential reference for any research on 
post-WW2 British European policy. 
Ash has written an interesting article on the debate about Britain's cultural affiliation 
in International Affairs (77/2001). He asks if Britain is European or American, and he 
finds it difficult to come a clear conclusion. Ash stresses that Britain had traditionally 
been closer to American culture than any other country in Europe, but also argues that 
the whole of Europe has become increasingly more Americanised after WW2. 
Regarding the changes in position of the British political party attitudes towards 
Europe, it is interesting to consider Clark's history of the Conservative Party (Clark, 
1998), where he shows how they changed their attitude towards European integration 
over the decades. 
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Especially striking is Clarke's description of the changes between the pro-European 
Heath administration and the Eurosceptic Thatcher and Major administrations, which 
in the end collapsed under the pressure of their divisions on Europe. 
In the case of the Labour Party, George and Rosamond have contributed an analysis 
to the 1992 volume on the development of the party in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
edited by Spear (George and Rosamond, 1992). Both authors describe how Margaret 
Thatcher's opposition to the socialist proposals of the Delors Commission 
increasingly caused the Labour Party to perceive the European Community as an ally 
in its opposition against Thatcherism. 
Brivati and Heffeman have edited a comprehensive history of the Labour Party on the 
occasion of its 100th birthday. It includes a number of informative contributions on 
Labour's European policy since 1945. Heffeman explains the change in Labour's 
stance on European integration over the decades. He argues that Labour's post-war 
policy priorities could not be brought in line with a pro-European attitude, as 
European integration was supposed to hamper the development of domestic socialist 
economic policies. Heffeman shows that the Wilson government only gradually 
became interested in European integration when Britain's economic decline became 
more and more obvious. He also indicates that the Labour party as a whole remained 
deeply sceptical towards Britain's Community membership throughout the whole of 
the 1970s and early 1980s, culminating in demands for withdrawal in the 1983 
general election manifesto. Heffeman then describes the gradual change under the 
leadership of Neil Kinnock, during which the Labour Party was still rather reluctant 
towards European integration, but increasingly believed Brussels to be an ally against 
Thatcherism at home. For Heffeman, the real change towards genuine pro-
Europeanism only came under Tony Blair's leadership, although New Labour was 
rather cautious in its European policy and base its engagement in Europe on a strong 
awareness of British national interests. 
Lord Owen, who left the Labour Party and became a co-founder of the SDP in the 
early 1980s, gives his personal reasons for his defection from Labour in the book. 
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He stresses that one of the major reasons for the defection of many Labour members 
to the more mainstream SDP had been Labour's extreme anti-European stance in the 
early 1980s. Owen's account is therefore a testimony of the split on Europe within the 
Labour Party in the 1980s. 
As in the German case, it is also interesting to consider the personal accounts of 
leading politicians in addition to the academic research that is available on British 
foreign policy. 
For an understanding of the Eurosceptic right-wing attitude of the Conservative party, 
which is shared by a large part of the British tabloid press, the memoirs of former 
Conservative Prime Minister Maragaret Thatcher are essential. The personal account 
of her years in Downing Street (Thatcher,1993) show how she became increasingly 
frustrated with her European partners, who did not share her desire to develop Europe 
into a free trade area with minimal political implications as possible. She never 
managed to come to an understanding of the continental desire to unify Europe in a 
political institutional framework, and perceived Brussels mainly as a threat to British 
independence and a continental socialist plot to counter the Thatcherite reforms at 
home. Her memoirs also show her lack of personal relations with other European 
leaders, especially with Germany's Chancellor Kohl, with whom she had a dispute 
over his desire to push towards reunification. Also with French President Mitterrand, 
when she became deeply disappointed after he had failed to back her resistance 
towards German unification. Thatcher's latest book (2002) is an even clearer 
testimony of the former Prime Minister's increasingly anti-European views. She now 
argues that the European Union could not be reformed and consequently advocates 
that Britain should leave the EU as soon as possible. She also strongly rejects the 
notion that Britain should ever join the eurozone, a stance which has also been 
adopted by the current leadership of the Conservative Party. 
Another leading Conservative Eurosceptic is John Redwood. He has published a 
number of books on Britain and Europe, in which he warns that Britain would be in 
danger of losing the substance of its state sovereignty if British leaders continue to 
agree with the deepening of political and economic integration (Redwood, 1999). 
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Redwood has also repeatedly made aware that Britain should not join the Economic 
and Monetary Union, which he considers to be a Franco-German plot to subsume the 
sovereignty of the nation states in Europe under a European Union government in 
Brussels (Redwood, 1997 and 2001). Although Redwood never became leader of the 
Conservative Party, his views are shared by many within his own party and among the 
British tabloid press. Therefore it is important to take his views into consideration in 
order to understand the reasons behind the widespread scepticism towards the 
European Union in Britain. 
Prime Minister Tony Blair published his vision of Britain on the occasion of the 1997 
general election, which brought Labour to power (Blair, 1996). The books consists of 
a collection of speeches and articles written by Blair, and clearly shows the contrast of 
Blair's European policy approach in comparison with the one pursued under the 
Conservatives. The most important aspect of Blair's expositions is that he no longer 
follows the traditional British self-perception as a global power beyond Europe, but 
underlines his belief that Britain will only maintain influence on a global scale as part 
of Europe. The basically positive stance towards the European Community 
accordingly became part of his new approach towards European issues in government, 
which has been more constructive than under any previous British Prime Minister. 
Various contributions on the debate about Britain's policy can be found in the 
compilation edited by Rosenbaum (2001). The book combines contributions by 
leading British political elites, including the main party leaders on the major policy 
issues, such as EMU, defence and security, institutional reform and relations with the 
u.s. Thus it provides an essential reference on the British debate about Europe on the 
brink of the 21 5t century. 
For an understanding of Britain's relations with Europe, it is also certainly important 
to look at Britain's domestic state framework, which is part of the reason why the 
British are more reluctant than other nations to join supranational designs. 
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Norton (1998) provides a good survey of the constitutional arrangement of the British 
state in Politics UK, a regularly updated textbook on British politics. He identifies the 
key components of the British constitution, based on parliamentary sovereignty, the 
rule of law, a unitary state structure, parliamentary democracy and a monarch as head 
of state. Norton stresses that with regard to British EU membership, the main issue for 
domestic debate centres round the impact it has on the sovereignty of the Westminster 
parliament. 
An excellent analysis of the British political system and state tradition can also be 
found in a German publication, the regularly revised report on Britain published by 
the Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung in Berlin. The report combines 
contributions by the leading German experts on the United Kingdom, including 
prominent British political scientists. In the latest edition, Sturm (1998) looks at 
Britain's constitutional framework and political system, including the main 
institutions of the British state and the devolved constitutional arrangements in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. He stresses that the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty, which has become the basis of the British state, is increasingly 
challenged by the process of regional devolution and deepening European integration. 
Sturm concludes that the prospect of a reformed constitutional framework for Britain 
could be a realistic possibility in the future. 
Bogdanor (1999) has published a comprehensive analysis of the effect the process of 
devolution, which was initiated under the Blair administration, will have for the 
structure of the British state. Bogdanor rejects the notion that the devolution process 
would inevitably lead to the separation of the United Kingdom, which, as he thinks, is 
held together by a strong sense of unity among the British people. He nevertheless 
points out that the strengthened representation of regions on the European Union 
level, in the Committee of the Regions and the devolution process at home would give 
the devolved regions a stronger voice with regard to European issues. 
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4. Franco-German alliance 
The condition of the close post-WW2 partnership between France and Germany has 
been widely discussed in the academic debate about the development of European 
integration since 1945. The bilateral relationship, which has often been described as 
an 'alliance' or 'axis', became the backbone of the first forty years of the integration 
process. 
A crucial chronology of the development of the Franco-German partnership between 
1948 and 1999 was published by the German Europa Union Verlag (2000). 
In short summaries of the major events of each year since 1948, supported by 
excerpts from major speeches made by French and German elites, the book 
documents the importance of the partnership for the unification of Europe, in addition 
to bilateral treaties and agreements. It therefore provides the best basic point of 
reference on the Franco-German alliance yet published. As mentioned earlier, 
personal assessments of why the relationship was perceived to have such crucial 
importance for West Germany's foreign policy can also be found in the memoirs of 
leading West German politicians such as Brandt (1990), Genscher (1995), and 
Schmidt (1990, 1996). 
Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie (1998) offer a good analysis of France's role in 
Europe, dealing with French European policy since 1945 and the domestic state 
framework, including the role of the President, the Prime Minister, major political 
parties and public opinion. The book also includes separate chapters on French 
contributions to a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the CAP, economic and 
social policies and regional devolution in the EU. The authors argue that the French 
have tended to use European integration after WW2 in order to develop a framework 
to serve the double purpose of being independent from the United States and of 
containing German power. 
Overall, Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie draw awareness to the fact that France's 
European policy has been rather inconsistent over the decades and strongly depends 
on the leaders of the day, especially on who holds the office of President. 
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The most interesting aspect of the book is the authors' explanation of how the 
domestic 'state machinery' influences French European policy. Guyomarch, Machin 
and Ritchie perceive the President to be in an extraordinarily strong position with 
regard to European policy-making, because he has unlimited influence on foreign 
policy matters and is the main French foreign policy representative at EU summits. 
The authors emphasise, that the President's leading role on foreign policy issues can 
be seriously limited if he has to share power with a Prime Minister who is not from 
his own party. A self-confident Prime Minister like the former Socialist Lionel Jospin, 
who governed in cohabitation with Gaullist Jacques Chirac, would therefore be able 
to influence the President's decision-making on foreign policy significantly. 
Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie generally expect a decline in French influence in a 
larger EU, where a single national interest would matter less than in the original 
Community of the six, in which France had a significant position. 
Webber (1999) has published a detailed study of the nature of Franco-German 
relations since WW2, which assesses the impact the Franco-German collaboration had 
on various policy areas of the EU. Webber's analysis includes monetary union, 
enlargement, the liberalisation of electricity and telecommunication markets, research 
and technology and, of course, agricultural policy. He perceives Franco-German 
relations to be part of an 'institutionalised' partnership, where both partners try to 
avoid open disagreements, and attempt to reach common positions before important 
summits. For Webber, this is what makes the Franco-German partnership crucial for 
the EU. However, he also stresses that the relationship can actually act as a brake for 
progress in the Community, when both partners disagree on an issue. Webber explains 
that the Franco-German partnership is based on a network of contacts between many 
different levels in France and Germany in which the German Chancellor and the 
French president occupy a special mediating position. The fact that the Franco-
German partnership has managed to push forward many important developments in 
the European Community is the main reason why Webber considers it to be widely 
accepted by the other member states. Although he notes a change in the balance 
between France and Germany since German unification, through which the German 
political weight has increased significantly, he does not think that the partnership had 
its day. On the contrary, Webber claims that Franco-German co-operation became 
more effective the further European integration advanced. 
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The book also includes an account of the Franco-German negotiations on monetary 
union by Jonathan Story, where he analyses the interests both countries had in 
creating the Single European Currency. 
Cole (2001) provides the best analysis of Franco-German relations available. His 
book is based on Webber. but has a much wider focus. Cole explains how the Franco-
German partnership developed in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, 
and reveals how it changed up to and after German reunification in 1990. Coles's 
analysis does not only include the domestic assessment of the bilateral partnership in 
both countries and its impact on the shape of the European Union (especially in the 
economic and security area). He also dedicates a chapter to the changes that occurred 
after the election of centre-left governments in France, Germany and Britain in the 
late 1990s. Cole considers the bilateral partnership to prevail, in spite of the changes 
in the power balance between the two countries in the 1990s. Nonetheless he 
emphasises that growing disagreements between French and German leaders on 
crucial issues (such as reform of the Common Agricultural Policy) have at times left a 
'leadership vacuum' in the EU. Like Webber, Cole perceives the importance of the 
Franco-German partnership diminished in an EU, where multiple working 
relationships are becoming increasingly important. Therefore he warns that in the long 
term, the partnership might be reduced to an 'elitist project' which not only 
increasingly loses public backing in both countries, but also more and more of its 
overall influence in a larger EU. 
Guerot, Stark and Defarges have contributed an article to Wemer Weidenfeld's 
compilation of discussions on the restructuring of German European policy towards 
greater efficiency (Guerot, Stark and Defarges, 1998). They examine options for 
German European policy as part of the Franco-German partnership after 1990 and 
look at a number of issues, including EMU, defence and security and institutional 
reform. Guerot, Stark and Defarges argue that both countries have a strong interest in 
European monetary integration and therefore reject the notion that Germany was 
forced by France to 'trade off' its national currency in order to get French support for 
reunification. On the contrary, German leaders would have realised that their 
monetary dominance could not be sustained indefinitely. 
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With regard to foreign and security policy, Guerot, Stark and Defarges believe that 
the French drive towards a CFSP for the EU in the 1990s was based on the initial fear 
that the unified Germany might turn its back on the Western security framework. The 
authors criticise the French tendency to try to use the issue of CFSP as an attempt to 
preserve national Great Power status and to install it as an alternative to NATO, 
which would prevent further co-operation with the Germans, who do not want to 
sever the transatlantic links. They also indicate that both countries are far apart on 
institutional reform. France would pursue a mainly centralist, intergovernmental 
approach to the reform of the EU, while Germany wanted a federal structure, based on 
subsidiarity and transparency. The difference in state tradition between the two 
countries would consequently make co-operation on institutional reform very 
difficult. Nevertheless they see perspectives for future Franco-German co-operation 
on the issue, provided that they both accept the changed nature of their post-1990 
relationship and jointly support the process of eastward enlargement of the EU. 
Guerot has also published a recent article in Internationale Politik (112002), in which 
she looks at the difficult relations between France and Germany in the aftermath of 
the Nice summit. Although Guerot claims that French and German leaders had 
managed to improve their personal relations after they obviously fell out at the 
summit, she also admits that France and Germany continue to show a fundamentally 
different approach towards the crucial enlargement process. She stresses that France 
reluctantly accepts the need to bring in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as 
new members, and would prefer to maintain the institutional and procedural status 
quo after enlargement. Moreover, as Guerot argues, recent German proposals on 
institutional reform would fundamentally contradict the French state culture. Franco-
German co-operation on institutional reform would therefore remain difficult and 
Guerot visualises the main future challenge for the two countries in their ability to 
prove to the rest of Europe that their partnership is still effective in producing results 
for the integration process. 
A brief, but very interesting analysis of the events at Nice is provided by Grabbe in a 
briefing paper for the Centre for European Reform (Grabbe, 2001). Grabbe argues 
that the Nice summit would have finally made the decline of Franco-German relations 
obvious, which had already started after Maastricht. 
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She consequently predicts the end of the dominance of the bilateral partnership 
between France and Germany, to be replaced by shifting leadership alliances between 
the five largest member states France, Germany, the UK, Italy and Spain. 
In another contribution for the CER, Grant (2001) explains why French leaders would 
be right to be increasingly worried about their influence in the EU. From Grant's 
point of view, it would be inconceivable that in an EU of 25 member states or more, 
even a well-functioning Franco-German partnership could dominate the agenda in the 
way it was able to in the initial stages of the integration process. 
Schild (2001) also attempts an assessment of Franco-German relations after the Nice 
summit, and stresses that similar positions on a number of issues would no longer be 
sufficient to maintain a leadership role in an EU of 15 and more member states. 
Schild explains that France's lack of willingness to find common agreements with 
Germany at Nice is an expression of the persistent French fear of German domination 
in Europe since unification. The result would be an increasingly confusing French 
attitude towards major European issues, captured between the desire to contain 
German power, and at the same time, to maintain as much national scope as possible. 
Schild consequently calls on French and German leaders to renew the mutual trust 
between themselves in order to avoid further erosion of the their partnership, which 
from Schild's point of view, will inevitably become less important in an EU of 27 
members and more. 
Froehly (2002) argues that France and Germany will only be able to maintain their 
traditional influence in the Community, if both countries would be ready to open up 
their partnership for other member states to join in. Froehly detects a declining 
willingness amongst both among French and German leaders to sacrifice national 
interests for the common goal of European unification, which has been shown in the 
lack of common Franco-German initiatives before and during the Nice summit. 
A very controversial but nevertheless immensely interesting assessment of the role of 
the Franco-German relationship in the development of an integrated Europe can be 
found in Siedentop (2000). 
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Siedentop is clearly critical of the role of the French in Europe, which he blames for 
the weaknesses of the Maastricht Treaty, and sees it as an attempt to transfer the 
structure of the centralist and bureaucratic French to the Community level. He shares 
the view of many analysts that French European policy has been mainly driven by a 
desire to contain German power, something which, has become even more obvious 
after German unification. Siedentop also blames Britain for the failure to counter 
French influence in Europe, due to a lack of engagement in the process of European 
integration. In addition to this interesting view of the Franco-German alliance, 
Siedentop's book also presents various reform proposals for the future of the EU and 
debates the relations between Europe and the United States, and provides proposals 
on how Europe should bridge the cultural gap between itself and Iraq. 
5. British-German relations 
In contrast to the Franco-German partnership, which had a significant impact on the 
development of European integration since 1945, relations between Germany and 
Britain, have found little echo in academic research. No comprehensive and relatively 
up-to-date analysis of possible areas for British-German European policy co-operation 
exist, which would fully take into account the full first terms of the British Labour 
government and the German red-green coalition. 
Larres has edited a compilation of articles on British-German relations since 1945 
(Larres, 2000), and they offer a very good analysis of the relations between West 
Germany and the UK before 1989, as well as the British role during the process of 
German unification in 1989/90. The contributing authors detect a cultural closeness 
between the two countries, which had been covered by the animosities of WW2 and 
continued to burden British-German relations in the first 40 years after 1945. 
Nonetheless Larres et al have watched a remarkable improvement in relations 
between the two countries in the 1990s, when the wartime memoirs started to fade 
and the traditional cultural similarities started to resurface. The book also provides an 
extensive comparative section on British and German European policies, but does not 
take into account the recent developments in the wake of the Nice summit, like the 
intensifying debate on institutional reform and the controversy about a possible 
military attack on Iraq. 
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A similar approach can be found in Mommsen (1999). His book focuses mainly on 
the history of British-German relations and concedes little room to the analysis of 
policy positions in the two countries. Nonetheless it is a crucial contribution to the 
understanding of British-German relations since 1945. 
Mommsen analyses the transfer of relations between the two countries, from former 
war-time enemies to partners in Europe. He supports the argument put forward by 
Larres, that an increasing normalisation in the two countries' relations has removed 
the mutual prejudices that emerged during the war. Mommsen detects this increasing 
normality especially on the British side. The widespread tendency during the 
ThatcherlMajor era to compare German intentions in Europe with the policies of the 
Nazis, had therefore become a rarity, as Mommsen argues. In a separate chapter, 
Paterson shows the British difficulties with the European Community since 1945, that 
in his opinion still remain under the Blair government, which he considers to be 
essentially pragmatic towards European issues. Paterson argues that the unresolved 
question of EMU membership will define whether or not Britain becomes a fully 
engaged EU member state, and consequently a partner of equal value as France is for 
Germany. 
Two recent publications have focused more on European policy positions in both 
countries. Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker (2001) concentrate on British and 
German interests in EU enlargement and reform. They provide a valuable 
interpretation of the motives behind the two countries' strong support for the 
enlargement process. The authors compare the British and the German case by 
emphasizing that both countries perceive enlargement project to include the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe in an area of security and stability. They also identify 
that Britain is less reserved about further waves of enlargement than Germany, who 
borders the accession area. Moreover, the German support would be based far more 
on economic interests than that of Britain, where economic relations with the 
accession countries are still comparatively weak. 
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The most up to date publication on Britain and Germany is by Grabbe and Miinchau 
(2002). The authors provide the first comparative analysis of British and German 
European policy positions, which does not only focus on a single policy area. Grabbe 
and Miinchau argue that Britain and Germany would have a great potential to form a 
strong working partnership on many issues in the EU if they would be able to 
overcome their domestic constraints. In this respect, Grabbe and Mfulchau explicitly 
name the euro referendum in the British case, and the continuing economic weakness 
in the German case. The authors do not advocate a replacement of the Franco-German 
partnership by a German-British alliance. Although they argue that due to a number of 
correspondences in British and German European policy positions on issues such as 
enlargement, trade liberalisation and CAP reform, where they stand jointly against 
French opposition, the two countries could achieve significant progress for the whole 
of the EU if they would act as a team. 
Grabbe and Miinchau's book does however offer no comprehensive study of the 
individual British and German policy positions, and therefore serves mainly as a 
reference for further discussion and research. 
58 
Chapter 1: Germany's European policy before and after 
reunification 
Both before and after 1989, Germany has been a crucial player in the development of 
the European integration process. Deeply embedded in the institutional framework of 
NATO and the European Community, the Federal Republic of West Germany has 
been a vital partner for its neighbours in the West. As the country on the borderline 
between the two sides of the Iron Curtain, West Germany did not only provide an 
important asset for the defence of Western Europe against a possible Soviet threat. In 
the first forty years after WW2, West Germany had also become a strong force for 
reconciliation in Europe, both between East and West and between the West 
European nations themselves. The strong commitment towards the development of 
European integration, which West Germany exercised in close co-operation with its 
main partner France, became an important factor in the process of safeguarding peace 
and economic stability in Western Europe after 1945. The attempts of the West 
German Ostpolitik to overcome the ideological divisions with the East after 1969 
(Hanrieder 1991, pp. 229-258) helped to ease the tensions of the Cold War and made 
the Iron Curtain more permeable, which became the basis for the events of 1989/90. 
In spite of the fears among many of its partners, the unified Germany basically 
adopted the West German foreign policy legacy. Although the internal and external 
conditions for German foreign policy had changed after reunification, the larger 
Germany continued to remain committed to European integration and multilateral co-
operation with its partners in the West. Unification has moved Germany even more 
into the centre of Europe, which has turned it into the ZentralmachtJ (Central Power) 
of Europe. The prospect of EU enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe will 
increase Germany's standing even further. Not only will it have a crucial role in the 
enlargement process itself, but it is more than likely that it will become the main focus 
for the new member states, which have established close ties with Germany since the 
Ostpolitik of the 1970s. 
I See Hans-Peter Schwarz, who explains the characterisation of Germany as the Zentralmacht in 
Europe with its central geographical position, greater economic power and larger population size than 
any of the other big European nations, like e.g. Britain, France, Italy and Spain (see Schwarz, 1994 and 
1999, p.t). 
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This chapter looks at the essential features of post-war German European policy, 
including the internal and external changes that affected German European policy 
after the reunification of the two Germanys in 1989. 
1.1. The foreign policy legacy of the West German Federal Republic 
The foreign policy of the Bonn republic had been characterised by a strong aspiration 
to regain international standing after the damages that had been done in the German 
name by the Nazi regime. It was clear from the outset, that the Federal Republic of 
West Germany (FRG), which had been created out of the three Western occupational 
sectors in May 1949, would only be able to develop a foreign policy of limited 
sovereignty. Because the status of Berlin and Germany as a whole had not been 
settled among the victorious WW2 Allies2 in a peace treaty, the Western Allies 
continued to reserve their occupational rights and responsibilities. West Germany was 
therefore never fully sovereign in its foreign policy, although it had regained formal 
sovereignty in the Deutschlandvertrag of 1955. The treaty was a reward for the 
willingness of West Germany's first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, to firmly integrate 
the Bonn republic into the West. It was based on a 'new relationship,3 between West 
Germany and the three Western Allies, the United States, Britain and France, which 
confirmed that West Germany had officially become part of the alliance of Western 
democracies. The Allies encouraged the Federal Republic 
'to completely link itself with the community of free nations, which contribute to 
the achievement of the common goals of the free world, through membership of 
international institutions' (Deutschlandvertrag, article 3, paragraph 2) 
The Deutschlandvertrag hence became the basis for West German rearmament and its 
integration into the military and political framework of NATO in 1955. 
2 The United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France. 
3 Vertrag uber die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Drei Machten 
(Deutschlandvertrag), preamble 
(source: www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www I de/infoservice/download/pdf/dokumente/6-1. pdt). 
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The Western Allies granted the Bonn republic 'the full sovereign power over its 
internal and external affairs ,4. They, however, limited this sovereignty by declaring 
that 
, With regard to the international situation, which has so far prevented Germany's 
reunification and the signing of a peace treaty, the Three Powers retain their 
previously exercised rights and responsibilities with regard to Berlin and Germany 
as a whole, including German reunification and a peace treaty settlement.' 
(Deutschlandvertrag, article 2) 
The Deutschlandvertrag therefore ended West Germany's pre-sovereign status and 
gave the country formal sovereignty over its internal and external affairs, in order for 
it to be able to join the community of Western democracies in its effort to contain 
Soviet expansion. The Federal Republic nonetheless de facto remained semi-
sovereign as it had to consult the Western Allies with regard to any policies or treaties 
which would affect the relations between the two Germanys or the status of West 
Berlin. For this reason, West Germany's semi-sovereign status was hence part of the 
double containment strategy of the Western Allies. By deeply integrating Germany 
into multilateral institutional frameworks in the West, any chance of a German 
Sonderweg (special way) towards neutrality between East and West was prevented. 
Moreover, with German rearmament and integration into NATO, the West had found 
an important ally in its attempt to contain the Soviet Unions. 
In spite of the continuing foreign policy constraints of the Allied rights and 
responsibilities, the regulations of the Deutschlandvertrag which were accompanied 
by West German membership of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
and NATO, were therefore both in the interest of the Allies and of Germany itself. 
4 Ibid. article I, paragraph 2. 
5 As a border country to the Warsaw Pact, West Germany became an important asset for NATO in case 
of a Soviet attack on the West. With the aid of its NATO allies, the Bundeswehr thus developed a 
strong conventional capability (Hyde-Price, 2000, p.116). 
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The West German leadership under Adenauer was less interested in regaining full 
independent sovereignty over its foreign affairs. As part of his policy of firm 
integration into the West, Adenauer was content to play the role of a reliable partner 
with equal rights, in order to improve the Federal Republic's post-war reputation: 
'The core element of the Bonn policy towards the West therefore was not an 
endeavour towards sovereign independence - a goal which did not have any 
chance for realisation and a term, which had become less important in the 
European post-war order - but the achievement of integration and equality ( ... ). 
Adenauer's European policy became the essence and the symbol of the German 
willingness to tie itself into the West and renounce a seesaw policy'. 
(Hanrieder, 1991, p.273) 
Adenauer's policy of firm integration into the West had initially not been undisputed 
at home. The SPD opposition under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher was sceptical 
towards Adenauer's West European and transatlantic orientation and favoured a less 
pro-Western stance for West Germany. In contrast to Adenauer's policy, Schumacher 
wanted to turn Germany into a democratic socialist country, which would then 
integrate into a Europe of other socialist states. Schumacher was therefore rather 
critical of Adenauer's policy of close consultation with the Western Allies, especially 
the United States. In Schumacher's opinion, Adenauer's policy of firm integration 
into the West hampered the chances for German reunification and European unity. 
Only by taking a neutral stance towards both superpowers would Germany be able to 
help to develop Europe into a third power between the United States and the Soviet 
Union (Hacke, 1997, p.47). Adenauer's repeated election victories between 1949 and 
1961 showed that the West German electorate refused the SPD's foreign policy ideas6 
and supported the policy of Westbindung. The Chancellor could therefore develop his 
foreign policy priorities with a strong public backing. 
6 Even after Schumacher's death in 1952, the SPD continued to pursue the essential features of his 
foreign policy concept. It took the party until the 1959 in the Godesberg manifesto to go along with the 
government policy of integration into the West. 
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The Bonn republic consequently pursued a policy of strict multilateral ism, which 
meant that any attempts to go-it-alone were strictly avoided and West German foreign 
policy was developed in close consultation with its partners in NATO and the 
European Community. In its European policy, the Federal Republic formed a close 
alliance with its former enemy France, and the two countries became the driving 
forces behind European integration. The Franco-German alliance provided Germany 
with two advantages: Firstly, by forming a continuous friendly partnership with 
France, West Germany showed that it had a strong desire to reconcile with the former 
arch enemy, and that it wanted to prevent the rise of further antagonism between 
European nations in the future. This calmed the fears of the Federal Republic's 
European neighbours that the Germans could attempt to pursue hegemonial 
aspirations again, and also improved West Germany's standing abroad. Secondly, the 
close bilateral relationship with France enabled Germany to exercise a relatively 
strong influence on the European integration process without raising any suspicions 
amongst its other partners. The Franco-German alliance was therefore crucial for the 
rebuilding of West Germany's post-war standing as it 
'performs the valuable function of reassuring other EC states over Germany's 
intentions and of framing German interests under a discourse of historical 
reconciliation' (Cole, 2001, p.45) 
The Franco-German alliance also helped to underline West Germany's self-definition 
as a Europeanised nation, i.e. a country that refused the notion of nationality and 
national self-interests but mainly defined itself as the European Musterschuler (the 
best pupil in the class). Due to the experiences of the past, the Federal Republic 
refrained from articulating any obvious national interests other than the advance of 
European integration and the long-term goal of peaceful reunification of the two 
German states. As a result, 'the nation was demonised and European integration was 
idealised' (Hacke, 1996, p. 1). The strong focus on Europeanness and the refusal to 
show obvious national pride consequently became a substantial element of the West 
German society (Kirchner, 1996, p. 157). It was closely linked to any refusal of old-
style power politics and military force as a means of conflict resolution (Paulsen, 
1999, p.545). 
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Because of the experiences Germans had made during two World Wars, both a 
majority of the West German public and the political elite supported a policy of 
peaceful conflict resolution through multilateral, preventive international co-
operation. The Federal Republic's approach was hence widely described as a that of a 
'civilian power', meaning 
'a state that is willing to take the initiative and influence international politics 
through strategies that include (among others) the monopolisation of force within 
systems of collective security (such as the UN), the preference for non-violent 
resolution of disputes and the strengthening of the rule of law'. 
(Harnisch,2001,p.35) 
West Germany therefore developed an almost automatic' "reflex" which sought to 
avoid overt positions of leadership' (Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p.1). The 
consequence of this stance was that even if the representatives of the Bonn republic 
lead the debate on an issue, they still tried to present it as a multilateral initiative7. 
Therefore, if the national interest was not neglected for the sake of the advance of 
European integration, then it was at least 'articulated in European language' (Bulmer, 
Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p.l). The Bonn republic was similarly fundamentalist with 
regard to its refusal of military force as a means of politics. Especially under its 
longest-standing Foreign Minister, the Liberal Democrat Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
(1974-1992), Germany promoted a cheque-book diplomacy, which preferred to 
contribute to the resolution of any conflict in financial rather than in military terms. 
Genscherism accepted the position of West Germany as the paymaster in Europe and 
in the world in order to prove that German national interests would always count less 
than support for supranational goals (Anderson, 1997, p. 86). It adopted a stance, 
which Max Weber had described as the 'ethics of ultimate ends', meaning that the 
rejection of force as a means of politics and the promotion of peace as an absolute 
priority became almost a creed for West German foreign policy: 
7 A good example for this attitude was the creation of the European Monetary System, which was 
presented as a Franco-German initiative, but was in fact mainly developed by German Chancellor 
Schmidt (Co le, 2001, p.92 and Bulmer, 1997, p. 65). Schmidt managed to convince French president 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing of the need to find a European response to the collapse of the V.S. Bretton 
Woods system and the oil crisis of 1973174, which had severely harmed the European economies. In 
his memoirs, Schmidt claims that the EMS was a joint Franco-German idea but fails to give any 
evidence for this (Schmidt, 1990, p.249). 
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'The so-called Bonn Republic appeared to be almost as much of an extreme in 
comparison to other Western countries as was the Third Reich ( ... ) Where 
Goebbels was declaring ''total war" to the world, West German "Genscherists" 
were declaring ''total peace" ( ... )' (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001, p.61) 
The Bonn republic was able to shape its own foreign policy within the boundaries of 
the constraints of its semi-sovereign status, and its commitment to multilateral action. 
The Western partners in NATO and the EC expected the leaders in Bonn to fully 
consult them on any new major West German foreign policy initiatives, which 
became especially obvious during the development of the new Ostpolitik in the late 
1960s. When the SPD, which had been in opposition since 1949, managed to finally 
gain the West German Chancellorship for Willy Brandt in the fIrst SPDIFDP coalition 
government in 1969, a new era in West German foreign policy had begun. Brandt was 
convinced that the rising tensions between East and West, and particularly between 
the two German states, would have to be reduced, in order to improve the living 
conditions for people living on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Brandt had already tried 
to initiate the first steps towards detente during his time as Foreign Minister under the 
CDU/CSU-SPD grand coalition government, led by CDU Chancellor Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger, between 1966 and 1969. The CDU/CSU had nevertheless been very 
reluctant to change its stance towards the East and to make any major concessions 
which would ease the tensions. 
The main hurdle in this respect had been Kiesinger's insistence on the principle of 
the foreign policy doctrine developed by Adenauer's foreign policy advisor Walter 
Hallstein in 1955. The Hallstein doctrine fundamentally rejected the acceptance of the 
East German GDR as a legitimate state, and therefore made it a West German foreign 
policy principle to end all diplomatic ties with any country which would officially 
accept the state character of the GDR (Pfetsch, 1993, p.155). Although the grand 
coalition weakened the claim of sole representation which was part of the Hallstein 
doctrine, the SPD did not manage to convince the CDU/CSU to officially accept the 
GDR as the other German state. 
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This prevented a major breakthrough in the relations between the two Germanys, 
which would have been a fundamental prerequiste for a new character of diplomatic 
relations with the other Warsaw Pact states: 
'Through its policy of non-acceptance, the BOnD government put its sparse 
relations with the GDR effectively under far harder political circumstances than 
those to other East European states' (Hanrieder, 1989) 
Apart from the CDU/CSU's fundamental opposition to any formal acceptance of state 
legitimacy for the GDR, the Warsaw Pact states had also not shown much willingness 
to compromise on any of their fundamental demands (Bingen, 1999, p.597). 
Any major political breakthrough in terms of reconciliation between East and West 
hence failed because both sides were not ready to make fundamental concessions. 
This changed under the leadership of Willy Brandt, when the Federal Republic was 
finally ready to change its attitude towards the other German state. The two coalition 
partners, the SPD and the FDP (led by Foreign Minister Waiter Scheel) agreed that 
the West German policy towards the Warsaw Pact states had to be revised. Brandt 
himself insisted that it was in the West German national interest to improve relations 
with the East, especially with the GDR: 
'The high time of the Cold War was over. The world situation had changed. 
Therefore, legitimate national interests demanded to remove the slag from West 
German policy towards Moscow and its allies. We knew where we belonged. And 
learned that the loyality towards and the friendship with the West had to be 
supplemented with reconciliation and co-operation with the East' (Brandt, 1990, 
p.170). 
The new Ostpolitik (policy towards the East) which the BrandtlScheel administration 
developed after 1969 represented no turning away from the previous principles of 
West German foreign policy. It was firmly based on the principle of integration into 
the West and did not in any way attempt to pursue neutralist ambitions (Meyer, 1999, 
p.573). 
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The main aim of the new policy towards the East was the improvement of living 
conditions for Germans on both sides of the political divide. as well as the 
safeguarding of peace in Europe. The BrandtlScheel administration was ready to 
accept the political status quo between East and West at the time in order to ease the 
tensions through a policy based on the principle of 'change through rapprochement' 
(Griffith, 1981, p. 236). In his first inaugural speech as West German Chancellor on 
October 28th 1969, Willy Brandt stressed that the improvement of the relations 
between the two German states would not only be in the interest of the German 
people but of Europe as a whole: 
'20 years after the foundation of the Federal Republic and the GDR we have to 
prevent a further drifting apart of the German nation, we must therefore try to 
achieve co-operation through a well-ordered juxtaposition. This is not just a 
German interest, because it also has its significance for peace in Europe and for the 
relations between East and West'8 
The new SPDIFDP administration was hence ready to abandon the Hallstein doctrine 
and to formally accept the existence of two German states in Europe. This effectively 
meant that the Federal Republic would formally acknowledge the political reality of 
the existence of the GDR as the second German state. It was part of the acceptance of 
the political status quo in Europe at the time, and improved the international standing 
of the GDR9. However, Bonn's new policy did not lead to an acceptance of the state 
character of the GDR under international law, a demand which the GDR and the 
Soviet Union had pursued for some time (Hacker, 1995, p. 42). 
• RegierungserkJarung von Bundeskanzler Wil/y Brandt, 28 October 1969, source: Archiv der 
Gegenwart, 30 October 1969, pp. 15000. 
9 As a consequence of this new policy towards the GDR, both German states could become members of 
the United Nations on 18 September 1973. 
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The new administration had made clear from the outset that such a move would not be 
possible: 
'The acceptance of the GDR under international law is out of the question. Even 
though two states exist in Germany, they are not foreign countries to one another; 
their relations to one another can only be of a special character'lO 
The implications of the Federal Republic's semi-sovereign status, became more than 
obvious once again during the development of the new Ostpolitik. Even if it would 
have wanted to accept the state character of the GDR under international law, Bonn 
would have needed the assent of the Western Allies under the regulations of the 
Deutschlandvertrag. The Western Allies remained responsible for any policies that 
would affect the status of Berlin and Germany as a whole, and they were therefore the 
guardians of the principle of German unity. Bonn had therefore no other choice than 
to develop its new bilateral policy of detente with the East in close consultation with 
the Western Allies and principally under their conditions. 
Although the new Ostpolitik had fitted into a general trend towards detente between 
East and West by the end of the 1960s, which had been actively pursued by the V.S. 
Nixon/Kissinger administration, principal concerns among Bonn's Western partners 
remained. The widespread fear, especially in France and the V.S., had been that the 
long-term goal of the Ostpolitik would be a new tendency towards the traditional 
German Schaukelpolitik (seesaw policy), i.e. an ambition to occupy a position of 
neutrality between Washington and Moscow. The Western Allies had been quite 
content with the traditional post-WW2 West German approach of firm integration into 
the West as part of the policy of double containment, of West Germany and the Soviet 
Union. They consequently initially viewed Brandt's new attitude towards the East 
with strong scepticism: 
JO Regierungserkliirung von Bundeskanzler Brandt im Deutschen Bundestag, 28 October 1969, 
source: Archiv der Gegenwart 
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'The Western Allies obviously found it hard to reach a positive attitude towards 
Bonn's Ostpolitik. France showed a dislike right from the beginning, not only 
because of the approach towards the East but also because it turned France's own 
role in Moscow into second-rate; and Washington considered its own leading role 
in the process of detente to be in danger, and lodged a complaint that Bonn would 
on the one hand inform but on the other hand not really consult - a racy inversion 
ofBonn's permanent complaint in the security area' (Hanrieder, 1991, p.235) 
As a result of the concerns of the Western Allies, the BrandtlScheel administration 
had to make sure not to overstep the mark and to act clearly within the Federal 
Republic's semi-sovereign foreign policy constraints. The negotiations for the number 
of bilateral treaties with Warsaw Pact states had to be conducted in close consultation 
with the Allies. They had insisted that the final ratification of any of the bilateral 
treaties depended on an agreement between the West and the Soviet Union on 
improvements for the status of West Berlin. The bilateral treaties between West 
Germany and the Soviet Union (12/8/1970), Poland (711211970), the GDR 
(21112/1972) and the CSSR (11112/1973) were therefore only ratified by the German 
Bundestag after the V.S., Britain, and France had found an agreement on the status of 
West Berlin in the Berlin agreement (3/9/1971)11, which improved living conditions 
for the inhabitants of West Berlin (Bingen, 1999). Especially the West German-Soviet 
bilateral treaty (Moskauer Vertrag) was a milestone in East-West relations. It formally 
accepted the abstinence from 'the threat with force or the use of force' (article 2), as 
well as the 'invulnerability of the borders now and in the future' under article 3 
(Rauschnig, 1989, p. 122). The treaty hence paved the way for improved relations 
between the two German states, because article 3 included the formal acceptance of 
'the border between the Federal Republic and the GDR' (ibid, p. 122). This could 
then be manifested further in the Grundlagenvertrag between West Germany and the 
GDR, in which the two German states pledged to 'develop good neighbourly relations 
to one another on the basis of equal rights' (article I). 
11 The Berlin agreement was reached in '4+0' negotiations, which meant that no representatives from 
the two German states were involved. The decisions were basically reached by the four occupying 
powers. 
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Under article 4, West Germany formally abandoned its claim to be the sole 
representative of all German people, in which it was stated that 'none of the two states 
can represent the other internationally or act in the other's name' (Rauschnig, 1989, 
p.164). 
Under pressure from the Western Allies, Bonn also had to clarify its stance in respect 
of the rights and responsibilities of the Allies with regard to the status of Germany. 
In their note delivered to the West German government on August 11 th 1970, the 
United States, the UK and France stressed that through the Moskauer Vertrag 'the 
rights and responsibilities of the four Allies with regard to Berlin and Germany as a 
whole ( ... ) are not being affected and cannot be affected' (Rauschnig, 1989, p.124). 
The Federal government consequently had to express this position clearly in the 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. The final clarification was made in the letter sent 
by the West German government to the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on August 
12th 1970. In the BrieJzur deutschen Einheit, the government stated that 
'this treaty does not stand in contradiction to the political goal of the Federal 
Republic, to work towards a situation of peace in Europe, in which the German 
people regains its unity in a process of free self-determination.' 
(Rauschnig, 1989, p.l23) 
The Soviet Union therefore had to realise that it dealt with a West German state of 
limited sovereignty which was in no position to give in to the maximum Soviet 
demands, which aimed at the final acceptance of the borders of the GDR (Griffith, 
1981, p. 256). Bonn was able to set new trends with regard to the essential features of 
its foreign policy but it could not fundamentally change course on any issue which 
would fall under the rights and responsibilities of the Western Allies. The new 
Ostpolitik of the Brandt/Scheel administration hence remained firmly based on the 
post-WW2 preconditions of West German foreign policy. Neither the principle of 
multilateral integration into the West nor the long-term political goal of peaceful 
reunification of the two Germanys was therefore abandoned. 
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In spite of these reassurances, the negotiations for the various bilateral treaties were 
accompanied by fierce criticism from the CDU/CSU opposition, which in particular 
strongly opposed the government's new approach towards the GDR. The CDU/CSU 
accused the government of endangering the principle of Westbindung and of 
abandoning the principal goal of reunification of the two Germanys. 
Especially from the point of view of the Bavarian CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss, the 
new Ostpolitik 'caused a dangerous euphoria for detente, which would misinterpret 
the dangerous character of the Soviet Union and the GDR' (Hacke, 1997, p.174 and p. 
176). In response to a major parliamentary question by the CDU/CSU on the foreign. 
policy and policy towards the other German state (November 11th 1971), the 
government made clear that it tried to improve the living conditions for the German 
people in both states without endangering the long-term political principle of 
unification: 
'The political point of reference for the Federal government is the safeguarding of 
the unity of the nation through the most appropriate means. Under the present 
circumstances, the Federal government is convinced that it serves the safeguarding 
of the unity of the German people best through a settlement of its relationship with 
the GDR. Such a settlement can of course not bring an end to the division of 
Germany: but it can counteract a deepening of the division and therefore is 
beneficial for the German nation as a whole' (Rauschnig, 1989, p. 137) 
Nevertheless, the CDU/CSU launched an appeal to the Federal High Court in order to 
clarify if the treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland would be in line with the West 
German Grundgesetz. In its decision on July 7th 1975, the Federal High Court ruled 
that the treaties would be in line with the German constitution because they would not 
affect 'bilateral and multilateral treaties und agreements, which had been signed by 
the parties to the treaty' (Rauschnig, 1989, p.141). This decision cleared the way for 
the integration of the Ostpolitik into the traditional post-war features of West German 
foreign policy. With its new conciliatory approach towards the East, the Bonn 
republic had managed to make an important step forward towards political maturity 
and international recognition. It had lead the way towards the overcoming of the 
political divide in Europe. 
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At the same time, it had proven that it would remain a reliable partner for its Western 
allies even when it took a more independent course. The initial worries of the Federal 
Republic's Western partners had not become reality: the leaders in Bonn developed 
the rapprochement towards the East strictly within the multilateral framework of 
Western integration. In the course of the 1970s, the principle of Westbindung had 
therefore been enhanced by reconciliation and co-operation with the East (Webber, 
2001, p.3). The Federal Republic had consequently become a driving force for post-
war reconciliation in Europe, working closely both with its former adversaries in the 
West and the East and proving that its main ambition was to reconcile rather than to 
establish a new German sphere of influence: 
, Ostpolitik, ( ... ) made possible a process of rapprochement with the Central and 
East Europeans and helped to assure them that Germany - and the Germans had 
changed ( ... ) Only with the Ostpolitik of Brandt and Scheel did the BRD seek to 
define and pursue its own distinctive foreign policy interests. Even then, German 
Ostpolitik was firmly anchored within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, 
European Political Co-operation (EPC) and the CSCE (Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe' (Hyde-Price, 2000, p. 105 and 109) 
After the rejection of Schumacher's ambitions towards neutrality by Adenauer in the 
1950s, the Ostpolitik of the Brandt/Scheel administration consequently became the 
'second fundamental decision' (Pfetsch, 1993, p. 186) in the Federal Republic's post-
war foreign policy. Because the Ostpolitik did not abandon the principle of 
Westbindung but did build on it, it became the optimal combination which would 
allow the Federal Republic to pursue its main interests in Europe, namely '( ... ) 
economic prosperity, securing peace, international respect and recognition, integration 
of the Germans and commitment of the partners towards the goal of unification ( ... r 
(Glaab et aI, 1998, p. 169-170). Especially in terms of economic development, the 
combination of Westbindung and Ostpolitik contributed strongly to West German 
prosperity. 
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The safe embedment into the economic and security framework of the West and the 
increasing co-operation with countries in Eastern Europe allowed West Germany to 
become the biggest export nation in Europe l2• 
In spite of the fundamental opposition of the CDU/CSU against the Ostpolitik during 
the 1970S13, it still continued to pursue the essential features of the policy developed 
under the successive SPDIFDP administrations of BrandtlScheel (1969-74) and 
SchmidtlGenscher (1974-82) when it returned to power in 1982. Just as the SPD had 
abandoned its opposition to Adenauer's policy of Westbindung in the Godesberg 
program of 19591\ did the new CDU chancellor Helmut Kohl continue with the 
policy of co-operation with the East that had been established in the 1970s. West 
German foreign policy was therefore generally characterised by a continuity and 
reliability which did not depend on the government of the day (Krause, 2001, p. 160; 
Schwarz, 1999, p. 2). The essential features of West German foreign policy, extensive 
multilateralism, role model Europeanness and a preventive civilian power approach 
with regard to crisis management remained part of the foreign policy consensus of the 
Bonn repUblic. As could be seen during the development of the Ostpolitik, West 
German leaders did not try to challenge the semi-sovereign status of their foreign 
policy and rather tried to use the integration into the multilateral frameworks of 
NATO and the EC in order to exercise a soft power influence (Bulmer, 1997, p.Sl): 
West Germany did therefore influence the development of European integration 
profoundly, but it did so in a non-obvious way within multilateral proceedings. The 
Bonn republic avoided to play the traditional game of power politics, and instead tried 
to work towards the reshaping of the multilateral framework of the EC in order to 
make it more adaptable to German interests. The Federal Republic's main ambitions 
within the EC lay therefore in 
12 West German exports into Central and Eastern Europe increased sharply during the 1970s (see 
Griffith, 1981, pp. 280-282). 
13 For a detailed account of the approach of the CDUlCSU towards the GDR and the Warsaw Pact 
countries see Hacke, 1975. 
14 The change in the SPD's stance was set out by Herbert Wehner in his speech on the essential 
political strategy of the SPD in the Bundestag on 30 June 1960 (Hanrieder, 1991, p. 406). 
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'strengthening the broader framework of European multilateralism and Germany's 
self-defined role within it; and creating a supportive external environment within 
which the German domestic model of political economy could flourish' 
(Anderson, 1997, p.82) 
Because West Germany was not a fully sovereign state and was still constrained by 
the rights of the occupying powers, 'the choice in favour of ceding important powers 
to regional or international organisation was easier for Bonn than for other large 
European states' (Webber, 2001, p. 4). For West German leaders it was hence a 
normal process to exercise joint, rather than unilateral leadership and to present 
German initiatives as multilateral ones. Nevertheless, on a number of occasions, the 
Bonn republic did take the lead, although it tried to conceal it under the mask of 
multilateralism. Apart from the obvious example of the development of the Ostpolitik 
in the 1970s, especially under the leadership of Brandt's successor as Chancellor, 
Helmut Schmidt, West German foreign policy became more self-confident. 
Schmidt found the right balance between the promotion of German self-interests and 
the compliance with the constraints of the semi-sovereign status. He avoided any 
unilateral moves but focused on the Franco-German alliance as a means to exercise 
West German influence (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p.56). Schmidt not only 
developed the idea for the creation of a European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978 
(against the will of the German Bundesbank). He also helped to initiate the G7 world 
economic summits (Schmidt, 1990, p. 198-201) and the controversial NATO dual 
track decision of 197915• Schmidt's close personal friendship with French president 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing was based on mutual trust and allowed Bonn to exercise 
more influence in Europe than it had ever done before. 
15 After it had become obvious that the Soviet Union had begun to station a new generation of SS-20 
short-range missiles in Eastern Europe in the course of the 1970s, Schmidt managed to push the 
reluctant U.S. administration of Jimmy Carter towards a Western response. After his speech in London 
on October 28th 1977, in which he had warned about the dangers of the SS-20 missiles for Western 
Europe, Schmidt and his American, British and French counterparts met in Gouadeloupe in January 
1979. At the meeting, it was decided to begin with the deployment of a new generation of Pershing 
missiles in Western Europe by 1983, if the Soviet Union would not have withdrawn the SS-20s by 
then. (Schmidt, 1987, p. 230-235). 
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In this respect, Christian Hacke notes that Schmidt's European diplomacy increased 
West-Germany's self-perception as an increasingly respected partner in Europe: 
'Schmidt's manner, partly in co-operation with Giscard d'Estaing during times of 
tension in the relations between East and West, illustrated self-confident European 
and West German presence of detente. This also had an effect on the self-
confidence of the West Germans.' (Hacke, 1997, p. 343). 
Especially the establishment of the EMS became a very important economic power 
asset for the Bonn republic as it was based on the power of a strong Deutsche Mark. 
Under the regulations of the EMS, all participating currencies had to join an Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) and were only allowed to deviate from the anchor currency 
ECU within a fixed limit. Because the Deutsche Mark was the strongest currency 
within the EMS, the participating countries became strongly dependent on the interest 
policies of the German Bundesbankl6• The EMS therefore 'demonstrated 
unambiguously de/acto German economic primacy in Europe' (Cole, 2001, p.92). In 
this respect it is interesting to note that the institutional complexity of the Federal 
Republic led to the occurrence of a particularity: due to its autonomy from political 
influence, the German Bundesbank was powerful enough to exercise a shadow 
'Frankfurt European policy' (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p. 15) in monetary 
terms, which has always been orientated on the principle of monetary stability. The 
Bundesbank has hence traditionally been far bolder in the obvious defence of German 
economic interests than the Federal government. The West German political leaders 
had always been reluctant to openly defend German economic interests in Europe and 
had rather chosen to secure them through multilateral soft power influence17• The 
Bundesbank, on the other hand, secured strong German economic influence in Europe 
through its rigorous interest rate policy, aimed at a strong Deutsche Mark. 
16 This became especially apparent during 'Black Wednesday' on September 16th 1992, when the 
British pound and the Italian lira were forced out of the ERM due to the high interest rate policy of the 
German Bundesbank in the wake of German reunification (Bulmer, 1997, p. 70). 
17 A number of analysts have argued that the acceptance of West German economic dominance of 
Europe had been based on the success of the economic model of Rhine/and capitalism, which was 
widely accepted by Bonn's Western partners (Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p. 18). 
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The Bonn republic's European policy was therefore characterised by 
'two actors: the Bundesbank, the role of which was to take decisions according to 
national parameters - decisions which affected other countries and which they 
perceived negatively - and the government, which had to take decisions fitting 
broader interests and soothe these countries ( ... ) Germany's political authorities did 
so in order to keep the system functioning, a system which benefited Germany.' 
(Le Gloannec, 2001, p. 124) 
With the strong support of the German Bundesbank, the Deutsche Mark therefore 
became the major power asset for the Bono republic which was economically the 
strongest force in Europe, but rather weak politically and firmly dependant on 
multilateral agreements. Willy Brandt's famous characterisation of the Federal 
Republic as 'an economic giant and political dwarf (Hyde-Price, 2000, p.112) is 
therefore more than accurate. The leaders tacitly accepted their country's economic 
predominance in Europe, and tried to even it out through an exaggerated political 
tendency towards multilateral decision-making and good Europeanness. West 
German economic power was consequently principally embedded in the European 
context and presented as being beneficial to the development of European integration, 
such as in the case of the EMS. As a result, a strong link between the Federal 
Republic's domestic institutions and the level of the European Community was 
established, which led to the development of two institutional structures with many 
similarities. As Simon Bulmer notes, the political system of the Federal Republic and 
the EU share a tendency towards co-operation between the higher and lower levels: 
'The principal structural characteristic of European integration is its co-operative 
(con-)federalist nature: the upper (European Union) tier has relatively few 
exclusive competences but many policy areas entail co-operation between the two 
levels of the system. Thus it is much more in line with the characteristics of 
German federalism than with the greater insulation between the federal and state 
levels of government that characterises the U.S. model of federalism' (Bulmer, 
1997, p.54) 
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In the political system of the Federal Republic the federal government is obliged to 
interact with the Bundestag, the Uinder representatives in the Bundesrat, and is under 
the scrutiny of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverjassungsgericht). 
Moreover, because absolute majorities are rare under the German electoral system of 
personalised proportionality (Rudzio, 1996, pp. 183-189) coalition governments are 
the norm, which includes the need for constant compromise and can led to the 
fragmentation of political positions within the government (Bulmer, Maurer and 
Paterson, 200 I, p. 180). 
The structure of the political system of the Federal Republic is therefore characterised 
by decentralisation, which includes that 'the necessity to take positions and achieve 
results under intense time pressure also promotes the creation of informal contacts and 
forms of co-operation' (Hoyer, 2001, p.89) 
Because they are used to a system in which consensual governance is the dominant 
principle, German political actors have consequently found it traditionally easy to 
operate on the European level. Although the EU cannot be characterised as a state, its 
political system bears many resemblances to the state structure of the Federal 
Republic. This is mainly due to the fact that the post-war development of European 
integration has been driven by the alliance between France and Germany. Both 
countries have therefore transferred a number of their domestic state characteristics to 
the European level. This process of 'externalisation' of domestic state structures also 
applies to Germany, which over the years has managed to 'externalise' a number of 
its own state characteristics to the community level (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 
2000, pp. 40-46). The community level was for this reason never considered to be a 
'foreign land' for German political actors, which encouraged the process of the 
Europeanisation of German identity even more: 
'Despite differences in historical origin, the similarity between European and 
German institutions and practices (such as multilevel governance systems, 
subsidiarity, an activist court, and an autonomous central bank) creates a milieu in 
which German political actors can feel at home. This provides a strong anchor for 
Germany in Europe' (Katzenstein, 1997, p. 40) 
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It was this close entanglement between the domestic and the supranational European 
level which made it easy for the Bono republic to develop the irrevocable link 
between its own identity and the ideal of European integration. Because West 
German leaders were pretending to act solely in the interest of Europe as a whole, 
'Germany chose to speak and act "in Europe's name" , (Hyde-Price, 2000, p.124). 
The problem with this approach was that the Bono republic officially denied the 
existence of national interests and equated them with the European interest. At the 
same time, Bono did still secure its interests by exercising multilateral soft power (and 
hard power such as in the case of the Bundesbank). 
The Federal Republic therefore constantly struggled to justify the equation of the 
national and the European, an approach which had always seemed to be rather 
artificial and unreal, even for a semi-sovereign state like West Germany: 
'A European interest is - apart from the maxims, which can be derived from the 
"objective" factors - just as little determined like the national interest of a state. It 
has to be decided in competition between the national interests, actually by 
compromise, in which the real distribution of power is usually reflected' 
(Link,2001,p.562) 
The discussion about a possible redefinition of the Federal Republic's foreign policy 
approach had therefore already begun before 1989/90. This was mainly due to the fact 
that West Germany's economic weight increased to an extent which made the 
traditional policy of understatement which had been exercised by the political class in 
Bono seem increasingly dishonest. Christian Hacke, one of the most outspoken critics 
of the exaggerated self-denial of the national in the Bono republic stresses the 
weaknesses of the pre-1989 Musterschuler approach by adapting Max Weber's 
concept of the 'ethic of responsibility': 
'What the foreign policy of the Federal Republic neglected, was the link between 
power politics and responsibility. 
78 
Power politics, which is characterised by an ethic of responsibility and tries to 
prevent the irresponsible policy of violence exercised by un- or anti-democratic 
states, did not have a status in the public opinion. Patriotism and the feeling for 
national vigilance were underdeveloped' 
(Hacke, 1997, p.350). 
The legacy the West German Federal Republic bequeathed to the unified Germany 
was therefore one which had suited its semi-sovereign status before 1990. The policy 
of European multilateralism and the civilian power attitude rebuilt West Germany's 
post-war reputation on the international stage and allowed the country to pursue its 
economic interests without raising cause for concern among its neighbours. The 
combination of Westbindung and Ostpolitik provided the right mixture for West 
German economic prosperity as it combined the important export market of the EC 
with new markets in the East. The Bonn republic consequently emerged as an 
'economic giant and a political dwarf' but with regard to the continuation of the pre-
1989 occupational rights of the Western Allies, West Germany had achieved the 
maximum room for political manoeuvre that had been possible at the time. 
1.2. Internal and external changes after reunification 
The fall of the iron curtain in 1989/90, by which Europe had been divided for more 
than forty years, brought an end to the abnormal post-war situation in which the 
German nation had to live in two opposing states. The CDU/CSU-FDP coalition led 
by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had seized 
the momentum of history, and thus managed to achieve the reunification of the two 
Germanys in a process of prudent multilateral diplomacy with the partners in East and 
West. The diplomatic process which lead to German reunification was a masterly 
application of the relations that had been established during the combination of 
Westbindung and Ostpolitik in the latter 20 years of the West German Federal 
Republic. Now it became clear that the bilateral rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union, which was based on the Moskauer Vertrag of 1970, would bear fruit. 
79 
The negotiations with the reformist Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev were 
based on an atmosphere of mutual trust. They were made easier by the fact that 
Gorbachev had abandoned the Soviet foreign policy principle of legitimate 
intervention into the internal affairs of any of the Soviet Union's satellite states in 
Central and Eastern Europe, as it had been set out in the Brezhnev doctrine/B. 
Gorbachev abandoned the doctrine and replaced it by the principle of freedom of 
choice, which he had announced during his famous speech at the United Nations in 
December 198819• 
This new liberal orientation in Soviet foreign policy did not actively encourage the 
changes that were to happen in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989/90 but it provided 
a new basis for the relations between them and the Soviet Union. For the question of 
German reunification, which had seemed to be unachievable during the pre-
Gorbachev era, the new orientation in Soviet foreign policy thinking had been crucial. 
The East German GDR leadership under Erich Honecker had categorically refused to 
follow any of Gorbachev's social and economic reforms and now had to pay the price. 
Under the principle of the freedom of choice, the Soviet leadership was no longer 
ready to defend the GDR through military intervention against the growing uneasiness 
amongst its population, which was longing for reforms. 
Because of the unwillingness of the GDR leadership to follow Moscow's new 
direction, the Soviet leadership had increasingly warmed to the idea that German 
reunification might become inevitable if the German people would want it. While 
before 1989, Gorbachev had stuck to the traditional Soviet view that the existence of 
two German states was an irrevocable fact of post-WW2 history, his views changed in 
the course of the developments of 1989. 
18 In 1968, the then general secretary of the Soviet politburo, Leonid Brezhnev had tried to legitimize 
the Soviet military intervention in the CSSR during the Prague spring by claiming that it was the duty 
of the Soviet Union to interfere, if any of the countries of the Soviet bloc adopts a 'nonaffiliated stand'. 
This would be the duty of 'the Soviet Union as a central force, which also includes the might of its 
armed forces', source: www.cnn.comlSPECIALS/cold. war/episodes/14/documents/doctrine. 
19 In the speech, Gorbachev states that 'Freedom of choice is a universal principle to which there 
should be no exceptions'. (see address by Mikhail Gorbachev to the 43 rd U.N. General Assembly 
Session, 7 December 1988, www.cnn.comlSPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/23/documents/gorbachev). 
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The West German-Soviet declaration signed on the occasion of Gorbachev's visit to 
Bonn in June 1989, explicitly stated that 'each state has the right to choose its own 
political and social system freely,2o. 
When his final attempts to push Honecker towards reforms failed during his visit in 
East Berlin on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the GDR, Gorbachev confirmed 
his reluctance to artificially stabilise the GDR by stating 'who comes too late is 
punished by life' (Diehl, 1993, p. 23). When the breakdown of the socialist regime in 
East Germany seemed inevitable in the course of the mass demonstrations and flights 
in summer/autumn 1989, Kohl and Genscher managed to achieve the final step 
towards reunification. During their visit in Moscow between February 10th and 11th 
1990, the West German leaders received the Gorbachev's official assurance that 
Soviet Union would accept German reunification. While this step alone was already 
remarkable, it was almost sensational that the Soviet leadership had now even given 
up their traditional principle that a unified Germany would have to be neutral in 
political and military terms: 
'Gorbachev emphasised - and the Chancellor agreed - that there would be no 
differences of opinion between the USSR and the FRG with regard to the fact that 
the Germans have to solve the question of the unity of the German nation by 
themselves and that they have to make their own choice with regard to the state 
structures, the timing, the speed and the conditions under which they will realise 
this unity,21 
One of the main reasons why the Soviet Union allowed German unification under 
such generous conditions was that the relations between the Federal Republic and the 
Soviet Union developed under the Ostpolitik, had become extremely valuable for the 
latter. 
20 West German-Soviet declaration signed by Chancellor Kohl and Soviet leader Gorbachev, Bonn, 13 
June 1989, source: Europa-Archiv, 13, 1989, pp. D 384. 
21 Kommunique iiber das TrefJen zwischen Gorbachev und Kohl, 10 February 1990, source: Europa-
Archiv, 8, 1990, pp. 0192. 
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Moscow consequently avoided the blockade of an almost inevitable process of 
German reunification, because it did not want to 
'put at risk the relations with a Germany, which would turn into Western Europe's 
most powerful economy, as well as an indispensable partner for Russia's economic 
recovery and for a fundamental restructuring of the relations with Western Europe' 
(Kaiser, 1993b, p.112) 
The Kohl administration made prudent use of the favourable circumstances of history 
and used the positive Soviet attitude towards reunification in order to initiate a 
diplomatic process which stood in the West German tradition of multilateral co-
operation22• By irrevocably linking the process of unification with a commitment 
towards the further deepening of political and economic integration, the West German 
government achieved German unification under the most favourable terms. 
Although the idea of German reunification had been a cause of concern for 
Germany's Western partners, particularly Britain and France23, the Kohl 
administration managed to initiate 2+4 negotiations between the two German states 
and the Allies (Soviet Union, United States, Britain and France). It had been crucial 
for Germany that it had the strong backing of the United States with regard to the 
aspirations to regain its full sovereignty. Whereas Britain and France had initially 
been temped to hold on to some of their occupational rights, 'right from the 
beginning, Washington pleaded for the respect of the German people's right for self-
determination and strictly refused any long-term discrimination of Germany' (Hacker, 
1995, p.97). 
22 Karl Kaiser praises the leadership skills of Kohl and Genscher during the negotiations for the 
reunification process, who co-operated to find the right balance between 'a sharp feeling for strategic 
opportunities and resolute action at the right moment.' (Kaiser, 1993a, p.22) 
23 Both for French president Mitterand but even more so for the British Prime Minister Thatcher, the 
division of Germany into two state had been a safeguard for peace and stability in Europe. While 
Mitterand gave up his initial scepticism towards German unification after reassurances from Chancellor 
Kohl (Kaiser, 1993b, pp. lW-Ill). Thatcher still considers it to be one of the great mistakes of history 
which was 'destabilizing an already unsettling continent' (Thatcher, 1993, p.814). 
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The outcome of the 2+4 negotiations, settled in the 2+4 Treaty signed on September 
12th 1990 could not have been more favourable for the united Germany. The 2+4 
Treaty gave Germany the full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs, which 
brought an end to the limitations set out on the Deutschlandvertrag of 1952. It was the 
substitute for an official peace treaty between the WW2 Allies which was never 
signed and therefore had left the final status of Germany as a whole undecided. 
In the 2+4 Treaty, the former WW2 Allies had finally agreed to abandon their rights 
and responsibilities with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole, 
'in recognition of the fact that ( ... ) with the unification of Germany as a democratic 
and peaceful state the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers with regard to 
Berlin and Germany as a whole lose their meaning,24. 
Moreover, as had been made possible due to the change in the Soviet stance, the 
united Germany was granted 'the right to be part of alliances with all rights and 
responsibilities involved,2s. These major concessions on the part of the Allies were 
linked to the German obligation to accept the finality of its borders and to sign a treaty 
under international law with Poland in order to confirm the German-Polish border: 
'(1) ( ... )The confirmation of the final character of the borders of the united 
Germany is a fundamental part of the peace framework in Europe. 
(2) The united Germany and the Republic of Poland confirm the existing border 
between them in a treaty under international law. ,26 
The German-Polish border treaty signed on November 14th 1990 fulfilled the 
obligations of the 2+4 Treaty through the commitment of the two parties to the treaty 
'that the existing border between them remains inviolable now and in the future' .27 
24 Vertrag uber die abschliefJende Regelung in bezug aul Deutschland (2+4-Vertrag), preamble, 12 
September 1990, source: Europa-Archiv, 19, 1990, pp. D 509-514. 
25 Ibid, article 6. 
26 2+4 Treaty, article 1, paragraph 1 and 2. 
27 Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen uber die Besttitigung der 
zwischen ihnen bestehenden Grenze, 14 November 1990, source: Bulletin des Presse- und 
Infonnationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 16 November 1990, 134, p. 1394) 
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The Allies had insisted on the obligation for the united Germany to accept the finality 
of its borders under international law in order to prevent a more powerful Germany to 
raise any territorial claims against its immediate neighbours in the East at some point 
in the future. The possible re-emergence of German expansionism towards the East 
was therefore prevented by law and this also prevented any possible revisionist debate 
which could have been exploited politically by the far right in Germany. 
The 2+4 Treaty had, at least officially, turned the united Germany into a 'normal' 
state. With the end of the rights and responsibilities of the Western Allies, the new 
Germany, which was formally united on October 3rd 1990, regained full control over 
its internal and external affairs, including membership of international alliances. 
As a result, the territory of the former GDR became part of NATO, when it officially 
acceded to the Federal Republic on October 3rd 1990. The former Warsaw Pact troops 
of the East German NVA (Nationale Volksarmee) were subsequently included into the 
Bundeswehr's contingent. 
The only limitations were that the united Germany would not be allowed to exceed 
the number of 370,000 men (including conventional, airborne, and naval troops) and 
Germany could not possess any chemical or nuclear weapons28. Moreover, until all 
Soviet troops had been withdrawn by the end of 1994, only conventional troops which 
were not integrated into the structure of NATO would be allowed to be stationed on 
the territory of the former GDR29. 
Contrary to all pre-1989/90 speculations about the possible conditions under which 
the two Germanys might one day be reunified, the fully sovereign united Germany 
was not forced into neutrality, but could maintain its principal pre-unification of firm 
integration into the West. Because the reunification process had not altered any of the 
conditions of the membership in international alliances which had been entered by the 
West German Federal Republic, the essential foreign policy features of the unified 
Germany continued along the lines of the Bonn republic. 
28 2+4 Treaty, article 3, paragraph 1 and 2. 
29 Ibid, article 5, paragraph 1. 
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It was clear from the outset that a larger Germany with a territory inhabited by over 
80 million people, situated in the heart of Europe, had not only grown in size but 
would in the long term also become more important in economic as well as in 
political terms. However, the immediate post-unification situation had brought less 
changes than expected. 
The united Germany remained part of the two pillars of Westbindung, NATO, and the 
European Community, and had proven during the unification process that it was still 
pursuing an essentially multilateral foreign policy. The immediate post-unification 
emphasis of the German political class was therefore characterised by continuity, an 
attitude which was also shared by the majority of the people in the West: 
'West Germans could hardly deny that unification would result in a larger and 
more populous country, but they resisted, in both word and deed, the notion that 
unity would represent a break with their postwar trajectory.' 
(Anderson, 1999, p. 37) 
The KohllGenscher administration, which had been overwhelmingly re-elected in the 
first post-unification general election in December 1990, tried to calm the fears 
among Germany's neighbours about a possible re-nationalisation of German foreign 
policy by exercising a policy of Selbsteinbindung (self-integration) (Bulmer, Jeffery 
and Paterson, 2000, p.l; Paulsen, 1999, p. 541). The government stressed that the 
foreign policy of the unified Germany would be built on the foreign policy legacy of 
the Bonn repUblic. This was represented by the continued firm integration into the 
multilateral frameworks of the EC and NATO, the civilian power ambition to work 
towards the establishment of world peace, and the further deepening of European 
integration as the main national interest of German foreign policy. 
In his message to all governments worldwide on the occasion of German reunification 
on October 3rd 1990, Chancellor Kohl stressed that, based on the continuity of its 
traditional multilateral post-war approach of the Bonn republic, the unified Germany 
would work towards the deepening of European integration and global peace: 
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'Our country wants to use its regained national unity in order to serve world peace 
and to advance European integration: This is the task of the Basic Law, our well-
established constitution, which is also in force for the united Germany ( ... ) We 
know that through reunification we also take on greater responsibility in the 
community of nations in general. Our foreign policy therefore remains orientated 
towards worldwide partnership, close co-operation and peaceful balancing out of 
interests.' 30 
The Bonn republic had already tried to act accordingly to the status of a role model 
European in order to rebuild the country's post-war international reputation. In order 
to maintain that standing in the aftermath of unification, the larger Germany had to 
commit itself to the deepening of European integration as a symbol for its willingness 
to limit its own power. 
The obvious sensible German reaction to fears abroad about the re-emergence of 
German dominance in Europe was hence to 'respond to these fears by advancing 
proposals to anchor Germany in a more deeply integrated Europe and to devote even 
more attention to its partners' (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p. 54). 
The KohllGenscher administration was thus more than willing to follow French calls 
for the deepening of European political and economic integration in the wake of 
German reunification. France had maintained its fears about the effects of German 
unification for Europe. The French leadership under Mitterand had only reluctantly 
consented to German unification as an inevitable process of history. It therefore 
expected that the unified Germany would prove its commitment to multilateralism 
and its refusal of unilateral hegemonial aspirations by integrating itself into an even 
deeper European framework: 
'From Mitterand's point of view, the foreseeable end of the division of Germany 
and the end of the split between Europe could lead to the re-emergence of the old 
Europe and with it to the old risks for France. 
30 BotschaJt des Bundeskanzlers der Bundesrepub/ik Deutschland, Helmut Kohl, zum Tag der 
Deutschen Einheit an alle Regierungen der Welt, 3 October 1990, source: Europa-Archiv, 21, 1990, pp. 
D 540-543. 
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The French policy countered it through a strategy of the forced deepening of 
European integration and the demand of evidence for the willingness to integrate 
from the German part, in order to put aside the option that the Federal Republic 
could paralyse European integration or even sever its links.' (Janning, 1999, p. 
347) 
The negotiation process in Maastricht in December 1991, which led to the signing of 
the Treaty of the European Union in February 1992, consequently became a joint 
Franco-German initiative to push forward European integration. The result was an 
enhanced political and economic European framework, which had brought European 
integration to a deeper level than ever before since the Second World War. At 
Maastricht, the Kohl administration had made the fundamental step of committing 
itself to the realisation of Economic and Monetary Union by 1999. 
In order to calm French fears about the mIsuse of Germany's post-unification 
economic power, Kohl had therefore agreed to communitise the main German power 
asset, the Deutsche Mark: 
'In this perspective the Maastricht Treaty and especially Monetary Union were 
perceived as the proper means to communitise the German Mark as the most 
important power assets of Germany for building a hegemonic position. Some even 
referred to this Maastricht Treaty as a new "Treaty of Versailles".' (Wessels, 2001, 
p.110) 
To a certain extent, Maastricht and EMU were therefore definitely a major sacrifice 
for Germany because they irrevocably linked the fate of the German economy with 
that of the rest of Europe and especially with that of France (Guerot, Stark and 
Defarges, 1998, p. 132). With it, the influence of the German Bundesbank in Europe 
would come to an end and Germany would have to accept to align its economic policy 
with the conditions set by the European Central Bank (ECB). The wide-ranging, 
complicated regulations of the Maastricht Treaty and especially the implications of 
EMU consequently led to an intense domestic debate in Germany. Contrary to 
previous agreements towards the deepening of European integration, the pro-
integrationist consensus in Germany seemed to break down after Maastricht. 
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The treaty can therefore be seen as a turning point in Germany's European policy as it 
marked the end of the quasi-automatic German consent to integrationist steps, even if 
they were considered to be against the German national interest. 
Ratification of the treaty proved to be extremely difficult for the Kohl government, as 
it had to face a debate in the public and the media31 , which was then mirrored in the 
discussions in the Bundestag: 
'Reactions to the Maastricht agreement in Germany was decidedly cool - critics 
accused the government of giving away too much on EMU in exchange for too 
little on political union. Public unease, reflected in opinion polls, was fed by the 
German press; the day after the conclusion of the Maastricht summit, many 
German newspapers printed screaming headlines that trumpeted the imminent 
demise of the D-Mark.' (Anderson, 1999, p. 47) 
The paradox result of these domestic discussions was that the European 
Musterschuler Germany now seemed to have increasing problems to submit his 
homework on time: Although a number of EU member states found it difficult to 
come to a domestic acceptance of the Maastricht treaty32, Germany was the last 
member state to ratify the treaty on October 12th 1993, two years later than had been 
originally intended (Jung, 1997, p. 334-335). The domestic debate about the 
constitutional implications of Maastricht and EMU had led to a decision by the 
Federal Constitutional Court in 1993 on the right of the Federal government to 
transfer powers to a supranational authority, such as the European Union, provided 
that the Bundestag and the Uinder would be consulted accordingly (Anderson, 1999, 
p.45). As a result, article 23 of the Grundgesetz was altered in order to clarify the 
proceedings with regard to the transfer of national sovereignty to the supranational 
level. 
31 Even in traditionally pro-European Germany, the Maastricht treaty was widely seen as a bureaucratic 
monstrosity which led to growing scepticism amongst the German public about the direction European 
integration had taken (George 1996, p.103 and Glaab, 1999, pp. 603-607). 
32 In contrast to Germany, a number of EU member states held a public referendum on Maastricht. The 
treaty was initially rejected in the Danish referendum and found only a slight majority in France (Jung, 
1997, p.334) 
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The new article 23 00 stressed the joint responsibilities of the Bundestag and the 
Liinder in the process, which on principle would have to be consulted by the Federal 
government: 
'(1) ( ... ) The Federal government can transfer sovereign powers by law with the 
consent of the Bundesrat ( ... ) 
(2) In matters concerning the European Union, the Bundestag and, through the 
Bundesrat, the Lander, participate. The Federal government has to fully inform 
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat at the earliest possible opportunity. ,33 
Since Maastricht, the European policy-making of the Federal Republic has 
consequently become much more complex as both the rights of the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat, in which the German Llinder are represented, have been strengthened 
under the new article 23 00. A two-thirds majority in the Bundestag is necessary in 
order to ratify amendments of EU treaties which affect the German constitution. This 
in effect 'means that all essential progress in the direction and creation of a European 
Political Union will in the future have to find cross-party support' (Krause, 2001, p. 
162). In order to take its new responsibilities into account the Bundestag has created 
an EU Committee, which is basically responsible for the decision-making of the 
Bundestag with regard to European policy. Due to the requirement of a two-thirds 
majority in the Bundestag on fundamental European policy decisions, the Federal 
government is obliged to work closely with the committee. As a result, it has to take 
into account its opinions and statements on European issues and also has to present 
them at Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) in order 'to ensure parliamentary 
consent in ratification proceedings' (Hoyer, 2001, p.96). 
At the same time, under the regulations of article 23 00 the Lander have increased 
their scope of action and have occasionally established a 'parallel foreign policy' 
(Knodt, 2001, p.173) with regard to matters concerning the European Union. 
33 Grundgesetz fUr die Bundesrepub/ik Deutschland, article 23, paragraph I and 2, source: 
www.bundesregierung.de/downloads/GG.pdf 
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Already having been designed as strong regional entities because they own semi-state 
structures with a written constitution (Maunz and Zippelius, 1998, p. 103), their rights 
of representation have been strengthened substantially under article 23 GG, because it 
is much easier for them to articulate their interests on the EU level. Article 23, 
paragraph 5 states that the opinion of the Lander has to be substantially included into 
the Federal Republic's official statement on EU matters, if mainly their rights and 
responsibilities are affected by the matter. Paragraph 6 even gives them the right to 
officially represent the Federal Republic on the EU level on matters, which mainly 
affect legislative areas of the Lander34• Moreover, the Lander not only send their 
official representatives to the Committee of the Regions35, in which the regional 
entities are represented on the EU level, they are also officially represented in the 
official German delegations to the Council and the Commission (Knodt, 2001, p.177). 
A direct representation of the Lander is above all secured through their permanent 
representation offices in Brussels, which has become one of the main means of 
bilateral bargaining on EU issues for each Liinder government (Hoyer, 2001, p. 98). 
The domestic changes brought about by the Maastricht treaty have thus substantially 
fragmented German European policy-making, a change which in terms of the Liinder 
is especially 
'characterised by the fact that the Liinder do not limit their international activities 
solely to the opportunities found within co-operative federalism but rather develop 
their own channels of external representation and contact, channels which vary 
from policy area to policy area' (Knodt, 2001, p. 183) 
These changes have made it far more difficult for the Federal government to find a 
swift domestic consensus on their official European policy-making, as an increasing 
number of domestic voices have to be heard and taken into account, before an 
agreement can be found. The increased domestic diversity of post-Maastricht German 
European policy-making has therefore made it 'much more difficult, even impossible, 
for the German government to satisfy domestic constituencies with traditional policy 
priorities and a self-effacing deportment in Brussels' (Anderson, 1999, p. 209). 
34 Grundgesetz, article 23, paragraph 5 and 6, source: www.bundesregierung.de/downloads/GG.pdf. 
35 For a discussion of the involvement of the German Lander in frrst working period of the Committee 
of the Regions, see Degen, 1998, pp.l 031 
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This new fragmentation of domestic opinions has been accompanied by a change in 
attitude towards the process of European integration after Maastricht. With the 
enormous post-unification costs for the economic stabilisation of the East German 
Liinde?6, Germany became increasingly uneasy about its status as the main net 
contributor within the EU. While Germany had traditionally accepted the high 
financial costs of European integration for the sake of the political gain of its role as 
the role model European, Maastricht marked a turning point in this respect. The 
growing shortage of public funds due to the financial burdens of unification hence 
caused the fundamentally pro-European Kohl administration to reconsider its position. 
The debate about Germany's Nettozahler (net contributor) status in the EU hence 
became a 'normal' part of German European policy in the 1990s (Jeffery and 
Paterson, 2000, p. 33). The Maastricht treaty had obviously asked too much from the 
Germans by not only determining the foreseeable abolition of their beloved Deutsche 
Mark, but by also enhancing the acquis communautaire of the EU on the basis of a 
continuing rise of the EU budget37• This was strongly reflected in German public 
opinion. Not only did the majority of Germans remain largely sceptical about EMU38, 
there was also an increasing weariness about the supposed inability of the German 
political leaders to represent German national interest in a politically and 
economically deepened EU39• 
36 Peter Katzenstein notes the gap between Germany's post-unification economic performance and the 
rising burden of its contributions to the EU budget: 'While unification has made Germany drop from 
the second to the seventh rank in the per capita income of the EU members, its net contribution has 
increased from OM 10.5 billion in 1987 to OM 22.0 billion in 1992' (Katzenstein, 1997, p. 27). 
See also Anderson, 1997, p.51. 
37 The Oelors Commission 11 budget proposals in the aftermath of the Maastricht treaty proposed a rise 
in the budget ceiling from 1.2 to 1.37 % of the community's GOP (Laffan and Shackleton, 2000, 
p.22 1-224) 
38 Public opinion in the frrst half of the 1990s showed a persistent trend in German public opinion 
against EMU and the abolition of the Deutsche Mark (Glaab et ai, 1998, pp. 184-188). Scepticism 
towards the Euro was especially strong in the East German Lander (Noelle-Neumann and Petersen, 
1999, p. 595-598). 
39 Between 1992 and 1997, a growing number of Germans supported a slower pace with regard to the 
deepening of European integration (Noelle-Neumann and Petersen, 1999, p. 594-595). 
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Such a change in the public perceptions towards European integration could not leave 
the stance of the German political leaders unaffected. German financial and economic 
interest therefore moved increasingly to the forefront in Germany's post-Maastricht 
European policy and ended the pre-unification acceptance of the German chequebook 
policy: 
'Up to and including the Maastricht Treaty, integration advanced on the basis of an 
implicit formula: in exchange for the invisible economic benefits provided by the 
internal market and the opportunity to reaffirm its innate multilateral credentials, 
Germany agreed to underwrite regional integration and to wield its influence 
unobstrusively. Unification rocked the foundations of this cosy arrangement ( ... ) 
Germany's European policies after 1989 continue to be driven by concerns about 
process and principles, but Bonn officials are paying closer attention to distributive 
outcomes and net pay-offs in the short term.' (Anderson, 1999, p. 207-208) 
In spite of the increasing domestic scepticism about the nature of European 
integration as set out in the Maastricht treaty, the domestic debate did however also 
lead to a new degree of institutional linkage between Germany and the EU. In 
response to the scepticism of the public and the German Bundesbank about EMU 
(Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p.94) the Kohl administration40 insisted on the 
inclusion of a stability pact, which, after lengthy discussions was finally included into 
the EMU regulations in December 1996. 
The strict regulations with regard to the limit on public debt of any member state 
participating in EMU41 clearly bears the trademark of the Bundesbank's traditional 
policy of monetary stability. 
40 It was especially the then finance minister Theo Waigel, at the same time leader of the Bavarian 
CSU, who pressed for the stability pact in order to silence his inner-party critics. 
41 The stability pact sets out the following criteria, which EMU participants must adhere to: I.The rate 
of inflation must not exceed the average rate of inflation of the three member states with the best 
results by a maximum of 1.5%,2. The annual rate of public debt must not exceed 3% of the GDP and 
the total rate of debt must not exceed 60%,3. A national currency must have stayed within the rates of 
fluctuation set out within the ERM (15%) for at least two years (Hillenbrand, 1999, p.354) 
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With the stability pact included in EMU and the final decision to create an 
independent European Central Bank in Frankfurt along the lines of the Bundesbank 
model, Germany consequently managed to export parts of its domestic institutional 
structures towards the EU level. The German political leadership had thus made 
prudent use of its traditional power resources in combination with the domestic 
pressures, which had been generated by the Maastricht treaty, in order to exercise 
strong direct influence on the institutionalisation of a major policy area: 
'( ... ) negotiators could point to the requirements of domestic law concerning the 
Bundesbank's autonomy or concerning fiscal prudence in order to exert leverage in 
technical negotiations on the economic criteria for the third stage of EMU and on 
the constitutional-legal situation for the European Central Bank. This position was 
enhanced by traditional power resources (for example, the strength of the deutsche 
mark and the organisational prestige of the Bundesbank), such that Germany was 
in a strong position to influence both the terms of transition to an EMU and its 
subsequent evolution ( ... ).' (Bulmer, 1997, p.74) 
The result was a prime example of 'direct institutional export', which showed that the 
unified Germany was well capable of securing its national interests. Even though the 
German public continued to perceive the abolition of the Deutsche Mark as a major 
sacrifice, Germany had at least managed to influence the organisation of EMU along 
the lines of its own economic interests, at least as they were defined by the 
Bundesbank: 
'( ... ) most of the technical conditions it had set out for the road to EMU were 
accepted, most notably an iron-clad guarantee of the independence of any ECB (to 
be located, of course, in Frankfurt) and of its commitment to Stabilitiitspolitik, and 
the imposition of tough convergence criteria as preconditions for EMU 
membership ( ... ) This allowed Helmut Kohl rightly to boast of the deutsche 
Handschrift on this part of the Treaty, and presented an example of German 
institutional export of far-reaching significance for the future development of the 
EU.' (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, pp. 41-42). 
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The post-Maastricht change in German European policy has thus become obvious: in 
response to the high financial burden of reunification and the increased fragmentation 
of domestic interests, Germany has become more willing to overtly defend its 
interests on the European level. The fact that Germany had so openly campaigned for 
its interests in the context of EMU showed that the country 'had broken with its past 
habit of playing "junior partner" in the launching of major EU initiatives' (Kirchner, 
1996, p. 160). In the post-Maastricht developments in the course of the 1990s, 
Germany consequently showed a more self-confident manner on the European stage 
and did not shy away from putting forward its own positions on major issues. 
The prime example for this was the paper published in 1994 by two European policy 
experts of the CDU, Wolf gang Schauble and Karl Lamers. They made a number of 
proposals on the development of a multi-speed Europe (Schauble and Lamers, 1998, 
pp. 71). The paper, which contained many ideas Chancellor Kohl shared, but could 
not put forward himself (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p. 80), was a 
surprisingly bold unilateral step which showed that the unified Germany was self-
confident enough to make its own proposals on the future of the EU. Contrary to 
Germany's traditional pre-1989 approach, the paper had not been agreed with any of 
Germany's European partners, not even with France. This was not a sign of a new 
German unilateralism, but simply an expression of Germany's willingness to act in 
accordance with its increased economic and political weight after reunification. The 
paper was hence another sign for the gradual 'normalisation' of German European 
policy, in the course of which the now fully sovereign Germany adopted a behaviour 
which had been normal for most other EU member states for decades. 
Because 'the positions and preferences of Germany are relevant for a larger number 
of topics on the European agenda than those of most of the other member states' 
(Janning, 1996, p. 34), the unified Germany feels almost obliged to develop its own 
ideas on the future of Europe in order to fulfil the expectations among its partners in 
the EU. After Maastricht, Germany has therefore become less concerned about how 
its behaviour on the European stage is perceived by its neighbours: 
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'Also in this area, the Germans follow the level of attitudes of other nation states. 
A feeling spreads in which the now formally sovereign foreign policy of the 
Federal Republic is examined in respect of whether it is really independent. (Korte, 
1997, p.53) 
A greater willingness to openly bargain for national interests on the EU level, 
including the setting of limits to integration where the effects are deemed to be 
undesirable for Germany, had already begun under Kohl. At the 1997 IGC in 
Amsterdam, which should have led to a profound revision of the Maastricht Treaty, 
the Kohl administration made clear that the greater domestic scepticism and scrutiny 
with regard to further integrationist steps would no longer allow Germany to maintain 
an uncritical stance towards integration. Germany therefore rejected the attempts of 
the newly elected Socialist French government under Lionel Jospin to link the 
Stability Pact for EMU, which still had to be signed, with the creation of a common 
European employment policy (Weidenfeld and Giering, 1998, p. 32). The dispute 
about this issue between the two main advocates of integration, France and Germany, 
overshadowed the Amsterdam summit and led to rather unsatisfactory outcomes 
(Giering, 1997, pp. 332-333; Weidenfeld and Giering, 1998, pp. 84-85). Moreover, at 
Amsterdam the Kohl administration was also not ready to agree to the extension of 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) towards social policy issues. 
The change in the German stance was therefore obvious. After the domestic 
difficulties with Maastricht, the German government was no longer ready to agree to 
integrationist measures from which Germany might not benefit but which might 
increase the financial burden of German net contributions towards the EU. 
Amsterdam had thus shown that 
'above all that there were limits to the traditional belief that Germany would make 
more sacrifices than others in order to maintain the Community ship on course. 
At the Amsterdam summit, the Germans acted to defend their narrow national 
interests, as perceived by Christian Democratic Chancellor Kohl. ' 
(Cole, 2001, p.68) 
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Although Germany remained principally pro-integration, this 'normalisation' of the 
German attitude towards European integration was inevitable. The larger, fully 
sovereign Germany has to shoulder the domestic financial burden of reunification and 
domestic public support for European integration would break away if German 
political leaders would maintain the cheque-book attitude of the West German 
Republic in Europe. In this respect, Glaab et al rightly point out that, especially by the 
end of the 1990s Germany faced a situation in which 
'the successes of European integration (negative and positive steps towards 
integration) have to a large degree been consumed in the awareness of the people 
( ... ) At present, a majority of the Germans rather follows the national definition of 
interests in which the value of Europe is only connected with costs.' (Glaab, Gros, 
Korte and Wagner, 1998, p. 168). 
Like for most other EU member states, European policy has thus become a normal 
part of foreign policy and 'is no longer an idealistically excessive special case' (Ibid, 
p.167) which has to be supported at all costs. Germany still remains committed to 
progress in European integration and wants to maintain its status as one of the main 
engines behind the integration process. However, the unreal and uncritical pre-1989 
embrace of everything European has to a certain degree come to an end. Instead, after 
the high point of integration at Maastricht, this 'has given way to the demands of 
more normal circumstances and sober analysis by policy elites' (Bulmer and Paterson, 
1996, p.1). 
Because Kohl still maintained his pre-unification visionary rhetoric with regard to 
European integration, while he at the same time started to defend Germany's material 
interests ruthlessly, Germany's stance became increasingly incredible. Towards the 
end of the Kohl era, an increasing gap between 'rhetorical excesses of the own 
European role and the actual behaviour' (Janning and Meyer, 1998, p. 12) had thus 
opened up. 
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After the change in government in September 1998, when the first SPD/Green party 
coalition came into power, the new administration tried to close this gap by talking 
more openly about Germany's national interests in Europe. Like the rest of his 
cabinet, the new Chancellor Gerhard Schroder is part of the post-war generation 
which has been politically socialised in the reformist climate of the 1960s. Other than 
the generation of post-war German leaders such as Helmut Schmidt or Helmut Kohl, 
whose attitude towards European integration had been shaped by their personal 
experiences of the scars of war, the new generation that came into power in 1998 
shows a more realist attitude towards Europe. Whereas their predecessors had seen 
the success of European integration as an issue of peace or war, the new German 
leaders have no personal experiences of the two world wars and therefore approach 
European integration in a far more pragmatic way (Hyde-Price, 2000, p. 5). 
Under Schroder, Germany is consequently far more blunt with regard to the limits of 
German contributions to the deepening of integration than under any previous 
German administration. The post-Kohl approach towards European issues is 'focused 
on making more open and "rational" calculations of cost and benefit in EU policy, 
and defining policy choices on that basis' (Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p. 35). Before 
becoming the official SPD candidate for the Chancellorship, Schroder himself has for 
long been on the Eurosceptic wing of the party. Although he has given up his initial 
scepticism towards EMU'2, Schroder had left no doubt, even before he came to 
power, that he was part of a new generation of pragmatic European politicians who 
would assess European integration by the balance between its costs and benefits 
only43. 
42 SchrMer had caused political turmoil within the SPD and Germany in the mid-1990s, when he 
branded the Euro as a 'premature birth' and a 'political adventure', which would give the SPD a major 
'national leftist issue' in the 1998 election campaign (SOddeutsche Zeitung, 'Schroder steht mit Kriti! 
an Euro-Termin al/ein', 2 January 1997 and 'Die Duftmarken der "Provinzpolitiker" " 11 September 
1997). 
43 See interview with Gerhard SchrMer in Die Zeit, 9 September 1998, 'SchrMer: Jetzt sind die 
Pragmatiker die VisionaTe'. 
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In this respect it is interesting to note that there is an obvious difference between 
Schroder and his Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who is not always happy 
with Schroder's more self-confident attitude in Europe and whose rhetoric with regard 
to European issues is far closer to that of the old generation of German leaders44. 
The new government has not principally altered Germany's pro-integration stance and 
its commitment to multilateral consultation with its European partners. It has however 
defended German national interests much more rigorously than any of its 
predecessors. The first German EU presidency under the new red-green 
administration therefore focused strongly on the aim to come to fairer share of the 
German net contributions to the EU budget: 
'Within the framework of the revision of the EU's finances we want to come to an 
increased fairness with regard to contributions and to reduce the German net 
burden to a fair amount'45. 
This was especially important with regard to the negotiations on the Agenda 2000, 
which would determine the financial framework for the enlargement process, where 
the new Schroder administration showed an unprecedentedly harsh attitude. Not only 
did the government threaten to slow down the enlargement process if the EU would 
not come to a fairer share of the financial burden (Jeffery and Handl, 1999, pp. 20-
21). 
Schroder himself also made clear that his government would be aware of the concerns 
of the German people46 with regard to the enlargement process and would therefore 
defend the national interest in the negotiations: 
44 Hans-Peter Schwarz argues that Fischer must be seen as the 'green foundling' of Kohl and Genscher 
who attaches much greater importance to the traditional German European policy emphasis of self-
/imitation and voluntary integration than SchrOder (Schwarz, 1999, p. 3) 
45 Regierungserkltirung von Bundeskanzler Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 10 November 
1998, www.bundeskanzler.de/Regierungserklaerungen-. 8561. 5 857 5/Regierungserklaerung-von-
Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-SchrOder-htm. 
46 A majority of German people fears negative consequences if the EU enlarges eastwards, which is 
why 43% of the German public are against EU enlargement (Eurobarometer 54, autumn 2000, 
http://europa.eu. intlcomml dg I O/epo/eb/eb54lhighlights.html. 
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'( ... ) there are also concerns with regard to the enlargement process. To overlook 
these concerns or to talk over them in respect of the big project as a whole, puts the 
support of the people for the opening of the European Union at risk ( ... ) Every 
negotiation result has to stand the test of reality. We will therefore only agree to a 
common position if the objective German needs on the issue are taken into 
consideration ( ... ) Everything has to be affordable within the framework of Agenda 
2000 and must also not overstretch the domestic budgets of the accession 
candidates ,47. 
Schroder consequently demanded a transitional period of seven years for the free 
movement of labour after the accession of the first CEE candidate countries to the 
EU48• The rigid stance with regard to Germany's interests in the enlargement process 
does however not mean that the new red-green coalition does not support the process. 
On the contrary, under Schroder, Germany remains strongly committed to eastward 
enlargement. It is simply an expression of the more pragmatic and 'normalised' 
attitude towards major integration issues under a new generation of German leaders, 
that national concerns and interests are openly put on the agenda. In his speech to the 
SPD party conference in Nuremberg in November 2001, Chancellor SchrOder 
therefore reiterated German support for a swift enlargement process: 
'After the fall of the Iron Curtain we want - to say it with the words of Willy 
Brandt - that also in Europe that which belongs together, grows together. ( ... ) The 
accession negotiations ( ... ) should, if possible, have been concluded with all 
candidates by the end of 2002. We hope, we can manage that.,49 
47 Rede von Bundeskanzler Schroder aul der Abschlussveranstaltung der Reg;onalgesprache der SPD-
Bundestagsfraktion, 3 April 200 I, www.bundeskanzler.delReden-.7715.27667IRede-von-
Bundeskanzler-Schroeder-auf-der-Abschlu ... htm. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Rede des SPD-Parteivorsitzenden, Bundeskanzler SchrOder zum Themenbereich Au6en- und 
Sicherheitspolitik, SPD-Bundesparteitag, NOrnberg, 20 November 2001, www.spd-
parteitag.de/servletIPB/menulI002034/index.html. 
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This new connection between pragmatism and continuity also became clear during the 
crucial Nice IGC in December 1999, which should have reformed the EU institutions 
and procedures in order to prepare them for enlargement. The German government 
had made clear from the outset that it would strongly support institutional reform but 
only if the larger size of the unified Germany's population would be taken into 
account. This was especially important with regard to the number of votes in the 
European Council, where Germany wanted an end to parity with the (in respect of the 
size of its population) smaller France. In its basic proposals for the Nice summit, the 
Schroder administration had therefore stressed that it would only be ready to give up 
its second Commissioner in the course of a reform of the Commission, if 'a sufficient 
settlement in other areas, especially with regard to the weighting of votes' 50 could be 
found. Chancellor Schroder had insisted on this issue during the intergovernmental 
negotiations at Nice and did not even shy away from falling out with the French 
'd th' 51 presl ency over e Issue . 
The greater boldness to openly stand up for Germany's national interests which 
developed under Schroder goes hand-in-hand with a general willingness to take on 
greater responsibility with regard to foreign policy issues. Under the new generation 
of leaders, Germany increasingly defines itself as a 'normal' partner in Europe, which 
openly advocates its interests but is also increasingly ready to share the risks and 
responsibilities of a fully sovereign nation. This is mainly an expression of the 
widespread feeling among Germany's new generation of political leaders that since 
1949, Germany has proven that it is a democratic and reliable partner in Europe52• 
50 Grundsatzpapier der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur Regierungskonferenz in Nizza zu den 
institutione/len Reformen, CD-Rom document supplement in Weidenfeld, 200 I. 
51 At the Nice summit, Schrtider supported other EU member states in their rejection of the French 
proposals for institutional refonn, which led to major disturbances in the Franco-Gennan relationship 
(SOddeutsche Zeitung, 'Noch keine Einigkeit uber EU-Reform', 1 December 2000; The Times, 
Schroder rejects parity with France', 4 December 2000; The Times, 'Chirac caught out by the 
numbers game', 12 December 2000). 
52 In an interview with the Daily Telegraph, Schrtider expressed the view that Gennans 'should finally 
be allowed to start expressing and feeling pride in their nationhood, ( ... ) proud of creating their post-
war democracy and culture, if not of their Gennanness' (Daily Telegraph, 'Our interests and Europe's 
are identical', 22 March 2001). 
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This new approach of multilateral responsibility became especially clear in respect of 
the changes in Germany's attitude towards military engagement. The debate about the 
increased international responsibility of the larger Germany had already started during 
Iraq's invasion into Kuwait in August 1991, which turned into the second Gulf War. 
Although West Germany had already supported the United States logistically in the 
Mediterranean sea during the 1980s and had also contributed to an international police 
force in Namibia in 1989 (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001, p.67), the German foreign 
policy consensus in the early 1990s strictly stuck with the principles of Genscherism. 
The traditional pre-1989 'civilian power' attitude, which had been personified by 
Germany's longest-standing FDP Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher stuck to 
the principle of non-military, civilian conflict resolution. The position was that the 
Grundgesetz had determined the role of the Bundeswehr as that of a 
Verteidigungsarmee (Le. an army used only for territorial defence). Any so-called out-
of area military engagement, which would not be part of the Federal Republic's 
obligation to defend an attack on NATO territory, was therefore out of question. In 
spite of repeated calls from the U.S. and other Western Allies, who formed the Gulf 
War coalition against Iraq in 1991, for Germany to deploy Bundeswehr forces 
(Frenkler, 2001 p. 51), the KohllGenscher administration therefore limited itself to 
financial contributions and to its duties as a NATO allyS3. This cautious attitude had 
been broadly in line with the views of the majority of the German public at the time, 
who broadly supported Germany's civilian approach to the conflictS4. 
Whereas the Bonn republic could easily get away with its profoundly pacifist attitude 
and the tendency to buy itself free from military risks through financial contributions, 
the pressure on the unified Germany to take on greater responsibility in accordance 
with its increased political and economic weight, grew in the early 1990s. 
S3 During the Gulf crisis, Germany sent 200 troops and 18 fighter jets to its NATO ally Turkey to 
support the country against a possible Iraqi attack. 
S4 The German domestic discussion mainly centred on the widespread accusations that the Gulf War 
was mainly about U.S. interests in Kuwaiti oil (Hyde-Price, 2001, p.!.) Moreover, especially East 
Germans strongly supported a pacifist stance, as they found it hard to come to terms with the united 
Germany's membership in the former 'enemy' alliance NATO (Maull, 2001, p.114). 
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In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the German political leaders increasingly had to 
defend themselves against 'snide comments about Bonn's "cheque-book diplomacy" 
(Hyde-Price, 2001, p.20). Although neither the German public nor the German 
political elite had wanted to realise it, Germany's post-unification international status 
would not allow the Germans to continue to 'free-ride under the American defence 
umbrella, content in the knowledge that they had excorcised the ghost of militarism 
from German soil' (Lees, 2000, p. 129). It became increasingly clear that Germany's 
partners, especially the United States, would expect the fully sovereign country to 
take on full international responsibilities, including the risks of military engagement. 
A united Germany would therefore no longer be able to limit itself to the pre-1989 
pacifist approach of the Bonn republic, which (due to the negative experiences of the 
World Wars) had defied military risks and left the major burden to its partners. For 
the unified Germany, the step from Max Weber's ethics category of 'ultimate ends' 
towards an 'ethics of responsibility , (Gerth and Mills, 1991, pp.l20) had to be taken55 • 
This was in line with the domestic discussion in Germany in the mid-l 990s, in which 
a number of academics had demanded a redefinition of the foreign policy priorities of 
the united Germany (Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p.30), among them Christian Hacke, 
who called for 
'a new foreign policy self-definition, in which a balance between power and ethics, 
between responsibility and interest, between national scope of action und global 
responsibilities is found. A powerful diplomacy, based on the willingness to use 
military force as a last resort if dictatorship and aggression endanger freedom, self-
determination and welfare, is indispensable' (Hacke, 1996, p.ll) 
The debate only bore fruit when the German head of state at the time, president 
Roman Herzog had delivered a speech to the Deutsch Gesellschaft fur Auswartige 
Politik in 1995, in which he called for a 'normalisation' of German foreign policy. 
5S The 'ethics o/ultimate ends', as characterised by Weber in his essay 'Politics as a Vocation', refuses 
force as a means of politics, and resorts to the belief in an idealistic world. In contrast, the 'ethics 0/ 
responsibility', which Weber promoted, accepts the realist character of the world as one full of 
conflicts, in which responsible action might have to include the use of force in order to prevent further 
evil. (Gerth and Mills, 1991). 
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In the speech, Herzog supported the call for an end to the foreign policy limitations 
the semi-sovereign Bonn republic had pursued because they would no longer be 
suitable for the larger, unified Germany: 
'We see more and more clearly that a policy which is unwilling to take risks can in 
the long term be more risky than the readiness to take risks ( ... ) We certainly 
cannot completely do without "hard power". We need it in order to be protected 
against genocide, aggressions and blackmail ( ... ) The quality of our engagement 
has to correspond to our increased weight, otherwise nobody in the world will take 
us seriously in the long term ( ... )' 56 
The fact that Herzog had directly criticised the traditional cheque-book diplomacy of 
the Kohl/Genscher administration made it clear that parts of the Gennan political elite 
were gradually adapting towards Gennany's new international role. Herzog obviously 
realised 'that the general public had to be conditioned to accept their country's new 
international status' (Lees, 2000, p. 129): 
'This means of course that the cheque-book is not always sufficient but that there 
will also once possibly be a demand to devote body and soul ( ... ) We should not 
take ourselves more serious than we are, but we should also not make ourselves 
smaller than we are,57 
An important constitutional hurdle towards the 'nonnalisation' of Gennan foreign 
policy was removed in the course of the debate about the Gennan military 
involvement in peace-keeping operations in fonner Jugoslavia in the early 1990s. 
Due to the increasing international pressure for Gennan participation in peace-
keeping missions, the Kohl government felt obliged to do more than just contribute 
financially. It therefore agreed to send both supply and transport units to Somalia in 
1993, as well as Gennan military personnel as part of the AWACS surveillance flights 
over Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
56 Roman Herzog's speech at the 40th anniversary of the Deutsche Gesellschaftfor Auswtirlige Po/itik, 
Bonn, 13 March 1995 (source: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Berlin). 
57 Ibid. 
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The SPD opposition, which argued that these involvements contradicted the 
regulations of the Grundgesetz, consequently appealed to the Federal Constitutional 
Court in order to clarify the issue. The decision of the Court on 12 July 1994 
confirmed that under article 24 of the Grundgesetz, the federal government would be 
entitled to commit German troops to multilateral international peace-keeping 
missions. The only precondition was that in each case of German military 
involvement, a majority of MPs in the German Bundestag would have to agree to the 
mission (Parlamentsvorbehalt) (Hacker, 1995, pp. 258-259). This clarification of the 
constitutional background of German military involvements paved the way for a 
gradual 'normalisation' of German foreign policy and especially for the major steps 
undertaken by the Schroder administration in this area. 
The first red-green coalition in Germany's history would have never expected that it 
would be up to them to introduce a fundamental change in German foreign policy, 
namely the first the Bundeswehr involvement in an active combat mission outside 
NATO territory since the Second World War. Both the SPD and even more so the 
Green Party had become the home for many traditional pacifists who valued and 
defended the Germany's post-war civilian power status which rejected any 
involvement in military combat outside the obligation to defend NATO territory 
against a possible attack. Especially the Green party had mainly managed to establish 
itself as part of the political establishment of the Bonn republic as a result of the 
opposition of many left-wingers towards the NATO dual track decision to deploy new 
missiles in Western Europe, which had been strongly advocated by SPD Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt. 
Formed as a political party out of a number of groups from the peace movement of the 
1970s, the Green Party consequently entered the West German Bundestag for the first 
time in 1983, in which it promoted German neutrality and disarmament. In this 
respect, the Green Party initially had stood for the classic example of Weber's ethic of 
ultimate ends: 
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'As a political grouping which had its West German roots in the peace movement, 
the party contained a strong and principled pacifist wing and thus rejected any use 
of force. and had demanded the dismantling of the Bundeswehr and the 
substitution of NATO with collective security arrangements within the CSCE and 
the UN. West German Greens also rejected any German participation in United 
Nations peace-keeping missions.' (Hyde-Price, 2001, p.112) 
It was only during the atrocities in former Jugoslavia in the early/mid-1990s that the 
Greens gradually started a debate about the possible, limited use of force in order to 
protect human rights. The general party line, however, remained one of the rejection 
of force and a focus on civilian, non-military conflict resolutionS 8 . 
The SPD held a similar. although not quite as fundamentalist position with regard to 
German military involvement. The Grundsatzprogramm the party had established at 
the Berlin party conference in 1989, which officially is still the party's basic 
manifesto today and was revised at the party conference in Leipzig in 1998. explicitly 
commits the party to a pacifist stance 
'War must not be a means of politics ( ... ) It is our goal to replace the military 
alliances through a European peace framework ( ... ) The Bundeswehr has its place 
in the concept of common security. It must only serve the purpose of defending our 
country. Its mission is the prevention of war through the structural inability to 
attack ( ... ) The goal of peace policy is to make troops unnecessary.,S9 
The SPD therefore had always been a home to pacifists, although its pacifist wing had 
never been as big as that of the Green Party. Throughout the early 1990s, the SPD 
continued to oppose the Kohl administration's hesitant attempts to 'normalise' 
German foreign policy by sending logistic support for peace-keeping missions (Maull, 
2001, pp. 111-112). 
S8 Only in 1995, Joschka Fischer had still warned about possible attempts to 'militarize' German 
foreign policy (Fischer, 1995, pp. 228). 
59 Grundsalzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, passed in Berlin, 20 December 
1989, modified in Leipzig, 17 April 1998, pp.l5-16. 
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Through its challenge of the government's policy at the Federal Supreme Court, the 
SPD had also brought about the crucial decision of July 1994. The pacifist tradition of 
both parties was reflected in the coalition agreement both parties signed after they had 
come to power in 1998. In the agreement, both parties define Germany's foreign 
policy completely in terms of the traditional pre-1989 civilian power tradition: 
'German foreign policy is peace policy. The new federal government will develop 
the essential features of the previous German foreign policy further ( ... ) The basic 
elements of it are the observance of international law, the promotion of human 
rights, the openness to dialogue, the renunciation of force and confidence 
building. ,60 
The coalition agreement further stressed that the new government would only agree to 
the involvement of Bundeswehr troops in peace-keeping missions, if these missions 
were based on a U.N. mandate: 
'The participation of German troops in measures to secure world peace and 
international security is bound to the compliance with international law and the 
German constitutional law. The new government will actively promote the 
preservation of the United Nation's monopoly of force and the strengthening of the 
role of the United Nation's general secretary.'61 
The government's noble intentions in this respect were harshly challenged after only a 
few months in office, when the ongoing violence in Kosovo between the Serbian 
army and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) escalated and led to an increasing 
number of atrocities against the Albanian civilian popUlation from the part of the 
Serbian military. In order to stop the Serbian aggression, NATO had decided to start 
an air raid campaign on Serbia in March 1999. Germany's NATO allies pressured 
Germany to actively take part in the campaign. As a result, for the first time since the 
Second World War, a German government faced the challenge of sending German 
military into an active combat mission. 
60 Koalitionsvertrag SPD-BUndnis90/Grtlne , 1998, Chapter 11, article 1 and 7, 
www.bundesregierung.de/dokumentlSch werpunkte/Koalitionsvertrag. 
61 Ibid. 
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That it was above all the first red-green coalition in Germany's history who faced 
such a decision was probably a particular irony of the events of history. On the other 
hand, it made the change towards the'normalisation' of German foreign policy far 
more credible than it would have been under a government led by the CDU/CSU. The 
fact that the two parties, who had for so long been the standard bearers of Germany's 
post-war civilian power tradition made the decision to send German troops into their 
first combat mission since 1945, therefore marked a major shift in the foreign policy 
of the unified Germany. 
The major figures of the government had to use all their political clout and rhetoric 
skills in order to convince their parties of the soundness of the decision. Both 
Chancellor Schrl)der, Foreign Minister Fischer, as well as SPD defence minister 
Rudolf Scharping were convinced, that the humanitarian crisis on Europe's doorstep 
justified the involvement of the Bundeswehr in the air raid campaign against Serbia. 
The situation in Kosovo, where thousands of Albanian families had been murdered 
and driven away from their homes by the Serbian military, presented a classic case of 
the fundamental abuse of human rights. Both the SPD and the Green party leadership 
therefore sensed an obligation to act. 
Schrl)der stressed this in his televised address to the German people, in which he 
announced that Germany would participate in the NATO bombing campaign against 
Serbia: 
'We defend freedom, democracy and human rights. We cannot allow that, only one 
hour away from here by air, these values are treated with contempt. Bundeswehr 
forces are also part of the NATO operation. That was the decision of the federal 
government and the German Bundestag - in accordance with the will of the large 
majority of the people. ,62 
62 Erklarung von Bundeskanzler SchriJder zur Lage im Kosovo, 24 March 1999, 
www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix 1 1696.htm. 
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Schroder could refer to the fact that indeed a majority of Germans supported the 
involvement of the Bundeswehr in the campaign against Serbia63 . This was especially 
remarkable because the NATO campaign had not been based on a V.N. mandate, 
usually a prerequisite for any German involvement in out-of-area missions. The 
human rights case seemed to be obviously strong enough to cause a major shift of 
attitude among both the German political establishment and the public. This became 
especially clear with regard to the change of stance in the Green Party. 
Joschka Fischer successfully managed to convince the majority of the party delegates 
of the government's position after long and turbulent debates at the party conference 
in Bielefeld on May 13th 199964• As a mirror of the German public's soul in respect of 
their uneasiness with military engagement, the Green party reflected the change in the 
public mood which had been caused by the atrocities in Kosovo. Now even a majority 
of the Green party supported a military campaign which had not been sanctioned by 
the V.N., even ifit did so reluctantly: 
'We have supported the intervention of NATO air forces in Jugoslavia since it 
began on March 24th in spite of numerous, concerns, especially with regard to the 
international law, because we were hoping that this would create a possibility to 
stop the criminal policy of the Serbian leadership against the Albanian majority in 
Kosovo ( ... ) We are still aware of the dilemma which lies in a strategy to defend 
human rights, which includes an undoubtedly violation against existing 
international rights. ,65. 
63 At the time of the bombing campaign in March 1999, 58% of the German public supported the 
involvement in the air strikes as part of 'the unified Germany's role in world politics'. 52% even 
supported the continuation of German participation if German soldies would die during the mission 
(Baumann and Hellmann, 2001, p.77). 
64 At the party conference, Fischer was attacked by a peace activist who threw a paint bomb at him in 
order to show his protest against the abolition of the party's pacifist principles (Die Welt, 'Fischer 
bietet seinen Gegnern unbeirrt die Stirn, 14 May 1999). 
63 'Alle Ansatze zu einer L6sung des Kosovo-Konj1iktes ernsthaft prafen " Erklarung des 
Bundesvorstandes von BONDNIS90lDIE GRONEN, 29 March 1999, 
www.gruene.de/archiv/pmlPM9903/pm99042.htm. 
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Scepticism against the new policy also existed within the SPD, although it was not as 
strong as in the case of the Green party66. Especially defence minister Rudolf 
Scharping became the main promoter of the government's stance towards the Kosovo 
crisis and helped Schr5der to counter opposition against the German military 
involvement within the SPD. At the crucial party congress on April 12th 1999, 
Scharping had managed to secure the backing of a majority of the delegates for the 
government's policy by appealing to the party's conscience with regard to human 
rights: 
'Against this background, I pose a question to all of us: Did we not write into the 
first article of our constitution: "The dignity of the human being is intangible"? Do 
we think that one could limit the responsibility which is derived from that to the 
territory of our state? What is the value of international solidarity and fraternity, if 
we do not find the strength to help and to end the killing at least where we can?,67 
Forced to come to a decision by the tragic events in Kosovo, the unified Germany, led 
by a rather inexperienced administration, had fmally decided to close the gap between 
its claims to have become a 'normal' European state with obvious national interests 
and its reluctance to take on full burden-sharing. 
Supported by the majority of the German public and the political elite68, the SchrOder 
administration had risked its political survival by forcing Germany to adapt to its 
increased international weight. It had become clear that Gennany did no longer want 
to be treated exceptionally and was therefore ready to shoulder the full burden of the 
fully sovereign status it had gained after reunification: 
66 The former SPD leader and finance minister Oskar Lafontaine who had only stepped down a few 
weeks before the Kosovo intervention headed the public campaign against the goverment decision 
(Lafontaine, 1999, p.32). He was supported by Willy 8randt's former foreign policy advisor, Egon 
8ahr (Die Zeit, 'Lieber Egon, lieber Erhard',] 7, 22 April ]999). 
67 Rede Von Verteidigungsminister Rudolf Scharping aul dem SPD Bundesparteitag, 12 April 1999, 
http://archiv.spd.de/suche/archiv/verantwortunglredenlscharping.php3. 
68 Apart from a few dissidents within the red-green coalition, the East German successor of the PDS 
was the only party which officially opposed the government policy on Kosovo in the Bundestag vote. 
This was also an expression of the continuing reluctance of the Germans in the East to agree to German 
military engagement, in contrast with the changes in the public mood in theWest (Hyde-Price, 2001, p. 
27). 
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'No other federal government had ever been confronted by the difficult decision, to 
send German troops into a joint military combat mission with our partners ( ... ) 
Against the background of our German history there must be no doubt about our 
reliability, decisiveness and strength. Germany's integration into the Western 
community of states is part of the German reason of state. We do not want a 
German special way. And we have to realise: Germany's role after the collapse of 
state socialism has changed. We cannot escape from our responsibility. ,69 
A major step towards a more responsible German foreign policy had thus been 
undertaken by an administration, which combined the traditional civilian power 
values of multilateralism and the protection of human rights with a new willingness to 
share full military risks with its partners. This new German approach of multilateral 
responsibility still values the non-violent settlement of conflicts 70 and operates strictly 
within a multilateral framework. It however also takes into account that the larger 
Germany has to face up to its international responsibilities, which include the sharing 
of the risks of military intervention. In this respect, Kosovo therefore marked a big 
step towards the 'normalisation' of German foreign policy, 
'which has been encouraged and welcomed by Germany's allies and partners, 
because it has taken place strictly within multilateral frameworks and ( ... ) does not 
presage the return of a political "Frankenstein monster" ( ... ), (Webber, 2001, p.l6) 
Kosovo had prepared Germany and the red-green coalition for the even stronger 
challenge of the events that were to follow the terrorist attacks on the United States of 
September 11 th 2001. This time the government went one step further and committed 
German soldiers into Afghanistan to support British and American forces in their fight 
against the terrorist Al Quaida groups of Bin Laden. 
69 Regierungserkiarung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder zur Aktuellen Lage im Kosovo, 7 
February 2002, www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix I I 699.htm. 
70 This became clear through the fact that the government tried to link its military engagement with 
new multilateral attempts to solve the Kosovo crisis peacefully. Foreign Minister Fischer initiated 
parallel multilateral negotiations (including with Russia) to find a peaceful solution. He also worked 
out a multilateral Stability Pact for Kosovo, which 'eptomises in an almost paradigmatic way a 
"Civilian Power's" approach to conflict resolution' (Maull, 2001, p.IIO). 
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German soldiers did not actively engage in combat but would have to defend 
themselves in case of an attack, which made the engagement very controversial at 
home. In his announcement of the decision to send German troops into Afghanistan, 
Chancellor Schr<Sder stressed that this policy was in line with the new German 
willingness to take on international responsibility, which would also suit German 
interests: 
'The contribution we want to make is also an expression of our willingness to take 
account of the increased German responsibility in the world. This also happens in 
Germany's own interest ( ... ) Alliance solidarity is no one-way-street. Therefore it 
is now important to contribute our share to solidarity, which is committed to our 
common goals, our common future in security and freedom.,7l 
Foreign Minister Fischer clarified that the engagement in Afghanistan would be 
necessary to maintain Germany's goal to promote the policy of multilateral 
responsibility on the international stage, as part of a new global role for Europe: 
'Germany will have to take on greater international responsibility ( ... ) Even if 
everybody talks about military responsibility, it is mainly political responsibility. 
This has nothing to do with German hegemonial ambitions from unhappy 
memories. We are part of Europe and this Europe as a whole has global interests 
( ... ) As part of multilateral structures, we contribute to the existence of a policy of 
responsibility. ,72 
Both Schr5der and Fischer had linked the Afghanistan decision with their political 
survival73 and had secured the backing of their parties in the end. 
71 Regierungserk/drung des Bundeskanzlers zur Beteiligung bewajJneter deutscher Streitkrdfte an der 
Bekdmp/ung des internationalen Te"orismus, 8 November 2001, 
www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede620941499.htm 
72 Interview with Joschka Fischer in the Sfiddeutsche Zeitung, 18 October 200 I. 
73 SchrOder had requested a vote of confidence in the Bundestag in connection with the issue and 
Fischer had announced that he would resign as Foreign Minister if his party would not back him 
(SUddeutsche Zeitung, 'Fischer droht Griinen mit Rucktritt', 8 November 2001 and 'Schroder macht 
den Grunen Zugestdndnisse', 14 November 2001). 
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The Chancellor found it easy to get the support of his party at the party conference in 
Nuremberg (19th-22th November 2001)74, whereas Fischer again had to use all his 
rhetorical skills to keep his party on board and in government at the Rostock party 
conference (November 24-2Sth 2001)75. The military engagement in Afghanistan 
found a broad majority in the German Bundestag with only 3S MPs voting against the 
deployment of German troops, including all members of the PDS76. 
The fact that the Schoder administration managed to get the backing for the 
Afghanistan mission both in parliament and within the SPD and the Green party 
proved those wrong who predicted that Kosovo had been a special case which would 
not show a new direction of German foreign policy. The Chancellor could therefore 
convincingly stress that with the military engagement in Kosovo and especially in 
Afghanistan, where German ground troops are involved, his administration had 
opened up a new chapter in German foreign policy: 
'Only ten years ago, nobody would have expected from us that Germany should 
participate in international efforts to secure freedom, justice and stability, other 
than through something like "secondary aid" ( ... ) This stage of German post-war 
policy ( ... ) is over for good. ( ... ) The readiness to take account of our increased 
responsibility for international security also means a new self-definition of German 
foreign policy. To take over international responsibility, while avoiding every 
immediate risk, can and must not be the guideline of German foreign and security 
policy,77. 
74 Die Welt, 'Der Kanzler pocht auf seinen Machtanspruch', 21 November 2001. 
7S Stlddeutsche Zeitung, 'Griinen-Basis H akzeptiert" Kriegseinsatz', 25 November 2001. 
76 Die Welt, 'Bundestag stimmt Bundeswehr-Einsatz in Afghanistan zu', 22 December 200 I. 
77 Regierungserkliirung von Bundeskanzler Schroder zur aktuellen Lage nach Beginn der Operation 
gegen den internationalen Terrorism us, 11 October 2001, 
httj>:llwww.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix629041499.htm. 
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The fact that the fonner communist PDS is the only party in the Gennan Bundestag 
which opposes the gradual 'nonnalisation' of Gennan foreign policy and that the 
majority of the SPD and the Green party changed their pacifist stance during their 
time in government, makes the changes all the more fundamental. The red-green 
coalition has thus achieved a shift in Gennany's domestic foreign policy consensus 
that none would have expected from a government fonned by the two parties that had 
fundamentally opposed these changes during the Kohl era. Because they did, the 
'nonnalisation' of Gennan foreign policy has become part of the foreign policy 
tradition of continuity, which will outlive any future change in government: 
'Gennany is now as normal as all other states in the alliance with regard to all 
questions which concern military operations. It decides from case to case, in 
which, like anywhere else, foreign policy and domestic consideration plays the 
decisive role. That it was the red-green coalition which has thrown the taboo of the 
U.N. mandate overboard represents one of the miracles, of which the world is full 
( ... ) Some observers have imagined then how the SPD and the Greens would have 
reacted, if a CDU/CSU and FDP majority would have sanctioned the order to go 
into action. But that is how foreign policy continuity materialises.' (Schwarz, 1999, 
p.6) 
After the end of the Kohl era, the Gennan priorities with regard to its foreign and 
European policy have not been completely transformed but they have been adapted to 
the changes that unification inevitably has brought about. These changes inevitable 
demanded that Gennany came to tenns with the fact that it is no longer the semi-
sovereign Bonn republic, but now a fully sovereign country and above all now the 
largest country in Europe. 
The expectations among Germany's partners to play a more active role in Europe and 
on the global stage have therefore grown and will continue to do so (Hellmann, 1999, 
p.50). A new generation of leaders with a new approach towards European issues has 
entered the political stage in Gennany and has managed to bridge the gap between 
Germany's foreign policy tradition and its future challenges. 
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German foreign policy remaIns reliable and within the post-war tradition of 
transatlantic solidarity and European engagement, but 
'C ... ) it is no longer the result of what Gerhard Schroder calls the 'constraint of the 
conditions', it is far more part of a German foreign policy which is more active, 
more determined and more endeavoured to defend the national interests' 
CVemet, 1999, p.16) 
1.3. Outlook: A 'normal' partner in Europe? 
A new chapter has been opened in Germany's European policy, but it contains many 
old pages. The peaceful end to the artificial division of the German people into two 
states as a result of the atrocities of the Second World War has not only turned 
Germany into the country with the biggest population in Europe, it has also moved it 
into a central position, which will become even more important once the EU enlarges 
into Central and Eastern Europe. Germany's new status as a 'middle power' has 
therefore become a fact which the German political elite is increasingly taking into 
account78. Since reunification in 1990, the Germans had to gradually adapt to new 
internal and external circumstances, which made clear that the larger Germany could 
no longer restrict itselfto the cosy status of the old Bonn republic. 
Increasingly troubled by the domestic financial and economic burden of 
reunification 79, a new generation of German leaders had to bridge the gap between a 
more Eurosceptic mood among the German public and new external demands from its 
partners. 
78 In an interview with Die Zeit on 10 March 2002, Chancellor SchrOder accepted that 'Germany is a 
middle power and has to live up to this responsibility.', Die Zeit, "Wir schicken So/do/en, urn sie 
einzusetzen", 10 March 2002. 
79 At present, the former draught horse of Europe is in decline. Due to the reluctance to reform the 
traditional economic system of Rhine/and capitalism, which is characterized by high labour costs and 
limited flexibility, the German economy is at the lower end in Europe. For the last ten years, the 
German economy has grown by less than the European average per year, while it still had to transfer 
4.5% of its GDP to the East German Lander each year (Marsh, 2002, pp. 2-3), 
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The larger Germany could therefore no longer continue to play the role of the 
European Zahlmeister (paymaster), who would shoulder the main burden of European 
integration in order to prove its status as a European Musterschiiler80. Moreover, the 
domestic foreign policy process has become more diffuse and complicated since 
unification with the federal government having to increasingly take into account a 
variety of interests from the strengthened Liinder influence in the Bundesrat and the 
Bundestag. As a result, 'German European policy-making has, like domestic policy-
making, become a process of managing institutional pluralism' (Bulmer, Jeffery and 
Paterson, 2000, p. 125). 
Under a younger generation of political leaders, Germany has consequently shown a 
more self-confident and self-centered approach. In this respect German European 
policy has definitely become more 'British', a metaphor for a 'nonnalisation' in tenns 
of its approach towards European integration. Gone are the days were Germany could 
neglect its domestic interests in order to satisfy its partners on the European stage. 
Gennany is now as committed to the development of European integration as ever, it 
is simply increasingly behaving like most of the other European nations, which have 
to reconcile between domestic pressures and global responsibilities: 
'Thus, while Gennany is becoming a more normal ally globally (which most of its 
partners welcome), it is at the same time also becoming a more nonnal - i.e. more 
self-centered and assertive - big player regionally in European affairs ( ... )' 
(Hellmann, 1999, p.57) 
80 As a result of Germany's greater post-unification consciousness with regard to fmancial issues, the 
Ministry of Finance has become the second most important federal ministry after the Foreign Ministry 
and has gained a number of responsibilities which used to fall into the area of the Ministry of 
Economics. These include EMU, costums, the Community budget. Moreover, under the short reign of 
Oskar Lafontaine as finance minister in 1998, it has acquired further rights of official representation on 
the Community level from the Ministry of Economics (Bulmer, Maurer and Paterson, 2001, p. 188). 
After the September 2002 general election victory of the red-green coalition, Chancellor SchrOder 
decided to return these powers to the newly formed 'super ministry' of work and the economy under 
the leadership of the former prime minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, Wolfgang Clement (see Die 
Well, 'Eichels Erfolgsstory scheint beendet', 21 October 2002). 
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The new Gennany's European policy will therefore be increasingly characterized by a 
combination of 'pragmatism, emphasis of interests, European willingness to act and 
( ... ) occasionally also stubbornness' (Meyer, 1999, p. 580). The fully sovereign status 
of the unified Gennany has also not come without a price. 
Gennany's partners had expected that it would shake off its reluctance to take on 
greater international responsibility even quicker than it has actually done. The 
'nonnalisation' of Gennan foreign policy in terms of its increasing willingness to 
share the full burden of international military engagement (as shown in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan) has been accompanied by a discussion about Gennany's traditional post-
war status as a civilian powel1. The Bonn republic's reluctance to use military force 
as a means of conflict resolution and its almost fundamentalist pacifist attitude 
towards international diplomacy definitely fulfilled the criteria of a classic civilian 
power. The new willingness of the united Gennany to engage in military combat 
missions since the late 1990s do at least suggest a modification of Gennany's civilian 
power attitude, which now includes 'the possibility of the use of force under certain 
circumstances' (Maull, 2001, p.l20). 
More adequate, however, is the description of Gennany post-Kosovo and Afghanistan 
as a ' "nonnal" civilian power' (Webber, 2001, p. 32), which still essentially pursues 
the civilian power goals of civilising world politics through a profoundly multilateral 
approach and the use of military force as a last resort only. Especially during the 
Kosovo crisis, however, Germany 'broke with a central norm of its foreign policy 
identity as a civilian power when it acted in the NATO context without a clear UN 
Security Council mandate in Kosovo' (Harnisch, 2001, p. 51). 
Whereas the semi-sovereign West German Federal Republic definitely was a 'special 
case' in Europe, whose foreign policy could not be compared to that of other 'normal' 
European powers, the new Gennany is gradually shaking off the old constraints and is 
increasingly trying to re-join the concert of the other, 'normal' European states. 
81 The traditional civil power concept, as defined by Harnisch and Maull includes the 'willingness and 
ability to civilise international relations, ( ... ) to transfer sovereignty or autonomy to supranational 
institutions ( ... ), and the eagerness to realise a civilised international order' (Harnisch and Maull, 2001, 
p.4) 
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As a result, '( ... ) the German self-image of being a 'civilian power' different from 
other more 'traditional' Western powers is misleading.' (Baumann and Hellmann, 
2001, p.79). 
Gunther Hellmann even goes as far as to reject the notion that, since reunification, 
Germany has ever been a special case. On the contrary, Hellmann insists that post-
unification Germany has been 'no more (and no less) a power shaped by circumstance 
and choice than any of its partners in NATO and the EU'. This would mean that the 
'normalisation' process in Germany's foreign policy 'is a process of "normalisation" 
which any country experiences at any time' (Hellmann, 1999, p.3). 
The greater willingness to take on international responsibility should therefore be seen 
as 
'a translation of "normalisation" into German by spelling out the multiple 
meanings of the term in the political and historical context of the country' (Ibid, 
p.2S). 
The 'normalisation' of German foreign policy has hence not led to a complete re-
definition of the country's foreign policy principles but has rather taken place within 
their framework. The united Germany remains committed to its traditional post-war 
integration into the West through NATO and EU, which allows it to exercise its 
multilateral approach to international affairs. 
Germany still pursues classic civilian power goals in its foreign policy, which are 
aimed at multilateral conflict resolution through international organisations and the 
use of force only as a last resort. The 'normalisation' of its attitude towards military 
engagement has however modified Germany's pre-1990 fundamentalist civilian 
approach by a new policy of multilateral responsibility. 
In this respect, Germany is now still a promoter of peaceful diplomacy but has 
become less of a special case in Europe, but rather 'a normal European state, one, 
however with special engagements' (Wessels, 2001, p.113). 
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Especially with regard to its European policy, Germany has become more self-
centered and pragmatic in its approach because it has to face up to its new status as 
the central power in Europe, with the prospect of becoming the leading power in an 
EU that has enlarged into Central and Eastern Europe. 
With regard to Germany's growing economic troubles and financial problems, it is 
still difficult for the unified Germany to live up to the financial demands which come 
with a normalisation of its foreign policy, especially in military terms. 
Germany will remain a 'European "medium power of power of the centre" , (Link, 
2001, p.561) and will continue to avoid any hegemonial aspirations, but its strong 
links with both its partners in the West and East82 make a more important role for 
Germany in a larger Europe almost unavoidable: 
'The European framework for a leading role of German European policy seem 
favourable: size, resources and geographical position turn Germany into a key state 
of the enlarged European Union ( ... )' (Janning, 1999, p. 352) 
Germany will have to make prudent use of its central position in order to counter fears 
among its neighbours that it might aspire a new hegemonial position in an enlarged 
EU. On the contrary, German policy-makers will have to develop a process of 
diplomacy, in which Germany proves that it can use its more self-confident attitude as 
a 'normal' power in the centre of Europe in order to re-unite the European continent: 
'It is especially important however, that the reunified Germany is endeavoured to 
integrate the CEE countries into the EU, which means to also create the 
'institutionalised constraints' in the East and therefore to 'Europeanise' the 
German engagement in Central and Eastern Europe as well as establishing a 
European balance-of-power, instead of creating a German sphere of influence or a 
"Germanization" , (Link, 2001, p. 558). 
82 Since reunification, Germany's share with regard to EU exports to the CEE-6 countries (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) has risen from 36.05% in 1989 to 51.43% in 
1995 (source: Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 2001, p. 43) 
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Fears about a possible re-nationalisation of German European policy are nevertheless 
unfounded, as the new generation of German leaders have no ambitions whatsoever to 
use Germanys increased weight to return to the nationalistic power politics of the past. 
On the contrary, German society is deeply committed to the continuation of the 
principles of multilateral co-operation and peaceful co-existence with its neighbours 
in Europe, which have helped to re-integrate Germany into the concert of peaceful 
nations after 1945: 
'Germany's national identity and its dominant foreign policy role conceptions are 
those of a 'normal' Zivilmacht, committed to the shaping of pan-European co-
operative security order buttressed by enlarged Euro-Atlantic structures.' (Hyde-
Price, 2000, p.223). 
Germany will therefore have to exercise leaderships3 in Europe but it will do so in 
close consultation with its partners and in order to deepen the process of European 
integration further. In this respect, it will be advantageous for Europe that Germany 
has become more self-confident and 'normal', because although it is expecting fairer 
burden-sharing from its partners, Germany is now also ready to take on greater 
responsibilities. Germany has still not completely found its role in the emerging new 
Europe but it is in the process of re-defining its position and adapting to the changes 
all EU member states will have to face. In this respect, ten years after reunification 
Germany is still a country in transition. It has already moved forward quite a stretch 
of the road, but there is still quite a way to go, which leaves Germany as insecure 
about the future, as the rest of Europe is at present: 
'German politics says goodbye to yesterday, but with hesitation. And it prepares 
for the new, without jubilation. Schroder, the crisis manager, has so far followed 
this path with determination, but now a touch of insecurity covers everything, even 
for him. To become "normal" is pretty hard, as you can see.,84 
83 In an interview with The Times in February 2002, Chancellor SchrOder accepted that Gennany will 
have to play a leading role in helping the EU to face up to the big tasks ahead (The Times, The euro 
Chancellor. 22 February 2002). 
84 Gunter Hofinann in Die Zeit, 'Und jetzt in Reih und Glied', 8 November 200 I. 
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Chapter 2: The reluctant European: Britain and European 
integration since 1945 
Britain's relationship with continental Europe has never been an easy one. Britain's 
attitude towards the unfolding, post-war project of European integration consequently 
differed fundamentally from those of its continental neighbours. Although from a 
continental perspective, Britain has always been considered to be a part of Europe, the 
British often prefer to take a different view point. As Britain is separated from the 
continent in geographical terms, the British have traditionally shown a tendency to see 
themselves as being more than just another European country. British self-definition 
amounts to a subconscious belief that they represent a special nation, which is quite 
different from any of its continental neighbours. Closely connected with this is the 
British view of the continent as a permanent source of potential trouble. The British 
have therefore traditionally been rather content with the geographic isolation their 
island grants. An isolation, which has allowed Britain to maintain its distance from a 
troublesome continent and to control any political or military engagement. Moreover, 
Britain's insular status has generally spared the country the humiliating fate of foreign 
occupation, which many of its continental neighbours have had to repeatedly bear. 
Britain was therefore free to occupy itself fully with the development of its role as a 
world power, based on a global Empire of nations, which it succeeded in maintaining 
until the close of the 1950s. 
For the British, the development of their global Empire only confirmed the view that 
their geographical separateness had not just emerged as an accident of nature, but was 
a product of 'divine will' (Barzini, 1983, p. 59), designed to enable the country to 
develop a global role. As a result, any long-term commitment to the European 
continent was generally deemed a danger to Britain's natural role as a proud, 
independent nation. Especially any involvement in institutionalised European 
integration, such as was unfolding on the continent after 1945, which might limit 
Britain's freedom to act independently. 
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To agree to bind themselves into an institutionalised European framework, would 
have amounted to an admission on the part of the British that their historical freedom 
for independent action and unique distinctiveness, had started to fade in the wake of 
the Second World War. Instead of joining a project which, from the British point of 
view, was likely to fail anyway (George, 1998, p. 39) and would have limited the 
country in its global approach, Britain tried to maintain the special relationship it had 
forged with the U.S.A. during the Second World War. By maintaining its distance 
from Europe and the post war European integration project, Britain sought to 
perpetuate the notion it was different from the continent. Based on its links with the 
Commonwealth and the special relationship with the V.S., Britain hoped to maintain 
its independent status as a world power, while keeping Europe at arms length. The 
country only moved closer to Europe when it realised it could no longer afford to 
maintain the illusion of being a Great Power, without inflicting serious damage on its 
economy. It was the decline of the British Empire and the domestic economic troubles 
of the 1950s and 1970s, that forced British leaders to pay more and more attention to 
the European integration project. They did so reluctantly and without surrendering the 
notion of maintaining Britain's global role. This showed that Britain had not suddenly 
developed an enthusiasm for European integration, but had warmed to membership of 
the Common Market, simply because it wanted to become part of an economically 
successful club of continental Europeans. When Britain finally joined the European 
Community after two unsuccessful applications in 1973, it remained a reluctant player 
which never fully shared the idealism of the continental member states. In terms of its 
membership of the European Community, the UK has therefore 'often fallen behind 
and had no choice but to catch up' (May, 1999, p. 92). This has been the case under 
successive British governments, regardless of their political orientation. Only under 
the present, fundamentally pro-European Labour government, has a new debate about 
Britain's role in Europe gradually emerged, which focuses mainly on the controversial 
issue of British membership of the Single European Currency. 
This chapter looks at the main reasons behind Britain's traditional reluctance to 
commit itself fully to Europe, and the changes the Blair government has made in 
terms of Britain's attitude towards the European Union. 
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The main factors to be considered are: 
• The impact of Britain's geographically insular position 
• Britain's unoccupied and victorious status during the two World Wars 
• The unbroken tradition of the British state and its political system 
• Relations with the former British colonies within the Commonwealth 
• The special relationship with the United States 
2.1. The geographical aspect 
Britain's island status has brought a number of advantages for the country, which is 
why most British people consider their country's geographic separation from the 
European continent as a positive attribute. 
In contrast to its neighbours on the continent, Britain found it relatively easy to 
protect itself against foreign invasion, by establishing a powerful navy. While the 
continental countries depended for their security on standing territorial armies, Britain 
was free to commit the majority of its resources to the establishment of its role as a 
naval power with a relatively small, flexible army. This paved the way for the country 
to become a world power in the course of the 19th century (Sanders, 1990, pp. 17-21). 
Britain's island position allowed the country to keep its distance from any continental 
troubles and maintain a long period of peaceful and prosperous growth. In contrast its 
continental neighbours found their own development constantly disrupted by power 
politics and nation state rivalries. This is why most of Britain's continental neighbours 
traditionally aspired to form permanent, stable alliances with like-minded nations, to 
provide them with support in case their existence was threatened by a foreign 
aggressor. In comparison, Britain had the freedom to select the level of its 
engagement in Europe and around the world. 
By forming temporary coalitions with other states, without becoming restricted by the 
obligations of membership in permanent alliances, Britain was able to focus on the 
development of its role as a world power with the realisation of its interests in various 
regions around the world (Young, 1997, p. 225) .. 
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Especially with regard to Europe, Britain had traditionally restricted its engagement to 
the maintenance of a balance of power among the European states. As long as the 
balance of power was equally distributed between the continental countries, Britain's 
leaders saw no need to commit themselves directly to European affairs and rather 
preferred to maintain a status of splendid isolation: 
'They could not afford to concentrate only on European affairs: indeed, European 
affairs held a relatively minor position in their perceptions, except when 
continental European states threatened to disrupt the world order set up and 
maintained by Britain. British policy towards Europe throughout the nineteenth 
century and into the early twentieth century was to promote a balance of power on 
the Continent, such that no one state could dominate. If there were a threat of that 
balance being irrevocably tilted in one direction, the British counterweight was 
thrown into the other pan of the scale ( ... )' (George, 1998, p. 12) 
Any intervention on the European continent was based on prudent and well-informed 
diplomacy on the part of the British, which would safeguard the effective upholding 
of the balance of power principle8s• The main aim of this approach was certainly the 
prevention of the emergence of any threat to Britain's interests around the world. 
Although Britain was reluctant to engage itself in European affairs, it nevertheless 
remained vigilant towards the possible emergence of a predominant continental 
power. 
The British were always aware that any state or group of states, which would seek to 
dominate the continent might 'enable that state either to weaken Britain's link with its 
Empire or to challenge its dominant commercial position in world trade' (Sanders, 
1990, p.18). The major examples of such incidents, when Britain felt the need to 
intervene militarily, occurred during the Napoleonic period, when France increased its 
power in Europe and against Germany's attempts to dominate Europe in 1914 and 
1939. 
85 Luigi Barzini describes the British policy of selective engagement on the continent as a mixture 
between diplomatic efforts and military engagement, in which 'British statesmen ( ... ), fully informed 
by their secret agents of what went on behind the scenes in foreign countries, managed to preserve the 
peace of Europe and the world (or, some said, occasionally provoked a small useful war) by 
relentlessly pursuing (or sometimes disrupting) the balance of power, with the unruffled steadfastness 
of the gambler who alone possesses a fool-proof scientific martingale.' (Barzini, 1983, p.44). 
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Britain's intervention on the continent during the First World War not only prevented 
German predominance in Europe but also allowed Britain to maintain its role as a 
world power, which had come under strain early in the 20th century. Britain's role as 
the leading naval power in the world had increasingly been challenged by Japan and 
Germany, who both managed to expand their naval powers significantly. Due to a 
parallel decline in Britain's manufacturing industry, the country found it increasingly 
hard to live up to the demands of its global role in financial terms. The fact that 
Germany had been defeated in the First World War and that Britain had emerged the 
victor, strengthened Britain's global role significantly. It had not only set limits to 
Germany's role as a naval power but had also expanded the British Empire, upon 
which Britain's economic stability depended. By taking over various colonies from 
Germany and Turkey, Britain managed to emerge from the First World War in a 
territorially strengthened position: 
'( ... ) by 1918 ( ... ) Britain had emerged as one of the victorious powers, a Great 
Power quite prepared to extend its global role and international commitments.' 
(Sanders, 1990, p.21) 
Britain's geographic position had left the country free from invasion during the War, 
and its soldiers consequently did not have to fight on British soil, but had helped to 
defend continental countries against German occupation. Because the country did not 
have to engage in post-war continental quarrels over territorial claims, it could 
continue to pursue its traditional approach of selective engagement towards Europe 
and focus on the establishment of a global, rather than a European order. 
British support for the creation of a new international order based on international law 
and 'new formal channels for co-operative diplomacy' (Sanders, 1990, p.24), such as 
the establishment of a League of Nations, therefore became the priorities after WW1. 
The fact that Britain continued to hold on to a global, rather than a regional European 
focus in its post-WWl foreign policy, contributed to the British leaders' 
misjudgement of Germany's intentions after 1936. 
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The British assumption that Nazi Germany could be contained by a policy of 
appeasement backfired badly when Germany occupied Czechoslovakia and started to 
threaten Poland. Again, the balance of power on the continent was under threat from 
an expansionist Germany, which forced Britain to assume the leadership of the Allied 
forces resisting Germany. The outbreak of a second World War within a relatively 
short time, which again had its source on the continent, strengthened the British view 
that Europe was the source of all trouble. This perception thus dominated the 
immediate post-WW2 British policy towards continental Europe: 
'During the first half of the 1950s, on the other hand, continental Europe was 
mainly regarded by both British decision-makers, and public opinion as a source of 
trouble and the symbol of uncertainty and political crisis' (Varsori, 1995, p. 15) 
Britain had also suffered enormously during the Second World War, sustaining 
serious damage to its infrastructure during the German bombardment. Moreover and 
even more importantly, Britain's traditional role as a trading nation had been 
undermined by the war, as most of Britain's financial reserves had been liquidated in 
1940. Nevertheless, although it had not been an ally of Nazi Germany, it remained the 
only major power in Europe, which had been spared the humiliating experience of 
German occupation. Like so many other European nations, Britain would have almost 
certainly been overrun by the might of the German military if it had bordered the 
continent. Britain's island position could not save the country from the destruction 
caused by German bombs, but it nevertheless increased the British confidence in its 
superiority and independence. Especially as during the Second World War, Britain 
had been turned into an island of freedom in defiance ofa Nazi occupied Europe. 
Not surprisingly, from the British point of view, WW2 had therefore rather widened 
the gap between Britain and the European continent as it had proven that, unlike its 
continental neighbours, Britain could stand firm against any foreign aggression. In 
this respect, 'the Second W orId War had reinforced the psychological de-
Europeanization of the interwar period' (Kaiser, 1999, p.8). 
The rise of Nazi Germany had confirmed the traditional British suspicion about the 
sinister nature of the peoples on the European continent: 
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'Many Britons attributed all social disturbances to sinister outside influences. The 
political clashes, the high society scandals and the gruesome murders that 
occasionally filled the popular press were generally dismissed as "inexplicable", 
mostly owing to foreign importations, to French novels or German political 
theories' (Barzini, 1983, p,42). 
The British therefore preferred to keep their distance from Europe and retreated to 
their traditional, almost casual xenophobia towards external influences from the 
'troublesome' continent. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the fog in the 
channel between Britain and the continent consequently remained dense. 
2.2 The victorious Great Power 
Britain had come out of the two World Wars as the only victorious nation in Europe 
and had successfully fought against German Nazism with the United States. Although 
Britain did not share the fate of most continental countries, which had their state 
structures extinguished by the German occupying forces, the impact of WW2 on 
British economy was profoundly adverse. 
The damages inflicted on Britain's domestic infrastructure and the cost of the military 
involvement on the continent, fundamentally weakened the country's budgetary and 
economic performance86• Britain's main interest after 1945 was therefore the 
prevention of any further conflict in Europe, which would have seriously harmed the 
British economy and any prospect of recovery. From the British point of view, after 
the troubles of the two World Wars, the re-emergence of a dominant power on the 
continent had to be avoided at all costs. Britain therefore not only shared the French 
desire to contain Germany, but was even more interested in preventing possible 
Soviet hegemony in Europe. For British leaders, continued American military 
involvement in Europe was therefore essential to deter Soviet expansionism and build 
a new post-war balance of power on the continent 
86 Wolfram Kaiser numbers the British payment deficit between 1939 and 1945 to have been 
approximately £ 1 0 billion, while British exports had been reduced by 30% in comparison to before the 
start of WW2 (Kaiser, 1999, p.l). 
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'In order to counteract the influence of the USSR it was seen in the Foreign Office 
as essential that the United States be kept in the system as a significant actor' 
(George, 1998, p.l4) 
The British leaders welcomed attempts to institutionalise the reconciliation of the 
former archenemies France and Germany, in a European framework, but they did not 
see a permanent role for their own country in such an integrated Europe. Contrary to 
the American desire that Britain should become the leading force behind European 
integration (George, 1998, p.lS), Britain saw no need to get involved in a regional 
organisation which did not suit its interests and would only limit the country in its 
global approach. 
In his famous speech at the University of ZUrich in 1946, Winston Churchill 
confirmed the British support for the development of institutionalised European 
integration, but made it clear that Britain was willing to let France and Germany take 
the lead. While the latter two were considered to be regional powers, Britain still 
classified itself as part of the group of post-war world powers: 
'In all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together. Great 
Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust Soviet 
Russia - for then indeed all would be well - must be friends and sponsors of the 
new Europe and must champion its right to live and shine,S7. 
From the British point of view, a permanent engagement in an institutionalised 
European framework would have endangered its involvement in the first two of the 
three circles of British Foreign Policy interests, as they had been determined by the 
Churchill administration after the War (Kaiser, 1999, p.2; Sanders, 1990, p.l). 
The first two of these circles, the British Commonwealth and the special relationship 
with the United States were considered to be more important to British interests than 
any involvement in the third circle, which constituted Europe and its integration 
project. 
87 Winston Churchill's speech at the University a/Zurich. 19 September 1946, source: Gowland and 
Turner, 2000, p.8. 
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They were the pillars upon which Britain tried to maintain its post-war role as a world 
power. Because British leaders continued to take a rather global approach towards 
foreign policy, they found it hard to share the motives for regional integration, which 
most continental European countries shared after WW2. The British certainly realised 
that the Second World War had harmed their economic and financial situation, but 
with regard to Britain's international standing, the focus was on continuity: 
'( ... ) Britain in the post-war years, including the 1960s, was not in fact seeking a 
role. It thought that it already had one, that the world-wide nature of this role was 
long-established and well-known and that, while there had been evolutionary 
changes, there had been no break in the continuity of its performance. ' 
(Hibbert, 1993, p. 114) 
The fact that Britain had not been defeated and occupied during any of the two World 
Wars played a big role in the British refusal to abandon its traditional foreign policy 
approach. Because Britain's fate differed so much from that of the continental 
countries, the notion of being different from the rest of Europe continued to prevail. 
The British attitude of 'us' and 'them' (May, 1999, p. 92) towards continental Europe 
therefore persisted. As a result, British leaders were quite happy to let the rest of 
Europe go ahead with the development of European integration without becoming 
involved themselves. For them, the most urgent issue was to secure the continuing 
presence of the U.S. in Europe, in order to provide peace and stability. Although 
Britain supported the reconciliation between the nations on the continent, especially 
between France and Germany, because it would help to re-establish peace and 
stability, the country's leaders saw no reason to share the continental enthusiasm for 
European integration: 
'Unlike the countries of continental Western Europe who accepted, albeit with 
varying amounts of fear and trembling, the need to reform their relations down to 
the very rudiments of statehood, Britain remained attached to the stratagems that 
had not resulted in the humiliation of June 1940 for France and the disaster of May 
1945 for Germany. Little wonder, then, that when Britain sought to make sense of 
membership of the EEC its trusted ways of thinking about the affairs of Europe 
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were unable to make sense of what was unfolding on the continent.' (Keens-Soper, 
2000,p.178) 
In contrast to the continental Europeans, who were very interested in creating a stable 
framework for lasting peace and economic stability, Britain stuck to its long-standing 
reluctance to engage in permanent co-operative alliances, which would inevitably 
involve the pooling of national sovereignty. The British leaders understood why the 
continental countries wanted to come together in such a institutionalised framework, 
but considered their own position to be too different from that of the defeated 
continentals. Britain's victorious post-WW2 status had not only confirmed the notion 
of British diversity but even more so the feeling of superiority towards the defeated 
European continent. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Britain therefore tried 
to ignore the reality of its declining international influence and attempted to punch 
above its actual weight. Neither the British public nor its political leaders seriously 
considered the option of British membership of any institutionalised European 
framework, even though early membership of the EEC may have had a beneficial 
effect on the economic recovery of Britain. The Second World War had simply 
hardened the British view of their distinctness from the continent, to allow any 
permanent engagement in a European framework to become a serious option. 
Wolfram Kaiser rightly points out that immediately after WW2, British European 
policy-making was characterised by a 'mental barrier' against anything European: 
'Whatever its economic merits, the mental barriers against closer British 
association with Western Europe, which were prevalent in the political class and 
the public at large should not be underestimated in their importance for European 
policy-making. The Second World War had reinforced the psychological de-
Europeanisation of the inter-war period.' (Kaiser, 1999, p.8) 
As a result, Britain remained in a state of 'complacent isolation' (Denman, 1997, p. 
292) and chose to refuse active involvement in the unfolding project of European 
integration. Instead, British leaders clung to the ambition to join the ranks of the 
United States and the Soviet Union as the new world powers in the post-war 
international order: 
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'So by stressing her "diversity" in comparison with Europe, Britain was also 
asserting her role as a victorious nation. Even if many Britons felt the United 
Kingdom was losing ground in the international context in comparison to the role 
played by the US or the Soviet Union, there was at least towards the "continent" a 
reassuring superiority complex' (Varsori, 1995, p.6). 
Britain's policy towards Europe after 1945 therefore was limited to partial 
engagement on an intergovernmental basis. Although British leaders considered the 
ties with the member states of the British Empire and the special relationship with the 
U.S. to be of greater importance than European issues, Britain still pursued a policy of 
selective engagement in Europe. The British post-war priorities were the containment 
of any possible Soviet threat against Western Europe and the stabilisation of the 
British national economy, as well as those of the continental countries. From the 
British perspective, these aims could be best achieved by limited co-operation 
between strong nation states in international organisations. The strong British 
engagement in the creation of NATO had its cause in the British desire to 
institutionalise the transatlantic military link with the V.S., in order to deter Soviet 
hegemony. Because the Europeans, even with British aid, were obviously incapable of 
deterring any Soviet military threat on their own. In this respect, both Britain and the 
United States shared a common goal, as both considered their national interests to be 
under serious threat should Western Europe fall under Soviet influence: 
'The long-run interests of both Britain and the United States would have been 
seriously damaged if Western Europe had succumbed to Soviet domination, 
leaving almost the entire Eurasian landmass under Stalin's control.' 
(Sanders, 1990, p.65) 
Moreover, the British leaders supported enhanced economic co-operation between the 
Europeans through a liberalisation of their national markets. Unlike the continental 
countries, which wanted to link economic co-operation with political integration, 
Britain preferred limited co-operation on an intergovernmental basis only, with no 
long-term political commitments. 
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The British alternative to membership of the EEC, was the formation of a EW'Opean 
free-trade area, the European Free Trade Association (EFT A) which was created in 
196088• This economic entity was established as an alternative to the continental 
project for European integration. It was conceived as a loose free-trade association, 
which would be open to the six founder members of the EEC, as well as any other 
European state. EFT A clearly expressed British priorities in contrast to those of 
continental Europe: 
'The major differences from the EEC were that there was no aspiration for the 
free-trade area to develop into a deeper form of economic integration, and it would 
have no common external tariff against the products of the rest of the world. It 
would be simply an agreement by the participating states to remove tariffs on trade 
between themselves.' (George, 1998, p.27) 
It was obvious Britain was ready to engage in international institutions, but only if 
they were loose and pragmatic in their approach towards international challenges. 
As long as they did not endanger Britain's freedom to act as an independent world 
power, or threaten its relations with the Commonwealth and the United States, Britain 
was ready to commit to such alliances. Due to the British scepticism towards 
visionary approaches, they could never share the enthusiastic pro-Europeanism of 
their continental neighbours. The general tendency to deal with problems in a 
pragmatic way, which is deeply embedded in the British psyche (Smith, 1995, p.2), 
made it difficult for the British to warm towards the strategic project of European 
integration: 
'Always the British want to know precisely what is meant by grand-sounding but 
vague phrases such as 'supra-nationalism' and 'European Union'. To the other 
Europeans, as to the French on this occasion, such a response is usually seen as a 
sign of Britain being awkward, and adopting a delaying or even wrecking tactic. 
To the British it seems a prudent and pragmatic course to adopt before entering 
into commitments.' (George, 1998, p. 21) 
88 It was joined by seven non-EEC countries: Britain, Denmark, Austria, Norway, Portugal, Sweden 
and Switzerland but by none of the actual members of the EEC. 
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As a result, Britain continued to look out for alternative solutions which 'did not 
involve the pooling of sovereignty in supranational bodies, and ( ... ) had to fit in with 
the US alliance and the development of the Commonwealth' (Young, 2000, p. 190). 
EFT A ultimately proved to be an unsuccessful British venture to create an alternative 
framework for Europe. Contrary to British expectations, EFT A's economic 
performance proved to be disappointing in comparison with that of the EEC countries 
(Hibbert, 1993, p. 120). Britain had managed to split Europe into two alternative 
frameworks, one aimed at 'ever closer union' and the other focused on free trade and 
market liberalisation89. The disadvantage for Britain was, that it found itself 'in the 
unfortunate position of belonging to the smaller, weaker and less dynamic of the two' 
(Gowland and Turner, 2000, p.84). 
If EFT A had been a success, Britain would not have come under increasing economic 
pressure by the end of the 1950s, and membership of the EEC would have almost 
certainly not become a serious option. However, the increasingly obvious gap in the 
economic performance of the UK and the member states of the EEC forced the British 
leaders to consider the option of British EEC membership. In comparison with most 
of the EEC member states, Britain's average annual economic performance remained 
poor throughout the 1950s. Between 1950 and 1956, Britain remained at the bottom 
of the league with regard to the economic growth of the major industrialised countries 
in Europe90• The global comparison did not present a better picture for Britain, as both 
in 1950 and 1960 the UK held the lowest rank in the world GDP ratings, even behind 
countries such as Iceland91 • 
89 Hugo Young describes the concept of EFT A as the British attempt to replace the EEC framework, a 
'fierce and narrow concept with a softer, broader one, ( ... ) an entirely different concept from the one 
the continentals had already expended massive political resources on trying to achieve' (Young, 1998, 
p.llS). 
90 See table 5.1 in Sanders, 1990, p.144. 
91 Table 4.2., ibid, p. 117. 
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At the same time, while the British elite continued to hold on to the belief that the 
country could revive its economic fortunes through trade with the Commonwealth, it 
became obvious the British economy increasingly depended on trade with continental 
Europe: 
'Already by the late 1950s, economists both inside and outside government were 
coming to the conclusion that the economic problems that Britain was experiencing 
were due in good part to the pattern of British trade, which continued to be 
oriented much more to the Commonwealth than towards Western Europe at a time 
when the fastest growth in world trade was between industrialised states' (George, 
1998, p.28) 
From the close of the Second World War, British trade with the European continent 
began to grow, resulting in a 5% rise in British imports and exports to EEC countries 
between 1948 and 1960 and a 30% rise up to 1971, two years before the UK finally 
joined the Common Market (Sanders, 1990, pp 150-151; Bulmer, 1992, p. 18). 
The consideration of a possible British application for EEC membership therefore 
became almost inevitable for the British leaders, if they wanted to take into account 
the growing domestic pressures to reverse their country's post-war economic decline. 
Connected with the growing realisation of their domestic economic troubles, was a 
fear the EEC countries might close their common market to non-member states such 
as the UK. Hence an 'irrational form of TorschlufJpan;/c, or 'fear of exclusion' 
(Nicholls, 1992, p.2) emerged among the British elite and led to a change of opinion 
on the possibility of EEC membership. Whereas immediately after the war 
membership had been considered potentially damaging for the maintenance of 
Britain's global influence, it was now seen by many as an opportunity to provide their 
country with a new base for future ambitions as an independent power: 
'Economic arguments for joining the 'common market' were fitted into a picture in 
which, far from being compromised by involvement with new fangled institutions 
linked to woolly political notions, Britain's position as an independent state would 
be refurbished by the stimulus of enlarged opportunities. 
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By helping to remedy its economic sluggishness, the 'common market' would 
strengthen Britain which would thereby be made more sturdily independent ( ... )' 
(Keens-Soper, 2000, p. 176-177) 
The Lee report, produced by a senior civil servant committee in 1960, further 
strengthened those within the British government, who advocated British application 
for EEC membership. The report stressed the likely long-term negative effects on the 
British economy, if Britain continued to pursue the weaker EFTA alternative, 
especially if such a policy might effectively exclude Britain from joining the faster 
growing EEC Common Market: 
'We have already been warned privately that ... there is great uneasmess, 
amounting almost to dismay, amongst leading industrialists at the prospect of 
fmding ourselves yoked indefinitely with the Seven and "cut off' by a tariff barrier 
from the markets of the Six' (Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 91). 
It also made clear that, if Britain continued to remam outside the EEC, the 
implications for Britain's international standing could be severely damaging in the 
long term. Especially with regard to Britain's post-war ambition to remain a leading 
power in the world. The Lee report painted a sombre picture if Britain continued to 
keep its distance from the institutional framework of the Six: 
'The Community may well emerge as a Power comparable in size and influence to 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. The pull of its new power bloc would be bound 
to dilute our influence with the rest of the world, including the Commonwealth. 
We should find ourselves replaced as the second member of the North Atlantic 
Alliance and our relative influence with the United States in all fields would 
diminish ( ... )' (Ibid, p. 91). 
The gradual warming of the MacMillan administration towards an application for 
membership of the EEC, in the wake of the Lee report, can therefore be seen 'as the 
pragmatic but sometimes reluctant acceptance of changing realities,92. 
92 Royal Institute oflntemational Affairs, 1997, p.3. 
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Although the British leaders had not at all given up the traditional world power 
ambitions for their country, they had realised that contrary to their original belief, the 
unfolding framework of continental European integration was proving to be a 
success, at least in economic terms. Moreover, apart from the expected economic 
benefits British membership of the EEC would bring, British leaders had to accept 
the fact they could not continue to challenge a community which 'was a voluntary 
organisation - not a single state seeking domination' (Young, 2000, p. 194). Britain 
had to come to terms with the reality that the EEC was on the way to 'become 
Western Europe's leading political force' (lbid, p.l94). In spite of this, British leaders 
continued to pretend that, even as a member of the EEC, Britain could maintain its 
world power status and act as independently as before. From the British point of view, 
the structures of the EEC were not binding enough to prevent Britain from pursuing 
its traditional interests. 
Faced with the necessity to join the EEC, the British elite tried to redefine the 
character of the Community as being mainly an economic organisation. In the House 
of Commons debate on EEC entry, Prime Minister MacMillan stressed that his 
government considered the EEC to be mainly an intergovernmental co-operative 
economic community: 
'I must remind the House that the E.E.C. is an economic community, not a 
defensive alliance, or a foreign policy community, or a cultural community ( ... ) 
At any rate, there is nothing in the Treaty of Rome which commits the members of 
the E.E.C .... to any kind of federalist solution, nor could such a system be 
imposed on member countries,93 
In contrast to the idea of the founding six member states, Britain therefore justified 
membership of the Community mainly through economic arguments and a belief it 
would help to restore Britain's leading role in Europe. 
93 Statement of Prime Minister Harold MacMillan to the House of Commons, 31 July 1961, source: 
Gowland and Turner, 2001, p.98) 
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While most EEC member states saw the Community as a means to maintain peace 
and economic stability in Europe, British leaders believed EEC membership could be 
used 'as a political vehicle, a prospective power bloc in which Britain would be a 
leading element if she gained access' (Nicholls, 1992, p. 3). The idea that Britain 
could remain relatively uncommitted to the Community and at the same time seek to 
change its internal power structure was a miscalculation from the start. British global 
influence continued to wane throughout the 1960s, due to the weakening of the 
Commonwealth and the declining importance the V.S. attached to the bilateral 
relationship with Britain. 
It had however been even more disillusioning for British leaders to have to find out 
that many of the EEC member states were rather lukewarm about the prospect of 
British accession to their European club. Britain had disappointed the initial high 
hopes of many continentals concerning a possible British contribution to the 
development of European integration after WW2. 
Germany had formed a close partnership with France, mainly because it was 
depending on French good-will to help it reintegrate into the community of 
democratic nations and gain a positive international standing. The Franco-German 
axis determined many of the structural and procedural developments of the integration 
process. In contrast to the early stages of the integration process, where Britain would 
have been more than welcome as a leader and mediator between the former 
adversaries France and Germany, the situation had changed once the integration 
process had taken shape. France and Germany had reconciled their former differences 
and consequently the Franco-German relationship had become the motor of the 
integration process, based on close consultation and joint initiatives between the 
French and the German leaders. Both countries had shown a convergence of 
perceptions with regard to what needed to be done in Europe after the end of the War. 
Britain had in the meantime shown a reluctant, and at times even hostile attitude 
towards the Community of the Six and had therefore confirmed its reputation as a 
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difficult partner94• The need for Britain to act as a possible mediator within the 
Community had therefore vanished. 
French president Charles de Gaulle was especially hostile towards the British bid for 
EEC membership. He not only feared that British membership could seriously 
threaten the leading French influence inside the Community of the Six (Young, 1993, 
p. 106), but was also convinced, British membership would gradually result in the 
Americanisation of the Community. De Gaulle thus considered Britain to be a 'trojan 
horse' (George, 1998, p. 35) which would gradually open up the EEC to increasing 
American influence and therefore threaten the development of a powerful integrated 
Europe, which could develop into the third global power besides the V.S. and the 
Soviet Union. When the French president had finally decided to veto the British 
application for EEC membership in 1963, he was self-confident enough to justify his 
unilateral move pUblicly. 
In a statement at the Elysee palace, de Gaulle stressed that in his opinion, Britain was 
ill-suited for membership of the Community due to its tradition as an independent 
island power and leader of a global Empire, which was fundamentally different from 
the experiences of the six EEC member states. From his point of view, British 
membership would have turned the EEC into an overstretched, Atlanticist community, 
which would no longer possess an independent European character: 
'England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her exchanges, 
her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant 
countries; ( ... ) She has in all her doings very marked and very original habits and 
traditions ( ... ) It must be agreed that first the entry of Great Britain, and then these 
States, will completely change the whole of the actions, the agreements, the 
compensations, the rules which have already been established between the Six, 
because all these States, like Britain, have very important peculiarities ... it would 
94 N. Piers Ludlow argues that, although most EEC member states, apart from France, were generally 
supportive of Britain's membership bid, they were still rather uneasy about 'Britain's reluctance to trust 
the policies and institutions of the Community' (Ludlow, 1997, p. 243). Consequently, Britain did not 
get much support from the other five EEC member states against the French reluctance to accept the 
British membership application in 1961. 
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appear as a colossal Atlantic community under American dependence and 
direction, and which would quickly have absorbed the community of Europe' .95 
Because France had established a dominant position within the Community of the Six, 
as a result of the British decision to remain outside at its foundation, the other five 
EEC member states did not try to seriously challenge the French position. Although 
basically in favour of British membership, they were too reluctant to upset the 
arduously established balance of the Community. Whereas British leaders demanded 
exceptions from the acquis communautaire which had been established in the Treaty 
of Rome, the Six were unanimous in their conviction that any enlargement of the EEC 
should not alter the existing framework (Ludlow, 1997, p. 242). De Gaulle thus found 
it relatively easy to get away with his unilateral resistance towards the British 
membership application, as the other Community members were unable 'to reconcile 
their support for enlargement with their commitment both to the Community as it 
existed, and to close co-operation with the French' (Ludlow, 1997, p. 252). 
Even more remarkable was the fact that De Gaulle managed to block British entry 
twice within a short period of time. The second British membership bid under the 
Wilson administration initially looked more promising, as the other five EEC member 
states 'were keen to resolve relations with Britain, and Britain was eager to end the 
division of Western Europe through the existence of rival trading blocs' (Young, 
2000, p. 83). Moreover, other than in 1961, the second application was not 
complicated by British demands for exceptions with regard to the adoption of the 
acquis communautaire. This was mainly due to the fact that most of the 
Commonwealth countries were now less concerned about British membership than 
they had been in 1961, as their dependence on trade with the UK had diminished 
(George, 1998, p. 37). Once again, however, Britain misjudged the scepticism of the 
French president Charles de Gaulle. 
95 Press conference of French president Charles de Gaulle at the Elysee Palace, 14 January 1963, 
source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 106. 
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De Gaulle had offered the British government the prospect of French consent to 
British EEC membership, but only if Britain was ready to back a French alternative 
framework for the development of European integration96• 
When the British leaked the French plans to the other EEC member states, de Gaulle 
felt confirmed in his view that Britain remained an unreliable partner and would 
seriously undermine French interests within the Community. Consequently, he vetoed 
the British membership application for a second time, this time arguing that the pound 
sterling would be too weak to be able to be integrated into the stable monetary group 
of the EEC countries' currencies: 
'( ... ) monetary parity and solidarity are the essential conditions of the Common 
Market and assuredly could not be extended to our neighbours across the Channel, 
unless the pound appears, one day, in a new situation and such that its future value 
appears assured. ,97 
Britain did not have to wait long for more favourable conditions on the part of the 
French, as de Gaulle resigned only two years after he had vetoed British accession to 
the EEC for the second time. His successor, Georges Pompidou had been less 
concerned about British motives in Europe, which made a further application much 
easier for the UK. Negotiations for a third British application thus started in 1970, 
under the leadership of the pro-European Prime Minister Edward Heath and were 
concluded relatively quickly, with the UK finally becoming part of the Common 
Market on January 1st 1973. The decisive point for the success of the third British 
application was that, apart from the vigour with which the Heath administration 
pursued the membership bid, French resistance had declined markedly under 
Pompidou: 
96 In a private meeting with the British ambassador Christopher Soames, de Gaulle had laid out his 
views on the future of European integration which would lead to 'a very different "Europe" from the 
EEC, a looser yet broader construct, with more pretensions and less invasions of national sovereignty 
that so offended Gaullist France' (Young, 1998, p.201). De Gaulle offered the British government the 
prospect of becoming a leading member state in this 'Gaullist' Europe, as long as the British 
government would support the French plans, which included the weakening of the transatlantic ties 
between Europe and the V.S. within NATO. 
97 Press conference by Charles de Gaulle, Paris, 16 May 1967, source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, 
p.l23. 
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'If Heath had been able to succeed where MacMillan and Wilson had failed, it was 
because of a change in French policy. Pompidou, perhaps because of his fear of 
Germany or a desire to spread the costs of the CAP, or maybe simply because he 
was not Charles de Gaulle, had decided to accept British membership after a 
decade of vain pressure from governments in London.' (Young, 1993, p.112) 
Britain nevertheless had a price to pay to finally turn its membership bid into a 
success. The EEC member states were still not ready to grant the UK any exemptions 
from the institutional and procedural framework of the Community. By the time of the 
third British application, the acquis communautaire of the EEC had grown immensely 
in comparison to the early 1960s: 
'There had been an immense accumulation of Community rules and precedents, 
even though half the decade had been spent, thanks to de Gaulle, in a condition of 
stasis ( ... ) A great deal of this was absolutely non-negotiable. That stance was laid 
down from the beginning, and within three months the British accepted it.' 
(Young, 1998,p.227) 
As a result, by 1973 Britain joined a Community which had been shaped along the 
lines of the interests of the six founding members and therefore did not really suit 
British interests (George, 1998, p.5). Britain's relatively late accession meant that the 
Heath administration had to accept unfavourable membership conditions for their 
country, in order to bring the accession negotiations to a conclusion. Britain's initial 
reluctance to become involved in the European integration process straight after the 
end of WW2 had resulted in the country paying a high price almost three decades 
later. British leaders had to accept budgetary arrangements98 and policies (such as the 
CAP) from which their country would not benefit, but which would put an additional 
burden on the British taxpayer: 
98 The British net contribution to the EEC budget amounted to £ 102.4 billion in the first year of British 
membership of the EEC. It was reduced in the following two years, but rose again sharply after 1976, 
amounting to £ 730 billion in 1976. (source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, document 8.3, p.159) 
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'When Britain actually joined in 1973, the price had become even higher, and 
Britain was for a long time the only net contributor to the Community budget apart 
from the Federal Republic' (Kaiser, 1999, p. 214) 
Moreover, the prospect that the UK, as a member state, would swiftly be able to 
challenge this unfavourable framework, was rather remote. Almost sixteen years after 
the Treaty of Rome had come into effect, the EEC had developed its own internal 
rules and procedures, which made it almost impossible for a new member like Britain 
to take on a leading role in the short term. 
Hence, the expectation on the British part, that most of the other EEC member states 
would want the new member state to take on a leading role within the Community 
was illusionary. While British leaders had originally expected to be able to use the 
Community for their own interests, similar to the way French leaders managed to 
pursue them, the reality as a member turned out to be quite different. Any attempt to 
fundamentally alter the Community structures met fierce French resistance and 
Britain could not expected to gain much support from other member states. Most of 
them, especially Germany, considered the consent of France as an indispensable basis 
for the stability and progress of the EEC and would therefore not seriously challenge 
French priorities. 
Once inside the EEC, British leaders consequently soon had to realise 
'that her relatively late entry meant that she joined a Community in which the 
economic interests of the original Six were already well entrenched and in which 
French and German political influence predominated' (Sanders, 1990, p. 160). 
Even more fundamental for British domestic interests, the expectations with regard to 
the quasi-automatic economic benefits, that membership of the Common Market 
would bring, had also been far too optimistic. The Heath administration had tried to 
justify the unfavourable membership terms for Britain with the promise of significant 
economic benefits for Britain, once it was inside the Common Market: 
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'The Heath government's case for EC membership had relied heavily on the view 
that the dynamic benefits of membership in the form of faster growth and a more 
competitive British industry would outweigh the static costs of membership arising 
out of more expensive food and raw materials imports' (Gowland and Turner, 
2000, pp. 152-153). 
In reality, however, these expectations did not materialise. British leaders had to 
realise they had joined the Common Market at an economically unfavourable time, as 
soon after British accession, most of the EEC national economies slid into recession. 
While the average GDP of the EEC member states grew throughout the 1960s, it 
declined in the 1970s after the impact of the 1973 oil crisis and the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods V.S. dollar exchange system99• Britain's hopes for a domestic 
economic revival as part of the previously booming Common European Market were 
consequently shattered: 
'The tragedy was that, shortly after Britain finally did accede to the Community in 
1973, Community growth rates - for a variety of exogenous reasons ... fell 
sharply' (Sanders, 1990, p.145) 
The VK Government had therefore promoted accession to the EEC by promising the 
British people economic prospects which could not subsequently be realised, and this 
initial disappointment contributed significantly to the disillusionment that was to 
follow once Britain had become a member. British leaders deluded themselves 'that 
membership would automatically deliver the political leadership of Western Europe to 
Britain and would spur the economic revitalisation of the British economy' 
(Kaiser,199, p. 218). The fact that these priorities could not be fulfilled, undermined 
the positive expectations that had been instilled in the British public. Both the political 
elite and the public had only warmed towards membership of the European club 
because they expected to gain political influence and an economic boost. In contrast 
to the founding members of the EEC, Britain still saw Community membership as an 
opportunity to profit from a liberalised European market. 
99 While the average annual growth rate of GDP in the EEC had stood at 4.2 % bewteen 1960 and 
1970, it fell to 2.6 % between 1970 and 1980 (source: Sanders, 1990, p. 145). 
142 
The financial disadvantages in the form of budgetary contributions and the pooling of 
national sovereignty were only accepted because they were expected to be 
outweighed by the supposed economic benefits of EEC membership. 
It was therefore not surprising that within a relatively short period of time, a renewed 
domestic discussion about EEC membership emerged, as 'EC membership was ( ... ) 
associated with economic dislocation and recession rather than growth' (May, 1999, 
p.95). As domestic economic growth remained low and unemployment was rising, the 
debate focused increasingly on the costs of Community membership, which had 
brought little benefit to Britain. Harold Wilson, was re-elected in 1974 on political 
platform, which promised to demand re-negotiations on the terms of the British 
membership of the EEC: 
'( ... ) a profound mistake made by the Heath government to accept the terms of 
entry into the Common Market, and to take us in without the consent of the British 
people. This has involved the imposition of food taxes on top of rising world 
prices, crippling fresh burdens on our balance of payments, and a draconian 
curtailment of the power of the British Parliament to settle questions affecting vital 
British interests. This is why a Labour Government will immediately seek a 
fundamental re-negotiation of the terms of entry. ,lOO 
Once in government, Wilson did indeed manage to renegotiate a number of the British 
membership terms 101 • In spite of this, he could only appease the growing Euro-sceptic 
wing inside the Labour party, by at the same time committing himself to hold a public 
referendum on whether Britain should stay in the Community. As a result, after two 
unsuccessful membership bids and within two years of joining, the British people 
were asked to decide if they wanted their country to leave the EEC. Although 67.2% 
of the British people voted to stay inside the Community (Donoughue, 1993, pp. 203-
204), Britain's problems with Europe did not disappear. 
100 'Lel Us Work Together - Labour's Way Out of the Crisis', Labour Party general election manifesto, 
February 1974, source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, p.142. 
101 Wilson managed to achieve the establishment of a Regional Development Fund, fro~ which the UK 
would benefit greatly and the introduction of a new principle of guaranteed refunds 10 case anyone 
member state faced excessive net contributions to the EEC budget (Young, 2000, p. 116). 
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While the Wilson government had achieved some improvements with regard to the 
terms of British membership and had won the referendum vote, the fact remained the 
British people were still disappointed with the affects of British membership on the 
domestic economy. 
They had decided to stay inside the Community, mainly due to the fear that Britain's 
dismal economic performance in the mid-1970s might worsen if the country was to 
leave the Common Market. EEC membership had thus become an unloved, but 
'reassuring fixed point in the status quo' (Young, 1998, p. 289). In spite of the 
overwhelmingly positive outcome of the referendum on British membership, the 
sceptical attitude towards the EEC among the British public and the political elite 
continued to persist. The question of leaving the Community had been answered, at 
least for the foreseeable future, but anyone who expected the UK to become a more 
active member within the Community after 1975 was proved wrong: 
'The referendum did not determine much. It settled the argument on British politics 
for a while. Not for some time was there any more talk, even from the serious anti-
Europeans about getting out of the Community. The decisive vote seemed to be the 
end of that debate. At the same time, it was the start of almost nothing. It failed to 
ignite a new collective effort in the chambers of government to take positive 
advantage of the Europe connection. In terms of British policy, as opposed to 
Labour politics, it was almost as if the referendum had never happened' (Young, 
1998, p. 299) 
The main reasons for this continuing British uneasiness with its involvement in the 
continental European framework, were a mixture between the traditional pride of an 
(obviously declining) world power, and the disappointed hopes with regard to the 
economic benefits of the membership of the Common Market. As a victorious power, 
which had survived two World Wars, the Britain had never found it easy to integrate 
itself into a structural framework, in which it was obliged to pool some sovereignty 
with weaker continental countries, which had been defeated in the World War. British 
leaders therefore had to promote British membership of the EEC as a basically 
pragmatic step to strengthen Britain's economic standing and consequently, its 
international role. 
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The fact that these supposed benefits failed to materialise determined Britain's 
continuing reluctance to engage positively with the Community and hence prevented 
the country from taking a leading role: 
'Arguably, it is because Britain was 'sold' EEC membership as a pragmatic step, 
and because the British people judge the results in these terms, that Britain has not 
become a leading player in the Community. It does not share the idealism of other 
members, and this has an important effect on how it fares. ' (Young, 2000, p. 198). 
In the wake of the 1975 referendum, British attitude towards Europe was thus 
characterised by an unholy alliance between Euro-sceptics from the left and right of 
the political spectrum. For more than a decade, this alliance would dominate the 
public discussion of European issues in Britain, supported by an anti-European tabloid 
press. 
The European policy of the Labour government was made increasingly difficult by a 
growing anti-European wing within the Labour party, led by Tony Benn, who had 
become a strong opponent of British EEC membership. In alliance with the 
Eurosceptic trade unions, who considered the EEC to be run by big business, the 
Labour left tried to undermine any attempts of Wilson's successor, James Callaghan, 
to adopt a more active role in the Community. The strong left-wing opposition 
prevented the Callaghan administration from joining the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM), created by Germany and France in 1978. Eventually it even 
helped to bring down the government after Britain had been shut down by trade union 
strikes during the winter of discontent in 1978. As Dennis Kavanagh describes it, a 
more positive role for Britain in Europe during the 1970s was prevented by the anti-
European stance of the Labour leftwing and the major trade unions. Both considered 
British membership of the EEC as a barrier to the introduction of domestic socialist 
economic policies, which in their opinion, would have stopped Britain's economic 
decline. The left was therefore objecting to the loss of national sovereignty brought 
about by Community membership and which undermined Britain's democratic 
sovereignty: 
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'The Labour Prime Ministers Wilson and Callaghan, had to cope with opposition, 
mostly from the political left and some trade unions, who dismissed the EC as a 
capitalist club, hostile to policies of public ownership and controls on capital which 
a left-wing government might want to impose' (Kavanagh, 1996, p.74) 
While the Britain of the 1970s, plagued by strikes and economic decline, had already 
been a difficult partner within the European Community, things became even more 
challenging after the country turned its back on Callaghan's Labour government. With 
the Conservative's general election victory in 1979, the new Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher, turned Britain from a difficult into a truly awkward European partner. 
While the Conservatives had been more pro-European than the Labour Party during 
the 1970s and Thatcher had been a supporter of British membership of the EC in the 
1970S102, once in government, she used the British veto to rigorously defend Britain's 
national interests. The 'iron lady' based her government's European policy on a 
strictly intergovernmental, free-market model of the European Community and 
opposed any proposals which exceeded such a viewpoint. As a result, Mrs Thatcher 
vetoed decisions in central policy areas of the Community, especially with regard to 
the EC budget. With her brusque negotiating style, and the uninhibited demand of 'I 
want my money back' at the EC summit in Dublin in 1979, (Greenwood, 1992, p. 
108), Mrs Thatcher ultimately managed to secure the financial rebate for Britain she 
desired. At the 1984 Fountainebleau summit, Mrs Thatcher secured a permanent 
rebate for the UK which consisted of 66% of the difference between the British 
contribution to the Community budget and the financial support the country received 
from the EC CY oung, 1998, pp. 321-322). 
Although Mrs Thatcher had been successful in securing Britain's financial interests, 
her uncooperative policy increasingly isolated Britain in Europe. 
102 In her recent book Statecraft, Mrs Thatcher explains she had originally supported British 
membership of the Common Market for economic reasons: 'f continued to view the decision as 
necessary and right. It was clear to all of us that the conditions. particularly as regards fisheries and 
agriculture. could be criticised But the wider economic benefits seemed to outweigh the drawbacks. 
and above all it was imperative to break through the European tarifJwall so that our goods could be 
soldfreely to the markets of the Six. with their 190 million consumers . • (Thatcher, 2002, pp. 367-368). 
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While Mrs Thatcher had been co-operative in her attitude toward the Community after 
the Fontainebleau summit, relations with the EC increasingly deteriorated when the 
Delors Commission developed proposals for common European social policies. 
The French Socialist Jacques Delors had taken over as Commission President in 1985. 
While Mrs Thatcher had initially managed to establish a working relationship with the 
new Commission president, especially during the creation of the Single European Act, 
after 1988 she distanced herself from Delors' attempts to deepen political and 
economic integration and to create an increasingly federal Community framework103• 
Although Mrs Thatcher had co-operated closely with the French and German leaders 
on the development of the Single European Act in 1987104, which contained many 
integrative measures and was based on proposals made by the Delors' Commission, 
she remained deeply sceptical about the possible development of a federal Europe. 
Mrs Thatcher feared the integrative trend encouraged by the Delors' Commission, 
would re-introduce traditional socialist policies, she had abolished in Britain, through 
the European back door. In her famous 1988 8ruges speech, Mrs Thatcher stressed 
her continuing opposition to any moves towards any sort of European super state and 
instead called for enhanced co-operation on an intergovernmental basis: 
'I want to see us work more closely on the things we can do better together than 
alone ( ... ) But working more closely together does not require more power to be 
centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy ( ... ) 
We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to 
(03 William Paterson stresses Thatcher had initially misjudged Delors real intentions. She had therefore 
agreed to the extension of QMV in the European Council, because she expected 'that the decisions with 
Qualified Majority Voting could be limited to the Common Market' (Paterson, 1999, p. 262). When 
Thatcher noticed that Delors and the other European leaders wanted to extend QMV to other areas, she 
withdrew her support and increasingly portrayed Delors as an enemy of the British national interest. 
(04 For a detailed account of the negotiations that lead to establishment of the SEA see Moravcsik, 
1991. 
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see them re-imposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a 
new dominance from Brussels.' 105 
Towards the end of her term in office, Mrs Thatcher became increasingly 
uncompromising and nationalist in her stance towards the EC institutions and other 
member states 106. She therefore reinforced the perception among Britain's partners 
that the country had turned from a reluctant European into an 'awkward partner'. 
The combination between Thatcher's refusal to engage Britain in major policy areas 
of the Community and her constant preference for co-operation with the United 
States, especially in military terms, made Britain's partners in the Community wonder 
if Britain really fitted into the European framework: 
'How could Britain play an appropriate role in Europe, and how could Europe 
fashion a role for itself in the world, if London continually questioned Community 
rules and sought to participate only in those aspects of Community activity that 
could be turned to national advantage?' (Sanders, 1990, p. 293) 
Even more disillusioning for Britain's partners, was that the main opposition party in 
the UK did not oppose Mrs Thatcher's anti-European stance. In fact, it took the 
Labour party more than a decade to overcome its own difficulties with Europe. In the 
aftermath of the 1979 general election, the Labour Party had finally been taken over 
by the anti-European left wing, which meant that a negative attitude towards British 
membership of the Community became the official party position. Already in its 
manifesto for the first elections to the European parliament in 1979, Labour had 
expressed serious doubts about the validity of continuing British EC membership, 
making it dependent on fundamental reforms of the Community structures: 
10' Margaret Thatcher's speech at the College of Europe in Bruges, 20 September 1988, source: 
Gowland and Turner, 2000, p.176. 
106 During the Commons debate on the European Council in Rome in 1990, Thatcher illustrated her 
iron resolve against plans of the Delors Commission to expand its powers by uttering her famous three 
'noes': 'The President of the Commission, Mr Delors, said at a press conference the other day that he 
wanted the European Parliament to be the democratic body of the Community, he wanted the 
Commission to be the Executive and he wanted the Council of Ministers to be the Senate. No. No. No.' 
(Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 184). 
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'We declare that if the fundamental reforms contained in this manifesto are not 
achieved within a reasonable period of time, then the Labour Party would have to 
consider very seriously whether continued EEC membership was in the best 
interests of the British people' 107 
It only took two years for the Eurosceptic left to convince the rest of the party that 
continuing British membership of the EC would in the long run only hamper the 
realisation of a socialist alternative to Thatcherism at the domestic level. 
As a result, as early as 1981 the Labour Party decided to officially campaign for 
British withdrawal from the EEC, a pledge which became a part of the 1983 general 
election manifesto. The small group of deviants, which had opposed the party's shift 
towards Euroscepticism, left Labour and formed the pro-European SDP to provide an 
alternative to the rigid anti-Europeanism of the two major parties108• 
Like Mrs Thatcher, who feared the deepening of European integration would hamper 
the free-market reforms she had introduced into Britain; the Labour Party of the early 
1980s believed the EEC would prevent the party from introducing dirigiste domestic 
economic policies, once it had returned to power. Although for different reasons, the 
Euroscepticism of the Thatcher administration and the Labour Party was based on a 
nationalist attitude, characterised by the fear that national sovereignty might be lost, 
especially with regard to the British economy. 
In the case of the Labour Party, 
'Euro-scepticism was reinforced by the party's broad support for some form of 
national Keynesianism, and the belief that Europe would interfere with the 
collectivist, interventionist, protectionist and statist economic policy outlined in 
even the mildest form of the Alternative Economic Strategy ( ... ) After 1979, the 
Labour mainstream rejected Europe in the belief that Britain, indeed any European 
107 Labour Party European Election Manifesto, 1979, source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, p.163. 
108 In an article on the legacy of the SDP, one of the main founders of the SDP, Sir David Owen, 
explains that he abandoned the Labour Party in 1981 because of the 'suicidal political stance on 
defence and Europe' (Owen, 2000, p. 167). 
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nation-state, should be free to pursue its own economic and industrial policies.' 
(Heffernan,2000,p.391) 
Labour only started to re-think its attitude towards Europe when it became obvious 
that its return to power would not happen swiftly. Labour had to realise that the 
support of the British people for the policies of Thatcherism, was greater than they 
could have imagined, leading to the re-election of the Conservatives at two 
consecutive general elections, in 1983 and 1987. As a result, Labour not only 
gradually abandoned its interventionist stance but also started to warm towards the 
Community. 
After the 1997 general election defeat, the disillusioned Labour Party and trade 
unions, which had been deprived of a great amount of their former influence by the 
Thatcher administration, started to consider the European Commission under the 
leadership of the French Socialist Jacques Delors as an ally in their opposition against 
Thatcherist policies at home. 
Mrs Thatcher's open hostility towards the proposals of the Delors' Commission, gave 
the Labour Party a new channel for its opposition against the Prime Minister's 
domestic policies lO9• Just as much as Labour had once considered EEC membership to 
be a hurdle to the establishment of national economic policies, now it equated 
opposition to Thatcherism with a pro-European stance: 
'Largely, though not entirely, because Mrs Thatcher was anti-Europe ... Labour 
became pro-Europe. Because Thatcherism dominated the power structure of 
Britain, socialism, as it was still called, sought and found another outlet' 
(Heffernan, 2000, p. 394) 
109 Especially the European Social Chapter, which had been developed by the Delors Commission in 
1988 was fiercely opposed by Thatcher, as she considered it to be a return to the policies which the 
British people had rejected in three consecutive general elections. In contrast, the Labour Party 
considered it to be very much in line with its own ideas, which 'made it very difficult in the early ) 990s 
to raise a loud voice within the Labour Party against the EC without appearing to be in sympathy with 
the social policies of Thatcherism' (George and Rosamond, 1992, p. 180). 
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While Mrs Thatcher's stance towards the Community hardened as the 1980s drew to a 
close, the Labour Party turned more and more towards Europe and fought both the 
1992 and the 1997 general elections on a broadly pro-European manifesto. The main 
public debate about the costs and benefits of Community membership, however, 
continued to be dominated by a nationalist, even xenophobic tone, which regarded 
European integration as the 'surrendering' of national sovereignty 11 0. 
Fuelled by the right-wing tabloid press and Eurosceptic Conservative right 1 11 , the 
British public continued to perceive Europe as a threat to British interests. Especially 
when the enlarged, reunified Germany became a constant target of the Thatcherite 
elements in the Conservative Party and media. Mrs Thatcher herself had been 
extremely concerned by the notion of German reunification and had tried to use her 
diplomatic skills to slow down the process. As part of the British generation who had 
witnessed the impact of WW2, Mrs Thatcher perceived the Germans as 
troublemakers, who had incorrigible character weaknesses, which threatened the 
peaceful existence of other nations in Europe: 
'Since the unification of Germany under Bismarck ( ... ) Germany has veered 
unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt ( ... ) The true origin of German 
angst is the agony of self-knowledge ( ... ) Germany is thus by its very nature a 
destabilising rather than a stabilising force' (Thatcher, 1993, p. 791) 
Mrs Thatcher's personal view appears to have been that a unified Germany would in 
the long run use its economic might to take over Europe by stealth, by hijacking the 
European integration process - thus realising the goal it had failed to achieve through 
110 Thatcher'S Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, who resigned in 1990 
because of growing disagreement with Thatcher'S European policy, accused the Prime Minister in his 
resignation statement of continuing to base her attitude towards the European Community on an 
outdated nationalistic view of sovereignty: 'We commit a serious error if we think. always in terms of 
'surrendering' sovereignty and seek to stand pat for all time on a given deal- by proclaiming, as my 
Right Hon. friend the Prime Minister did two weeks ago, that we have 'surrendered enough' (Gowland 
and Turner, 2000, p. 185) 
I11 Two prominent examples are The Sun's reactions to Commission president Delors' proposals on the 
creation of a single European currency at the 1990 EC Council in Rome, which the paper commented 
with 'Up yours, Delors' (Young, 1998, p.367) and the portrayal of former German fmance minister 
Oskar Lafontaine, who advocated the harmonisation of economic policies, as the 'most dangerous man 
in Europe' (The Sun, 25 November 1998). 
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military means in WW2. These views were not publicly expressed by Mrs Thatcher, 
but by her Trade and Industry Secretary, Nicholas Ridley, who later had to resign. In 
an interview with the Spectator in July 1990, Ridley expressed the Prime Minister's 
fears about the real agenda of the Germans in Europe: 
'This is all a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe. It has to be 
thwarted ( ... ) When I look at the institutions to which it is proposed that 
sovereignty is to be handed over, I'm aghast ( ... ) I'm not against giving up 
sovereignty in principle, but not to this lot. You might just as well give it to Adolf 
Hitler, frankly,1l2. 
Mrs Thatcher broke the taboo to openly fuel xenophobic sentiments under the pretext 
of trying to defend the British national interest, a tendency which was welcomed by 
the right-wing tabloids and Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative Party, even after she 
had stepped down as Prime Minister. Mrs Thatcher therefore left a legacy which had 
made it socially acceptable to use abusive language when dealing with the EC and 
Britain's continental partners. As a result, 'the negative rhetoric of politicians for long 
reinforced the public's negative perception of the EC' (George, 1993, p. 184). 
John Major, Mrs Thatcher's successor, had to learn the hard way how much Mrs 
Thatcher had influenced the European attitude towards his own party and the general 
public as a whole. Although at the start of his premiership, Major had announced that 
his government would place Britain 'at the very heart' of Europe (Young, 1998, p. 
424), he soon had to realise he was leading a party and government which was 
hopelessly divided over the question of Europe. 
The Major administration's European policy was constantly undermined by the 
Thatcherites within the government and the party, who opposed any retreat from 
Thatcher's hardline stance towards Europe. 
112 Interview with Nicholas Ridley, Trade and Industry Secretary, The Spectator, 14 July 1990, source: 
Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 178. 
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The 'bastards', as Major called them, prevented him from developing an 
unambiguous stance for Britain in Europe and even forced him to temporarily stand 
down as party leader in 1995, in a vain attempt to restore his authority I 13. 
Other than Major, who was basically pro-European and would have been cautiously 
ready to engage Britain further in Europe, the Eurosceptics in his party followed 
Thatcher's perception of the European Community as a Franco-German plot to take 
over Britain by stealth. John Redwood, who had challenged Major for the leadership 
in 1995, has repeatedly made clear that in his opinion, Britain should not concede any 
more of its sovereignty to the European level and should especially resist any calls to 
join the Single European Currency: 
'Monetary union has to be seen in the context of a wish to create a superstate with 
wide-ranging governmental powers over a whole number of policies. ( ... ) if we 
abolish the pound, we make a decisive move towards a country called Europe, 
governed from Brussels and Frankfurt' (Redwood, 1997, p.33, see also Redwood, 
1999,p.170) 
Contrary, to John Major's original intentions, during his period in office, the 
perception of 'us' against 'them' on the continent became even more deeply engraved 
in the British psyche. Major had not proven to be a strong enough leader to alter 
Thatcher's European legacy, or to challenge the one-sided domestic debatell4 about 
Europe. With regard to European policy, the end result of his premiership was 
therefore rather bleak, as it had disappointed the hopes of many of Britain's partners 
that the country might engage more openly within the Community in the 1990s: 
'( ... ) the British made themselves pretty much detested, certainly ignored, by the 
leaders whom Major had once imagined he would join at the heart of Europe ( ... ) 
113 Although it had been widely expected that Michael Portillo would challenge Major for the 
leadership in 1995, it was Eurosceptic John Redwood who fmally stood against Major as the candidate 
of the Eurosceptic right within the party and the government (Clark, 1998, pp. 519) 
114 Roy Denman stresses that this debate is largely dominated by a right-wing tabloid press which 
deliberately misinformes the British public about the EU. Therefore, in order to 'brainwash the 
chattering classes, their newspapers treat the European Union in much the same way as Pravda dealt 
with the United States at the height of the Cold War.' (Denman, 1997, p. 292) 
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What could be said for Major was that, in his error, he himself had exhibited a 
certain historical constituency. Most of his predecessors would have recognised his 
problem - though vacillation, the chronic disease, took none of them as close to the 
heart of darkness. ' (Young, 1998, p. 470-471) 
During 18 years of Conservative leadership, Britain's attitude towards European 
integration and the EU had become increasingly negative and characterised by a ill-
informed, one-sided debate. Whereas, in the pre-Thatcher era, a balanced debate 
about the costs and benefits of British membership of the Community could take 
place, (e.g. during the campaign for the 1975 referendum), by the mid-1990s, debate 
was being stifled by the persuasive view that the Community was an enemy, led by a 
sinister coalition of bureaucrats (Kaiser, 1999, p. 223). 
As a result, 
'By 1996 it was hard to argue that the domestic debate about Britain's place in 
Europe had not deteriorated to a level of ill-informed dogma. A virulently anti-
European press- much of it under non-British ownership - found EU-bashing to be 
a comfortable and even popular theme.' (Peterson, 1997, p. 29) 
Britain had therefore failed to make the transformation from a victorious Great Power, 
into a leading European partner, willing to share sovereignty within the Community 
framework on an equal basis. As the 21 st century came closer, Britain was still 
engulfed in its traditional perception of being different from the rest of Europe, and 
continued to be plagued by fears of foreign domination. The legacy of Britain's post-
war status as a victorious nation over Nazi Germany is still lingering today, even five 
years after the Conservatives have lost power and one year into the second term of a 
pro-European Labour government. 
Although the leading figures of the Blair administration have established a more 
positive tone towards Europe and show few of the prejudices of their Conservative 
predecessors, the present government has not yet found a way to warm the British 
public towards European integration. 
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Public scepticism in Britain towards Community institutions and the general aims of 
the integration process remains high and the country will therefore have some way to 
go before it has finally arrived in Europe with its heart and soul. 
For now, the public debate about Europe is still characterised by traditional 'delusions 
of grandeur' (Denman, 1997, p. 293), resulting in a belief that as a significant power, 
Britain can shape Europe through negative rather than positive actions: 
'The conviction of the British government in the 1930s that nothing could happen 
in Central Europe without its permission, finds a parallel in the conviction since 
the war of successive British governments, that we should be acting on the world 
stage a Parlmerstonian role quite beyond our resources. Recently, the conviction 
has become one that nothing in the European Union can happen without our 
permission. As Chancellor Adenauer said, after the Second World War, Britain 
reminded him of a millionaire who had lost his money but did not know it.' (Ibid, 
p.293) 
2.3. The unbroken tradition of the British state 
Closely connected with the fact Britain had emerged from the two World Wars as a 
victorious nation is the unbroken tradition of the British state and continuous 
development of the British political system. Contrary to most continental European 
states, which went through repeated periods of constitutional change, the British state 
was allowed to evolve in a relatively unbroken development. England, the birthplace 
of parliament, and which developed the constitutional and legal framework of the 
British state, has not been invaded successfully since 1066. 
As a result, the constitutional, political and legal framework of the British state was 
allowed to evolve in a gradual, continuous process of development. While most 
155 
continental countries repeatedly faced the destruction of their state institutions either 
through invasion, revolution, coups d'etat or dictatorship115. 
Apart from the Glorious Revolution, which represented a relatively harmless uprising 
of Parliament and whose impact cannot be compared to the ferocity of the French 
revolution between 1789 and 1799, the British state was allowed to evolve in relative 
tranquility. Whereas political and constitutional change on the continent has always 
been driven by political radicalism, Britain's mainstream political culture never 
embraced extreme or radical tendencies. 
That is why political movements on the extreme left or right of the political spectrum 
never stood a realistic chance of gaining power in Britain, let alone even gaining 
representation in parliament. Other than in most continental European countries, 
where Communist and right-wing parties are a part of the political spectrum of 
parliament116, not a single extremist party holds a seat in the House of Commons. As 
a result, the British people have come to consider their democratic system as superior 
to that of other nations, as it has not shown any of the turbulence and instability 
repeatedly witnessed on the European continent: 
'Measured by the standards of duration, absence of violent commotions, 
maintenance of law and order, general prosperity and contentment of the people, 
and by the extent of its influence on the institutions and political thought of other 
lands, the English government has been one of the most remarkable in the world ... 
The typical Englishman believes that his government is incomparably the best in 
the world. It is the thing above all others that he is proud of. He does not, of 
course, always agree with the course of policy pursued ... but he is certain that the 
general form of government is well-nigh perfect.' 117 
115 Such as the French revolution in 1789, the Franco dictatorship in Spain and the Nazi dictatorship in 
Germany in the 1930s. 
116 Even Germany, which had been an exception when it was still divided into East and West, because 
no radical left-wing party was represented in the West Germany Bundestag, has since unification 
turned to political normality with the former Communist East German PDS having been represented in 
each parliamentary term since 1990. 
117 Professor Lawrence Lowell in Government of England (1908), quoted in: Barzini, 1983, p. 43. 
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Because it was allowed to evolve undisturbed, the British state, in contrast with its 
continental counterparts, could also do without a written constitution. Not being given 
the privilege of continuity, most continental countries depended on the establishment 
of a written constitution as the basis for the re-foundation of democratic state 
structures after revolutions, wars and other influences, which had caused former 
structures to collapse l18. 
The British state has up to now managed to function smoothly without the need for a 
written constitution, like the German Grundgesefz, which determines the division of 
powers within the state; the rules and regulations of the political process; as well as 
defining the different qualities of constitutional law and simple acts of parliament in a 
single document 1 19. Based on the principles of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule 
of law, the British state does have some written constitutional arrangements, but they 
are not combined into a single document. Because legislation passed by parliament 
binds any other body of the British state, all acts of parliament are de facto 
constitutional law and are consequently part of the British constitution. The British 
state is thus best described as being based on 'a part written and uncodified 
constitution' (Norton, 1998, p. 214), many elements of which have evolved in a 
gradual, customary way, and which generally lacks 'systematic and hierarchical 
order' (Sturm, 1998, p. 194). 
As a unitary state, in which the centre of power rests with parliament, without any 
independent, powerful regional subdivisions (such as the German Liinder), Britain can 
allow itself the freedom to go without binding written rules for the division of power 
within its state structures. 
118 Good examples for continuous continental change are France and Germany, which both changed 
their state structures repeatedly by developing new written constitutions. France has already gone 
through five different republican structures and is now in the process of considering a renewed change 
of its constitution due to growing dissatisfaction of the French public with the political system. In 
Germany, the written constitution of the Weimar Republic did not manage to safeguard the democratic 
system against political extremism from left and right which is why the post-WW2 West German 
Grundgesetz, which is still Germany's written constitution today, includes detailed rules and 
regulations with regard to the powers of state institutions and the political process as a whole. 
119 For a detailed account of the German state structures as set out in the Grundgesetz see Maunz and 
ZippeJius (1998). 
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An almost natural result of the unbroken continuity of the British state and its 
institutions is the existence of a strong patriotism among the British public for the 
major institutions of the state and the monarch. Although, like in most other Western 
European countries, the British people show an increasing amount of disillusionment 
with the effectiveness of the political process and the way public institutions work 120, 
an essentially strong patriotic bond between the British public and the institutions of 
the British state remains. Although the public patriotism for the major British 
institutions, such as parliament and the monarchy, are mainly due to their symbolic 
importance with regard to British national sovereignty, it represents the basic reason 
for the British reluctance to integrate into supranational frameworks. 
Due to the fact that the British state has never seen any revolutionary changes 
comparable to those that occurred in continental Europe, the unWillingness of the 
British public to accept any substantial alterations to the structure of the British state 
remains deep-seated: 
'Britain never had a serious, house-clearing revolution. The Royal Family, the 
Church, the law, the army, the City, the land owning class, inherited money and 
their concentric circles have continued without a radical break for centuries. The 
result has been that Britain has largely become a cosy backwater, a backs lapping, 
eighteenth-century type oligarchy, its boardrooms stuffed with clapped-out 
politicians, Foreign Office retreats and sundry cronies of the Establishment' 
(Denman, 1997, p. 289-290) 
Any attempts to transfer powers from the British political centre in Westminster to an 
external organisation or institution, such as the European Union, has consequently 
traditionally met resistance in Britainl21 • 
120 Andrew Marr describes this process as 'the failure the British state to evolve into a popular modern 
democratic society', which has led to 'the unpopularity of British political culture and our institutions, 
which seem so often the property of the "top ten thousand" of politicians, hacks, fixers and officials' 
(Marr, 1999, p. 206). 
121 In this respect it is important to note that a differentiation between the different regions in the UK 
has to be made with regard to the reluctance to transfer national sovereignty. Wales and especially 
Scotland have traditionally found it easier to agree to the pooling of sovereignty on the European level, 
mainly because European integration was seen as way of gaining more regional independence from 
London. Under a new system of devolution introduced by the Blair administration, Scotland and 
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The ongoing debate about the Single European Currency shows more clearly than 
ever, how important state symbols are to the British. An essential element of the 
discussion of the pros and cons of British membership of the Eurozone therefore 
continues to focus on the question of loss of national sovereignty, if Britain should 
decide to give up its own currency 122. Even the issue of the display of the British 
monarch's portrait on the currency, which is irrelevant for most other European 
countries, has become an issue in the British debate. 
From the British point of view, deeper political and economic integration, which 
involves the pooling of national sovereignty, is therefore still largely considered a 
major risk for national independence, and the 'birthright of freedom and democracy' 
(Redwood, 1999, p. 8). 
Due to the fact the British state structures, including the political system, are 
fundamentally different from those on the continent, Britain finds it harder to 
integrate into the continental European framework than other EU member states 
(Kaiser, 1999, p. 213). While coalition politics is a common element of most 
continental political systems, the British system of first-past-the-post nearly always 
produces clear one-party majority governments. British politicians are hence not used 
to the need for consensus politics, which is essential to make coalition governments 
work and involves constant compromise and regular consultations between the 
partners in government. 
Unlike their European counterparts, who are well versed in the constant bargaining, 
which is required by systems of proportional representation, British leaders fmd it 
hard to adapt to the rules of a supranational organisation like the EU, in which 
interstate bargains are a daily part of business. 
Wales already have greater independent possibilities to make their voices heard on the EU level (see 
Bogdanor, 1999, pp. 276-287). 
122 As Margaret Thatcher, who has become the self-appointed guardian of the British pound, puts it in 
her latest publication: 'The power to issue a currency is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty, not 
some symbolic or technical matter. Indeed, it is not for nothing that in past centuries infringement of 
that right by counterfeiters was reckoned as something akin to treason and punished accordingly.' 
(Thatcher, 2002, p. 351) 
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Used to clear-cut decisions which are supported by the majority of the governing 
party and opposed by minority opposition parties, the British consider the way the EU 
works as a constant process of being forced to give way to the demands of other 
member states: 
'An island power, with a strong national identity and a strong parliament, will 
never find it easy to accept the ideal of 'closer union' and a powerful European 
parliament ( ... ) Neither are British ministers used to sharing power with members 
of other parties, still less with members of other national governments ( ... ) Unused 
to permanent involvement in continental affairs, Britain has found it difficult to 
adjust to the 'continuous renegotiation' demanded by Community membership, 
and often treats the European Community as something "alien" , (Young, 2000, p. 
199) 
The traditional post-war failure of the British public and its political leaders to share 
the visionary continental enthusiasm for European integration, therefore has its roots 
in the fear that the whole project will lead to the abolition of the nation state and 
consequent decline of British sovereignty. This is illustrated by the British 
Eurosceptic portrayal of the integration project as a new form of dictatorship, which 
in the end pursues the same goal as Nazi Germany, i.e. the replacement of individual 
democratic nations by an unaccountable super-state: 
'Today, among the anti-European writers in Britain, these visionary continental 
politicians are tarred with a totalitarian brush. It is suggested that the European 
Union is an anti-democratic conspiracy based on pan-European thinking developed 
by the SS' (Marr, 1999, p. 173) 
In spite of the growing public dissatisfaction with the efficiency of British institutions, 
especially parliament, the British have not yet given up the glorification of these 
institutions as symbols for British national independence. 
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Moreover. the traditional British reluctance to change. continues to persist. which is 
why an open and honest debate about the possible benefits of the transfer of power to 
Brussels has not yet really taken place 123. The debate continues to focus on the 
negative aspects. which results in Brussels being portrayed as an intruder into British 
public life and national political decision-making. Britain' s future position in Europe 
will thus largely depend on a change of attitude amongst the British public and elite 
towards the pooling of national sovereignty on the European level. An honest and 
open public debate about the pros and cons of European integration will then of 
course still rightly result in criticism of EU procedures and policies. but it might bring 
Britain closer towards the more relaxed continental attitude towards the integration 
project. 
2.4. The British Empire 
One of the most important factors which may explain why a large part of the British 
public and elite still consider their country to be different from the European 
continent. is Britain's past role as a successful colonial power. The scale and extent of 
Britain's historic global Empire. out stripped any other European country's 
achievements. 
As head of a Commonwealth founded in 1931. Britain managed to maintain its 
position as the leader of an association of ex-colonies and sovereign nations. until the 
mid-1950s. when trade relations within the Commonwealth began to decline. British 
leaders had considered the economic and political ties with the Commonwealth, as 
crucial for the maintenance of Britain's status as a world power. The top priority of 
British foreign policy had therefore been to hold its former Empire together. and to 
avoid any commitments to other international organisations which might endanger 
relations with the Commonwealth: 
123 Roy Denman mainly puts this down to 'the reluctance of an old-fashioned society, opposed to 
change. to recognize great changes in a world which might be nearby, but not one in which it felt at 
home.' As a result, a general view in Britain persists which holds on to 'a conviction that British 
institutions are the best in the world and cannot possibly be changed.' (Denman, 1997, p. 294). 
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'( ... ) the Commonwealth was seen as being an "important buttress" of Britain's 
world position. This was because Britain was not only the founder, but also the 
"central pivot" of the Commonwealth, and because the association was thought to 
depend so heavily on British "care and initiative" , (Butler, 1993, p. 161) 
Especially in the aftermath of the Second World War, in which Britain had been 
financially and economically weakened, economic relations with the Commonwealth 
became crucial for the revival of the British economy and the country's ability to 
exercise its influence around the globe. Low trade tariffs between Britain and the 
Commonwealth countries, as part of the imperial preference system created in Ottawa 
in 1932, as well as the sterling zone currency union, which included non-
Commonwealth countries, helped Britain to mask its post-WW2 economic decline: 
'In the early post-war years of food, raw materials shortages and dollar deficits, 
this system offered such an assured market to British exports and also access to 
cheap food and raw materials that British policymakers were determined to resist 
any American attempts to dismantle it in return for dollar aid.' (Gowland and 
Turner, 2000, p. 62) 
Between 1952 and 1956, Britain's average trade per annum with the countries which 
were part of the sterling area accounted for 46% of all exports, and with the 
Commonwealth countries in general up to 48% of Britain's annual average. 
In comparison, total annual average trade with the countries of the ECSC during the 
same period amounted to only 12% and 35% with the rest of the world l24• Apart from 
the political significance the Commonwealth held for Britain's role as a world power, 
the economic importance must therefore not be underestimated. Because trade with 
the Commonwealth was based on favourable trade tariffs for Britain at a time when a 
global dispute about trade tariffs was taking place, 
124 See table 4.6a in Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 73 
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'British trade with the Commonwealth was stimulated by the remaining 
preferences and provisions of the Sterling Area, which favoured trade transacted in 
sterling.' (Kaiser, 1999, p. 4) 
In contrast, in the immediate post-WW2 period and before the creation of the 
Common European Market, trade between the continental European countries was 
still not attractive for Britain as discriminating national trade restrictions had not yet 
been removed. Until the mid-1950s, the Commonwealth circle, as defined by 
Churchill as part of the UK's three post-WW2 circles of foreign policy interest, 
consequently had much greater importance for Britain than the other two, the special 
relationship with the U.S. and continental Europe. Initially, British leaders had even 
considered the establishment of the Commonwealth as a third world power besides 
The U.S. and the Soviet Union, an idea which was abandoned soon after as it was 
considered to be illusionary when measured against the real global post-war political 
situation125• It was only when trade relations with the Commonwealth declined after 
1955 that Britain's leaders started to shift their focus. The combined development of a 
growing number of former Empire countries gaining national independence126, and a 
shift in Britain's export patterns towards Western Europe and the United States had 
the effect of repositioning British foreign policy priorities. 
A trend toward greater independence among Britain's former colonies fuelled by 
'national movements ... - with their views clearly articulated by a new post-war 
generation of third-world intellectuals' (Sanders, 1990, p. 133), undermined British 
influence within the Commonwealth. As a result, British leaders came to realise that 
Britain would not be able to maintain its central position within a Commonwealth, 
whose members were increasingly developing their own economic ties across the 
globe and were thus less likely to focus their attention on Britain (Kaiser, 1999, p.5). 
m Ernest Bevin had elaborated the idea in 1948 as an attempt to combine the 'tremendous resources, 
which stretch through Europe, the Middle East and Africa, to the Far East', which would result in 
bringing together 'resources, manpower, organisation and opportunity for millions of people' . (Bevin's 
Western Union speech, January 1948, source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 68). 
126 Between 1956 and 1974,34 former British colonies became independent (Sanders, 1990, table 4.1, 
pp. 106-107). 
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The British assumption that the Commonwealth could help to maintain its traditional 
role as a world power, leading a global alliance, even in the altered post-WW2 
economic and political environment consequently turned out to be an illusion: 
'Britain was no longer a world power but a "Power with world-wide interests", and 
was no longer at the centre of a huge trading empire but managing the "wasting 
asset" of Commonwealth preference. Furthermore, the opportunity for British 
leadership of the Commonwealth was rapidly diminishing, to leave an organisation 
that was politically sometimes "more of an embarrassment than an asset" and that 
was fast losing the image of a white man's club under the impact of the second 
wave of decolonisation ( ... )' (Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 65) 
At the same time, the focus of Britain's trade started to shift from the Commonwealth 
towards North America and Europe. Between 1955 and 1965 British exports to 
Western Europe and the V.S. rose by £1.39 billion, while total exports to 
Commonwealth countries only rose by £403 million 127. In general, British exports to 
non-sterling countries between 1952 and 1956 amounted to more than four times the 
number of British exports to countries which were part of the sterling zone l28 . The 
figures continued to grow after 1955, so that by 1965 more than half of British exports 
went to Western Europe and the U.S. 129, a clear indication of a major change in the 
U.K.'s trading patterns. In 1968, the currency union of the Sterling area finally 
collapsed. The parallel development of the weakening British influence within the 
Commonwealth and the increasing importance of trade with non-Commonwealth 
countries made the three circles of British foreign policy less and less equal. 
By the end of the 1950s, the importance of both the Commonwealth and the special 
relationship with the V.S. were still vital, but it had become clear to British leaders 
that they would no longer be sufficient to maintain Britain's influence in world 
politics. 
127 See table 4.3. in Sanders, 1990, p. 118. 
128 See table 4.6b in Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 73. 
129 See table 4.4. in Sanders, 1990, p. 119. 
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Contrary to British hopes, the United States had not wanted Britain to maintain its 
traditional pre-WW2 role of an independent world power after 1945, but was rather 
interested in the UK taking on an active role in the development of the EEC. 
As expressed in a paper published by the V.S. State Department in 1950, the V.S. 
leadership was not worried about the prospect of a weakening of Britain's role as a 
colonial power, as it hoped this would bring the country closer to Europe: 
'It should be our line with the British to assure them that we recognise the special 
relationship between our two countries and that we recognise their special position 
with regard to the Commonwealth. We should insist, however, that these 
relationships are not incompatible with close association in a European framework. 
In fact, the close V.S.-U.K. relation and the Commonwealth today find their 
significance in their ability to contribute to the attaining of other ends, including 
the strengthening of Western Europe and resistance to Soviet expansionism,13o 
The British leaders themselves only reluctantly accepted the changing situation with 
regard to the Commonwealth. In the end they only turned their attention towards 
Europe when it became obvious their country would continue to lose international 
status if it remained outside of the EEC. So a growing attention to the long neglected 
third circle came about as a result that British leaders came to recognise that 'if 
Britain wished to retain a significant voice in world affairs, then it would have to do 
so in concert with its allies in Western Europe' (Sanders, 1990, p.135). 
At the same time, due to the growing independence of the Commonwealth countries, 
who now chose their economic relations in accordance with their own national 
interests, it was likely that the EEC might in the long run become attractive for these 
countries: 
'( ... ) Britain's declining status would be likely, gradually, to reduce its influence in 
the Commonwealth and in the non-aligned countries generally. Conceivably, the 
EEC might itself come to have more influence with some Commonwealth 
130 US State Department paper, 19 April 1950, source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 70. 
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countries than Britain. The consolidation of Europe, coinciding with the 
dismantling of Britain's colonial interests, therefore threatened Britain's political 
influence and its pretensions to world power status.' (Butler, 1993, p. 160) 
As a result, the decision of the MacMillan administration to submit the first British 
application for EEC membership in 1961, must be viewed as 'a serious attempt by 
Britain to catch up with a new reality' (Hibbert, 1993, p. 118). A reality in which 
Europe had become far more important than the Commonwealth. The acceptance of 
these facts amongst the British elite did not however lead to a fundamental change of 
attitude with regard to Britain's international role. By the late 1950s, British leaders 
considered membership of the EEC as an inevitable step to catch up with a new 
political reality, the growing importance of the Common European Market in the 
global economy. Britain was nevertheless still very interested in preventing any 
further damage to its relations with the Commonwealth countries, which became clear 
during the pre-negotiations for British membership in 1961. 
At a cabinet meeting immediately before the official declaration of the British 
membership application to the EEC, the MacMillan administration made clear that it 
could not accept terms of membership for Britain which would hamper its trade 
relations with the Commonwealth: 
'Our objective should be to secure transitional arrangements which maintained 
substantially the Commonwealth's present position, and an understanding that 
those arrangements would continue ( ... ) 
We would have to try to ensure that Commonwealth countries had opportunities 
for exports (either to the United Kingdom market or to the Common Market as a 
whole) broadly comparable with those they enjoyed at present.' 131 
British leaders therefore tried to combine the best of both worlds: while membership 
of the EEC was supposed to compensate for the loss of influence within the 
Commonwealth and to strengthen Britain's economic performance, the essential ties 
131 Cabinet meeting, 18 June 1961, source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 80. 
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with the former Empire countries should be maintained. With a foot in each of the 
three circles, British leaders assumed that the global importance of Britain as an 
independent power could be maintained. The notion that Britain could maintain a 
rather imperialist world power attitude once it had joined the EEC, became a major 
obstacle for convergence with the continent. While it had already been a major factor 
in the British elites decision to stay away from the unfolding project of European 
integration for more than a decade after 1945 (George, 1998, pp. 15-16), the 
continuing British involvement in the Commonwealth, prevented the country from 
committing itself fully to Europe. In spite of the declining economic and political 
importance of the Commonwealth, British leaders largely continued to behave as if it 
would provide a viable alternative to deeper involvement in the European circle. To a 
large extent, the perception of the UK as a reluctant European, even after it had 
become a member of the Common Market in 1973, was consequently down to 'the 
reluctance, especially after 1956, to give up more quickly the global presence and 
attitudes which went with it' (Young, 1997, p. 224). 
Although economic relations with Europe have become more and more important 
since the 1960s, there is a persistent perception among the British political elite that 
there is more to the British national interest than engagement in Europe. Britain's 
imperial legacy has consequently prevented the country from abandoning an attitude 
of superiority towards its continental neighbours, and a general 'distrust towards 
European integration' (Varsori, 1995, p. 24): 
'Wide-ranging and protracted international co-operation of the sort engendered by 
the EC was all very well, and always welcome, but it could never be permitted to 
interfere with the vital national interests of the United Kingdom.' 
(Sanders, 1990, pp. 156-157) 
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2.5. The Special Relationship with the U.S. 
The second backbone of Britain's self-assessed superiority in comparison with the 
continental European countries was the special relationship with the United States. It 
had formed as a result of the two English-speaking countries' determination to join 
forces in the fight against Nazi Germany's attempt to subjugate Europe. 
After the successful liberation of Europe from nazism, U.S. leaders remained very 
much interested in maintaining the close relationship with the U.K., as it now needed 
a leading partner in the fight against the threat of Soviet expansionism on the 
European continent. Because of the two countries close diplomatic and military 
relations, U.S. leaders had destined Britain to take on a leading role in the creation of 
a European framework which would safeguard the strategy of containing both 
Gennany and the Soviet Union. The British post-war foreign policy strategy was 
fundamentally interested in maintaining the special relationship with U.S., but for 
reasons which did not coincide with American priorities. Although British leaders 
strongly shared the U.S. desire to contain the Soviet Union and were therefore 
determined to secure a continuing U.S. military presence in Europe, they were very 
uneasy about the American support for British involvement in the unfolding project of 
European integration. 
British leaders had intended to use the continuation of the WW2 -alliance with 
America after 1945 as a means to have a second basis for the continuation of Britain's 
role as a world power. As was laid out in a memorandum created by the Foreign 
Office in 1944, British post-war foreign policy was focused on the attempt 'to use the 
power of the United States to preserve the Commonwealth and the Empire, and, if 
possible, to support the pacification of Europe' 132. 
When it became obvious in the mid-1950s that Britain's influence within the 
Commonwealth was in decline, British leaders tried to make up for this loss by 
reaffinning 'the importance of the Anglo-American partnership' (Gowland and 
Turner, 2000, p. 40). 
132 Foreign Office memorandum, 21 March 1944, source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 42. 
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The United States, on the other hand, started to get more and more frustrated with the 
British refusal to commit to Europe and challenge French leadership. As early as 
1950, the U.S. had made it clear to Britain that in spite of the special ties between the 
two countries, there would be no special benefits for the U.K. if it decided to remain 
outside the European continent. Apart from a strong relationship with Britain, the U.S. 
also desired close ties with a stable and integrated Europe: 
'We recognize the special close relation between us and it is one of the premises 
of our foreign policy. It is not, however, a substitute for, but a foundation under 
closer British (and perhaps U.S.) relations with the Continent. In dealing with other 
Europeans, however, we cannot overtly treat the British differently and they should 
recognise that the special US-UK relation underlies US-Europe relations, and that 
we do not consider close UK-European relations as prejudicial to the US-UK 
relation,133 
Contrary to the British expectation and in spite of the close wartime alliance, the U.S. 
consequently did not feel obliged to treat Britain any better than any other West 
European nations. British leaders had thus built their three circle foreign policy on the 
misconceived understanding that the bilateral British-American relationship would be 
of greater value to the Americans than the development of an integrated Europe. 
Therefore, by refusing to engage in Europe before the late 1950s, Britain weakened 
rather than strengthened the special relationship by sharing V.S. By staying outside 
the ECSC and the Common Market, Britain reduced its importance to the U.S., which 
now had to increasingly focus its attention on the six continental states: 
'The refusal by the Attlee government and subsequent British governments to lead 
Western Europe into economic and, ultimately, political integration was arguably 
the most important source of division between Britain and the United States until 
the British EEC application of 1961' (Kaiser, 1999, p. 7) 
133 US state department paper, 19 April 1950, source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 47. 
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It was clear that the U.S. did not see any alternative to the unfolding Community of 
the Six on the continent. From the American point of view, the Common Market 
approach of the Six members of the ECSC was ideally suited to safeguard the V.S. 
double containment strategy of Germany and the Soviet Union. The U.S. leadership 
therefore strongly supported the ambitions of the Six to expand integration into 
further areas besides the existing integrated coal and steel sectors. V.S. secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles made this view absolutely clear in a letter to British Foreign 
Secretary MacMillan in 1955: 
'To my mind, the six-nation grouping approach glves the greatest hope of 
achieving this end because of the closer unity which is inherent in that Community 
and because of the contribution which it will make to the strength and cohesion of 
the wider European grouping ( ... ) It is for these reasons ( ... ) that the President 
[Eisenhower] and I have been anxious to encourage in every appropriate way the 
current revival of initiative by the six nations in their search for new forms of 
integration in the fields of nuclear and conventional energy, a common market and 
transportation,134 
Initial British hopes that America would support them in the development of an 
alternative free trade area were thus quickly dashed. 
The Suez crisis in the autumn of 1956 strained Anglo-American relations still further 
and made it obvious that there was no longer any automatic convergence between 
British and American foreign policy objectives. Although relations between Britain 
and the U.S. did recover after the Suez crisis, it became increasingly obvious that the 
V.S. leadership would not support British ideas for a free trade alternative to the 
Common Market. 
In 1959 U.S. Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon stressed in a meeting with 
Harold MacMillan, now British Prime Minister, that the U.S. would not support 
British plans for an association between EFTA and the EEC. 
134 Letter by V.S. Secretary of State Dulles to British Foreign Secretary Macmillan, 10 December 1955, 
source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 49. 
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This was a clear indication that the V.S. did take the view that EFTA 'had no political 
importance but was purely an economic organisation,l35. 
American support for the EEC and pressure on Britain to join the Common Market of 
the Six became even stronger under the administration of President John F. Kennedy. 
Vnder Kennedy, the V.S. urged Britain to join the EEC, in order to 'tie Germany 
more closely to the West' 136, and to generally enhance the economic prospects of both 
the V.S. and the V.K. This strong American backing for British membership of the 
EEC was a major factor in the decision of the MacMillan administration to fmally 
apply for membership in 1961. British leaders had to realise that the V.S. did not want 
the V.K. to remain in its traditional role as an independent world power which 
focused on its Commonwealth rather than on Europe. It is true that in general 
'Americans never did have much time for the imperial so-called Commonwealth' 
(Young, 1998, p. 128), which is why British hopes for American support to revive its 
position within the Commonwealth were illusionary. However, the fact that Britain's 
role as an imperial power declined during the 1950s and 1960s still affected the 
special relationship. As Britain was losing its major influence within the 
Commonwealth and was reluctant to engage in Europe, it was also losing much of its 
former value as a major ally for the V.S. 
Even after Britain had joined the EEC after three unsuccessful application attempts in 
1973, it failed to engage full-heartedly within the Community and thus failed to 
provide the V.S. with the leading ally it sought within the Community. As V.S. 
foreign policy remained focused on relations with the European Community as a 
whole, Britain's reluctance to play an active part in the European circle made the 
special relationship less special from the American point of view. By failing to 
commit their country fully to Europe, British leaders consequently did not strengthen, 
but weaken their country's influence across the Atlantic and in the end seriously 
undermined Britain's global influence: 
135 Transcript ofa meeting between Prime Minister MacMillan and V.S. Under-Secretary of State 
Douglas Dillon, 9 December 1959, source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 54. 
136 Transcript of meeting between U.s. president John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister MacMillan, 
April 1961, source: Gowland and Turner, 2000, p. 56. 
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'However attached it still wishes to be to the USA, a Britain detached from 
Europe's political fortunes is therefore likely to be of less significance to 
Washington. The USA is quite able to absorb Britain's Atlanticism, which costs 
little, while adjusting its main centre of interest to whatever new and more 
effective constellation of power takes shape on the continent ( ... ) 
( ... ) In important respects, such as trade, USA statecraft has already recognized that 
with or without EMU and further enlargement, the EU is its principal interlocuter 
in Europe' (Keens-Soper, 2000, p. 195) 
This disadvantageous development for Britain is based on a serious misconception on 
the British part about the nature of the relationship with the U.S. For decades after the 
Second World War, a majority of the British have perceived relations with Europe 
and the V.S. as two options which inevitably exclude one another. While the U.S. 
wanted a new relationship with a Britain, that was a leader in Europe and a 
counterweight to the anti-Americanism of France, British leaders clung to a different 
view: that they will only remain a special ally for the U.S. if they do not engage too 
much in Europe. At least until the end of the ThatcherlMajor era, British leaders 
therefore held on to the view that relations with the U.S. 
'( ... ) would be fatally compromised by the lure of something called the European 
Community. The idea that these amounted to alternative choices, the one necessary 
imperilling the other, afflicted the decision of all leaders from Churchill to 
Margaret Thatcher, if not beyond.' (Young, 1998, p. 2) 
The official British approach has changed slightly under a younger generation of 
British leaders, who are more willing to combine the traditional closeness with the 
U.S. with an active role in the EU (see Section 3.6). British society, however, still 
seems to be deeply influenced by the traditional preference for a transatlantic rather 
than continental European orientation. 
For many British people the cultural gap between Britain and continental Europe is 
still perceived to be wider than with America, with whom the country shares a 
common language and a tradition of 'religious, moral and political beliefs' (Thatcher, 
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2002, p. 20). Although most other European nations have also been immensely 
influenced by American culture since 1945, Britain seems to have opened up more 
than any other European nation to U.S. cultural influence, resulting in a self-
perception of being 'Little Americans' (Marr, 1999, p. 201): 
'( ... ) Americanisation is, so to speak, a European phenomenon. In many ways that 
is right. But in Britain it is especially intense. Nor is it confined to the relationship 
with the United States ( ... ) There is an extraordinary little phrase many people in 
Britain use when talking about America: 'across the pond' - as if the Atlantic were 
a village pond, and America were just the other side of the village green. In one 
semantic bound, the Channel becomes much wider than the Atlantic' (Ash, 2001 , 
p.l0,) 
The public debate about greater British commitment towards Europe is therefore still 
dominated by the notion that Britain's cultural closeness to America makes it 
unsuitable to integrate into a Europe of continental states, which do not have a history 
as globally orientated as Britain's. Because the British economic model of a liberal 
market economy shares more elements with the U.S. than with the social models of 
many continental countries, the British debate about European integration often boils 
down to a choice between the Euro and the Dollar. 
Whereas economic co-operation with the U.S. is perceived as an essential part of 
Britain's role as a powerful global economy, involvement in an integrated financial 
and economic European framework is considered to be a serious disadvantage137• 
The legacy of the wartime special relationship with the U.S. thus lingers on even 
today, as 'a direct continuation of Britain's wartime experience, so deeply engraved in 
the national psyche' (Hibbert, 1993, p. 115). 
137 Eurosceptic Conservative MP John Redwood has repeatedly expressed this view: 'The United 
Kingdom has been an attractive haven, given its relative freedom from undesirable overregulation and 
the relative surplus of talented scientists who wish to seek research appointments in well based 
companies. There have not been the same tie-ups with compianies from member countries of the 
European Union owing to the relative backwardness of the European Union industry and the common 
culture shared acorss the Atlantic between US and UK companies' (Redwood, 1999, p. 155) 
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The fact that a large part of the British public and the British elite still holds on to an 
exaggerated assessment of the value of the Anglo-American ties for both partners, 
makes it difficult to come to a more relaxed attitude towards European integration. In 
the end, this stance risks the alienation of both Britain's partners within the EU as 
well as the United States who would like to see greater British influence within the 
Community. 
If Britain would indeed increasingly focus on its relations with America and turn its 
back on Europe it might therefore be unwise to expect any favours from the U.S.: 
'Certainly, a subservient relationship with an America looking ever more to the 
Pacific, and wanting to deal with the whole EU, would not be easy or comfortable' 
(Marr, 1999, p.200) 
With regard to defence and security, the U.S. certainly values the strong British 
support in the fight against international terrorism after the events of September 11 th 
2001. In this respect, the supportive stance of the British government has certainly 
increased the British diplomatic influence in Washington and has turned Britain into 
the Americans' main contact in Europe. It would nevertheless be wrong to 
overestimate the general effect of the British-American co-operation in the fight 
against terrorism. Although the V.S. are grateful for the British support, they still need 
to maintain a broad coalition of states within NATO, which includes other European 
partners. 
British leaders should therefore be careful not to fall into the old trap of 
overestimating their influence in Washington, even in the post-September 11th 
environment. The Bush administration has shown that, in spite of British support for 
the war against terrorism, it is still ready to ignore British interests and pursue its own 
economic advantage. The announcement that all imported steel, including British 
steel, would fall under a new punitive import tariff38 was evidence that Britain cannot 
expect to be treated as a special partner by the US., in all respects. 
138 See The Guardian, 'US industry opposes Bush steel tariffs', 10 April 2002. 
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As Hugo Young argues, the special relationship between Britain and the U.S. 'became 
long ago not just about power but exclusively, military power' 139 
As a result, especially with regard to the imminent enlargement of the EU, Britain will 
only be able to remain a crucial partner for the U.S., if it is willing to fully commit 
itself to the development of the Community. Should it fail to do so, a reunified and 
more self-confident Germany, which will be at the centre of an enlarged EU, could 
turn into the new focus of attention for a U.S. which seeks a partner in Europe: 
'A united Germany holding sway in the centre of Europe would make Berlin of at 
least as much value to the USA as Britain ( ... ) With its strategic eyes on both ends 
of the Eurasian landmass, the USA might aim for alliance with Russia and 
Germany as the means of denying China diplomatic support' 
(Keens-Soper, 2000, p. 189) 
Although the categoric refusal of the Schroder administration to provide military 
support for a possible U.S. attack on Iraq makes such an alliance unlikely at present, it 
is possible that it might form under different circumstances at some point in the 
future. It will therefore be in Britain's interest to make sure it maintains a healthy 
balance between a strong engagement in Europe and close ties with the U.S. 
2.6. Conclusion: Still an 'awkward partner' under New Labour? 
The various illustrated reasons for Britain's traditional sense of separateness from the 
European continent and its lack of enthusiasm for the development of an integrated 
European framework still determine British attitudes toward Europe today. The 
majority of the British public remains sceptical about the benefits of British 
engagement in Europe, which is clearly illustrated in the continuing debate about the 
benefits of British EU membership and possible accession to the Eurozone. 
139 Hugo Young, 'Why our leaders love to get cosy with Washington', The Guardian, 3 September 
2002. 
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The end of 18 successive years of Conservative leadership in Britain, during which 
continental Europe was portrayed as the arch-enemy of British interests and any 
concession to the pooling of sovereignty as a national defeat, has however brought a 
new generation of British leaders to power. The leading figures of the Blair 
administration, including the Prime Minister, still have their reservations about certain 
aspects of EU policies and procedures. In general though, they have shown a positive 
and co-operative approach towards European issues and have abandoned the negative 
rhetoric, which dominated British European policy for more than fifty years. 
Although fully aware of the persistent public scepticism at home, the first Labour 
Prime Minister in 18 years, made it clear from the beginning that his government 
would show a more constructive approach within the EU, based on the willingness to 
compromise and to play a more active role: 
'If Britain is to remain part of the EU, as it will under a Labour government, we 
have got to get the best deal for Britain out of Europe. That means Britain has a 
contribution to make to shape the future of Europe, not sitting there and resisting 
what everyone else does ( ... ) we want a Europe that works - it works in British 
. b' k ,140 mterests, ut It wor s 
This new British approach was of course warmly welcomed by Britain's partners in 
the EU141 , who hoped that Britain would finally take on its destined role as a 
committed European. It showed that Britain was now led by a politician who 
represented a younger, post-war generation, which shares few of the resentments of 
the previous generations, who had witnessed the cruelties of two World Wars. 
Unlike most of his predecessors 142, Blair therefore carries little of the ideological 
baggage, that set them so squarely against the European idea. This means he is more 
likely to be able to forge a fresh start in Britain's relations with Europe: 
140 The Times, 'Blair: I want to forge a new Europe', 24 May 1997. 
141 The Times, 'International acclaim for Blair victory', 3 May 1997. 
142 The exception to this rule was Edward Heath who, in spite of having been an eye-witness to the rise 
of the Nazi terror in Europe, strongly advocated closer links between Britain and the European 
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'Born in 1953, Blair matured when the Second World War was a distant memory. 
The formative events of 'Europe' had made no impact on him ( ... ) The history 
suggested strongly that no alternative had existed for fifty years. But there was 
now a Prime Minister who did not fight it, and, untroubled by the demons of the 
past, prepared to align the island with its natural hinterland beyond.' (Young, 1998, 
p. 481 and p.515). 
Moreover, unlike most of his predecessors, Blair does not face any significant 
opposition from within his own party against his pro-European orientation. The older 
generation of left-wing Eurosceptics, such as Tony Benn and Dennis Skinner, who 
had managed to determine the party's course in the early 1980s, no longer have the 
influence to fundamentally threaten the government's course on Europe143• 
The Blair administration could therefore underline its pro-European credentials with a 
number of policy changes, that were strongly opposed by preceding Conservative 
administrations. For example, Blair's administration agreed to sign the Social 
Chapter, which had been resisted by the Conservatives, because they feared it would 
introduce continental socialist policies through the back door. 
The government was also more open towards the extension of Qualified Majority 
Voting (QMV), which it agreed both at the 1997 Amsterdam IGC and the 2000 Nice 
IGC l44• With the decision to make the Bank of England independent, the government 
adopted the German central bank model and basically took a significant step towards 
possible membership of the Eurozone (Young, 2000, p. 178). 
continent and in the end managed to take Britain into the EEC. For an account of Heath's premiership 
and the background to his pro-Europeanness see Young, 1998, pp. 214-256. 
143 Richard Heffeman stresses that 'no overt Euro-sceptic is to be found on the Labour frontbench, and 
critics are confined to the backbenches, if not the very fringes of the Parliamentary party' (Heffeman, 
2000, p. 396). 
144 At the Amsterdam summit, the Blair administration agreed to the extension of QMV to 16 areas of 
decision-making, including regional, social and environmental ones. They did also not object to the 
inclusion of a chapter on the coordination of European employment policy into the Amsterdam treaty. 
(Weidenfeld, 1998, pp.30). At the IGC in Nice in December 2000, Blair agreed to a fruther 40 areas to 
be decided by QMV, including industrial policy, financial regulations of the EU budget and structural 
fund rules (The Times, 'Nice Summit - Where Britain has surrendered its veto', 12 December 2000). 
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At the same time, however, it became clear that the new Labour government would 
not completely abandon British scepticism towards deeper integration and would still 
be prepared to defend British national interests. The government was not ready to 
surrender Britain's sovereignty over its border controls and also insisted on 
unanimous decision-making with regard to taxation, social security, defence and 
revenue-raising mechanisms within the EU I4s • 
The government's hesitant stance on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is of 
especial interest and has disappointed many of Britain's partners, as they expected the 
British government to make a decision on the single currency early in its first term. 
The government's ambiguous stance on EMU I46 seems to contradict its general 
ambition to take on a leading role in Europe, which had already been set out by Blair 
in oppositionl47 and was later re-confirmed by Foreign Secretary Robin COOkI48• It is 
obvious that Britain will not be able to take on a leading role within the EU 
comparable with that of France and Germany as long as it stays out of the crucial 
integration project of EMU. To become an accepted leader in the EU, Britain will 
need to join the Eurozone, so it can have a full say on decisions with regard to 
monetary and economic issues, and clearly demonstrate its commitment to the 
European project: 
145 Point 58 in the official government white paper on the British approach to the IGC in Nice, 
December 2000, www.europa.eu.int/commJarchives/igc2000/offdoc/memberstates/indexen.htm. 
146 On the one hand, Blair tried to court the readers of the eurosceptic Sun by promoting himself as a 
'pound sterling patriot (see The Sun, 'The Sun backs Blair', 25/4/97). On the other hand, he repeatedly 
stressed that in contrast with the Conservatives, a Labour government would only assess the issue in 
economic terms because there were no constitutional barriers which would prevent Britain from joining 
in principle. (Blair, 1996, p.287). As a result, the five economic tests set out by Chancellor Gordon 
Brown in the House of Commons on 27 October 1997 have to be met before the British people will 
have their final say in a referendum (For a transcript of the statement see the official website of the 
treasury http://www.hm-treasury.gov.ukipublhtmVdocs/emu.main.html). 
147 In a speech to the Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs in April 1995 Blair stated that 'We are not 
setting out to break up the Franco-German partnership or to engage in a new round of 'balance-of-
power' politics. Rather our aim is to join others in the leadership of Europe in the pursuit of Our aims' 
(Blair speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs,S Apirl 1995, source: Blair, 1996, p. 285). 
148 Cook spoke of the establishment a leadership 'triangle' between Britain, France and Germany. See 
Robin Cook's statement in The Guardian, 'Britain seeks leading role in Europe', 8 May 1997. 
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'( ... ) it took the French and the Gennans more than one parliamentary tenn to forge 
a relationship built on mutual trust and close co-operation. It is only such a long-
tenn commitment - completely absent in Britain's European relationships - that 
can be strong enough to bridge even quite fundamental differences over individual 
policies ( ... ), (Kaiser, 1999, preface, xviii) 
If the Blair administration is serious about its ambition to turn Britain into a fully 
committed player within the EU, and to finally abandon the traditional British 
aversion towards engagement in a European framework, EMU will be the decisive 
issue which detennines the success or failure of the government's approach. 
It has already become obvious that a greater willingness on the British part to abandon 
old dogmas leads to greater influence at the Community level. The Prime Minister's 
decision to reduce the traditional British reluctance to participate in the development 
of a European identity with regard to defence and security and his general acceptance 
of the necessity to develop a common foreign security policy for the EU149, has 
allowed him to take on a leading role in the development of the Rapid Reaction Force 
(RRF). 
The joint Anglo-French declaration of St. Malo in December 1998150 laid the ground 
for the decisions made at the Helsinki summit in December 1999151 which declared 
that a European Rapid Reaction Force was to be created 'by 2003,\52, which would 
enable the EU to act militarily whenever NATO would not want to act itself. 
149 At the informal EU summit in POrtschach, Austria, in October 1998, which was dominated by the 
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, Blair stated that 'a common foreign security policy for the European 
Union is necessary, it is overdue, it is need and it is high time we got on with trying to engage with 
formulating it' (Tony Blair's press conference in POrtschach, 25 October 1998, 
www. weu.intlinstitute/chaillotlchai4 7 e.html). 
150 Joint declaration issued at the British-French summit, Saint Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, 
www.fco.gov.uklnews/newstext.asp?1795. 
151 See the EU's official website (www.ue.eulpresid/conclusions.htm) 
U2 The Helsinki declaration stated that 'Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days 
and sustain for at least I year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000' in order to develop an 
'autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and 
conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises' 
(http://www.ue.eulpresidlconclusions.htm). The declaration also stressed, however, that full 
transparency between EU decisions and NATO had to be maintained. 
179 
The experience of the Bosnian crisis, during which the Europeans had to realise that 
they did not have the capacity to intervene without U.S. support, had therefore caused 
the Prime Minister to put aside the usual British doubts about a European defence 
identity. Traditionally, British Prime Ministers had resented the idea because they 
feared it would lead to the military disengagement of the V.S. in Europe, and 
consequently endanger European security. 
At least in this respect, Blair has shown that his government is basically ready to 
agree to new integrative steps, which involve the pooling of British national 
sovereignty if it is in the British national interest and to the benefit of the EU as a 
whole. The government's readiness to get involved in the development of a European 
defence identity and possibly even a Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is 
based on the existing transatlantic links within NATO, is also founded on a new 
evaluation of relations between Britain and the U.S .. Whereas British leaders have 
traditionally seen engagement in Europe and close relations with U.S. as two 
incompatible choices, the Blair administration has repeatedly made clear it no longer 
see Europe and America as two alternate choices for Britain. In the understanding of 
the present government, Britain could use its traditionally close ties with the U.S. as 
an asset in Europe, in order to act as a mediator between European and American 
interests. 
As Blair laid out in his speech at the Polish Stock Exchange in October 2000: 
'( ... ) our strength with the United States is not just a British asset, it is potentially a 
European one. Britain can be the bridge between the EU and the US.' 153 
The government consequently seems to have accepted the fact that the U.S. will only 
accept Britain as a leading partner if it is fully engaged in Europe. Like all British 
Prime Ministers, Blair has not abandoned the British aspiration to maintain strong 
bilateral ties with America but, on the contrary, sometimes pursues it with such vigour 
IS3 Prime Minister'S speech at the Polish Stock Exchange, 6 October 2000, www.number-
1 O.gov.uklnews.asp?NewsId= 134&section 1 d=32. 
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that he is often portrayed as America's 'poodle' 154. In spite of this understandable 
scepticism about the Prime Minister's real intentions, so far Blair has given no 
indication that he wants to turn his back on Europe in favour of closer relations with 
the V.S. If the Prime Minister sticks to the principle he has laid out in his speech in 
Ghent in February 2000, then the government's ambitions to become more engaged in 
Europe will continue: 
'As we lost influence in Europe, it did not help us in America. Britain has close 
ties with America. They will remain close, no more so than under this government. 
But America wants Britain to be a strong ally in a strong Europe. The stronger we 
are in Europe, the stronger our American relationship' 155 
Under the present Labour government, British European policy has thus not 
fundamentally changed but it has been based on a new, co-operative attitude. In the 
end, this amounts to a certain degree of 'normalisation' of British European policy, in 
which Community rules and procedures are no longer demonised and British national 
interests are only safeguarded where it is deemed essential. The Labour government is 
therefore still ready to oppose any measure which it considers to be against the British 
national interest and will not automatically agree to any steps towards the deepening 
of integration. As for most other EU member states, the national interest will continue 
to be a priority under Labour, but it has also been accepted that the pooling of 
sovereignty need not always run against British interests: 
'Indeed, because Labour continues to look towards Europe in terms of "pooling" 
rather than "surrendering" sovereignty, it is "European" only in a "national" sense, 
an attitude reflecting its well established fidelity to the ways and means of the 
British state' (Heffernan, 2000, p. 397). 
IS4 Blair's strong backing for the V.S. military operation in Afghanistan and reports about a possible 
British involvement in an attack on Iraq have often been criticized in the press as a continuation of the 
traditional British orientation towards the U.S. at the expense of Europe. (See The Guardian, 
'Opposition to attack mounts up', 7 August 2002 and 'If Blair gets this wrong he could be gone by 
Christmas', 8 August 2002). 
ISS Prime Minister's speech at the Ghent City Hall, Belgium, 23 February 2000, www.number-
10 .gov .uklnews.asp?section 1 d=32. 
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It would be fundamentally wrong to suppose that Britain has in the past often been a 
difficult partner in Europe because of a British 'Sonderweg,156. Although Britain has 
found it much harder to warm towards European integration than most other European 
nations, it has not pursued a special course in its European policy. 
The country had simply developed a different attitude towards European integration 
due to a history, which is fundamentally different from that of the continental 
European nations. Like most other European nation states, Britain tried to act 
according to its national interests, which up to the late 1950s seemed to allow the 
country to neglect any deeper involvement in the European circle. Although British 
leaders overestimated the post-war importance of the Commonwealth and the 
relationship with the U.S., it was not unreasonable for them to aspire to maintain 
Britain's global role after 1945, given Britain's past standing as a world power. In 
contrast to most continental states and for the reasons explained in this chapter, 
Britain simply took a longer time to arrive in Europe. When it finally managed to do 
so in 1973, it entered a Community which had already been shaped according to the 
needs of the Six founding members, especially France and Germany. 
The resulting British uneasmess with Community procedures and policies was 
therefore understandable, although from 1979 it reached excessive and sometimes 
xenophobic proportions under 18 years of Conservative leadership. The downside of 
this legacy is of course the continuing portrayal of the EU as a continental conspiracy 
against the British which persist in some parts of the British media, and fuels 
Euroscepticism among the British public. 
While the present government has adopted a more positive and constructive approach 
towards the EU and continues to stress the benefits of British engagement, the public 
remains deeply sceptical about deeper British involvement in Europe . 
• '6 Wolfram Kaiser rejects the 'Sonderweg' thesis developed by many analysts who explain Britain's 
problems with Europe with British 'exceptionalism' and ignore the various historical reasons for 
Britain's relative distance from the continent. In this respect Kaiser points out that other European 
nations, namely Denmark and Norway, have initially also remained sceptical towards the project of the 
Six and that even West Germany and the Benelux countries supported Britain's promotion of European 
free trade (Kaiser, 1999, p. 207 and pp. 210-211.) 
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While on the political side the perception of involvement in Europe as a 'defeat' is 
now largely confined to the Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative Party, a large part 
of the British public still clings to this traditional view: 
'For Britain ( ... ) the entry into Europe was a defeat: a fate she had resisted, a 
necessity reluctantly accepted, the last resort of a once great power, never for one 
moment a climactic or triumphant engagement with the construction of Europe. 
This has been integral in the national psyche, perhaps only half articulated, since 
1973.' (Young ,1998, p. 2) 
The main challenge for the Blair administration and for any essentially pro-European 
administration that might follow, will therefore be to bridge the gap between the 
official British policy towards Europe at present and the public attitude at home. As 
long as British leaders do not manage to engage the public in an open and honest 
debate about the benefits of British involvement in the EU, public perceptions of 
Europe will remain unchanged and the country will never achieve its ambition of 
assuming a leading role in the Community. With regard to its position in Europe, 
Britain is in a process of reconsideration, similar to the gradual 'normalisation' 
process Germany is experiencing as it comes to terms with its involvement in foreign 
military operations ls7• 
In order to reposition Britain at the heart of Europe, British leaders face an uphill 
struggle to take the British public on board. This can in the end not simply be 
achieved by a more positive British demeanour at the Community level, but must 
begin at home as a serious struggle to break up engrained patterns of thought on 
Europe. The fundamentals for this task have already been established by the Blair 
administration, because it has proven that in spite of the persisting Euroscepticism at 
home, under its leadership, Britain will spurn the anti-Europeanism of the past: 
157 In his speech at the SPD party conference in Nuremberg in November 2000, Prime Minister Blair 
has stressed that both countries face a similar challenge to overcome their traditional post-war foreign 
policy attitudes at present: 'For you, Europe is relatively easy as an issue: the commitment of military 
forces hard. For us, the opposite. To commit our military, relatively uncontentious; to commit to 
Europe causes deep passions ( ... ) So both our nations face a time of challenge' (Prime Minister'S 
speech at the SPD federal party conference in Nuremberg, 20 November 2001, source: SPD 
Pressestelle, Berlin. 
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'In the last couple of years, Britain has been pursuing a constructive, engaged and 
steady European policy. The government is absolutely determined to stick to this 
course towards the European Union and not to follow Thatcher's example, who, 
after a short but deceiting ray of light performed an about-face with regard to the 
project of the Common Market' (Paterson, 1999, p. 272) 
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Chapter 3: Changes in the Franco-German partnership 
The close relationship between France and Germany, which has often been described 
as an 'axis' or 'alliance' has undergone many changes in the long period since the 
Second World War. For decades it had been the motor of the integration project and 
had become an indispensable basis for both countries' post-war foreign policy, 
strongly based on the mutual personal understanding of French and West German 
leaders. While before the end of the Cold War and German reunification, both 
countries had been rather at ease with their designated role within the mutual 
partnership, disagreements increasingly started to affect Franco-German relations in 
the course of the 1990s. In the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, both France and 
Germany found it difficult to adjust their foreign policies to the changed balance 
between themselves, which had been mainly caused by the increased political weight 
of the unified Germany. As a result, the traditional post-war Franco-German 
consensus on major European issues is increasingly fading away and both countries 
frequently find themselves at loggerheads with regard to the future of Europe. 
This chapter looks at the reasons behind the changes in the Franco-German 
partnership and its effects on the EU as a whole. 
3.1. The Franco-German axis as the post-war motor of integration 
After the end of the Second World War, the reconciliation between the former 
enemies France and Germany became the crucial fundament for the successful 
rebuilding of Europe and the safeguarding of lasting peace and stability on the 
continent. Both countries showed an equal commitment towards the creation of an 
integrated political and economic framework for Europe, although for fundamentally 
different reasons. France had repeatedly been traumatised by the threat of German 
expansion and occupation. 
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For the French it was therefore indispensable that a peaceful and stable framework for 
Europe would have to be based on the effective containment of any possible future 
German aspirations to develop a hegemonial position in Europe. Although the French 
were, in principle, ready to reconcile with a democratic Germany, French leaders 
remained very anxious not to allow a post-war German state to become too powerful, 
both in political and economic terms. In the immediate period after the end of WW2, 
France had even continued its post-WW1 stance. It had focused on the opposition to 
the rebuilding of the German state and the weakening of the German economic 
performance through extensive reparation demands. Contrary to the British and 
American long-term plans for the defeated Germany after 1945, France had initially 
showed no interest in the recreation of a German state on a national level. 
As France had not taken part in any of the war-time international conferences which 
determined the post-WW2 order of Europe and especially Germany, French leaders 
initially had felt free to pursue plans to contain and weaken Germany, even against 
American and British opposition. On August 30th 1945, France decided to separate the 
Saar region, which had been a repeated contentious issue between France and 
Germany in the past, from the French occupation zone and finally included it into the 
French economic and tariff zone in December 1946. The Saar, a region rich in the 
production of coal, was vital for the French economy and consequently for the French 
desire to match German economic performance. Of equal importance had been the 
Ruhr region, a major centre of German steel production, which had traditionally been 
the spine of the German economy. French president de Gaulle had therefore initially 
attempted to find support for a plan to put the Ruhr under a supranational 
administration, in order to deprive post-war Germany of this essential economic 
resource. (Dokumente, 2000, p.7) 
Even when France had subsequently decided to join the Potsdam agreement, it still 
felt free to openly express its opposition to the re-emergence of a German state: 
'France did in particular not support the corresponding passages on the 
preservation of Germany as an economic unit, when it joined the Potsdam 
agreement in August 1945 and the combination of the French occupation zone with 
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the American and the British zone (tri-zone) only came about with hesitation' 
(Pfetsch, 1993, p. 134) 
French leaders started to refocus their priorities when they realised that they would 
not gain much support for their policy of obstructionism towards the rebuilding of 
Germany from the side of the American or the British. By 1947/48 it had become 
obvious that the Soviet Union was not longer willing to co-operate with the Western 
Allied Powers and would instead pursue its own individual plan for its zone of 
occupation in the Eastern part of Germany 1 58. In order to gain a partner at the heart of 
Europe in the fight against Soviet expansionism, both the United States and Britain 
were consequently interested in turning the three Western occupation zones into a 
stable and democratic West German state framework with a viable economy. As a 
result, after 1948, France tried to present its demands towards Germany in a more 
modified way159, as part of proposals for the development of an integrated European 
framework. 
The Schuman plan, presented by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in May 
1950, proposed the pooling of French and German coal and steel under a 
supranational authority. It became the basis for the foundation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community, under which six European countries, including France and 
Germany, decided to pool their coal and steel sectors. The official motive of the 
Schuman plan was to increase economic co-operation between France and Germany 
in their effort to rebuild their battered economies after WW2. This should then 
become a basis for enhanced economic co-operation throughout the whole of Western 
Europe: 
IS8 In March 1948 the Soviet Union left the Allied Control Council, in which the Allied Powers had 
tried to co-ordinate their policies within each of their different occupation zones. On 24 June 1948, the 
Soviet Union started to block all access routes to Berlin in an attempt to bring the whole of Berlin 
(including the three Western sectors) under Soviet control. 
IS9 France gave up most of its original the far-reaching demands towards Germany at the London 
Conference in June 1948, but continued to insist on the establishment of an International Authority for 
the Ruhr in order to supervise the distribution of coal and the creation of a costums union with the Saar 
region (Dokumenle, 2000, p. 7). 
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'The unification of the European nations demands that the century-long conflict 
between France and Germany is being extinguished ( ... ) The pooling of coal and 
steel production will immediately secure the creation of a common basis for the 
economic development - the first stage of the European federation and change the 
destiny of those regions, which, for a long time, have been committed to the 
production of weapons, of whom they have been the uppermost victim.' 160 
It was clear, however, that France's mam interest under Charles de Gaulle's 
leadership was to bind the economy of the newly founded West German Federal 
Republic closely to that of France. If France could not prevent the re-establishment of 
a West German state due to American and British resistance, then it at least wanted to 
make sure that it would benefit from the economic capacity of the Federal Republic: 
'Having failed to dismember Western Germany, French governments resorted to 
the Briand approach: reaching agreements with Germany in order to bind her to 
France' (Cole, 2001, p. 6) 
The same was true for French proposals on European defence and security. De Gaulle 
had been a strong opponent of German rearmament, but had to realise that, due to the 
rising tensions of the Cold War, it would in the long term be inevitable. The V.S. 
wanted to use Germany's conventional military assets in order to strengthen NATO's 
ability to defend its Eastern borders against any Soviet military aggression 
(Handrieder, 1991, pp. 55-56). The U.S. strategy of double containment of both 
Germany and the Soviet Union hence did not exclude, but include the rearmament of 
West Germany as an integral member of the family of democratic nations and of the 
transatlantic alliance NATO. This was much to the discontent of French leaders. 
The French leadership did not share the American conviction that West German 
rearmament would be unproblematic if it would take place within the multilateral 
framework of NATO. On the contrary, even though West Germany's military assets 
would be strongly embedded in the multilateral structures of NATO and would 
prevent any possible German attempts to threaten its neighbours militarily, they 
160 French government's declaration on the plan for the creation of a European Coal and Steel 
Community, 9 May 1950, source: Dokumente. 2000, p. 15. 
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would controlled mainly by the V.S. As a result, 'the French feared that the NATO 
option would remove Germany from French control altogether' (Cole, 2001, p. 8). 
If they could not prevent German rearmament, they at least wanted to find a solution 
which enabled France to exercise strong control over West Germany's military 
capacity. The French therefore produced the Pleven plan, which aimed at exercising 
strong control over the process of German rearmament within the framework of a 
European army, which would be linked to NATO (Janning, 1997, p. 342; Do/cumente, 
2000, p. 15-17.). 
If France would have had its way, the European army would have been as 
independent from NATO as possible. But as things stood at the time, France was too 
weak both in political and economic terms to be able to lead the development of a 
European force without American support. The Pleven plan was therefore the military 
counterpart to the ECSC. Both had been designed to control the emerging economic 
and military resources of the West German Federal Republic: 
'Initially, the goal was to contain Germany, then to make West Germany pay for 
the defence of Western Europe, then to link France economically to West 
Germany, thereby to share all the benefits of its economic success' (Guyomarch, 
Machin and Ritchie, 1998, p.40) 
The irony in this respect is that, although the ideas of the Pleven plan had been 
adopted by other member states of the ECSC in the European Defence Treaty signed 
in Paris in 1952, they were in the end rejected by the French national assembly in 
1954. The main reason for that was the fact that the initial French initiative had 
developed into something which would 'have transformed the Six into an effective 
federation, with a European executive accountable to a directly elected European 
Parliament' (Forster and Wallace, 2000, p. 463). The French considered this political 
structure, which was supposed to provide the framework for the European army 
divisions within NATO, to be an attack on the national sovereignty of the French state 
and therefore rejected it (Gouyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, 1998, p. 7). 
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For that reason it had become obvious that France's policy towards West Germany 
was characterised by contradictions and exaggerated self-confidence. 
On the one hand, French leaders attempted to use the means of the development of 
European integration to pursue their demands towards Germany, and to secure 
themselves a leading role in a post-war European framework. On the other hand, 
when they were asked to pool substantial part of the French state sovereignty on a 
supranationallevel, they withdrew towards a traditional Great Power attitude. 
De Gaulle's insistence on maintaining France's status as a Great international Power 
consequently led to a policy 
'which is characterised by the fundamental contradiction of traditional ideas of 
Great Power Policy and the reality of a economically shattered middle power, 
which is depending on help from outside' (Pfetsch, 1993, p. 135). 
This double-edged attitude of the French towards European integration has repeatedly 
caused bewilderment on the German part. German leaders have often found it hard to 
come to terms with the fact that the French have traditionally been very reluctant to 
concede parts of their national sovereignty in order to achieve far-reaching steps in 
the process of European integration. As a result, the purpose of the existence of the 
close co-operation between France and Germany, the so-called 'axis', has been 
interpreted in a different way by both sides. Right from the start, the West Germany 
Federal Republic had been ready to 'Europeanise' its regained limited state 
sovereignty by integrating itself deeply into a European institutional framework. 
West German leaders tended to show a positive attitude towards the further deepening 
of integration, because within this multilateral European framework, the officially 
semi-sovereign Federal Republic was allowed to exercise a far greater amount of 
control over its own affairs than would have been possible unilaterally. From the 
German point of view, the purpose of the close relationship between France and 
Germany, the so-called alliance, was thus mainly to lead the way forward in the 
development of European integration in a joint effort. 
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As the integration process was beneficial for Germany and unilateral initiatives from 
the German side would have been considered as an attempt to create a 'German 
Europe', the alliance with France became the right means to this end. 
For the French, on the contrary, the bilateral relationship with Germany has always 
been more of a means to secure that French interests would never again be threatened 
by the Germans. By binding Germany closely to itself, France attempted to neutralise 
German power assets and to establish a leading position for itself in the development 
of a post-war European framework. In contrast to the ideas of German leaders, the 
French have however always been sceptical towards the establishment of a federal 
framework for Europe. They have instead promoted a strong intergovernmental basis 
for a Community of European nations. Especially under Charles de Gaulle's 
leadership, France stressed that it desired to create a 'Europe des patries', based on 
strong and sovereign nation states. For de Gaulle, the Franco-German alliance 
therefore became an alternative which would prevent the creation of a European 
superstate rather than a means to push towards the development of exactly such 
structures: 
'De Gaulle's Europe was explicitly predicated upon a dominant Franco-German 
axis. This bilateral relationship was conceived in a directory sense as an alternative 
to an ever close union under the political leadership of a federally minded 
European Commission' (Cole, 2001, p. 10). 
Although there have certainly been differences in accentuation between the various 
French leaders since general de Gaulle, the French notion of Europe as an 
intergovernmental entity has persisted over the years, consequently running counter to 
German ideas. Closely connected to the French post-war self-perception as a 
victorious Great Power, which should maintain as much autonomy over its domestic 
affairs as possible, French leaders since de Gaulle have traditionally advocated a 
model of Europe which focuses on its external strength. The ideal French model of 
Europe would therefore be one with relatively weak institutions, but explicitly strong 
influence on the international stage. The concept of the development of Europe as a 
new World Power, besides the United States, Russia and China has been a significant 
motive behind French European policy since 1945. 
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Led by France in association with Germany as a junior partner, it would be able to 
secure France's influence on the international stage and reinforce its status as a Great 
Power: 
'( ... ) in spite of the terrible defeat in June 1940, France perceives itself as a Great 
Power, which has to fulfil a task of its own ( ... ) France dreams of a coherent, strong 
union, which proves itself as a new 'Great Power' besides the U.S., Russia and 
China ( ... ) On the one hand, with regard to external affairs, France wants the united 
Europe to be strong and to act united on the international stage. France's 
diplomatic special role should remain. On the other hand, with regard to the 
internal affairs of the Community, France wants decisions to remain in the hands 
of the individual member states and their governments' (Guerot, Moreau and 
Defarges, 1998, p. 158-159). 
The post-war West German Federal Republic had developed an attitude towards 
Europe, which was less ambiguous and much more focused on the building of an 
integrated framework, which included the concession of parts of the national 
sovereignty of each member state. As a semi-sovereign state, the Federal Republic 
had been strongly depending on the development of a multilateral European 
framework, within which German leaders could pursue Germany's own interests 
without raising the suspicion of an attempt to pursue a German Sonderweg. The firm 
integration of West Germany into a strong institutional European framework had been 
the only way for Germany to rebuild its economy and its international standing as a 
democratic nation. At the same time it allowed West Germany to pursue the long-term 
goal of peaceful reunification of the two German states. The Federal Republic's first 
Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, was therefore ready to accept concessions, such as the 
prospect of sharing the fruits of the post-war West German boom with the rest of the 
Community by literally becoming its paymaster. De Gaulle, on the contrary, seeked to 
reap the benefits of European integration, such as the institutional linkage between the 
French and the German economy, but was rather reluctant to make similar 
concessions with regard to French interests: 
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'De Gaulle wanted the economic benefit of the Common Market, without having to 
pay a political price for it; Adenauer was ready to pay an economic price for his 
global ambitions; Adenauer was looking for an Atlantic basis for his European 
ambitions' (Hanrieder, 1991, p.17). 
Moreover, as the Federal Republic shared none of the Great Power ambitions of the 
French, it did also not share the French objective of establishing Europe as an 
alternative to the transatlantic link with the United States. For Adenauer, the re-
establishment of the Federal Republic on the international diplomatic stage was based 
on the combination of the transatlantic link with the U.S., and the firm integration into 
a European institutional framework, which had to be deepened over time. 
In order to be able to achieve the latter, post-war reconciliation and a strong mutual 
relationship with France was seen as an essential basis. From the German point of 
view, the establishment of a close alliance with France was seen as a necessary means 
to prove the German willingness to achieve a lasting reconciliation with the French 
and to re-integrate itself into the community of democratic nations in Europe. 
Moreover, by binding France into a close bilateral partnership, West Germany wanted 
to secure that France would remain firmly integrated into the West, instead of trying 
to establish closer ties with the Soviet Union. In spite of the different approaches and 
motives of the Adenauer and de Gaulle, the two leaders therefore basically agreed that 
there was a strong need for Franco-German co-operation in Europe: 
'Adenauer strongly believed that the stability of the German state required an 
entwining relationship with France. Franco-German reconciliation was a 
precondition for a lasting European peace and for rebuilding German prosperity 
( ... ) the Franco-German alliance would strengthen the Western alliance against the 
Soviet bloc. Germany also valued a close relationship with France as a symbol of 
Germany's return to the European community of nations' (Cole, 2001, p. 12) 
Adenauer's strong interest in the establishment of an alliance with France did 
however not go far enough to accept initial French demands for a choice between 
France and the U.S. as part of a bilateral treaty. 
" .. /~7.' 
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The original French proposals for a bilateral treaty, which would institutionalise the 
close co-operation with Germany, had included demands on the Federal Republic to 
give up consultations with the U.S. As this was considered to be unacceptable by 
many in Adenauer's own party (Hacke, 1997, p. 82), the Chancellor had no other 
choice but to refuse the treaty in its original form. 
In spite of Adenauer's strong desire to confirm the Franco-German ties in a treaty, the 
West German Chancellor was not ready to accept any choice between France and 
America. This would have seriously undermined the German policy of Westbindung, 
which was based on the transatlantic links within NATO and the close co-operation 
with France as part of the development of European integration. With the policy of 
Westbindung, Adenauer had established a tradition of West German foreign policy 
which was later continued by all his successors: 
'( ... ) his policy towards the West was mainly focused on the mediation and the 
balance between the Atlantic and the Western European continental component. 
This primacy of an inner-Western balance of power-policy, in which the interests 
of the Alliance gained priority over domestic interests, was a decisive factor for the 
trust set in Adenauer's foreign policy and his successors, who, according to the 
situation and their own temper, tried to pursue this "middle-Atlantic ideal line" of 
the Federal Republic's interests' (Schwarz, 1994, p. 82). 
The signing of the Franco-German Elysee Treaty of 1963 had consequently only 
become possible when the French had accepted a watered-down version of their 
original draft, which excluded any demands which would be directed against relations 
between the U.S. and West Germany. The final version of the treaty, which was 
signed on 22 January 1963, symbolised the importance of the bilateral relationship 
for both partners by institutionalising their partnership. In the treaty both countries 
had agreed to regularly consult each other on a variety of levels, ranging from 
meetings of the heads of government at least twice every year, the consultation of 
Foreign Ministers every three months to the establishment of a cross-ministerial 
committee, which would co-ordinate co-operation on various issues. The most 
important aspect of the treaty, however, was the institutionalisation of consultations 
between the French and German governments with regard to 
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'all important issues of foreign policy and foremost with regard to issues of 
common interests, in order to come to a far as joint a position as possible.' 161 
The treaty specified these 'important issues' as issues relating to the European 
Community and the European Political Co-Operation, political and economic 
relations between East and West and any issue which would be negotiated in 
international organisations, such as NATO or the U.N. 162 . Closer co-operation was 
also determined in the area of defence. In order to avoid the impression that the Treaty 
would create an exclusively bilateral alliance, both countries stressed that they would 
'keep the governments of the other member states of the European Union informed 
about the development of the Franco-German co-operation,163. 
The Elysee Treaty marked the institutionalisation of the co-operation between France 
and Germany as the basis for the functioning and the further development of the 
European Economic Community (EEC). The treaty symbolised the fact that both 
countries were depending on each other in post-war Europe. West Germany needed a 
partner in order to achieve its aim to successfully reintegrate into the community of 
democratic nations and to be able to exercise relatively sovereign control over its 
internal and external affairs. As the junior partner of France, the partnership offered 
the chance to proceed bilaterally and therefore secured the semi-sovereign Federal 
Republic the ability to exercise a relatively strong influence in Europe. 
For France, on the other hand, the Franco-German alliance secured that Germany 
would not attempt to go it alone in Europe and, even more important, allowed France 
to take on a leading role within the EEC. Moreover, the close ties of the Franco-
German partnership and the economic framework of the EEC allowed France to 
permanently secure its share of German economic success. 
161 Treaty between the Federal Republic of West Germany and the French Republic on Franco-German 
co-operation, 22 January 1963, paragraph 11, section A, source: Hesse and Ellwein, 1997, p. 32. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid, paragraph Ill, point 2, source: Hesse and ElIwein, 1997, p. 33. 
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Because of these differences of perception with regard to the value of the bilateral 
relationship and the future of European integration, the Elysee Treaty was therefore 
more a symbol for both countries' post-war dependence on one another, rather than a 
genuine document of friendship: 
'It had considerable symbolic importance, although in many ways it did not live up 
to its original promise and there continued to be major policy differences between 
the two countries' (Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, 1998, p. 109) 
In spite of the Franco-German disagreements with regard to policy details and the 
desirable future shape of the EEC, both countries nevertheless had found a modus 
vivendi, which satisfied them both. Although France had originally set out to achieve 
far greater control over West Germany, the settlement of the Franco-German alliance 
in the end satisfied French interests, as France had become the leading partner in a 
relationship with a politically much weaker Federal Republic. France also did not find 
it too hard to accept the fact that, after the boom years of the 1950s, West Germany 
had once again become the economically stronger nation. The Franco-German 
alliance, as it had been institutionalised in the Elysee Treaty, and the pooling of 
economic power in the EC secured France a permanent fair share of the German post-
war miracle. The fact that the post-war economic and monetary policy in Europe was 
strongly influenced by the priorities of the German Bundesbank, which literally 
exercised its own shadow foreign policy, did not trouble the French too much under 
the given circumstances. 
It was for that reason that France agreed to the de facto institutionalisation of the 
Bundesbank supremacy in Europe through the creation of the European Monetary 
System (EMS) in 1979. A joint Franco-German initiative, it was based on the 
Deutsche Mark as an anchor currency and provided the basis for the later 
development of a European currency union, which France had always desired. 
Because the post-war power of the Deutsche Mark had been successfully 
'Europeanised' in a European framework, which, at least according to French plans, 
was to lead to the creation of a European single currency in the long term, from the 
French point of view, the benefits of West German economic leadership outweighed 
the disadvantages. 
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The loss of French economic influence in Europe was therefore compensated by 
profound economic benefits for the French economy: 
'With the partial exception of the 1981-83 period, French governments had 
welcomed close relations with the German economy as a means of modernising 
their own ( ... ) Tying the Franc to the Deutsche Mark through the ERM produced 
substantial economic benefits. It allowed inflation to be mastered, the productivity 
gap with Germany to be narrowed, and even an improved commercial balance with 
Germany.' (Cole, 2001, p. 93) 
Nevertheless, the long-term concept of a European monetary union had always 
remained important for French leaders, as it 'should enable it to catch up with 
Germany, which was perceived as the economically stronger partner' (Guerot, Stark, 
Moreau, Defarges, 1998, p. 132). Through the creation of a European single currency 
with a European Central Bank, which would replace the dominant German 
Bundesbank, France believed to be able to end the German economic dominance and 
increase its own economic influence, while still being able to benefit from the 
economic linkage with the Federal RepUblic. For the French, the establishment a 
monetary framework (like the EMS in 1979) was therefore closely linked to the idea 
of Economic and Monetary Union, which would have to be gradually developed and 
would have to include more than just a core group of states: 
'Its preferred vehicle for reconciling growth and stability was a 'common 
currency' jointly managed by a confederation of interdependent states. The 
Bundesbank's steel grip over interests and exchange rate policies in Europe would 
be loosened if they were decided by a wide coalition of states, including Britain or 
Italy, that diluted Germany's influence' (Story, 1999, p. 20) 
From the German point of view the tacit acceptance of a junior partner position 
alongside France in the EC also was a rather positive development, which was gladly 
accepted. The post-war leaders of the Federal Republic realised that their country was 
in urgent need of a permanent partner in order to be able to rebuild its reputation as a 
democratic nation in Europe and elsewhere. France was the ideal partner for this 
purpose, as it had traditionally been the main rival of Germany in Europe. 
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In order to make the Federal Republic's re-integration into the group of civilised 
nations credible to the outside world, it was thus indispensable to achieve lasting 
reconciliation with the French. An integrated Europe, in which West Germany would 
play an essential part could therefore only be based on a close alliance between 
France and Germany. It symbolized a new post-war German approach towards the 
idea of Europe, which was no longer based on hegemonial aspirations but on the 
peaceful co-operation amongst the nations of Europe for their own benefit. 
In this respect, the Franco-German alliance served as a symbolic proof for the 
changed post-war German motives in Europe, based on a 
'( ... ) view of the EU as a Werte- und Friedensgemeinschaft which continues to be a 
powerful force in German European policy, with the Franco-German relationship 
as its most potent symbol' (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p. 55) 
Moreover, it allowed the Federal Republic to take on a leading role inside the 
European Community without raising any suspicion about renewed German great 
power ambitions. Both countries formed a bilateral alliance, which acted as a 'co-
operative hegemon' (Hyde-Price, 2000, p. 194) in the European Community. 
For a country of semi-sovereign status, the Franco-German alliance allowed the 
Federal Republic a relatively large amount of influence on the process of European 
integration. 
It was for these reasons that West German leaders were very interested in maintaining 
the Franco-German alliance, even if it often meant accepting political and economic 
implications which were not in the German interest. The Federal Republic thus not 
only accepted the creation of a protectionist Common Agricultural Policy for the EU, 
which mainly benefits French agriCUltural interests, but also reluctantly agreed to 
budgetary arrangements of the Community, which turned Germany into the biggest 
net contributor. The CAP system established as part of the EEC's acquis communfaire 
in the 1960s, was strongly shaped along the lines of French national agricultural 
interests. 
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French president de Gaulle pressured West Germany and the rest of the Community 
to accept a system, which mainly favoured the large French agricultural sectorl64• 
Through CAP, French farmers have been able to benefit from a protectionist system 
which opened up external markets for French agricultural products and, through mass 
production subsidies, secured the existence of French farming in the international 
market. De Gaulle had therefore achieved a settlement, which greatly benefited 
France, mainly at the expense of Bonn: 
( ... ) it made net importers of food, notably Germany, contribute 
disproportionately to paying for this support. German funds for French farmers 
were viewed as a positive result, and not least because it helped to legitimise both 
the Franco-German alliance and EEC membership with reluctant or hesitant voters 
at home. Paradoxically, it was by fixing product prices at German levels that the 
maximum gain for French farmers was attained.' (Guyomarch, Machin and 
Ritchie, 1998, p. 141) 
Through CAP, France had thus secured a massive permanent share of the German 
financial capacity for itself. Because since its introduction, the CAP has taken the 
largest share of the Community budget, 'it became the principal cause of the massive 
financial transfer from Germany to France and, later, the southern European 
countries' (Cote, 2001, p. 70). While France has traditionally always paid far less into 
the Community budget than Germany, it continues to receive a great deal from 
Community funds 16S, especially with regard to CAP. The Common Market of the 
Community had hence been based on a mutual compromise between the two leading 
partners France and West Germany: 
164 De Gaulle had put enormous pressure on the other partners within the EEC to accept the French 
proposals for a Common Agricultural Market. On 21 October 1964, the French government announced 
that it would leave the EEC in case the CAP would not be realised as planned. Especially the 
lukewarm attitude of the West German government towards the CAP was strongly criticized. In 1966, 
France even resorted to an 'empty chair' policy in the EEC. By withdrawing its representatives from 
the Community, it tried to pressurise the other member states to accept French proposals. 
(Dokumenle, 2000, p. 43 and p. 47). 
165 In an analysis of the CAP, The Times reported on June 28th 2002 that Germany received 14% of the 
£ 26.5 million which were allocated in the EU budget for CAP in 2000, while it had contributed £ 14.1 
billion to the budget that year. At the same time, France received 22.2% with a contribution of only 
9.37. (The Times, 'Biggest farmers to fare worst under CAP reforms', 28 June 2002). 
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'The Germans received an extended, secure market for their industrial products 
with regard to competition rights, as a countermove a protectionist dirigiste 
agricultural system was installed, from which mainly the French profited. This set 
a development in motion, which later often posed a dilemma for Bonn: Due to 
political considerations, one agreed to economic conceptions on the European 
level, which, with regard to regulation policy, actually did not find a majority in 
the Federal Republic and, moreover, led to a growing German financial 
contribution towards the Community budget' (Meyer, 1999, p. 569) 
At least until after German reunification, this settlement was considered to be an 
inevitable sacrifice in order to maintain good relations with France and to advance the 
process of deepening the political and economic integration of Europe. Because the 
continuing success of the integration process and the functioning of the Community 
were fundamentally in the West German interest, its leaders tended to try not to 
endanger the Franco-German alliance by fundamentally challenging French 
proposals. 
For the sake of the political gain, which the Federal Republic got from the bilateral 
alliance with France, such as the ability to exercise joint leadership in the Community, 
its leaders were ready to make economic sacrifices with regard to budget 
contributions. Because there was no realistic alternative to the close relationship with 
France, the leaders in Bonn considered it to be part of the essential foreign policy 
tradition of the West German Republic. Mutual consent with France was considered 
an indispensable part of West German European policy, which is why consensus with 
France on major European issues was desperately sought on the West German part: 
'Despite the fact that France is willing to sacrifice bilateralism where it clashes 
with its national interests, the German elite has tended to see the relationship more 
as transcending such considerations' (Bulmer, Maurer and Paterson, 2001, p. 200) 
West German leaders consequently not only went along with many French ideas for 
Europe, but also reluctantly accepted the fact that de Gaulle vetoed British 
membership of the EEC twice in 1963 and 1967. 
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Although many of West Germany's elites would have wanted Britain as part of the 
Community sooner rather than later, mainly due to similar economic interests, their 
determination to maintain the Franco-German alliance outweighed their support for 
British membership. Strongly influenced by the rather sceptical attitude of Chancellor 
Adenauer, West Germany withdrew its initial principal support for the British EEC 
membership when the French resistance became obvious (Ludlow, 1997, p. 237). 
Adenauer himself had always been rather sceptical about the prospect of British 
membership, as he considered it to make the smooth functioning of the bilateral 
relationship with France more complicated. The British reluctance towards the whole 
project of European integration made the German Chancellor rather reluctant to 
actively support British membership, as he feared that support for such an 
unpredictable partner within the Community might alienate France: 
'( ... ) Adenauer could do well without British participation in West European 
institutions which he believed might actually complicate Franco-German 
rapprochement; and for him this was top priority. Although British and German 
trade interests were very similar, the political perspectives on European integration 
were not' (Kaiser, 1999, l" 95) 
The situation had changed under the leadership of Adenauer's successor, Chancellor 
Ludwig Erhard (1963-66), who was far more orientated towards an Atlanticist 
position and rather critical of de Gaulle's attitude in EurOpel66. Nevertheless, even 
under Erhard, the German resistance against the second French veto of the British 
application remained rather lukewarm. In spite of de Gaulle's withdrawal of French 
representatives from the Community in 1966, which had put France into an 
intolerable position, and Erhard's strong public support for the second British 
membership attempt, de Gaulle could maintain his veto towards British membership: 
166 Christian Hacke stresses that, in spite of Erhard's closeness towards the United States, his 
government officially tried to maintain good relations with the French. Privately, however, Erhard had 
made no secret of his disillusionment the French president's European policy and stated in 1964 'that 
West European integration in the spirit of the Treaty of Rome could under no circumstances be realised 
as long as de Gaulle was alive' (Hacke, 1997, p. 109). 
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'Right from the start Erhard did not make a secret of his essentially anglophile 
attitude, which was, as one may say, shared in large parts of the German elites and 
he also let it be publicly known that the Federal Republic would welcome British 
accession to the EEC in the near future ( ... ) Declarations of good-will do however 
not constitute policy and even more so as Erhard did, against all expectations, not 
manage to sustain his position in the domestic political arena for long' (Mommsen, 
1999,p.204) 
In spite of the fact that, since the Elysee Treaty, the institutionalisation of the Franco-
German alliance on many different levels has brought about 'many kinds of Franco-
German relationships ( ... ), not necessarily in synchrony or harmony with that of the 
political leaders' (Webber, 1999, p.l68), the functioning of the alliance has 
nevertheless, depended a great deal on the mutual understanding between both 
countries' heads of government. The relationship worked best when especially the 
(West) German Chancellor and the French president managed to establish a close 
personal relationship, based on the mutual acceptance of each other's position. That is 
why under the long-lasting leadership of General de Gaulle in France, Franco-German 
relations have repeatedly shipped into troubled waters. 
Although the Federal Republic's first Chancellor Adenauer made great efforts to 
maintain the Franco-German alliance, de Gaulle's often very nationalistic and at times 
uncompromising stance did in the end prevent the two leaders from establishing a 
close personal relationship167. De Gaulle had a tendency to stress his perception of 
France as an independent Great Power which would be the dominant partner in the 
Franco-German relationship. This not only disconcerted Adenauer but also his 
successors Erhard and Kiesinger168• 
167 Christian Hacke stresses that the relationship between Adenauer and de Gaulle was characterised by 
an underlying tragic, because 'de Gaulle, who was adored by Adenauer, pursued interests that were 
fundamentally different from those of Adenauer and who tried to use his political obligingness for his 
own ambitions with regard to power politics' (Hacke, 1997, p. 82). 
168 De Gaulle did not only reject any West German plans for the deepening of European integration but 
also criticised the West German leadership for the lack of support for the French position in the 
aftermath of the Elysee Treaty: 'After 18 months of his application one can say that ( ... ) the Franco-
German treaty, up to now, has not lead towards a common position' (Dokumente, 2000, p. 43). 
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Relations only improved after a change of presidency in France in June 1969, when 
the more pragmatic Georges Pompidou had been elected. Pompidou gave up both the 
French resistance towards the British membership application, and was also ready to 
compromise on a number of issues in order to move the integration process forward. 
Although, especially after the election of the first West German SPD Chancellor 
Willy Brandt, Franco-German relations were better than under de Gaulle, they never 
reached the level of personal friendship 169. This was only achieved under their 
successors Schmidt and Kohl, who both managed to bring the relations between 
France and Germany to a new level. 
Both Helmut Schmidt and Valery Giscard d'Estaing in the mid-1970s, and their 
successors Helmut Kohl and Fran~ois Mitterrand in the 1980s, came to a personal 
understanding and friendship which allowed them prove that Franco-German relations 
really deserve to be called an alliance or axis when they function smoothly. Under 
both leadership combinations, the Franco-German partnership indeed became a motor 
for European integration and helped to advance major initiatives. 
Based on close personal consultations between the leaders, initial differences were 
cleared up before official negotiations on Community initiatives were publicly 
brought forward, which greatly improved the ability to act as a leading duo on the 
Community level 170. Although this is certainly not the only aspect which decides if 
the relationship between France and Germany works, it is a point which must not be 
underestimated with regard to its importance. In spite of the institutionalisation of the 
Franco-German alliance, the question if French and German leaders had come to a 
personal understanding of their mutual points of view has often had a decisive impact 
on the quality of the relationship. 
169 For Brandt's personal assessment ofthe relationship with Pompidou see Brandt, 1989, pp. 256 and 
p.489. 
170 Especialy Helmut Schmidt has provided a detailed description of the way the collaboration within 
the Franco-German alliance reached a peak when it was based on the personal friendship between him 
self and Valery Giscard d'Estaing in the 1970s. Both leaders had prepared the creation of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) in 1978, which became the basis for Economic and Monetary Union and had 
acted jointly on a number of other initiatives. Schmidt describes the period of collaboration between 
him and Giscard as 'German-French red-letter days', which were based on an understanding of history 
and the need to move forward in Europe, 'from which we both took for granted that the other would 
share it' (see Schmidt, 1990, p.215-213 and Schmidt, 1996, p.261). 
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Because the institutionalisation, which has been set out in the Elysee Treaty, includes 
regular bilateral consultations between the German Chancellor and the French 
president l7l , the personal level of understanding can be crucial for the quality of the 
relations of the two countries as a whole. It is therefore fair to say that 
'( ... ) effectiveness of the "special relationship" depends in part upon the warmth of 
relations maintained between leaders, although such relationships are always 
underpinned by other, ultimately more consequential considerations' (Cole, 200 I, 
p.48) 
The fact that relations between France and Germany improved under the leadership of 
SchmidtlGiscard and KohllMitterrand also explains why during the period between 
the late 1970s and early 1990s substantial progress in European integration could be 
achieved. After a relative stalemate in the integration process in the 1960s and early 
1970s, the Franco-German couple now jointly managed to push towards further steps 
in European integration. 
Although both countries' motives for the support of each of the projects achieved 
remained different and focused on domestic interests, progress was achieved because 
of the willingness from both sides to compromise and to listen to each other's 
concerns. The succeeding combinations SchmidtlGiscard and KohllMitterrand 
worked because they were based on the mutual acceptance of each other's national 
interests in the integration process. Both Schmidt and Kohl accepted the fact that 
France's main interest was to bind the Federal Republic as deeply as possible into a 
European framework. They were therefore ready to go along with this French desire, 
as long as their domestic economic considerations were taken into account by the 
other side and progress towards the further deepening of the integration process could 
be made. 
171 Douglas Webber stresses that between 1982 and 1992, there were 115 meetings between the 
German Chancellor and French president, a number which exceeds any bilateral contacts with leaders 
from other countries. (Webber, 1999, p. 2) 
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On the French part, both Giscard d'Estaing and Fran~ois Mitterrand basically 
accepted the fact that the continuing integration of West Germany could only be 
maintained if, instead of aspiring independent Great Power ambitions, France was 
ready to integrate itself deeper into the Community framework. Instead of promoting 
a fake idealism towards European integration, the Franco-German alliance was now 
based on a more realistic approach from both sides. Helmut Schmidt stresses this in a 
self-critical assessment of the motives behind his and Giscard's interest in the 
deepening of integration: 
'The strategically thinking French knew of course that a permanent integration of 
Germany could only be achieved, if France would integrate itself in the same way 
( ... ) for Giscard d'Estaing it was natural. ( ... ) Giscard and I have probably made the 
mistake, not to talk about it clearly enough in public. ( ... ) Our goal of the self-
integration of both our nations and states was widely mistaken as idealism by the 
pUblic. Giscard and I failed to explain in sufficiently clear words that we actually 
pursued central, mutual national interests' (Schmidt, 1996, p. 262) 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who had served as German Foreign Minister both under 
Schmidt and Kohl, comes to a similar assessment of the relationship between Kohl 
and Mitterrand, who, like Schmidt and Giscard, based the Franco-German alliance on 
personal friendship and close consultations: 
'Not only had a political friendship developed between Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
and President Mitterrand for quite some time, which was based on the awareness 
of the common responsibility. From that resulted an effort, to achieve common 
action and to use this correspondence for European integration' (Genscher, 1995, 
p.379) 
The mutual understanding under SchmidtlGiscard and KohllMitterrand proved that 
the partnership between France and Germany can indeed act as a motor of the 
integration process when both partners pull together. Schmidt and Giscard jointly 
initiated the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978, which lay the foundation for 
the later steps towards Monetary Union. 
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The Schmidt administration was very interested in the creation of the EMS, because it 
was a first step towards greater European independence from the US Dollar, which 
had put the European economies into crisis after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1973 and the succeeding oil crisis (Schmidt, 1990, p. 248). Although, 
mainly due to the strict monetary stabilising policy of the Bundesbank, the Deutsche 
Mark became the leading currency within the EMS, the West German government 
had not seeked the creation of the EMS framework in order to reinforce Bundesbank 
power over the rest of Europel72. The West German motives were more focused on 
'stabilising its economic surroundings through an institutionalised EMS with a 
common currency as a perspective' (Guerot, Stark and Defarges, 1998, p. 129-165). 
In the end, the Federal Republic was therefore less worried about the loss of monetary 
power in Europe than it was interested in integrating its powerful monetary assets into 
a European framework in order to end French and European worries about West 
German economic power. 
The French, on the other hand, were ready to engage inside the EMS because, 
although they realised that they would be bound to the interest rate policy of the 
Bundesbank in such a system, it would be the first step towards merging the West 
German currency into a Single European Currency. Apart from giving the French 
government a greater influence on monetary matters on the European level than it 
would have had outside the system, the EMS consequently helped the French to come 
an important step closer towards their strategic goal of monetary union. 
Although having been traditionally reluctant to agree to the pooling of national 
sovereignty on the European level in crucial areas, monetary integration was a prime 
example of how France turns into an advocate of the deepening of integration in 
areas, where the transfer of sovereignty actually leads to greater influence: 
172 On the contrary, the Schmidt administration actually had to defend itself against fierce criticism 
from leading Bundesbank economists, who were strongly opposed to the creation of the EMS as they 
feared it would threaten their DM-Stabilitiitspolitik (Schmidt, 1990, p.251-252 and p.259). 
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'In reversal of the traditional dynamic, the French government - along with others 
- learnt the lesson that sovereignty could be recovered by the solution of 
Europeanisation. Since monetary sovereignty had already disappeared, a single 
currency would allow the French and others to recover elements of national 
sovereignty by promoting European solutions' (Cole, 2001, p. 93) 
The mutual agreement between Schmidt and Giscard that the deepening of economic 
and political integration would be advantageous for both countries continued under 
Kohl and Mitterrand, who both helped to establish the Single European Act (SEA). 
which lay the basis for the major integrative steps set out in the Maastricht Treaty. 
The 1987 Single European Act, in which it had been determined to realise the Single 
European Market by the end of 1992, provided the economic basis for a Single 
European Currency. Its proposals had been developed in close co-operation between 
the European Commission under Jacques Delors and a triple alliance between the 
French, the German and the British government. They had been made possible not 
only because all three governments shared the desire to liberalise European markets, 
but especially because French president Mitterrand, whose country held the EC 
presidency at the time 'began to adopt the rhetoric of European federalism' 
(Moravcsik, 1991, p. 51). 
The French and the German leadership were therefore once again united in their 
desire to advance the integration process, which is why, in the aftermath of the SEA, 
the basis for the moves towards the creation of a European Union with a single 
currency could be laid. Strongly supported by both France and Germany (with the 
exception of the Bundesbank), the European Council decided to install an expert 
commission under the leadership of Jacques Delors, which would develop a step-by-
step plan towards European monetary union. The final report of the Delors expert 
commission in June 1989 proposed to move towards monetary union in three steps, 
with the final step being the transfer to irrevocable exchange rates with a Single 
European Currency (Tsoukalis, 2000, p. 159). 
Although the details of each different stage of EMU still had to be decided on by the 
European Community, the Delors report had finally provided a framework for the 
major integration project, which had been pursued by the French since the 1960s. 
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That its initiation coincided with another major event, the emerging end of the 
division of Germany into two separate states, strengthened the French interests in the 
further deepening of economic and political union in Europe. The path towards the 
Maastricht Treaty had therefore been paved in 1989/90, but it would also soon 
become apparent how much the Franco-German partnership would change under the 
new post-Cold War conditions. 
3.2. After Maastricht: End of the mutual consensus 
From the French point of view, the prospect of the reunification of the two Germanys 
was a most unwelcome turn in history, especially at a time when the partnership 
between France and West Germany was functioning very well and crucial decision 
were imminent. In spite of their official rhetoric, French leaders had always 
considered the existence of two German states to be beneficial for the stability of 
Europe. In more than four decades since the end of the Second World War, they had 
found a way to successfully bind the West German Federal Republic into an 
economic and political European framework. Moreover, they had secured a leading 
role for their country in Europe, based on the close bilateral partnership with West 
Germany. 
The politically semi-sovereign West Germans had always been the junior partner in 
this relationship, at least in political terms. It was therefore not surprising that, 
although the French generally welcomed the looming end of the Cold War in Europe 
in the course of 1989, they were rather worried about the developments in the East 
German GDR. The increasing signs that the East Germans not only wanted to shake 
off their communist regime, but in fact seeked reunification with their fellow 
countrymen in the West, had made the prospect of German unification more likely. In 
spite of the cordial relations between French and German leaders during the 
KohllMitterrand years, the official French reaction towards the notion of German 
reunification remained rather cool and was limited to kind remarks. 
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When it became clear, that the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev would not oppose a 
peaceful process towards reunification, French president Mitterrand publicly 
expressed his rather lukewarm support, which showed that the French had deep 
reservations about the notion: 
'I simply say, reunification is legitimate for those who pursue it, here and there, in 
whatever part of Germany, like Mr Gorbachev has just expressed it. What does 
reality look like? Two Germanys, which are integrated into systems, which are 
different in every respect: economically, socially, politically, they belong to 
different alliances, as they exist with states, sovereign states. This causes many 
problems ( ... )' 173 
When Chancellor Kohl presented his 10 point plan to the German Bundestag on 
November 27th 1989, in which he outlined plans for a confederation between the two 
German states, the French leadership became increasingly alarmed, especially 
because they had not been consulted by Kohl beforehand. On December 6th 1989, 
President Mitterrand flew to East Berlin to hold talks with the SED leadership, a 
move which was widely considered as a flawed attempt to stabilise an East German 
state, the collapse of which had been inevitable. As the pace of the events would 
show, Mitterrand had fundamentally underestimated the desire of East Germans to 
reunite with their West German neighbours. He had clung to an unrealistic balance of 
power idea, which continued to be based on the necessity of the existence of two 
German states in Europe: 
'France's interest, moreover, was related to guaranteeing the European balance of 
power for as long as no new balance was able to replace the old order established 
by Yalta. It is fairly safe to say that Mitterrand reckoned on a long, drawn-out 
process of unification' (Guerin-Sendelbach and Schild, 2002, p. 35) 
173 Joint press conference of French president Mitterrand and Soviet general secretary Michail 
Gorbachev, Paris, 5 June 1989, source: Dokumente. 2000, p. 109. 
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After it become clear that the process of German reunification would be unstoppable 
and would neither be resisted by the Soviet, nor by the D.S. leadership, France bowed 
to the inevitable and tried to make sure that the now substantially larger Germany 
would be tied even deeper into a European framework. As the KohllGenscher 
administration had been anxious to calm any fears about German reunification 
amongst its neighbours, the French leadership found it easy to obtain assurances from 
their part that the unified Germany would actively engage in the deepening of the 
European integration process 174. In order to avoid the de-Europeanisation of the 
united Germany's foreign policy, the French therefore made every effort to accelerate 
the pace of the integration in the aftermath of German reunification. In this respect, 
German reunification had thus made the way towards the Maastricht Treaty easier, as 
the Kohl administration realised that the price for French consent to German 
reunification was to go along with French concepts for the development of Europe. 
The 1990/91 Maastricht negotiations were therefore dominated by the French desire 
to adapt the European Community's institutional framework to the fundamentally 
changed international environment after the end of the Cold War. French leaders 
realised that the larger and fully sovereign Germany would in the long run not only 
become more powerful in economic terms, but its political importance would also 
increase significantly. The urgent need to integrate the unified Germany hence 
outweighed any French reservations about the pooling of national sovereignty on the 
European level. 
As a result, the Maastrlcht Treaty led to a complete overhaul of the European 
Community with a number of integrationist measures, which pooled more national 
sovereignty on the Community level than ever before since the Treaty of Rome. 
Although strongly supported by the Kohl administration, which had for quite a while 
advocated the deepening of political and economic integration, the Maastricht Treaty 
can be regarded as an essentially French design. 
174 In his memoirs, the then German Foreign Minister Genscher describes how president Mitterrand 
openly expressed his worries about the lack of German commitment towards the integration process. 
Bonn responded by reassuring the French of their willingness to bring the process forward: 'Mitterrand 
reckoned that everything would be possible with regard to the German question, if the Germans helped 
to build Europe ( ... ) I wanted to thank the French president for his attitude towards German unification; 
it would be of historic importance for us. And our response towards European integration would be as 
well.' (Genscher, 1995, p. 680). 
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With the exception of Monetary Union, the dense and complicated structure of the 
European Union which has been established by the Maastricht Treaty was essentially 
influenced by the structures of the French political system. As the French state has a 
tendency to centralise power, rather than to devolve it to smaller units, French 
representatives advocated a model for the European Union, which is characterised by 
massive regulation and bureaucracy: 
'The concentration of power at the centre of Europe ( ... ) clearly reflects the 
instincts of a political elite shaped by the French form of the state ( ... ) By using 
Brussels and the post-Maastricht process to gain an important say in the 
government of Germany, the French political class has the opportunity to prolong 
French dominance by way of projecting the French model of the state, a 
bureaucratic model, on the whole of Europe' (Siedentop, 2000, p. 115) 
As Alistair Co le points out in support of Si eden top's argument, especially the internal 
design of the EU institutions, which has been further complicated by the Maastricht 
Treaty, clearly represents an export of French institutional traditions. In contrast, 
although German elites have not found it too difficult to adjust to Community 
proceedings and structures, mainly because of their domestic tradition of co-operative 
federalism, they have nevertheless not been as efficient as their French counterparts in 
taking over key positions on the Community level. The French have hence been more 
successful than any other member state in their ambition to use the EU for their own 
national purpose: 
'( ... ) France uses the European arena as a means of exporting ideas, policies and 
administrative styles ( ... ) The European institutions were modelled along French 
lines; hence the role of Cabinets, and Directions Generales in the Commission. 
The French model of the concours was that adopted for recruitment to European 
institutions; this might explain the reputation for effectiveness of French civil 
servants within the Commission and elsewhere. France was reputed for its efficacy 
in placing its nationals in key directorates in areas of overriding national interest 
{such as DGVI, Agriculture, while no such reputational mastery has been 
attributed to Germany. In contrast to Germany, France offered a model of strong, 
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centralised EU coordination rivalled only by the British and Danish.' (Cole, 2001, 
p.59-60) 
It was hence not surprising, given these circumstances, that the German domestic 
discussion about the implications of the Maastricht Treaty turned out to be rather 
negative and critical. The fact that Kohl and Genscher had agreed to a treaty which 
not only contained an obscure network of regulation, but also decided to rush towards 
monetary union, led to severe domestic criticism in Germany. The overall media echo 
was critical175 and even prominent advocates of European integration, such as the 
former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt characterised the treaty as 'the monstrous 
Maastricht packet' 176 (Schmidt, 1993, p. 214). In member states, where the ratification 
of the treaty depended on a public referendum, it was either rejected in the first 
instance (like in Denmark) or only accepted by the tiniest of majorities (like in 
Francel7\ The criticism in Germany especially focused on the planned design for 
Economic and Monetary Union and the question if the German government would 
have the constitutional rights to transfer such an enormous amount of national 
sovereignty to the Community level. 
The German constitutional debate, which had to be clarified by a decision of the 
Federal Constitutional Court in October 1993178 had put Germany in the strange 
position of having become the brakeman in the Community. 
m See Dokumente. 2000, p. 126. 
176 Schmidt put his criticism of Maastricht in concrete form by stressing the sheer size of the treaty, 
which included a lot of unimportant visionary elements: 'The treaty suffers from its monumental 
complexity. It contains in total more than 200 printed pages, including its 17 added protocols and 33 
declarations, as well as the repeatedly changed text of EC Treaty, which is still in force' (Schmidt, 
1994, p. 168). 
177 Even the French public considered the treaty to be an excessive bureaucratic design for Europe, 
which is why the French government was struggling to win the public referendum. On September 20th 
1992, the treaty was accepted by a majority of 51,05% of the votes. This was not a very promising 
basis for the newly created European Union. (Dokumente. 2000, p. 129) 
178 In its official ruling on the Maastricht Treaty on 12 October 1993, the Federal Constitutional Court 
had made clear that the Federal government had the right to transfer national sovereignty as part of its 
membership of an international organisation such as the European Community. Bundestag and the 
Liinder in the Bundesrat would, however, always have to be consulted. As a result, a new article 23 
was included in the Grundgesetz, the so-called 'Europe article', which clarifies this procedure. (see 
Hacker, 1995, p. 281) 
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As the last country to ratify the Maastricht Treaty after the Bundestag decision on 
December 2nd 1993, Germany had significantly delayed the point when the treaty 
could finally be ratified. 
The fact that the Maastricht Treaty had set the timetable towards Economic and 
Monetary Union has widely been seen as a major concession towards the French by 
the Kohl administration. A number of analysts have classified it as the price the Kohl 
administration had to pay for the French consent towards reunification (see e.g. 
Webber, 1999, p . 22; Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p. 99; Guyomarch, Machin 
and Ritchie, 1998, p. 119; Bulmer, 1997, p. 70). It is certainly true that the Germans, 
although they principally supported the idea of monetary union, were far more 
interested in political integration and would have preferred a slower timetable towards 
EMU. Opposition towards the blank cheque Kohl had given the French in terms of 
monetary union therefore not only came from leading economists, but also from 
within Kohl's governing coalition. The then finance minister Theo Waigel, leader of 
the CDU's Bavarian sister party CSU, had come under intense pressure from his party 
to insist on the inclusion of a stability pact in the Maastricht Treaty. The Bavarian 
Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber feared that due to the apparent public hostility 
towards the abolition of the Deutsche Mark at the time l79, the CSU might lose the 
support of many of its Conservative voters in Bavaria if a CSU finance minister 
rushed Germany into monetary union without any stability guarantees 180. 
The strict stability pact which was then included in the Maastricht Treaty in 
December 1996 due to the German insistence, was an obvious continuation of the 
traditional post-war Bundesbank policy. Not only would membership of the single 
European currency be based on strict economic criteria but, even more so it would be 
based on a Europeanised form of the Bundesbank model. 
179 Between 1995 and 1998, a persistent majority of the German public (about 60%) opposed the idea 
of a single European currency and rather dreaded the notion of having to abandon the Deutsche Mark. 
(Noelle-Neumann, 1999, p. 595-98). 
180 The Bavarian Prime Minister publicly insisted that fiscal stability would have to be the prime 
target for the European single currency. (Die Welt, 'Wahrungsunion unter BeschuB - Politiker streiten 
urn das 'Einfuehrungszenario', 4 November 1995). 
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The fact that the Kohl administration had used domestic German pressure to push 
through a German model of EMU, which would be based on strict convergence 
criteria and a politically independent European Central Bank, not only worried the 
French leaders but also stirred up French domestic opposition. Although Kohl had 
brushed aside the notion of a public referendum on EMU, he realised that he had to 
take into account domestic scepticism about the stability of the single currency. He 
thus used the domestic pressure to make it clear to France and the other European 
partners that Germany would have to insist on a stability pact and an independent 
Central Bank model (Anderson, 1999, pp. 48-49). 
On the French part, the German demands with regard to the conditions of EMU were 
seen as a first indication of the new arrogance of the larger Germany. The French 
found it hard to come to terms with the fact that, contrary to their initial experiences 
during the 1990/91 Maastricht negotiations, the unified Germany would be a far more 
difficult partner than its West German predecessor. Mainly because of the altered 
domestic political environment in the unified Germany, in which the main focus was 
now on financial issues and the costs of structural and economic transformation in the 
East German Lander, German leaders were far more adamant to secure the German 
financial and economic interest on the EU level. From the French perspective, this 
amounted to an attempt to impose German economic and fiscal priorities on the rest 
of the EU: 
'As far as the French are concerned, German policy towards Monetary Union put 
considerable strain on Franco-German relations - and hence on the one long-term 
project which Germany and France have been pursuing together ( ... ) Germany was 
obviously exploiting its influential position as the most important participant in 
EMU to make its own ideas on stability obligatory in Monetary Union and, to this 
end, used its own considerable domestic opposition to Monetary Union skillfully-
and thoroughly credibly - as a means of putting pressure on its European partners' 
(Guerin-Sendelbach and Schild, 2002, p. 40) 
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The post-Maastricht debate consequently obviously uncovered the major differences 
between French and German interests, which had been concealed during the 
Maastricht IGC. Because the French considered EMU to be an indispensable project 
in order to effectively integrate the economic power of a larger Germany in Europe, 
French leaders were ready to leave aside many of their original intentions with regard 
to EMU's structural design. The fact that the French had to realise that they would 
not be able to win over the Germans in their goal to establish an economic 
governmental framework for the EU as part of the single currency led to increasing 
frustrations on the French part. After the high point of Franco-German co-operation 
before and during the Maastricht negotiations had passed, relations between the two 
countries were hence increasingly characterised by diverging interests and opinions. 
The disagreement about the final structure of EMU played a major part in this 
development, as 
'the succeeding and permanent tensions in the Franco-German discussion about 
EMU can for a major part be explained as a result of the desire of parts of the 
French decision-makers, under pressure from the French public, to want to break 
out of the treaty regulations (e.g. absolute independence of the European Central 
Bank) and to return to original French ideas' (Guerot, Stark, Defarges, 1998, p. 
134). 
As a result, in contrast to the previously bonne entente between French and German 
leaders, the post-Maastricht relations between France and Germany were increasingly 
characterised by a lack of mutual trust. The traditional Franco-German approach of 
finding common ground before crucial negotiations, in order to be able to act as a 
motor of the integration process, did hardly occur after 1992. Instead, from the mid-
1990s onwards, differences about policy details and especially institutional 
arrangements dominated Franco-German discussions. The Franco-German motor 
consequently increasingly lost its power and repeatedly even turned into a brake pad 
within the EU. 
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A major factor in this development was that Fran~ois Mitterrand had failed to use his 
cordial personal relations with Helmut Kohl to sort out the disagreements with regard 
to EMU, before he stepped down as president in 1995. Although Mitterrand had 
ignored French domestic opposition towards the German conditions of EMU, in order 
not to endanger its realisation, he was still intent to pursue the French goal of getting 
strong political control over the officially independent European Central Bank. 
His successor, the neogaullist Jacques Chirac, who showed a far more brisk and 
nationalistic attitude in Europe, therefore continued to pursue this goal with 
vehemence. He was supported in this by his cohabitation partner, Socialist Prime 
Minister Lionel Jospin, who had won the French general election in 1997. In spite of a 
public display of personal friendship, Kohl and Chirac had never managed to establish 
a personal relationship similar to that between Kohl and Mitterrand (Co le, 2001, p. 
111; Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, 1998, p. 40) which had been crucial for the 
integration process. It was hence not surprising that the unsolved disagreements 
between France and Germany were far harder to settle in the post-Mitterrand era. The 
fundamental disagreement between French and German leaders on the future design 
of an EU with a single currency consequently continued to drive a wedge between the 
once cordial partnership: 
'Both Mitterrand and Chirac indicated that once the currency was introduced, the 
ECB would be flanked by the finance ministers, who, in the French view, would 
set the parameters of monetary and exchange rate policy. In other words, there was 
to be a significant role for national fiscal policies within a single currency area ( ... ) 
The German government by contrast emphasises the independence of the ECB, 
contests recurrent French references to a parallel role of national fiscal policies, 
and interprets the Treaty as imposing strict fiscal constraints before and after 1999' 
(Webber, 1999, p. 38) 
This became more than obvious at the June 1997 IGC in Amsterdam, which was 
supposed to revise the regulations of the Maastricht Treaty in order to make EU 
structures and procedures more transparent. 
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At the summit, the stability pact for the EMU was supposed to be officially adopted 
by the EU member states. The newly elected Jospin administration had initially 
insisted on a combination between the stability pact and a common European 
employment policy (Giering, 1997 , pp. 327-328) . Furthermore, the French side even 
expressed the desire to establish an economic government on the Community level as 
a counterweight towards the politically independent ECB (Weidenfeld and Giering, 
1998, p. 32). This was of course completely unacceptable to the Kohl administration, 
which had a dislike of socialist interventionist policies. Moreover, the German side 
was especially worried about the financial implications of such measures. 
Kohl therefore fiercely opposed any attempts to provide extra budget funds for a 
European employment policy and the first half of the summit plunged into chaosl81 • A 
compromise could only be found in the last minute and consisted of the establishment 
of a rather vague co-operation between the employment policies of member states 
under the framework of an employment committee, for which no extra financial 
spending should be freed (Giering, 1997, p. 330). 
It became clear that the German side was rather ready to risk the failure of the IGC 
than to give up its position on crucial issues of national interest. This was remarkable 
as it clearly showed that France was no longer capable of forcing the larger and 
increasingly self-confident Germany to go along with French interests: 
'France appeared weak and isolated in the absence of an effective Franco-German 
relationship; it needed the special relationship far more than Germany, which 
demonstrated an uncharacteristic unwillingness to agree with France in the name of 
Franco-German solidarity' (Cole, 2001, p. 68) 
To the astonishment of the other EU member states, France and Germany were no 
longer helping to advance the integration process but rather hampered its progress 
because of their national differences on crucial issues. Amsterdam had made it 
obvious for both partners and the rest of the EU, how much the former entente 
cordiale had changed since the reunification of Gennany. 
ISI See Die Welt, 'Gelassenheit nach der 'Nacht der langen Messer', 19 June 1997. 
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Gone were the days when both partners made every effort to come to mutual 
agreements. Instead, while the unified Germany could no longer afford to give ground 
on financial issues due to the severity of its domestic economic problems and was 
prepared to defend its national position, France complained about the lack of 
European spirit on the German side. 
The French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine carefully put these changes into words 
in 1998, when he hinted at the changed relationship between France and the larger 
Germany, which now defends its interests in a similar way to France: 
'The personal relations with Germany are good but the situation and therefore the 
relationship are no longer exactly the same like before. Without somebody having 
intended it, the French and German interests diverged during that period. The 
unified Germany defends its positions without any complex. I am not saying it, that 
Germany has become less European, but it is, as France is: it does what it has to 
do.' (Dokumente, 2000, p. 163). 
That the events at Amsterdam had not been a one-off and Maastricht had indeed 
become a turning point in the post-war Franco-German relations (Siedentop, 2000, pp. 
114-115) became even clearer at the EU summit in Brussels in May 1998. 
Again France and Germany found themselves on opposite sides and argued about who 
should lead the European Central Bank, which was to be set up in Frankfurt. The fact 
that the French had both given in to the German desire to base the single currency on 
a stability pact and agreed to Frankfurt as the location of the ECB made them more 
confident about wanting to have a say in the choice of its leadership. The French thus 
favoured Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the French central bank as head of the 
ECB, because they hoped that it would be easier to exercise some political influence 
on the bank if it was lead by a Frenchman. The Kohl administration, in contrast, was 
very interested in making sure that the ECB's independence from political influence, 
as set out in the Maastricht Treaty, would be adhered to. As a result, the Germans 
opposed the Trichet nomination and supported the appointment of the Dutch 
candidate, Wim Duisenberg, who had a reputation for pursuing a policy of monetary 
stability (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000, p. 100). 
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The Franco-German disagreement on such a crucial appointment took place at the 
most unfortunate time, namely during the first British presidency under the leadership 
of the newly elected British Labour government. The Blair administration had been 
too unexperienced in European affairs at the time to act as an efficient mediator 
between the French and Germans. The summit therefore ended in chaos with an 
outcome which was both politically and economically damaging for the EU: Wim 
Duisenberg had officially been nominated for the 8 year period as ECB president but, 
from the French point of view, he would have to step down after half of his period in 
office in favour of their candidate Trichet. The lack of consensus between France and 
Germany on the issue had led to a lame duck-presidency of the ECB, which seriously 
undermined the credibility of the single currency and was therefore widely 
criticised 182. 
For those who had seen the public disagreements between France and Germany the 
Amsterdam IGC as an unfortunate one-off incident, the Brussels summit had finally 
made obvious that the Franco-German engine had seriously started to stutter, with 
dire consequences for the rest of the EU. While the Franco-German tandem had acted 
as a motor for European integration in the past, it now proved to act as a brake to 
further progress and sensible outcomes. It became clear that 'when Franco-German 
conflicts on such issues remain unmediated, this tends to produce deadlock, if not 
crisis, in the EU policy process ( ... r (Webber, 1999, p. 176). 
What many had anticipated after German reunification, had actually occurred. In the 
aftermath of Maastricht, both partners have found it increasingly hard to adapt to the 
changed balance between them. Especially the French side seems to find it difficult to 
come to terms with the fact that the larger, fully sovereign Germany is no longer 
willing to act as a junior partner. While the semi-sovereign Bonn republic realised its 
political dependence on the French partner, which allowed the West Germans to 
influence major decisions on the Community level as part of a bilateral leadership 
alliance, the larger Germany is no longer limited to this option. 
182 It was mainly the British presidency which was criticised at home and in the rest of Europe for 
having failed to reign in the French demands and allowed a damaging outcome for the ECB (see Die 
Welt, 'Nach Gipfel-Chaos sinkt Blair-Fieber in Europa', 5 May 1998. 
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The fully sovereign Germany, which is now on an equal political level with France, is 
less willing to sacrifice its own interests for the sake of the Franco-German 
partnership. As German domestic political and economic problems have increased in 
the wake of reunification, and continue to plague the German economy, German 
leaders have become more focused on making sure that their financial and economic 
interests are secured. French disappointment about a lack of German commitment to 
the Franco-German alliance was therefore unavoidable, as 
'Germany now exerCIses considerable influence on European policy debates 
through unilateral semi-official policy statements and not within the context of the 
Franco-German ( ... ) initiatives, something which was inconceivable in the 
seventies and eighties' (Guerin-Sendelbach and Schild, 2002, p. 46) 
The spanner in the works in the post-Maastricht Franco-German relationship hence 
consists mainly of a new German self-perception to have become a 'normal' state like 
any other in Europe and the French refusal to deal with Germany on an equal political 
level. The Franco-German disagreements which had occurred in the last few years of 
the Kohl era should thus have been a warning sign for both partners to try to find a 
new basis for their partnership under the altered circumstances. Under these new 
circumstances, as Stephan Martens rightly points out, 
'France and Germany can however only play the role of a common motor for the 
European Union on the basis of equality. In the meantime, the representatives of 
the 'Berlin Republic' are, however, less willing to let France have the leading role 
in Europe' (Martens, 2002, p. 27) 
For France to have wholeheartedly accepted the political equality of the unified 
Germany would have been a precondition for the continuing success of the Franco-
German alliance. The fact that French leaders have failed to do so, has shipped the 
relationship into previously unknown troubled waters. 
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3.3. Towards increasing flexibility: France and Germany in the post-Nice EU 
The 1998 general election in Germany, which brought a new post-war generation of 
political leaders to power and ended the 16 year-long era under Helmut Kohl, also had 
a profound impact on Franco-German relations. The SPD/Green party coalition under 
the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schrl)der showed a new attitude towards the 
integration process and the partnership with France. Already in opposition, Schrl)der 
had expressed his view that the unified Germany would have to readjust its European 
policy in terms of greater cost-effectiveness. Schrl)der announced that under his 
leadership, Germany would still be a promoter of European integration, but only if 
there was a balance between costs and benefits. On top of it, although not denying the 
continuing importance of the partnership with France, Schrl)der stated that his goal 
would be the creation of a new leadership triangle between Germany, France, and 
Britain within the EU183• 
It had become clear that Germany was now lead by a Chancellor who, mainly because 
he had no personal experience of the scars of the two World Wars, belonged to a 
younger, more pragmatic generation of politicians in Europe. Schrl)der would 
therefore lay an even greater focus on Germany's domestic interests than Kohl had 
done in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty. Immediately after the September 1998 
German election, French leaders had had high hopes for the revival of the Franco-
German alliance. During the brief period in office as German finance minister of the 
francophile SPD leader Oskar Lafontaine, the emergence of a new Franco-German 
axis in the EU seemed indeed promising184• 
183 Interview with Gerhard SchrOder in Die Zeit, 9 September 1998, 'SchrOder: Jetzt sind die 
Pragmatiker die Visionllre'. 
184 During his period in office, Lafontaine had tried to intensify the co-operation with France, 
especially with regard to the development of a harmonised European economic and finance policy. 
Both he and the then Socialist French finance minister Strauss-Kahn had put forward a number of joint 
initiatives for interventionist economic policies on the European level (see joint article in Die Zeit, 
'Europa - sozial und stark, MUrkte brauchen die ordnende Hand des Staates' , 3/1999). 
Lafontaine had strongly criticised the SchrOder-Blair paper and had refused to accept any notion of 
closer co-operation between Germany and the UK: 'We can only advance European integration in co-
operation with France. Britain will still occupy a special position for the foreseeable future' 
(Lafontaine, 1999, p. 193). 
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After he resigned as finance minister and SPD leader in March 1999, the francophile 
element within the Schroder administration had almost disappeared and was, if at all, 
only still represented by Foreign Minister Fischer, although with less enthusiasm than 
under Lafontaine. The first German EU presidency under the leadership of the 
SchroderlFischer administration in the first half of 1999 had thus set out clear 
demands with regard to institutional reforms and budget arrangements: 
'It will be a first main emphasis of the Council presidency, which Germany takes 
over on January 1 st 1999, to already conclude the negotiations for the "Agenda 
2000" at a special meeting of the European Council in spring 1999. It will have to 
deal with duties, expenditures and the financing of the European Union. Within the 
framework of the revision of the EU's finances we want to come to a fairer share 
of the contributions and to reduce the German net burden to a fair level. 
With regard to CAP, we will be committed to fundamental changes. Where the 
alignment of prices with the global level disadvantages German farmers, we have 
to push through a system of direct income subsidies, which can also be 
supplemented on the national level' 185 
The new German leadership had consequently made clear straight away that it would 
push towards institutional and procedural reform in the EU. Especially the issue of the 
reform of CAP and the revision of German budget contributions in general were 
likely to meet French resistance. At the Berlin European Council summit on March 
24th and 25th 1999, the French government vetoed substantial reform of the funding 
principle of CAP and also prevented a substantial reduction of the German budget 
'b' 186 contn utlons . 
185 Regierungserkliirung von Bundeskanzler Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 10 November 
1998, www.bundeskanzler.de/Regierungserklaerung-.8561.58575IRegierungserklaerung-von-
Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-S ... htm. 
186 See Presidency Conclusions of the Berlin European Council, 24 and 25 March 1999, 
httj):I/ue.eu.intlNewsroomlLoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=57322&LANG= 1. 
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At the end of the German Council presidency, the Schroder administration hence had 
to admit that its original plans for far-reaching reforms would had to be postponed to 
the next IGC in 2000, in order to avoid another stalemate in the EU187• The adoption 
of the Agenda 2000 was crucial in order for the enlargement process to go ahead, a 
project which Germany strongly supports. Schroder and Fischer therefore realised that 
they could not risk to stop the necessary funds for enlargement to be frozen, just 
because France would not go along with their demands for a fairer deal on the budget 
and CAP reform. This boiled down to 
'( ... ) the Federal Republic of Germany doing justice to its role as a honest broker-
but the price to be paid was that Germany's burden of contribution to the budget 
was not reduced to the extent it had wanted (and previously demanded)' (Laux, 
2000, p. 3) 
During the preparation phase for the IGC in Nice in December 2000, it became even 
more apparent that France and Germany did no longer share common goals in Europe. 
When German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer decided to set out his personal 
vision188 of the future shape of the EU in a speech at the Humboldt University in 
Berlin in May 2000, he provoked reactions in France which ranged from concealed 
criticism to outright hostility. Fischer had touched the French sensibility on Europe on 
two points: 
187 In his official statement on the EU summit in Cologne to the German Bundestag on June 8th 1999, 
Chancellor Schr~der confirmed, that the substantial institutional and procedural reforms had not yet 
been achieved during the German presidency: '( ... ) we have agreed to the further proceedings with 
regard to institutional reform. An IGC will be held at the beginning of 2000, in order to make the EU 
ready for enlargement (oo.) And the last hurdles for the enlargement process will be removed with the 
conclusion of the IGC we have agreed on in Cologne.' 
htn?:1 Iwww.bundeskanzler.de/Regierungserklaerung-. 8561.8178/Regierungserklaerung-von-
Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-S ... htm. 
188 Fischer had explicitely stated that he had not made the speech as Gennan Foreign Minister, which is 
why the ideas he expressed were not official government policy but his private thoughts. The 
manuscript of the speech therefore simple stated 'Joschka Fischer'as the speaker, with no reference to 
his official position as Foreign Minister. (Saddeutsche Zeitung, 'AuBenminister entwirft "persOnliche 
Vision" - Fischer wirbt fUr europaische FOderation, 13 May 2000). 
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First of all, he had shown the courage to make his own proposals on the development 
of the EU without prior direct consultation with French leaders 189• He had therefore 
confirmed the French view that the unified Germany was becoming too self-confident 
to make any efforts to maintain the pre-unification bilateral approach of making joint 
proposals on the future of Europe. 
The French had already been angered by the Schiiuble-Lamers paper in 1995, which 
in their opinion confirmed the suspicions about the new German intentions to create a 
German Europe (Cole, 2001, p. 80). As the French continue to strongly disapprove of 
German unilateral initiatives in Europe, the Fischer proposals were perceived as a 
major disruption of their preparations as EU Council presidents for the Nice summit. 
French leaders were thus angered by, as they saw it, Fischer's attempt to take the 
initiative on EU reform away from them, at a time when it would have belonged to 
them: 
'The French Council presidency wanted to fully concentrate on the agenda of the 
Intergovernmental Conference ( ... ) It considered itself to be distracted in its 
"pragmatic" approach towards the IGC by Foreign Minister Fischer's speech on 
European policy principles and the resulting broad debate about the future 
direction of the development and the shape of the EU' (Schild, 2001, p. 3) 
Secondly, in the eyes of the French, Fischer's proposals were a clear indication that 
the Germans wanted to create a federal European superstate, along the lines of the 
German political system. Fischer's proposal to create a core federal Europe, based on 
a two chamber-European Parliament and even on a directly elected European 
president190, bore too many similarities to German federalism for the French to be 
able to accept it. 
189 Franco-German consultations on the Fischer speech had been limited to notification between the 
planning staff of the German and the French Foreign Office. 
190 See' From Confederacy to Federation - Thoughts on the finality of European integration', Speech 
by Joschka Fischer at the Humboldt Univeristy in Berlin, 12 May 2000, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/www/de/infoservice/downloadlpdflredenlredene/rO00512b-rl 008e.pdf. 
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The French reactions were correspondingly harsh, mounting in the French interior 
minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement's accusation that Fischer's proposals had shown 
that 'Germany had not yet overcome Nazism' 191. He clarified his position in a 
succeeding debate with Joschka Fischer in the German weekly Die Zeit, in which he 
would not repeat his accusation. However, he still insisted that the Germans would 
cling to a definition of the nation which stemmed from the 'Volksidee', while France 
would see the nation mainly as a political and cultural entityl92. 
Both the French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine and president Chirac were more 
careful in their reaction towards the Fischer speech, but still could not conceal their 
dislike of the German unilateral approach. In a letter to Joschka Fischer193, Vedrine 
expressed the view that 'it would be perfectly legitimate that the German Foreign 
Minister expresses his view in this debate with such force'. On the basis of this 
diplomatic nicety, he however left no doubt that the French government would not 
accept further German unilateral proposals on the future of the EU: 
'It would therefore be best at this stage, if we would abstain from theoretical 
controversies about the various meanings of the word "federalism" ( ... ),194 
In his speech to the German Bundestag on June 27th 2000, President Chirac laid out a 
vision, which was clearly different from the one Fischer had presented. Chirac 
stressed that the French wanted to maintain a strong intergovernmental basis for the 
EU, in contrast to Fischer's federal vision. He also clearly criticized the German 
attempts to push towards deeper European integration without consulting its partners: 
191 Le Monde, 'L'Allemagne ne s'est pas encore guerie du nazisme', 23 May 2000, 
www.lemonde.fr/recherche resumedoc/l.96S7.S3423.00.html. 
192 Die Zeit, 'Streitgesprlch Joschka Fischer contra Jean-Pierre Chevenement', 26/2000, 
http://www.zeit.de/20001261200026 titelei.html. 
193 Schreiben des jranz(Jsischen AujJenministers, Hubert Vedrine, an den deutschen AujJenminister, 
Joschka Fischer, 8 Juni 2000, (source: Internationale Politik, August 2000, 8, 
httj>:llwww.dgap.org/IP/ipOOOS/vedrineOS0600.html). 
194 Ibid. 
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'Enlargement must not lead us to taking the bull by the horns. We will not allow 
that the European construction work is destroyed, which you and ourselves have 
been working on in co-operation with our partners for nearly half a century with 
such an amount of will and energy ( ... ) Moreover, I am convinced that you cannot 
dictate the speed of the European construction work. To a large degree, it depends 
on to what extent our peoples identify themselves with Europe, feel part of it and 
are willing to "coexist" in a community of solidarity ( ... ) Neither you Germans, nor 
we French want a European superstate, which would replace our nation states and 
mark the end point of their role as actors on the international stage' 195 
Chirac also went on to criticise the state of the relationship between France and 
Germany under a new post-war generation of German representatives. He called for 
renewed efforts on both sides to overcome an attitude, in which the relations are seen 
as a normality without the need for mutual consultation and dialogue: 
'Reconciliation between us has been completed. It is now a naturalness, a reality in 
daily life, which is normal to an extent that we do in fact no longer realise its 
dimension. And the new leadership generations, who have learned all this in the 
history books, maintain this reconciliation as a legacy, which does no longer rouse 
the same emotions amongst them like it did amongst their predecessors. Let us 
therefore make another attempt; let us return to the vigour of the years of 
foundation,196 
Chirac's speech was widely perceived as an unveiled criticism of the Fischer 
proposals and an attempt to regain the momentum in the EU, just before the start of 
the French Council presidency. 
195 Rede von Jacques Chirac, dem Priisidenten der RepubJik Frankreich, vor dem Deutschen 
Bundestag, 27 June 2000, www.bundestag.de/cgi-binldruck.pl?N=default 
196 Ibid. 
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The Times commented that Chirac's speech had to be seen as 'the most delicate of 
warnings to the German government not to go out on a limb,197. The German paper 
Die Welt assessed Chirac's response to Fischer's proposals as 'a damper on Fischer's 
flourish,198. As it could be expected, the continuing Franco-German disagreements on 
the future shape of the EU did not go away but fatally overshadowed the Nice IGC in 
December 2000, which was supervised by the French presidency. In the run up to the 
IGC, the German government had returned to its original demands on a fairer share 
with regard to budgetary contributions and the reform of CAP. On top of that, 
Chancellor Schr5der made it clear that he intended to demand a fairer representation 
of the now larger Germany with regard to the number of votes in the European 
Council. 
The official German position paper on the Nice IGC consequently focused on a 
greater consideration of the increased political weight of the unified Germany, 
especially in the Council. As Germany was still on an equal level with the (population 
wise) smaller France regarding the number of votes in the Council (lO each), the 
Schr5der administration demanded 'to come to a model, in which the demographic 
differences between the member states are better expressed' 199. Senior members of the 
government had repeatedly confirmed this position in the run up to the Nice summit. 
In a speech in Brussels in November 2000, a few weeks before the start of the Nice 
IGC, Foreign Minister Fischer had stressed that 'Germany speaks up for a better 
consideration of the size of the population, without leaving the interests of the smaller 
member states aside ,200. With a clear hint to the French position, the permanent 
secretary in the foreign office, Gunther Pleuger, stressed in Berlin that 'if we want to 
consider the demographic factor within the framework of a reweighing of the votes, 
197 The Times, 'So very French - A brilliant manipulative performance by Chirac', 28 June 2000. 
198 Die Welt, 'Ein Dltmpfer tllr Fischers FanfarenstoB-- Chirac prltsentiert sich als pragmatischer 
Europlter', 27 June 2000. 
199 Grundsatzpapier zur RegierungskonJerenz in Nizza zu den institutionellen Reformen, source: 
Weidenfeld, 2001, CD ROM supplement. 
200 Rede des Bundesministers des Auswttrtigen Joschka Fischer im belgischen Parlament, Brussels, 14 
November 2000, www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdflreden 
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then this has to apply to everyone,201. Moreover, Germany was still insisting that the 
EU would have to come to a revised system of the costly CAP if it wanted to be able 
to include new member states into such a system202. 
French reactions to these Germans demands did not help to improve the strained 
relations between the two governments. The French foreign minister, clearly angered 
about the German unwillingness to leave the Nice reform agenda to the French 
presidency, called Fischer a 'pied piper', who would endanger progress in Europe 
with his visionary ideas203. At a bilateral meeting between Chirac and Schrl>der days 
before the start of the negotiations in Nice, both leaders had unsuccessfully tried to 
settle their disputes. 
While Schrl>der insisted that the EU would have to achieve a reweighing of the votes, 
with a greater consideration of the German weight, the French president insisted on 
parity between both countries, as anything else would lead to an imbalance in 
Europe204. In the aftermath of the meeting, Schrt>der publicly stressed that he would 
under no circumstances abandon the German demand for a bigger number of votes in 
the Council than France205. It was obvious that under these circumstances it had 
become impossible to maintain the usually practice of presenting a joint Franco-
German position paper on the major issues for the IGC. At Nice, the unprecedented 
situation therefore occurred, that no major Franco-German initiatives took place and 
both countries limited their co-operation to a small joint letter proposal on the 
extension ofQMV206. 
20) 'Die institutionelle Reform der Europaischen Union: Perspektiven auf dem Weg nach N izza' - Rede 
von Staatssekretar Dr. Gunter Pleuger in der Humboldt-Universitat Berlin. 26 October 2000, 
www .auswaertiges-amt.de/www .de/infoservice/download/pdflreden 
202 See The Times. 'Franco-German split hits summit', 30 November 2000. 
203 The Times. 'Franco-German row hits treaty', 1 December 2000. 
204 Suddeutsche Zeitung, 'Noch keine Einigkeit Uber EU-Reform - SchrOder und Chirac kOnnen 
Differenzen nicht ausraumen', 1 December 2000. 
20' See The Times, 'SchrOder rejects parity with France', 4 December 2000 and also the SchrOder 
interview in Der Spiegel, 4 December 2000. 
206 Gemeinsames Schreiben der deutschen und der franzosischen Delegation bezuglich der Ausweitung 
der qualijizierten Mehrheit, source: Weidenfeld, 2001, CD rom supplement. 
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Instead, Germany produced a more complex joint position paper with the Italian 
government on increased co-operation within the EU207• Even the British government 
supported the German line on institutional reform and remained rather critical of the 
French proposals208• 
France in the end reacted by using its role as the presidency to put its own proposals 
on the table, without seeking any prior consultation with other member states on the 
details. This inconsiderate French approach to the IGC, combined with an obviously 
patronising style of negotiation by French president Chirac209 isolated the French at 
the summit and led to a rather chaotic outcome with many unsolved problems210• 
Germany failed to get a larger number of votes in the Council than France and 
received a concession with regard to the size of its population with sending the largest 
number of MEPs (99) to the European Parliament. The parity between France and 
Germany in the Council remains and the detailed reform of the Commission had been 
postponed once again to a later date (Giering, 2001, pp. 61-144). The fact that 
Germany with a population size of over 82 million people would continue to have the 
same number of votes in the Council (29) as France with just over 58 million, showed 
that the French are continuing to deny the political reality in Europe. French leaders 
are not willing to accept that the larger Germany has gained a greater political weight 
in the EU than its West German predecessor. The Nice summit had therefore made 
obvious that the difficulties within the Franco-German relationship mainly stemmed 
from a failure to accept the altered political balance between the two countries: 
'Germany wanted to get at least symbolically more votes than France, in order to 
give recognition to the clearly larger size of the population. For'France, this would 
have questioned the historic basis for negotiations of European unification, namely 
that France and Germany act as partners with equal rights' (Giering, 2001, p. 74). 
207 Gemeinsames deutsch-italienisches Positionspapier zur verst(irkten Zusammenarbeit, source: 
Weidenfeld, 2001, CD rom supplement. 
208 The Times, 'Germans are fighting on our side, says Cook', 7 December 2000. 
209 The Times, 'Chirac lecturing style angers delegates', 9 December 2000, 'Chirac caught out by the 
numbers game', 11 December 2000 and 'Marathon sumn:tit in chaos', 11 December 2000. 
210 The Observer, 'How the EU's lines were redrawn - President Chirac's refusal to achknowledge 
national interests has left a new treaty in disarray', 10 December 2000. 
229 
The fact that Germany had been supported in its reform initiatives by a number of 
other EU member states, which were all very critical of the French attitude, shows 
that, with a persistent Great Power attitude, France has increasingly moved itself into 
an isolated position within the Community2ll. The British Prime Minister Blair, who 
had sided with Schr{)der and other EU leaders in rejecting the French proposals at 
Nice and trying to achieve last minute compromises212, summed up his summit 
experience with the statement 'We can't go on like this,213. 
What had become obvious for all EU member states was that the once privileged 
bilateral leadership coalition between France and Germany within the Community had 
finally come to an end. Although both countries still tried to make an effort to 
overcome their differences and to achieve joint initiatives, they found it almost 
impossible to return to the traditional, almost natural co-operation, which had carried 
their relationship for decades. Even though both sides publicly tried to maintain the 
impression that their relationship would still be cordial and would be able to 
overcome disagreements on detailed issues, they could not deny the reality of the 
decline of their former European axis. The Schr{)der administration could not conceal 
its disappointment about the outcome of Nice, but still refrained from fundamental 
criticism of the French style of negotiation: 
'Not all hopes, with which we went to Nice have come true in the end ( ... ) That this 
has not been achieved, is regrettable ( ... ) We will really have to continue to fight 
for this new Europe. Our crucial partner in this was and is France. We will 
therefore also coordinate closely with France in the coming weeks and months.' 214 
211 In an analysis of the Nice summit, Jean-Pierre Froehly criticised the French leadership for having 
shown a far too self-centred attitude at Nice: 'France has however concentrated far too much on the 
summit itself and has possibly underestimated the variety of interests, which needed to be harmonised' 
(Froehly, 2002, p. 5). Heather Grabbe called France's diplomatic approach at Nice 'ham-fisted 
diplomacy' (Grabbe, 2001, p.I). 
212 The Times, 'Chirac caught out by the numbers game', 11 December 2000. 
213 Grabbe, 2001 and The Times, 'We can't go on like this', 12 December 2000. 
214 Regierungserklarung von Bundeskanzler Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag 
Ergebnissen des Europaischen Rates in Nizza, 19 January 
http://www.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserklaerung-.8561.217731RegierungserkJaerung-yon-
Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-S ... htm. 
zu den 
2001, 
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Schr6der called for a 'redefinition' of Franco-German relations after Nice21S, in order 
to put them on a new and more stable basis and both countries agreed to hold more 
regular bilateral consultations on European issues216. This almost forced public 
display of continuing unity, which attempts to conceal the underlying disagreement on 
major European issues, will not change the real state of Franco-German relations. The 
continuing attempt on both sides to pretend that a new unity between France and 
Germany could be achieved by simply conjuring up the value of the partnership will 
not remove the fundamental differences of opinion. 
As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung rightly stated after the Nice summit, 'behind 
such words of mutual encouragement lurks the unspoken,217. 
A fundamental renewal of the Franco-German partnership could only be achieved by 
open and honest discussions about the reasons for the difficulties in the relations. 
Continuing public statements of friendship have led to no progress with regard to the 
two countries' former function as the motor of integration, but have opened up an 
increasing gap between pretension and reality: 
'The Franco-German reflections about the future of Europe are characterised by a 
dichotomy, even schizophrenia. It seems odd, when a variety of proposals are 
being made, although the political will to realise them is lacking. If the French and 
the German leadership only agree to having to agree, then setbacks are inevitable' 
(~artens,2002,p.27) 
The unified Germany has become larger and politically more self-confident and 
therefore wants to be accepted as an equal partner by France. France on the other hand 
has so far not given up the self-delusion that even after German reunification, the 
conditions of the Franco-German alliance would remain the same. 
215 The Economist, 'Divorce after all these years? Not quite, but...', 25 January 2001. 
216 Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 'SehrOder und Chirae wollen sieh besser abstimmen', 31 January 2001. 
21? Frankfurter AlIgemeine Zeitung, 'Die Sehatten der Vergangenheit holen Europas Zukunft ein', 9 
December 2000. 
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Instead of trying to adapt to the altered circumstances, France has withdrawn even 
more to its own national position. A persistent fear of an increasing German influence 
in Europe has made the French uneasier about deeper European integration and the 
enlargement of the EU. While a more self-confident political generation in Germany 
pushes towards greater European unity, albeit under fairer conditions for their 
country, France has turned into the promoter of the status quo in the EU. It is hence is 
reluctant to accept reform of established community institutions and procedures and 
also shows a rather lukewarm attitude towards enlargement218 • 
The continuing suspicion about the role of the unified, more self-confident Germany 
in Europe has led to an increasing insecurity on the French part about its own role in 
Europe and the aim of its European policy: 
'The French concept of integration is questioned wherever further European 
integration not only enhances the French position in the EU, but the German one as 
well. For France, the question centres on whether the Europeanization of the 
growth of German power, as practised in the past, can still be made practicable in 
the future through the French strategy of anchoring Germany within Europe' 
(Guerin-Sendelbach and Schild, 2002, p. 53). 
Due to the lack of personal understanding between the present French and German 
leaders219 it is very unlikely that these fundamental differences can be settled without 
major efforts from both sides. 
218 UIrike Guerot stresses that 'eastwards enlargement will cost a lot and France wants to keep the price 
as low as possible. Simulations of different reform scenarios in the agricultural and structural policy of 
the EU have shown, that France, as the biggest profiteer of the reflux in the agricultural policy, has a 
special interest in the status quo' (Guerot, 2002, p. 35) 
219 The German MEP Or Gerhard Schmid, who has links with the Chancellory , admitted that the 
personal relations between SchrMer and Chirac remain difficult, mainly due to a difference in personal 
character. In a personal conversation I had with him in his constituency office in Germany in June 
2001, Schmid stressed the importance of personal relations for the quality of Franco-German relations, 
which were simply not good enough under SchrMer and Chirac. (Interview with MEP Or Gerhard 
Schmid, Regensburg, 18 June 200 I). 
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The biggest hurdle in this respect is the current insecurity of the French about their 
national identity and their position in Europe, which has also become obvious during 
the April 2002 French presidential elections22o• France fears that it will be left behind 
in a larger and possibly German-dominated Europe and has not yet found an answer 
to this changing reality, in which it can no longer successfully manage the balancing 
act between containing German power and maintaining an influental position on the 
global scale. France has therefore retreated to a 'watered-down Gaullism' (Guerin-
Sendelbach and Schild, 2002, p. 53), which stresses intergovernmental solutions for 
most issues on the EU level, including Common Foreign and Security policy, but still 
advocates greater harmonisation on economic and monetary issues: 
'Even on the governmental level, an insecurity with regard to its own status and 
role in Europe has become apparent recently - and especially during the EU 
Council presidency, which manifested itself in a rather hesitant European policy 
( ... ) The dilemma between the integration interest towards Germany and the desire 
to retain autonomous scopes of action - for example in foreign policy - for France 
becomes more and more apparent. The "watered-down" Gaullism in the French 
European policy ( ... ) can neither adequately secure France's position in Europe, 
nor does it offer coherent answers with regard to the definition of the relationship 
towards Germany' (Schild, 2001, p. 9). 
As expected, the French side consequently increasingly retreats to an 
uncompromising stance on European issues, which in spite of the nice rhetoric 
towards Germany, focuses on the defence of its national interest more than ever 
before. Major issues of disagreements between France and Germany, such as a 
fundamental reform of the system of CAP, therefore remain unresolved and show 
little prospect of being resolved in the future221 • 
220 The strong showing of right-wing candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen in the frrst round ofthe presidential 
elections has been assessed by many commentators as a sign of deep political insecurity in France after 
a number of corruption scandals, which included both the Chirac's Gaullists and the Socialist party 
under Lionel Jospin, who dropped out of the presidential election. (The Guardian, 'A new French 
revolution', 28 April 2002). 
221 Since his second election victory at the presidential election and the resulting end of the cohabitation 
after the Socialists defeat at the French parliamentary election in June 2002, Jacques Chirac has shown 
an even more uncompromising stance on major issues. In spite of repeated meetings with his German 
counterpart and the public assurance that he would like to find a compromise on CAP reform with 
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The Franco-German 'compromise' reached at the October 2002 EU summit in 
Brussels should not be misinterpreted as a breakthrough in the revival of the old axis. 
Chancellor Schroder's readiness to postpone fundamental CAP reform in return for 
the French concession to put a limit on spending for agriculture only after 2007 led to 
an agreement based on the lowest common denominator. It both enraged other EU 
member states, especially Britain222 and was widely interpreted as a result of 
Schroder's weak political standing after the narrow election victory of his red-green 
coalition in the September 2002 general election. Under intense domestic pressure to 
reform the German economy and to get the public deficit and rising unemployment 
under control, the German Chancellor seems to be determined to settle any foreign 
policy disputes instead of opening up new fronts. Especially because Schroder 
realised that the go-ahead for 2004 enlargement depended on a compromise, he was 
not willing to risk the project for short-term German national interests. Schroder was 
therefore any easy target for an increasingly self-confident French president, who is 
politically strengthened by his re-election against Jean-Marie Le Pen and the end of 
the cohabitation with the Socialists. However, the issue of fundamental reform of 
CAP, which in spite of the compromise will remain costly for Germany, still seems to 
be on the German European policy agenda, as indicated by Schroder straight after the 
Brussels summir23. 
Germany (Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 'SchrMer und Chirac wollen Agrarstreit beilegen', 31 July 2002), the 
French president shows an increasingly Thatcherite stance in Europe. He not only rejects a new 
funding principle for CAP, but also ignores the EMU stability pact with regard to the French budget 
deficit and shows no interest in a debate about the permanent relocation of the European Parliament 
from Strasbourg to Brussels (The Times, 'Chirac accuse of doing a Thatcher on Europe', II October, 
2002). 
222 The Franco-German compromise led to a personal public row between Tony Blair and Jacques 
Chirac at the summit, which was widely reported. As a result, the British government publicly 
continues to reiterate its commitment to achieve fundamental CAP reform in the future (The Times, 
'Britain digs in for long EU farm battle', 26 October 2002). 
223 In the press conference on the outcome of the Brussels summit, SchrOder excused his failure to 
convince the French of the need for fundamental reform with misunderstandings, which had been 
caused by errors made by the translators, which had been present at his meeting with Chirac 
(Saddeutsche Zeitung, 'Chiracs geschickter Schachzug', 28 October 2002). See also The Times, ' 
"You have been very rude" huffy Chirac tells Blair as France calls off summit', 29 October, 2002). 
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The present truce between France and Germany on CAP is therefore a rather 
deceptive one and is likely to turn into an open dispute again, once the full 
implications of agricultural costs under the present system become clear in an EU of 
25 member states or more224• Even on the controversial issue of a possible European 
participation in an U.S.-Iead attack on Iraq, the French president surprisingly rather 
chose to side with the Americans than to attempt to come to a common line with the 
recently re-elected Schr5derIFischer administration, which opposes military action22S• 
The perspectives for the future of Franco-German relations consequently give few 
reasons for optimism. Under the present leadership constellation in France and 
Germany226, agreements on major issues are unlikely. The IGC in Nice can therefore 
be seen as a major landmark in the EU's inner leadership structure. 
Although disappointing with regard to its reform outcome, the Nice summit has given 
the obvious indication of the end of a dominating bilateral Franco-German leadership 
duo inside the EU, which had already become apparent in the aftermath of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Although good relations between France and Germany will remain 
important to achieve progress within the EU and to avoid a stalemate on major issues, 
they are no longer as crucial as they used to be during the first 40 years of the 
integration process. 
224 Gerhard BUlske rightly commented on the compromise that 'there is no reason for ecstasy of joy on 
both sides, even if the hurdles for enlargement have been removed' (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 'Chiracs 
geschickter Schachzug', 28 October 2002). 
225 SiJddeutsche Zeitung, 'Chirac geht aufDistanz zu SchrOder', 9 September 2002 and The Times, 
'France signals wish to fall in with America over Iraq', 11 October 2002. 
226 The situation might have looked different if CSU leader Edmund Stoiber had won the September 
2002 German general election. Stoiber had indicated during the election campaign that his priorities 
would be the revival of the Franco-German alliance in the EU (The Times, 'Kohl's heir will press 
Britain to enter eurozone', 5 August 2002) 
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The former motor of European integration has definitely been diminished into a 
partnership227, which will lose more and more of its special character should the two 
countries not find a way of 'changing from a used car to a new model' (Martens, 
2002, p. 27). 
It is therefore very likely that an EU of 25 members or more will be increasingly 
dominated by a multiplicity of short-term leadership coalitions, which are mainly 
issue-related and vary from time to time. Germany has an advantage over France in 
this respect, as it has established a number of close diplomatic and economic relations 
with countries in Central and Eastern Europe since the Second World War. France, 
which has traditionally had closer links with Southern European states, thus risks to 
be pushed to the sidelines if does not prepare itself for the post-enlargement structure 
of the EU; 
'If, as likely, the EU has 25 members after 2004 or 2005, it will be impossible for 
any two of them to dominate as they did in the past. The French should adjust to a 
Europe of more fluid, issue-focused alliances - and they should note that the 
Germans, unlike themselves, have already developed close ties with Central 
European countries' (Grant, 2001, p. 3) 
France will still be able to play a leading role within an enlarged EU, if it adapts to the 
changed circumstances and realises that the partnership with Germany can no longer 
be exclusive but must become inclusive for other big member states. As Heather 
Grabbe stresses, Nice has shown that already at present it is mainly the biggest five 
member states (France, Germany, UK, Italy, Spain), which form alternating coalitions 
on a variety of different issues. 
227 What should be especially worrying for the French is that this perception is increasingly shared by 
representatives of the German political class, even amongst those who have traditionally supported co-
operation with France. All the German representatives I interviewed in the course of my research had 
accepted that the Franco-German relations had declined since the early 1990s and that other 
constellations might replace them if they were not improved in the near future (Interview with Dr Ingo 
Friedrich MEP, Gunzenhausen, 31 March 2001; Dr Gerhard Schmid MEP, Regensburg, 18 June 2001; 
Professor Jtlrgen Meyer, SPD party conference Nuremberg, 20 November 200 I). Moreover, the 
German-born British MP Gisela Stuart considered it to be almost a natural development that the 
partnership has changed and will become less important for the EU, once it has been enlarged 
(Interview with Gisela Stuart MP, House of Commons, London, 24 July 2002). 
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It must therefore be taken into account that these five largest member states (and then 
possibly more after enlargement) 'might eventually emerge as the EU's dominant 
grouping' (Grabbes, 2001, p. 2). In the post-Nice EU, which heads towards increasing 
multiplicity, both France and Germany have therefore to be prepared to redefine their 
partnership and to make it more transparent for other leading member states, such as 
Britain, which will play a much more influental role should it decide to join the single 
currency: 
'If one thinks about the political shape of Europe now, the German-French 
agreement can only be "condition necessaire", but no longer "condition 
suffisante". While an exclusive German-French motor was probably an ideal type, 
the German-French coordination has to open up towards new partners. If this is not 
achieved, Paris and Berlin will be replaced by other self-confident member states 
as initiators of an impetus for more European integration' (Froehly, 2002, p. 2) 
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Chapter 4: Areas for British-German co-operation 
In an EU of increasing multiplicity, where shifting leadership coalitions determine the 
outcome of decisions on central issues, it has become more and more important to 
consider corresponding interests between member states outside the Franco-German 
partnership. In this respect, possible areas for co-operation between Germany and 
Britain will be of particular significance for the future of the EU. Both states are in a 
process of redefining their status within the Community. Germany, which remains 
the central player in the Community and whose importance is likely to grow after the 
EU has enlarged to 25 and more member states, has made major steps towards the 
'normalisation' of its foreign policy. Moreover, as the promoter of enlargement within 
the EU, it has become the main contact for the CEE applicant countries. Britain, on 
the other hand, has adopted a more positive stance towards the integration process 
under the New Labour administration and has therefore been able to take on a 
leadership role on a number of issues, such as defence and economic liberalisation. 
The process of redefining their position in the EU, however, also confronts the two 
countries with major challenges. Germany will have to take concrete steps towards 
the reform of its economy and labour market if it wants to avoid sliding deeper into 
economic recession, which would seriously undermine its traditional role as the 
economic cart-horse in Europe. Moreover, in spite of the shortage of its public 
finances, the German government will have to underline its 'normalisation' claim 
with regard to the foreign and defence policy with a substantial reform of the 
Bundeswehr towards professionalism. Such a reform will have to be based on 
sustained financial support. In the case of Britain, the ability to secure itself a 
permanent leading position within the EU, continues to be hampered by the exclusion 
from the Eurozone, in spite of the British government's less prejudiced approach 
towards European issues. If British leaders want to exercise influence in all areas of 
EU decision-making, the outcome of the assessment of the government's five 
economic tests on EMU membership and a succeeding public referendum on the Euro 
will be a crucial watershed for the country's position in the Community. 
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This chapter looks at British and German positions towards essential European policy 
areas, and attempts to make an assessment of possible areas for co-operation between 
these two key EU member states in an EU, which faces enlargement to 25 member 
states in 2004. 
4.1. Institutional and procedural reform of the EU 
The issue of fundamental reform of the EU's institutions and decision-making 
procedures is an essential matter of concern for both the British and German 
governments. In contrast to other larger member states, such as France, both countries 
have been pressing for the need to fundamentally reconsider the internal structure of 
EU institutions and the way they interact in decision- and law-making procedures for 
a number of years. Especially with regard to the imminent prospect of accession of 10 
new member states to the EU in 2004, and likely further enlargement after 2007, 
Britain and Germany have been the champions of the reform discussion amongst the 
larger member states. Mainly due to the background of two fundamentally different 
political cultures, official British and German reform proposals certainly differ in 
detail. However, British and German leaders strongly concur in their determination to 
make the EU's institutional setting fit for enlargement. Immediately after the start of 
their first term in office, both the Blair and the Schroder administration set out 
institutional and procedural reform of the EU as the centrepieces of the European 
policies. 
Already when he was leader of the opposition, Tony Blair had repeatedly stressed his 
determination to press towards fundamental reform of the EU. Blair argued, that the 
younger generation of post-war politicians like himself would show a more pragmatic 
approach to European integration, which would include greater openness, but also a 
clear analysis of the weaknesses of Community procedures: 
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'We can lead the case for reform. We are a new generation, not scarred by war. We 
do not accept that Europe should remain as it is. Our commitment to Europe does 
not mean that we accept a bureaucratic and wasteful Europe ( ... ) We want a new, 
revitalised, people's Europe,228 
The 1997 Labour manifesto promised that under a New Labour government, the UK 
would 'set out a detailed agenda for reform, leading from the front during the UK 
presidency in the first half of 1998,229. Major points for reform mentioned were the 
'urgent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy' and an overhaul of the EU 
institutions 'towards greater openness and democracy' 230. After New Labour had 
come to power, the work programme for the first British Council presidency of the 
EU reiterated these points and especially focused on the need to reform EU 
institutions towards greater democratic accountability: 
'The UK Presidency intends to improve transparency and openness, and prepare 
for the implementation of the new transparency provisions agreed at 
Amsterdam ,231 
At the end of the British Council presidency of 1998, the British Prime Minister 
evaluated its work in an article in the German Frankfurter AI/gemeine Zeitung on 
June 30th 1998. Blair stressed that reforms of the EU would be indispensable, which is 
why the UK had pressed towards a reform agenda during the Council presidency. He 
called for a new vision for Europe, which would strike the right balance between a 
strong national identity continuing integration in certain areas, which would 
consequently manage to reconnect the EU with its citizens: 
228 Speech to the Royal Institue ofIntemational Affairs, London, 5 April 1995 (source: Blair, 1997, p. 
287). 
229 'New Labour - because Britain derves better', Labour 1997 general election manifesto, p. 37. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Work Programme of the UK Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, p. 9, 
http://presid.fco.gov.uklworkproglwithin.shtml. 
240 
'In Britain and elsewhere in Europe, citizens fear that the EU is too centralised, too 
distant and its economic policy to entangled in bureaucracy ( ... ) We need a vision 
for Europe, which enables people to feel at home with their national identity and to 
extend the hand towards European partnership at the same time.,232 
It became clear that the basis for the British engagement towards EU reform is based 
on a new pragmatic approach towards European integration, which does not 
fundamentally reject the deepening of integration, but accepts that in some areas the 
closer co-operation on the European level will be in Britain's national interest. 
The Prime Minister therefore emphasised that his government would support the 
deepening of integration in some areas, whereas in other areas it would call for the 
redistribution of powers to the national and the regional level. Moreover, the British 
government would strongly support powerful and active Community institutions, 
which are able to scrutinise the EU's decision-making process with regard to the 
Single Market: 
'In some areas, like the fight against crime, the environment, the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy we will integrate further. In order for the Single Market to 
function, we need a strong Commission and a strong European Court of Justice, 
who control it. In other areas, however, more, much more can be achieved on the 
national, regional and local level. ,233 
Based on an engaged European policy and a pragmatic attitude towards European 
integration, the Blair administration thus showed its commitment to an active role in 
the EU reform debate. While its Conservative predecessors had limited the UK's role 
in the debate to calls for an end to further integration and the return of fundamental 
areas of decision-making to the national level, the New Labour government decided 
that the best way to maintain British influence is through active engagement: 
232 Article of the British Prime Minister Tony Btair on the British Council presidency in the 
Frankfurter AlIgemeine Zeitung, 30 June 1998, source: www.dgap.orglIP/ip9809/artblair300698.htm. 
233 Ibid. 
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'At this crucial juncture, where reforms of an absolutely momentous nature are 
being debated and decided, Britain's place must be at the centre of them. To 
withdraw from them is not patriotic; it is an abdication of our true national 
interest,234 
The new British readiness to take part in an open debate about the future of the EU 
does however, come with the strong demand to overcome traditional vested interests 
among the member states, and to pursue radical changes in the way the Community 
works in order to make it fit for enlargement: 
'( ... ) we will need to consider in what circumstances the flexibility outlined at 
Amsterdam should operate. To consider how we balance the desire to move 
forward with the desire not to create a two-tier Europe. I am confident common 
sense can find a way through ( ... ) the answer lies in focusing on what really needs 
to be done at the EU level and what should be done by the member states or civil 
society' 235 
In its ambition to achieve fundamental reform of the EU and to prepare it for 
enlargement, the Blair administration has found a strongly supportive partner in the 
German red-green coalition government led by Gerhard Schroder and Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer. The leading figures of the German government are part of 
the same post-war generation of politicians, like the majority of the New Labour 
administration. Both governments are therefore united in their desire to avoid empty 
hymns of praise on the European ideal, and instead focus on the necessary reform in 
order to prepare the EU for the accession of new member states. In this respect the 
red-green coalition in Germany shares the pragmatism of the British government in 
the reform debate, which includes the open expression of national interests and the 
strong focus on the effective functioning of the EU's institutional framework. 
Gerhard Schroder had therefore already called for close co-operation between Britain 
and Germany in the drive towards reform in Europe, when he was still in opposition. 
234 'Committed to Europe, Reforming Europe', Prime Minister's speech at Ghent City Hall, Belgium, 
23 February 2000, www.number-1O.gov.uklnews.asp?Newsld=579&Sectionld=32. 
235 Ibid. 
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Schr5der outlined his strong support for the British calls for a more transparent and 
democratically accountable EU in the book he had published on the occasion of his 
election campaign. Like Blair, Schr5der called for a reform debate which would have 
to take into serious consideration 
'the concern, yes even the frustration of many citizens ( ... ) if more and more 
powers of the welfare state and the state under the rule of law would be given away 
to European institutions, which only possess moderate democratic legitimacy' 
(Schroder, 1998, p. 100) 
Schr5der stressed that his generation wanted a Europe in which 'strong and self-
confident'236 member states co-operated towards reforming Europe and he called for 
the inclusion of Britain into the leadership of the EU237. After Schroder's election 
victory in 1998, the newly formed red-green coalition set out the principles of its 
European policy with a strong emphasis on institutional and procedural reform. The 
coalition agreement stressed that the necessary reform steps would have to be 
completed before the next wave of enlargement and would have to be based on the 
principle of greater transparency and democratic accountability: 
'The new federal government will push towards greater democracy in the 
European Union and the strengthening of the European Parliament. It will support 
clearer and more transparent decision-making processes in the European Union. 
The transparency rule of the Amsterdam Treaty has to be put into practice strictly. 
It will work against overregulation and bureaucratisation. When exercising its 
competencies, the EU has to obey the subsidiarity principle ( ... ) 
236 Ibid. 
237 During his 1998 election campgain, SchrOder repeatedly emphasized that he considered Britain to 
be an important partner in the future development of Europe and he even spoke of a new ' "triangle" 
Paris-Bonn-London' (SchrOder, 1998, p.99). In his opinion, in a more flexible and larger EU, the 
limitation to bilateral alliances was not enough to bring the EU forward, which is why 'the possibility 
of flexible combinations of members on certain initiatives have to come greater use than before' (Rede 
des SPD-Kanz/erkandidaten Gerhard SchriJder vor der Fraktion der Sozialistischen Parteien Europas 
(SPE) im Europdischen Par/ament am 14. Ju/i 1998 in Straftburg, 
www.dgap.orglIP/ip9809/redeschroeder140798.htm). 
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The European Union rapidly has to become ready for enlargement through internal 
reforms. This includes the conclusion of institutional reforms before 
enlargement. ,238 
In his first official inaugural speech on November 10th 1998, Chancellor Schroder 
announced that the priorities of his government for the upcoming German presidency 
of the EU Council would be to make sure that the EU decides a reform package as 
part of the Agenda 2000, which includes 'duties, expenses and the financing of the 
European Union,239. The German government hence had put a strong emphasis on the 
need to conclude the major institutional and procedural reforms before the first 
accession of a new group of member states. In its official programme for the EU 
Council Presidency in the first half of 1999, the newly elected red-green coalition 
clearly stated its priorities for reform of the EU, with a special focus on the 
establishment of a new budgetary framework for the EU for the period between 2000-
2006, a fundamental reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the 
structural policies240. The German Foreign Minister loschka Fischer reiterated these 
priorities in his inaugural speech to the French national assembly in January 1999. 
Conscious of the French reluctance to undertake serious reform of the EU's budgetary 
and institutional arrangements, Fischer pointed out that the German presidency would 
be committed to the modernisation and the democratisation of the Community. This 
would include fundamental reform of the system of CAP, greater fairness with regard 
to budget contributions, and substantial institutional reform: 
'I can see four major tasks for the EU in the future: The modernisation of the 
European contrat social, swift enlargement of the EU, the strengthening of its 
political ability to act and the strengthening of its democratic legitimacy ( ... ) 
readiness and legitimacy of the EU demands a fair distribution of the financial 
burden ( ... ) 
238 Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bundnis 
90lDie Grunen, 20 October 1998, www.dgap.orglIP/ip9812lkoalitionsvereinbarung.htm. 
239 Regierungserkllirung von Bundeskanzler Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 10 November 
1998, www.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserklllrungen-. 7 561.5857 5lRegierungserklaerung-von-
Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-SchrMer.htm 
240 Programm der deutschen EU-Ratsprtisidentschaft. 21 December 1998, 
www.dgap.orglIP/ip9906/eude211298.htm. 
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( ... ) due to enlargement and especially because of the next WTO round of 
negotiations, a reform of the CAP will be inevitable ( ... ) Because, as founding 
members, we have a special interest in making enlargement possible and 
maintaining the EU workable in the future, we want to complete the institutional 
reforms on time before the conclusion of the accession negotiations.'241 
Because the German presidency of the EU in the first half of 1999 had been 
overshadowed by the tragic events in Kosovo and was hence mainly dominated by 
debates on foreign policy, major reform steps with regard to the EU's institutional 
framework had been postponed once again. Mainly due to the French reluctance to 
accept the reform proposals of the German presidency42, the Agenda 2000 package 
passed at the March 1999 Berlin Council had not achieved the major reform goals of 
the German presidency. The red-green coalition consequently put pressure on the 
upcoming French EU presidency in the second half of 2000 to make sure that the 
overdue reforms would be concluded by the end of the year. In an address to the 
Deutsche Gesellschafl fur Auswartige Politik in November 1999, Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer emphasised the importance of the IGC on institutional reform, which 
had been planned for the end of 2000, with regard to a successful enlargement 
process: 
241 Rede des Bundesminislers des Auswarligen Joschka Fischer in 
Nalionalversammlung, Paris, 20 January 1999, 
amt.de/6 _ archiv/99/rIR990 120a.htm. 
der Jranzosischen 
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242 The French had not only been lukewarm about institutional reform, but had vetoed fundamental 
reforms of the system of CAP and the budget contributions during the German EU presidency. The 
French president Chirac defended the lack of fundamental reforms at a press conference at the March 
1999 Berlin Council: 'For us, to preserve the principles of financial solidarity, which are the principles 
of the European Union, came first. We therefore absolutely did not want a system of co-financing or a 
cutting model ( ... ) some have tried to evade the framework of financial solidarity. On CAP he bluntly 
rejected the need for reform before enlargement: '( ... ) a reform will be postponed, which is not urgent, 
which is expensive, very expensive and would cause a lot of problems for the French and the European 
milk farmers' (Press conference given by French president Jacques Chirac after the European Council, 
Berlin, 26 March 1999, www.dgap.orglIP/ip9906/chirac260399.htm). 
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'The intergovernmental conference on institutional reforms has a key role for the 
functioning of a future enlarged Union. It has to be concluded on time next year 
under the French presidency, in order to achieve the time setting of 2003 ,243 
Fischer was bold enough to clarify the details of his considerations on institutional 
reform by giving a major speech on the future of the EU as a 'private person' at the 
Humboldt University in Berlin in May 2000244. The speech did not win him many 
friends among the French political elite, as it was seen as an unwelcome intrusion in 
the French preparations for the IGC on institutional reform under the French Council 
presidency (see chapter 4). Although the speech was not an official representation of 
the German government's position on institutional reform, it included many proposals 
which were based on the main German concerns with regard to institutional reform. 
It was based on the urgent call for fundamental institutional reform before the first 
new member states could accede to the EU, an issue which had so far not been 
sufficiently tackled by any of the preceding intergovernmental conferences: 
'The institutions of the EU were created for six member states. They just about still 
function with fifteen ( ... ) The danger will then be that enlargement to include 27 or 
30 members will hopelessly overload the EU's ability to absorb, with its old 
institutions and mechanisms, even with increased use of majority decisions, and 
that it could lead to severe crises. ( ... ) it shows the need for decisive, appropriate 
institutional reform so that the Union's capacity to act is maintained even after 
enlargement' 245. 
243 Rede des Bundesm;n;sters des Auswlirt;gen Joschka F;scher be; der Mitgliederversammlung der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Auswdrtige Polit;k, Berlin, 24 November 1999, 
ht.tl.:lIwww.deutschebotschaft-moskau.rulde/aussenpolitiklredenlaussenpolitischergrundsatz.html. 
244 At the beginning of his speech, Fischer stressed that 'this is not a declaration of the Federal 
Government's position, but a contribution to a discussion long begun in the public arena about the 
"finality" of European integration, and I am making it simply as a staunch European and German 
parliamentarian' ('From Confederacy to Federation - Thoughts on the finality of European 
integration', Speech by Joschka Fischer at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000, 
ht.tl.:llwww.dgap.org/IP/ip9906/schroederI40499.htm). 
24' Ibid. 
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Fischer made the controversial proposal to set out the transformation of the EU into 
'full parliamentarisation as a European Federation' as a long-term goal for European 
integration. Such a federation should be based on a constitution, and a European 
federal government, as well as a parliament with full executive and legislative 
powers: 
'And that means nothing less than a European Parliament and a European 
government which really do exercise legislative and executive power within the 
Federation. This Federation will be based on a constituent treaty,246 
It is obvious that Fischer's federal vision for the EU is strongly based on the German 
political system, in which a federal government and parliament is forced to take into 
account the interests of strong and relatively independent regional entities, the 
Lander. The latter not only have their own regional constitutions, parliaments and 
Prime Ministers (Ministerprasidenten). They are also independently in charge of a 
number of policy areas247 and have substantial rights of participation in the passing of 
national legislation in the Bundesrat, the second legislative chamber which represents 
Lander interests248. The German form of federalism is therefore based on close co-
operation between strong regional units and the federal level. The federal level is 
responsible to maintain the equality of living conditions within the federal state, but 
based on the principle of subsidiarity, areas which mainly concern regional matters 
are decided by the Lander and regional councils. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Article 80 of the German Grundgesetz defines the areas, in which the federal government can only 
pass framework legislation, but where the essential responsibility lies with the Lander: regional public 
sector employment laws, common principles of higher education, environmental and landscape 
protection, environmental planning. In addition, article 91a clarifies the common tasks of the federal 
and the Lander level, in which the federal government only interferes if they are of substantial interest 
for the nation state as a whole: planning and building of universities, improvement of the regional 
economic structure, the agricultural structure and the protection of coastal areas. (Grundgesetz fUr die 
Bundesrepub/ik Deutschland, http://www.bundesregierung.de/static/pdf/gg.pdt). 
248 For an assessment of the powers and the internal structure of the Bundesrat see Rudzio, (2000), pp. 
293-305 and Maunz and Zippelius {I 998), pp. 275. 
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In contrast to the UK, where the 'f-word' has become a powerful weapon for 
Eurosceptics and the tabloids in their attempts to influence the British public's attitude 
towards integration in a negative way, the Germans see federalism as an effective 
mechanism to reconcile the various interests on the different levels within a state or an 
organisation. In Germany, the concept of a federal Europe is therefore not perceived 
as a move towards a European superstate, but rather as an attempt to organise the 
growing need for enhanced co-operation among the EU member states in a number of 
areas in an effective way. 
This German concept of federalism was clearly expressed by Fischer in his Berlin 
speech. He was well aware of the negative reactions the mention of the term 
'federation' would give rise to in a number of member states, especially in Britain249• 
Fischer thus explicitly emphasised that his idea of a European federation would be 
based on strong nation states, including the respect for their cultural and institutional 
particularities. As Fischer pointed out, any attempt to ignore the various national 
cultures of the EU member states and to try to force them to merge into an artificial 
supranational framework would be doomed to failure right from the start: 
'( ... ) it would be an irreparable mistake in the construction of Europe, if one were 
to try to complete political integration against the existing national institutions and 
traditions rather than by involving them C ... ) Only if European integration takes the 
nation-states along with it into such a Federation, only if their institutions are not 
devaluated or even made to disappear, will such a project be workable despite all 
the huge difficulties. In other words: the existing concept of a federal European 
state replacing the old nation-states and their democracies as the new sovereign 
power shows itself to be an artificial construct which ignores the established 
al·· . E ,250 re Itles In urope. 
249 Fischer appealed to the Eurosceptics in Britain, including the tabloid press, too see his speech as a 
personal visionary, contribution for the long term which is why he thought that 'they would be well 
advised not to immediately produce the big headlines again'. He also stressed that for him, the idea of a 
European federation would be based on a 'much larger role than the Under have in Germany' for the 
individual member states ('From Confederacy to Federation - Thoughts on the finality of European 
integration', Speech by 10schka Fischer at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000, 
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6archiv/2/r/r00512b.htm). 
250 Ibid. 
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Instead, a proper balance between national interests and the common interests of the 
Community would have to be found, based on a proper use of principle of 
subsidiarity:25J 
'The completion of European integration can only be successfully conceived if it is 
done on the basis of a division of sovereignty between Europe and the nation-state. 
Precisely this idea underlying the concept of "subsidiarity", a subject that is 
currently being discussed by everyone and understood by virtually no one.' 
Fischer's strong reliance on the domestic political experience of the German federal 
system for his European ideas become even clearer if one considers the details of his 
proposals with regard to the changes to the institutional framework. In terms of the 
European parliament, Fischer proposed the creation of a two chamber-model along 
the lines of the German Bundestag and Bundesrat. In Fischer's model, the European 
Parliament and a new second chamber would thus become the main legislative bodies, 
which would have to co-operate closely in order to pass legislation. The second 
chamber would consist of 'members who are also members of their national 
parliaments' and would either be structured along the lines of the German Bundesrat 
or the U.S. senate model2s2• 
In terms of the future executive role within the EU, Fischer did not tie himself down 
on a particular proposals, but he rather suggested two different models. In the first, the 
European Council would be further strengthened in its executive powers and would 
consequently be turned into a proper European government. Such a construction 
would of course give the EU an even stronger intergovernmental fundament, as the 
nation states would be in fundamental control of the decision-making. This first 
proposal would certainly appeal to British leaders, who have traditionally favoured a 
strong intergovernmental basis for the EU. 
251 Ibid. 
232 Ibid. 
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Fischer's second proposal of turning the Commission into an executive body with a 
directly elected Commission president 'with far-reaching executive powers,253 tends 
more towards the establishment of a supranational framework for the EU. The second 
model would certainly under no circumstances be supported by Britain, as it would 
fundamentally weaken the decision-making powers of the individual member state 
governments. Having obviously been aware of this, Fischer remained rather vague in 
terms of which solution he considered to be the best one for the EU and stressed that 
'there are also various other possibilites between those poles,254. Further on in the 
speech, he however admitted his preference for the second model as part of a multi-
speed development towards a European federation255. 
A great deal of importance in Fischer's speech was attached to the notion of the 
establishment of a European constitution, which would enable the EU to simplify its 
structural framework and to clearly determine the division of powers between the 
national and the Community level. Based on the subsidiarity principle, the 
Community level should only be responsible for matters which can no longer 
sufficiently be dealt with on the national level: 
'There should be a clear definition of the competences of the Union and the nation-
states respectively in a European constituent treaty, with core sovereignties and 
matters which absolutely have to be regulated at European level being the domain 
of the Federation, whereas everything else would remain the responsibility of the 
nation-states,256 
Fischer did also not shy away from bringing up the controversial idea of a Europe of 
multiple speeds, based on a core of member states, which had already been outlined in 
the Schiiuble-Lamers paper in 1996. 
253 Ibid. 
2S4 Ibid. 
2S5 Fischer proposed that a core group of states should lay the foundations for a European federation 
and should 'develop its own institutions, establish a government which within the EU should speak 
with one voice on behalf of the members of the group on as many issues as possible, a strong 
parliament and a directly elected president' (Ibid). 
256 Ibid. 
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The 'centre of gravity' would consist of a core group of pro-integrationist member 
states, who would lead the way towards further progress in terms of the deepening of 
integration and the development of a federal structure for the EU. Other member 
states should be allowed to join the core group at any time follow later, should they 
wish to do so: 
'One possible interim step on the road to completing political integration could 
then later be the formation of a centre of gravity. Such a group of states would 
conclude a new European framework treaty, the nucleus of a constitution of the 
federation ( ... ) Such a centre of gravity would have to be the avant-garde, the 
driving force for the completion of political integration and should from the start 
comprise all the elements of the future federation ,257 
The wide-ranging and partly controversial Fischer proposals found a strong media 
echo in a lot of member states, especially in France and Britain. In the aftermath of 
the speech, the British Prime Minister came under increasing domestic pressure to 
make a British contribution to the debate on EU reform, which had been initiated by 
Fischer's speech2s8. As a result, in the months following the Berlin speech and leading 
up to the December 2000 IGC in Nice, the debate on the future of the EU intensified, 
with major speeches given by the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin2s9 only a few 
days after Fischer's speech, and by French President Chirac in the German Bundestag 
in June 2000. 
The British Prime Minister finally made his contribution to the ongoing debate about 
institutional reform when he addressed the Polish Stock Exchange on October 6th 
2000. 
2S7 Ibid. 
258 The Observer called on the British Prime Minister to take the lead in the emerging debate on 
Europe, in order to influence the increasingly federalist debate in terms of a greater focus on 
intergovemmentalism (The Observer, 'Blair needs to take the lead on Europe', 21 May 2000). 
259 'On the future of an enlarged Europe', Speech by French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, 28 May 
200 I, www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/enlp.cfm?ref=24924 (200 I). 
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In the speech, Blair once again pointed out the need for Britain to remain committed 
to Europe in order to be able to influence the pre-enlargement debate about the 
political future of the EU260. He rejected the purely free-trade model for the EU, 
which is favoured by the Eurosceptic wing of the British Conservative Party and 
acknowledged the need for Europe to co-operate closer on economic and 
environmental issues, in the fight against crime, as well as foreign and security policy: 
'What people want from Europe is more than just free trade. They want: 
. . d tr gth,261 prospenty, secunty an s en 
Blair has however expressed great reluctance to follow 10schka Fischer's vision of a 
federal Europe, especially if it meant the weakening of the intergovernmental element 
in favour of the development of a supranational European framework. Blair called for 
the EU to remain a Community of 'free, independent sovereign nations who choose to 
pool that sovereignty in pursuit of their own interests and the common good,262. The 
balance between a strong intergovernmental base and supranational elements would 
have to remain in favour of the nation states. Blair pointed out that only under such 
circumstances could the EU turn into a powerful entity, as he called it a 'superpower' 
rather than a 'superstate': 
'Such a Europe can, in its economic and political strength, be a superpower; a 
b tat ,263 superpower, ut not a supers e 
260 Blair stressed that British non-engagement in the EU would have serious consequences for the 
British influence in the world, as the EU was about to become larger and more influental: 'For Britain, 
as for those countries queuing up to join the European Union, being at the centre of influence in Europe 
is an indispensable part of influence, strength and power in the world. We can choose not to be there; 
but no-one should doubt the consequences of that choice and it is widely unrealistic to pretend those 
consequences are not serious' (Prime Minister's speech to the Polish Stock exchange, 6 October 2000, 
www.number-lO.gov.uklnews.asp?NewsId=1341&Sectionld=32). 
261 Prime Minister's speech to the Polish Stock exchange, 6 October 2000, www.number-
1 O.gov.uklnews.asp?Newsld= 1341 &Sectionld=32. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid. 
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From Blair's point of view, the debate about the institutional reform of the EU would 
have to clearly take into account the wants and needs of the people of Europe, in order 
to be able to bridge the declining identification of Europe's citizens with the 
Community: 
'The problem Europe's citizens have with Europe arises when Europes priorities 
aren't theirs. No amount of institutional change most of which passes them by 
completely will change that'264 
Blair made it clear that from the British perspective the reconnection between the EU 
and its citizens could only be managed by making sure that the EU would continue to 
be based on a strong intergovernmental base. As a result, there should be no doubt 
that 'the European Council should above all be the body which sets the agenda of the 
Union,26s. 
The Prime Minister however proposed a fundamental reform of the working practises 
of the Council towards greater clarity and transparency by asking the Council to set 
out an annual legislative agenda in the major policy areas of the EU. This agenda 
should be worked out in close co-operation with the Commission president, leaving 
the Commission itself in a prematurely supervisiory role with regard to the Council's 
agenda and being restricted to 'bring forward additional proposals where its role as 
guardian of those treaties so required,266. Blair also proposed an end to the rotation of 
the Council presidency among the member states in order to achieve greater long-term 
planning stability and the establishment of elected chairs and team presidencies for 
the individual Councils. 
264 Ibid. 
26' Ibid. 
266 Ibid. 
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In terms of the establishment of a constitution for the EU, the Prime Minister 
expressed the traditional British caution towards binding legal documents as the basis 
for the constitutional framework of the state267• Instead of a comprehensive written 
legal constitution for the EU, Blair suggested a 'statement of principles or a 'charter 
of competences', which would determine the division of powers between the national 
and the Community level. This document should be rather political, which means that 
it would not be of a legally binding nature. The rather vague stance on the 
constitutional issue can be seen as an expression of the government's initial fear of the 
domestic reaction to the idea of a legal constitution for the EU in the UK. The notion 
of a legally binding European constitutional framework is closely linked to the fear 
that this would give the EU the legal identity of a state and would thus be a significant 
step towards the creation of a federal superstate268• In order not to be accused of 
giving in to continental federal aspirations, the New Labour government was 
consequently more than reluctant to accept the idea of a constitution during its first 
term in office (Grabbe and Milnchau, 2002, p. 17). 
Extending his emphasis on the strengthening of the intergovernmental element within 
the EU, the Prime Minister takes up 10schka Fischer's proposal of the creation of a 
second chamber for the European Parliament, which would create a stronger link 
between national parliaments and the EU level. In contrast to Fischer's concept 
though, Blair does not foresee any involvement in the scrutiny of EU legislative acts 
for the second chamber, which would consist of representatives from the national 
member states' parliaments. 
267 Blair argued that the EU's institutional and procedural framework would be too complex to 
determine it in one single, written document. Similar to the British constitution, the EU should continue 
to be based on 'a number of different treaties, laws and precedents'. Blair went on to stress that from 
the British perspective, 'a constitutional debate must not necessarily end with a single, legally binding 
document called a Constitution for an entity as dynamic as the EU' (lbid). 
268 The public perception on the issue in Britain is strongly influenced by large sections of the 
Eurosceptic press and the Conservative Party, who are strongly opposed to the establishment of a 
written constitution for Europe and continue to argue that it would be an irrevocable step towards a 
federal superstate. During an interrogation of the then Minister for Europe, Peter Hain, the Tory 
Eurosceptic MP Bill Cash warned of the danger of 'an autochthonous constitution, which means that it 
grows from its own roots', which would lead to an unstoppable process towards further loss of national 
powers (See House of Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny, Minutes of Evidence, 
Exammination of Witnesses Rt Hon Peter Hain MP and Mr Nick Baird, question 56, 16 July 2002, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uklpalcrn200102/cmselectlcmeuleg/1112/2071601.htm. 
See also press notice on the Conservative party website, in which the MEP Timothy Kirkhope opposes 
the idea of a constitution as 'a further bold step towards a European superstate' 
(www.conservatives.com!news/articIe.cfm?obj id=37574). 
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Its role should rather consist"'Of.'the 'political review' of the 'statement of principles' 
which determine the division of powers within the Community and the scrutiny of 
decision-making in the area of Common Foreign and Security policr69. Blair's focus 
is therefore once more on the powers of the representatives of the national 
governments in the Council, rather than on the strengthening of the parliamentary 
influence in the EU. 
This is also clear with regard to the role of the European Commission in a reformed 
EU. Whereas Fischer was bold enough to bring up the possibility of turning the 
Commission into a proper executive body, reminiscent of the concept of a European 
federal government, Blair ignores any notion of the strengthening of the 
Commission's powers.' Instead, he states that the EU has to reconsider the size of the 
Commission in order for it to remain effective after the accession of further member 
states. 
The Prime Minister concluded his speech by basically agreeing to the notion of the 
formation of multiple hard cores on certain issues. He however rejected the creation 
of a permanent hard core, as envisaged by Fischer, 'in which some Member States 
create their own set of shared policies and institutions, from which others are in 
practice excluded,27o. 
The process of institutional change would therefore have to be agreed on by all 
member states and could not be advanced by a small group, something which Fischer 
had considered to be a possibility. On top of that, Blair insisted that any group of 
member states, which would choose to advance faster in a certain policy area than 
others, would have to make sure that their group was open to any member states who 
wished to join 'at every stage,271 
269 Ibid. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Ibid. 
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Fischer's Berlin and Blair's Warsaw speeches were the starting point for the official 
government proposals for the IGC at Nice in December 2000, which was supposed to 
clear out the remaining questions on pre-enlargement institutional and procedural 
reform. The official German and British approach to the IGC re-confirmed the visions 
for Europe, which had been put forward by Fischer and Blair. While the official 
German proposals for Nice tended towards the creation of a federal structure for the 
EU as proposed by Fischer, the British White paper on Nice once again stressed the 
intergovernmental character of the Community. 
Fischer had re-confirmed his ideas in an interview with the Berliner Zeitung on 
October 16th 2000. During the interview Fischer argued for a strengthening of the 
powers of the Commission and the European Parliament and re-iterated his proposal 
to directly elect the Commission president. It was therefore clear that he personally 
preferred the second of the two models he had outlined in his Humboldt speech. 
While the British prefer Fischer's first model, that of an EU based on a strengthened 
Council, the Foreign Minister himself clearly favours the federal model: the 
development of the Commission into a strong EU federal executive government, led 
by a directly elected Commission president and still based on strong nation states: 
'A directly elected president, who can freely pick his government ... However, this 
would have to be balanced out by an appropriate institutional representation of the 
enduring nation states ( ... ) I think that within a ten years, thus before the end of this 
decade, we will stand on the threshold of a European federation ( ... ) I do however 
not think that the nation states will dissolve in favour of a Europe of regions. The 
regions will be of great importance, but they will not replace the member states,272 
It became clear that, in spite of Fischer's earlier insistence that the proposals set out in 
his Berlin speech were of a private nature, the official German positions were strongly 
based on Fischer's Humboldt speech. 
272 loschka Fischer Interview, Berliner Zeitung, 16 October 2000, 
http://www.berlinonline.de/wissenlberlinerzeitung/. bin/dump. fcgi/2000/ 1 0 16/politikl007 5/index.html? 
keywords=Fischer:ok=OK%21 :match=strict:author=:ressort=:yon= 16.1 0.2000:bis= 16.1 0.2000:mark=f 
ischer. 
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The official German statement of principles for Nice linked the possibility of an 
agreement with regard to the number of Commissioners in an enlarged EU to a reform 
of the internal structure of the Commission. In this respect the German government 
proposed 
'the strengthening of the position of the Commission president, or within the 
framework of a comprehensive solution, the increase of the number of vice 
presidents with overlapping co-ordinating responsibilities. ,273 
Due to the experiences with the Santer Commission, who collectively resigned in 
1999 after two Commissioners had been embroiled in bribery scandals, Germany 
called for a change in the principle of collective responsibility of the Commission to a 
new practice, which would allow to force individual Commissioners to resign274. 
Gunter Pleuger, German Foreign Office minister in charge of institutional reform, 
consequently took on board Foreign Minister Fischer's emphasis on the need to 
strengthen the Commission, and especially its president. Pleuger clarified the details, 
of how the German government would like to see the Commission president 
strengthened: 
'He has to determine the cut of the department and has to be able to change them at 
any time. The Commission President has to be in charge of an authority in matters 
of general practice as regards content. We take the view that he shall also be 
enabled, to ask individual Commissioners to resign, if they have committed a 
breach of duty,27S 
273 Grundsatzpapier der Bundesrepub/ik Deutschland zur RegierungskonJerenz zu den institutione//en 
ReJormen, 30 March 2000, p.4, source: Weidenfeld, 2001, CD Rom supplement. 
274 Ibid, p. 6. 
m 'Die institutionel/e Reform der Europiiischen Union: Perspekliven aul dem Weg nach Nizza', Rede 
von Staatssekretiir Dr. Gunter Pleuger in der Humboldt-Universitiit, Berlin, 26 October 2000, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/downloadlpdflredenl2000/rOOI 026a.pdf. 
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In terms of greater flexibility within the EU, the official German position came very 
close to what Fischer had proposed in Berlin, although it did not go quite as far as 
that. The German government stressed that it would like to see greater flexibility 
within the EU with regard to the possibility of the formation of multiple hard cores. 
In a joint position paper with the Italian government, Germany therefore put forward 
proposals to make it easier for a group of states to advance quicker than others in 
certain policy areas. This should include the abolition of the right to veto the 
formation of core groups by any single member state due to • domestic policy 
interests', and the reduction of the necessary minimum number of participating states 
to five276. However, the notion ofa 'Europe a la carte' was specifically rejected. 
Hence the option of a hard core establishing the institutional framework for a 
European federation, which would be joined by other member states later, something 
Fischer had proposed as a possibility in his Humboldt speech, had clearly been 
dropped. The German-Italian joint proposal on greater flexibility stressed in this 
respect that not only would multiple cores have to be transparent, in order for any 
other member state to be able to join at any time. It also strongly emphasised that the 
formation of a core group in a certain policy area would have to be strictly based on 
the existing institutional framework and should not be allowed to break out of it 
without the agreement of all member states: 
'These member states should be enabled to form an open functional vanguard, 
which serves the integration process and which remains open at all times for the 
future participation of further member states C ... ) The use of enhanced co-operation 
has to serve the common goal of quicker and enhanced integration. The acquis of 
the Union must not be undermined by the enhanced co-operation,277 
The official German proposals for Nice also adopted Fischer's proposal to base a 
reformed EU on a written constitution, which would not only define the division of 
powers between the national and the EU level. 
276 Deutsch-italienischer Obermittlungsvermerk zur RegierungskonJerenz 2000 betreffend der 
versttirkten Zusammenarbeit, 6 October 2000, p. 4, source: Weidenfeld, 200 I, CD rom supplement. 
277 Ibid, p.3. 
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They went even further and demanded that the Charter of Human Rights, which 
would be proclaimed at Nice, should be included in the acquis communautaire, in 
order to establish a basis for a written constitution278. As a result, the Charter would 
attain legal status and would give each EU citizen enforceable basic rights. 
Above all, Germany took a principally pro-integrationist stance at Nice with regard to 
decision-making procedures and the further harmonisation of policies. The German 
government promoted the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to 
principally all areas of decision-making. Exceptions should be determined according 
to the implications of the decisions in a 'concrete catalogue of criteria', based on the 
principle of' exception to the rule'279. In terms of the criteria, the German government 
proposed exemptions from the principal rule of decision-making by QMV for the 
decisions, which are characterised by the following criteria: 
, Decisions, which are subject to ratification by the member states ( ... ); Decisions 
with constitutional character, which are outside a treaty change ( ... ); Decisions, by 
which the adoption of QMV would mean a retogression with regard to integration 
( ... ) Decisions with links to military policy and defence,28o 
As a result, decisions 'should in principle only continue to be decided by unanimity, if 
they meet the named criteria after a strict examination. Foreign Office minister 
Pleuger stressed that Germany would especially push towards the extension of QMV 
towards crucial areas of decision-making, where an agreement among member states 
had traditionally been difficult: social policy, justice and home affairs, taxation, trade 
policy and anti-discriminatory measures281 • 
278 'Die institutionelle Reform der Europdischen Union: Perspektiven aUf dem Weg nach Nizza', Rede 
von Staatssekretdr Dr. Gunter Pleuger in der Humboldt-Universitdt, Berlin, 26 October 2000, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/downloadlpdf/redenl2000/r001026a.pdf. 
279 Grundsatzpapier der Bundesrepub/ik Deutschland zur Regierungskonferenz zu den institutione//en 
Reformen, 30 March 2000, p.S, source: Weidenfeld, 2001, CD Rom supplement. 
280 Ibid, p. 6. 
281 'Die institutione//e Reform der Europdischen Union: Perspekiiven aul dem Weg nach Nizza', Rede 
von Staatssekretdr Dr. Gunter Pleuger in der Humboldt-Universitdt, Berlin, 26 October 2000, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/downloadlpdflredenl2000/r001026a.pdf. 
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Moreover, in a joint Franco-German letter on the extension of QMV in the run-up to 
Nice, both countries called for the extension of QMV to all decisions concerning the 
harmonisation of sales taxation, excise duties, the co-operation between national tax 
authorities, the removal of barriers for the single market and tax competition between 
member states282. 
The official British government white paper for Nice stressed that even an enlarged 
EU of 15 plus x states 'will continue to be a mixture of intergovernmental co-
operation and, where it makes sense, integration' 283. In this respect, the British 
position on the future shape of the EU was therefore not too far apart from that of the 
German government, as both emphasised that the Community would have to continue 
to be based on intergovernmental as well as supranational elements. The British 
approach to institutional reform was, however, much more focused on the 
preservation of the intergovernmental basis for the fundamental decision-making 
processes within the Community. 
In contrast to the German side, the British government based its considerations on 
institutional and procedural reform on the clarification that the fundamental control 
over the integration process would have to remain in the hands of the member states' 
national governments: 
'But the Member States themselves will remain at the heart of decision making in 
Europe. Co-operation and co-ordination will be the general rule. In responding to 
the challenges of economic policy co-ordination, the development of an effective 
role in defence and in building co-operation in justice and home affairs, it will be 
decisions taken by governments, working together, that shape Europe.,284 
282 Deutsch-Jranzosisches Schreiben zur RegierungskonJerenz 2000 betrefJend Ausweitung der 
qualijizierenden Mehrheit beziiglich Steuern. 21 November 2000, p. 2, source: Weidenfeld, 2001, CD 
rom supplement. 
283 'IGC:Reform for Enlargement The British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental 
Conference 2000', White Paper presented to Parliament, February 2000, p. 10, paragraph 21, Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office. 
284 Ibid, p. 10, paragraph 22. 
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With regard to the Commission, the UK approach did not foresee a fundamental 
change in the Commission's role within the institutional framework of the EU but 
rather a clear definition of its role as the institution in charge of 'delivering the 
objectives that the EU's political leaders set,285. The white paper stated that hence 
'Commission reform does not on the whole require Treaty change ,286, but rather a 
reduction in the number of Commissioners and a restructuring of its internal 
organisation. The notion of giving further powers to the Commission or even to 
directly elect its president was not given any mention whatsoever. 
The focus was rather on reform of the Council as 'the primary decision making body 
in the EU'. Here the British government favoured a reweighing of the voting system 
in favour of the larger member states in order to compensate for their loss of 
influence, should a decision to reduce the number of their Commissioner to one be 
reached. With regard to the extension of QMV, where the German government had 
demanded the general use of QMV in the Council, with the exception of areas 
determined in a 'catalogue of exceptions', the UK showed a principally positive 
attitude. While the mention of the issue used to make Conservative British, 
administrations see red, the Blair administration generally accepted that in an enlarged 
EU, the extension to QMV would be inevitable: 
'The Government recognises that, as the Union grows in size, so decision making 
by unanimity becomes more difficult. Qualified majority voting (QMV) in the 
Council of Ministers can help to make decision making easier,287 
It is remarkable in this respect that decision-making by QMV is no longer rejected by 
the British side on the fundamental objection that it would lead to the 
'supranationalisation' of the EU. 
283 Ibid, p. 16, paragraph 40. 
286 Ibid, p. 16, paragraph 42. 
287 Ibid, p. 20, paragraph 54. 
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On the contrary, the Blair administration accepts that, in many areas, decision-making 
by QMV is in Britain's interests, as it makes decisions, which are favoured by the 
UK, but opposed by other member states, easier to achieve. The prime example for 
this is the UK's interest in advancing the liberalisation of the Single European 
Market: 
'QMV does not weaken Britain's position in Europe. On the contrary, it helps 
Britain to pursue an agenda that is in our interests. The Single Market is a prime 
example of that. It could not have been put in place without qualified majority 
voting,288 
The British position was consequently much closer to the German position than it had 
ever been before, as it basically supported its extension to further areas of decision-
making. The main difference between the German and the British approach, however, 
was the extent of the extension of QMV. While Germany wanted to include even 
sensible areas such as taxes, social policies, justice and home affairs, the UK 
government stressed that 'in areas of key national concern we will insist on retaining 
unanimity' 289. For the British, the exceptions would therefore not only include 
constitutional issues, treaty changes and defence, as proposed by Germany, but 
taxation, national border controls and social security290. 
The British government nevertheless generally remained open to discuss the extension 
ofQMV into any other areas of decision-making, 'where it is in Britain's interest,291. 
On the issue of individual responsibility of individual Commissioners, which had 
emerged due to the corruption scandals within the Santer Commission in 1999, the 
British government supported the German calls for an individual responsibility of 
Commissioners. 
288 Ibid, p. 20, paragraph 55. 
289 Ibid, p. 21, paragraph 61. 
290 Ibid, p. 20, paragraph 58. 
291 Ibid, p. 21, paragraph 60 and 61. 
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Rather than to pass a vote of no confidence against the whole Commission, this would 
allow individual Commissioners to be sacked by the Commission president should 
they behave irresponsibly in office. In contrast to the German position, Britain was 
not in favour of giving the European Parliament the powers to sack individual 
Commissioners. The Germans had considered this issue as a chance to enhance the 
powers of the European Parliament, whereas for the British such a step would 
undermine the powers of the national governments to control the Commission: 
'( ... )it would weaken the collegiality of the Commission and lead to a significant 
change in its relationship with the European Parliament. It would also overlook the 
important role of the Member States in nominating Commissioners in the first 
place,292 
In the run-up to Nice, the British government did also not support the German 
initiative to change the rules for greater flexibility within the Community. Although it 
accepted that greater flexibility would have to be necessary, the British side did not 
see any need to weaken each member state's right to veto the formation of core 
groups on the basis of important reasons of domestic policy. The British government 
stressed that such an 'emergency brake' would continue to be necessary in order to 
make sure that 
'too much flexibility did not undermine the Single Market, or could not be used 
against the interests of a minority of Member States. Those remain important 
obj ectives' 293 
It was nevertheless remarkable that, mainly as a result of the experiences of the 
Kosovo war, the UK government now favoured greater flexibility in the area of 
defence and security. 
292 Ibid, p.24, paragraph 70. 
293 Ibid, p. 25, paragraph 76. 
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Here it proposed to establish decision-making procedures, which would allow to 
initiate operations of the EU's Rapid Reaction Force, in which member states could 
choose to simply support the engagement, without having to participate in it. 
Moreover, the British government suggested that such procedures would have to 
enable non-EU member states to participate in military operations, including the 
d .. ak' 294 eClSlon-m mg process . 
In spite of the disagreements in detail and the different focus, the pre-Nice approaches 
of Britain and Germany shared a common determination to achieve fundamental 
reform in order to make the EU fit for enlargement. It was obvious that even under 
New Labour, the UK was approaching the reform issues from a more 
intergovernmental point of view than Germany. The British tradition of defining 
Europe as a community of strong and independent nation states, who would remain in 
full control of the process of pooling of sovereignty on the Community level, 
continued to have an effect on British European policy. At the same time, German 
leaders became increasingly ready to let their domestic political culture of co-
operative federalism influence their vision of Europe. Provided one accepts that the 
difference in political culture in both countries almost unavoidably have to lead to 
different approaches towards institutional reform, it is not difficult to work out areas 
of corresponding interests. The fact that both the Blair and Schr()der administration 
pushed towards fundamental reform as a precondition for the successful initiation of 
further enlargement of the EU, showed a fundamental correspondence between the 
two countries in terms of their perception of the right way forward for the future of 
Europe. 
In this respect it was not so important that the German government pursued a federal 
vision for the EU and the British side emphasised its intergovernmental character. 
Rather crucial was the fact that both countries had become allies in promoting 
fundamental changes in the status quo of the Community against a rather complacent 
French Council presidency. 
294 Ibid, p. 25, paragraph 77. 
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The fact that Britain under New Labour had become positively engaged in the debate 
about the future of Europe and was now pursuing an 'active rather than a reactive 
engagement in Europe' (Jeffery and Sloan, 2000, p. 5) had brought the country much 
closer to Germany during and after Nice. 
Germany, now being led by a younger generation of more pragmatic leaders, who are 
willing to put forward their own vision of Europe without hesitation, was much less 
willing to go along with the agenda of its traditional European ally, France, at Nice. 
As a result, in spite of the differences in approach towards European reform, British 
and German leaders sided at Nice and opposed a rather complacent French presidency 
in its attempt to dominate the agenda. Blair and SchrOder co-operated closely to 
rescue the Nice summit from complete failure, when it became obvious that a number 
of member states were opposed to French proposals on EU reform295• Both leaders 
could however not compensate for the lack of co-ordination of the French Council 
presidency at Nice, which is why the treaty passed by the IGC did not deliver the 
major reforms it was supposed to296• 
Disappointing as it was in terms of the actual progress achieved, Nice nevertheless 
marked an important shift in the internal structure of the EU. The obvious collapse of 
the Franco-German couple, which had been the motor of integration for decades, 
opened up the possibility for new and flexible working relationships within the 
Community. It is therefore important for the future of the EU that Nice marked a 
widening of the gap between France and Germany and an increasing convergence 
between Britain and Germany. The French found it obviously hard to cope with an 
increasingly self-confident and active Germany, which no longer would leave the EU 
reform agenda with France and instead set out its own priorities for the future. 
29S See The Times, 'Marathon summit in chaos', 11 December 2000. 
296 Heather Grabbe summed up the disappointing outcome of Nice by emphasizing that 'the final deal 
at the end of 2000 was little better than what looked within reach at Amsterdam in 1997, even after 
many months of deliberation and hours of prime ministerial time' (Grabbe, 2001, p. 1). 
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The British government, on the other hand, willing to engage in the European debate 
and in search of partners to help to promote its own EU agenda of fundamental 
reform, seemed to be less delicate with regard to Germany's integrative vision than 
France. 
Instead, British leaders focused on the fact that Germany would be a partner in the 
pursuit of fundamental reform, in contrast to the French tendency to maintain the 
status qu0297. Foreign secretary Robin Cook had already emphasised before the start 
of the summit, that Germany was basically on the UK's side in the drive to prepare 
the EU institutionally for the enlargement process. Cook strongly supported the 
German aim to hold another IGC on institutional reform in 2004, something which the 
French were opposed t0298. In his assessment of the outcome of Nice summit, the 
British Prime Minister refrained from directly criticising the supervision of the French 
Council presidency at Nice. Blair nevertheless pointed out that Nice had been 
disappointing in terms of essential institutional reforms and that the failure of progress 
was only proof that the way the EU was doing business really had to change. He 
therefore committed Britain to be a promoter for further reforms: 
'Enlargement will now happen ( ... ) But we cannot continue to take decisions as 
important as this in this way ( ... ) The ideas for future reform in the EU which 
Britain put forward a few weeks ago, are now essential so that a more rational way 
of decision making is achieved. This too is a debate in which we should be 
thoroughly and constructively engaged. And we will be,299 
The German position was similar. In his statement on the Nice summit to the 
Bundestag, Chancellor Schroder emphasised that, although Nice had made 
enlargement possible, a serious debate about the future would now have to begin: 
297 In his speech at the German Bundestag in May 2000, French president Jacques Chirac had warned 
German leaders not to push the reform agenda to forcefully and not to use the enlargement process as 
an excuse 'to take the bull by the horns', because 'the speed of the European construction work cannot 
be ordained' ('Unser Europa' - Rede von Jaeques Chirae, dem Prasidenten der Republik Frankreieh, 
vor dem Deutsehen Bundestag, Berlin, 27 June 2000, www.bundestag.de/cgi-binldruck.pl?N=default). 
298 See The Times, 'Germans are fighting on our side, says Cook', 7 December 2000. 
299 Statement to the House of Commons on the Nice European Council by the Prime Minister, 
www.pm.gov .uk/print/page36.asp. 
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'Not all hopes with which we went to Nice have been fulfilled in the end C ... ) 
Based on a German-Italian initiative, the intergovernmental conference has worked 
out the framework for the period after Nice. This has clarified that the discussion 
about Europe will continue. Many questions arise in this respect. I only name the 
division of competences between the national and the European level, the division 
of powers between the Brussels institutions, the future status of the Charter of 
Basic Rights, the simplification of the treaties and also the role of the national 
parliaments. Nobody has to teach us how important the response to these questions 
is. It is exactly why, before and during Nice, we have so persistently, and finally 
successfully supported a comprehensive intergovernmental conference in 2004. ,300 
The failure of Nice to achieve fundamental reform had consequently brought Britain 
and Germany even closer together in their pursuit to prepare the EU's institutional 
setting for enlargement. As Jeffery and Sloan note, the changes in both countries' 
attitudes towards European integration 
'( ... ) has brought the UK closer to a Germany arguably moving in an opposite 
direction from an earlier, "instinctive" Europeanism to a more conditional 
commitment to the European integration process focused on more explicit 
conceptions of cost and benefit for Germany' (Jeffery and Sloan, 2000, p. 5) 
In the aftermath of Nice, both the British and the German government consequently 
made increased efforts to come to a mutual understanding of each other's position on 
the future of Europe. Only shortly after the Nice summit, German Foreign Minister 
Fischer was awarded with the 'German British 2000 award'. Fischer used the 
opportunity of his acceptance speech in London on January 24th 2001, to explain the 
German stance on institutional reform to the British side. In contrast to the federal 
vision he had set out at the Humboldt University a year before, Fischer now focused 
much more on the intergovernmental basis of the Union. 
300 RegierungserkJtirung von Bundeskanzler Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zu den 
Ergebnissen des Europtiischen Rates in Nizza, Berlin, 19 January 2001, 
http://www.bundeskanzler.de/Regierungserklaerung-.8561.21773IRegierungserklaerung-von-
Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-S ... htm. 
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He accepted that the nation state 'would always remain irreplacable in the Union, in 
order to convincingly and fully legitimise European decisions as democratic,301. 
As a result, Fischer rejected the criticism of British Eurosceptics that the deepening of 
European integration would necessarily lead to a superstate. 
He argued that in contrast to the belief of many in Britain, the German position 
focused on the need for deeper integration in areas where it made sense, without 
trying to challenge the integrity of the nation state as the fundament of the 
Community: 
'The European integration thus has to take the member states on board. Only if 
their institutions will not be devaluated or even disappear, will the completion of 
European unification succeed. The horror vision of British Eurosceptics, the so-
called "superstate", which replaces the old nation states and their democracies as 
the new sovereign, is therefore nothing but a myth, a synthetic construct beyond all 
grown European realities,302 
Fischer stressed that in the debate on the future of Europe, member states would have 
to accept each other's differences in domestic political cultures, which would also 
lead to different approaches. In the case of Britain and Germany, this amounted to a 
different interpretation of federalism: 
'Because each of our national constitutional histories differ, we associate different, 
partly even contrasting ideas with the same term. A good example is this terrible 
German f-word, which implicates decentralisation for us and centralisation for 
yoU.,303 
301 Rede des Bundesministers des Auswartigen Joschka Fischer an/ass/ich der Ver/eihung des 
'German-British 2000 Award', London, 24 January 2001, www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/redenl200 1 IrQ 1 0 1 24c.pdf. 
302 Ibid. 
303 Ibid. 
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It became clear in Fischer's remarks that like the British, the German government saw 
the main post-Nice priority for institutional reform in 'a clear regulation of 
competences between ' "Europe" and its member states' . 
As Fischer emphasised, this would amount to an EU based on a combination of 
'strong European institutions with extensive powers to act for European decisions, at 
the same time based on strong member states in the future Union,304. In spite of the 
continuing differences in political culture in both countries, Britain and Germany had 
therefore moved much closer to each other in terms of defining Europe: 
'Even if our cultural and historical conditions will continue to leave their mark on 
us, it is crucial that our interests with regard to Europe converge far more today 
than in the past. It is the desire for a Union, which is capable to act and for the 
establishment of freedom and democracy in our neighbouring regions, which 
motivates us both, to continue European integration,30s 
The post-Nice German disappointment about the lack of enthusiasm for reform on the 
part of the former close partner France was big enough to let German leaders 
seriously look out for alternative partners in the reform debate. In spite of the 
country's history of Euroscepticism, a Britain led by a fundamentally pro-European 
government, which was ready to do business with Europe, was perceived as an ally in 
the impetus towards post-Nice reform. In an interview I conducted with the vice-
president of the Bundestag committee for EU affairs, Professor JOrgen Meyer, who is 
at present also the official representative of the German parliament in the Convention 
on the Future of Europe, this became more than obvious. Meyer expressed his 
disappointment about the outcome of Nice, which in his opinion had left fundamental 
issues aside306 and stressed the importance of a renewed reform discussion to prepare 
the 2004 IGC. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid. 
306 With regard to Nice, Professor Meyer said: 'The summit has only achieved the absolute minimum. 
The results are anything else but nice' (Interview with Professor JUrgen Meyer, MdB, SPD· Party 
conference, Nuremberg, 20 November 2001). 
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With regard to the possibility of achieving the necessary reforms, Meyer welcomed 
the prospect of an enhanced leadership constellation in the EU, which would no 
longer simply be limited to the Franco-German couple307, which had not shown much 
leadership qualities at Nice. In this respect, he also underlined his hope that the British 
government would continue to play a positive role in Europe in order to be able to 
take on a leadership role in the debate about the future of the Union: 
'I would consider it to be desirable if, for example, Britain would, far more than in 
the past, take on a leading role, instead of functioning as a brake,308 
A symbolic sign of the growing correspondence between British and German leaders 
in the aftermath of Nice were the mutual invitations of Chancellor Schroder and 
Prime Minister Blair to each other's party conferences in 2001. In Schroder's speech 
at the annual Labour Party conference in Brighton in October 2001, which had been 
overshadowed by the effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11 th, Schroder 
emphasised the importance of British engagement in Europe: 
'( ... ) it was so important for Great Britain under the leadership of Tony Blair and 
Labour to join us and our European partners, without competitive squabbling and 
petty jealousies. Europe is the most successful political project in our varied and 
sometimes bloody history. Europe is not only the people's answer to war. I am 
convinced that Europe will also play a vital role in the peoples' answer to 
terrorism. ,309 
Blair spoke at the SPD party conference in Nuremberg in November 2001, where he 
pointed out that personal relations between him and Schroder were better than ever 
before. 
307 Meyer pointed out the benefits of an enhancement of the bilateral Franco-Gennan leadership role 
after Nice 'The more members participate in such a leadership role, the better and the more likely to 
achieve consensus I reckon the policy of the European Union will become' (lbid). 
308 Ibid. 
309 Speech by Gerhard Schr~der, Gennan Chancellor, Labour Party conference, Brighton 2001, 
http://uk.srd.yahoo.coml goo. uklSpeech+by+Gerhard+Schroeder+ Labour+ Party+con ference+ 200 I /1 /*h 
ttp://www.bits.de/public/documentsIUS Terrorist Attacks/schroederO 11 00 1 e.htm. 
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In an apparent sideswipe at the deterioration in personal relations between French and 
German leaders, especially between Schrl)der and Chirac, Blair stressed that this 
provided a good basis for close long-term Anglo-German relations: 
'No British Prime Minister and German Chancellor can have had a closer or 
warmer relationship than we do. And I look forward to many years ahead, after 
your elections next autumn, when I am confident it will grow closer stil1'310 
Blair pointed out that the British and the German government were co-operating 
closely on the debate about reform of the EU and welcomed a new SPD initiative in 
the debate, a document on Germany's role in Europe, which had been discussed at the 
conference on the same day. Once again it became clear, that the Blair government 
accepted disagreements in the detailed reform proposals and considered it to be more 
important that Germany was on the British side in supporting the reform agenda: 
'I welcome the debate on the Future of Europe which Gerhard and I played a 
significant role in initiating at Nice. I also congratulate the SPD on its most 
thoughtful contribution to that debate which you have discussed at your Congress 
this morning. Whatever disagreements on certain points in detail, I agree strongly 
that it is essential for Europe's future development that we provide guarantees 
against centralisation and are clear about the division of responsibilities between 
Europe's institutions. Britain has nothing to fear from a constructive and wide-
ranging debate about Europe's constitutional future. Britain under New Labour 
leadership wants to be a full partner with Germany and others in the development 
of the European Union. This is our true destiny·311 
310 Speech by the Tony Btair at the SPD Party conference, Nuremberg, 20 November 2001, 
http://2001.spd-parteitag.de/servtetIPB/menulI002017/index.html. 
311 Ibid. 
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The SPD leadership draft document on 'Germany in Europe,312, which had been 
circulated months before it was passed at the Nuremberg party conference and was 
hence widely discussed across Europe, re-confirmed the German federal perspective 
on the future of the EU. 
In his contribution during the debate on foreign and security issues at the Nuremberg 
conference, Chancellor Schroder confirmed that the SPD paper was supposed to be a 
controversial contribution to the post-Nice debate, which should once again prove the 
German commitment to substantial reform in an enlarging EU. Schroder emphasised 
that the document was an attempt to outline a federal structure for the EU, which 
would clearly define the division of powers between the Community and the national 
level. This would include greater powers for the Community level in some areas, but 
also possibly the redistribution of competences to the national level: 
'The motion, which you have in front of you, has indeed caused a sensation and 
that is what it was supposed to do ( ... ) The main issue is a decision on the question: 
What remains in the hands of the nation states and what necessarily has to become 
Brussel's responsibility? With regard to this question of competences, it is 
perfectly possible that the nation state will have to hand over further competences 
to Europe. But this process is also possible in the opposite direction: That those 
questions, which need not be solved in the European context, are transferred back 
to the nation state out of inner compulsions. This will be the task for the discussion 
about the division of competences in and for Europe,313 
312 'Verantwortung fur Europa - Deutschland in Europa·. SPD leadership draft motion for the Party 
conference in Nuremberg. http://www.spd.delservletIPB/show// 0 / 0 / 38lbeschlussbuchpd(, pp. 42-55. 
313 Rede des SPD-Parteivorsitzenden. Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schr6der zum Themenbereich Auj3en-
und Sicherheitspolitik. SPD-Party conference, Nuremberg, 20 November 200 I, http://2001.spd-
parteitag.de/servletlPB/menul 1 002034/index.htm I. 
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The SPD motion stressed that 'there is no alternative to further integration and 
Europeanisation,314 and called for greater co-operation on the EU level in a number of 
crucial areas, such as taxation, social policy, environmental protection, the fight 
against crime and international terrorism, as well as defence and security. 
The paper confirmed the German commitment to a European Charter of Rights, which 
should not be limited to rights of liberty and equality, but would have to make sure 
that the basic economic conditions for a decent existence of every European citizen 
are provided across the EU; 
'This includes the realisation of political and social participation and the creation 
of the economic preconditions for dignified existence,3lS 
In order to achieve this, the Charter of Rights should not simply be a 'festive 
declaration', but would have to be included into the EU treaties and thus become 
legally binding, in order to enable EU citizens 'to lodge a complaint or institute 
proceedings at the European Court of Justice, if they see their rights endangered by 
EU institutions,316. The Charter should also be the basis for the development of a 
common European asylum and immigration policy, based on an 'area of freedom, 
security and law,317. 
With regard to institutional reform, the SPD motion stressed the need to clarify the 
division of powers between the Community, the national and the regional level in 
order to come to a much more transparent and simplified structural framework for the 
EU. It stressed explicitly that such an overhaul of the present institutional setting 
would also have to look at competences which were wrongly based in the hands of the 
EU institutions, when they could be better handled on the national level: 
314 'Verantwortung fUr Europa - Deutschland in Europa', SPD leadership draft motion for the Party 
conference in Nuremberg, http://www.spddelservletlPB/show/}OJOJ38Ibeschlussbuch.pd(, p. 42. 
315 Ibid, p,47. 
316 Ibid, p. 47. 
317 Ibid, p. 48. 
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'The member states - and in Germany also the Lander and the local authorities 
have lost out in terms of their political scope of action during this process, although 
relevant decisions in many areas can he better decided on their level ( ... ) The 
present system of the division of tasks lacks transparency and clarity. Therefore it 
is often not recognisable , which political level is responsible for decisions, which 
directly intrude on the real life of citizens. Through this, the legitimacy of political 
action on the European level is called into question. ,318 
Although the paper generally supported the deepening of integration in many areas, 
the emphasis on the lack of transparency. and the need to redefine the division of 
competences in Europe, showed that the perspective of the German government after 
Nice had indeed moved very close to the British priorities. 
In this respect, the SPD leadership stressed that the basis for the essential decisions on 
the future of Europe would have to remain in the hands of the national governments, 
something which is at the heart of the British reform demands: 
'The right to transfer new competences to the EU level, has to remain in the hands 
of the member states. The division of tasks between the federal level, the Lander 
and the local authorities is, and remains a question of domestic policy' 3 19 
As part of a better use of the subsidiarity principle, the paper explicitly named 
agricultural and structural policies as possible areas which could be transferred back 
to the national level, while at the same time the deepening of co-operation on the EU 
level would have to be strengthened with regard to foreign and security policy and 
matters of security and immigration32o• Furthermore, in order to achieve greater 
transparency and scrutiny on decision-making within the EU, the three major 
Community institutions would all have to be strengthened. 
318 Ibid, pp. 52-53. 
319 Ibid, p. 53. 
320 Ibid, p. 53. 
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The motion proposed to develop the Commission into a true European executive and 
to enhance the rights of the European Parliament further, granting it full budgetary 
powers321. The Commission president would have to be elected by the European 
Parliament in order to provide a stronger link between the institution which is elected 
by the citizens of Europe and the Union levet322. With regard to the Council, a 
development towards a European chamber of states should be attempted with a clear 
expansion of decision-making by QMV323. 
Chancellor Schrl>der clarified the proposals in the debate on the motion at the party 
conference by pointing out that they would represent 'a reasonable goal' for the future 
of Europe, which Germany would contribute to the 'difficult process of discussion ,324. 
Schrl>der justified the German focus on more integration in essential areas with the 
traditional post-war German commitment to European unification, which had turned 
Germany into the main advocate for the deepening of the integration process: 
'I think a good tradition of German European policy exists - not depending on the 
colour of the political party in this respect - which simply means that, because of 
its historic experiences and the necessity to integrate Germany in Europe, Germany 
has always played a strong integrationist role and shall, in our opinion, continue to 
do SO,325 
The SPD motion was an important contribution to the reform debate in the run-up to 
the Laeken European Council in December, where the EU leaders finally wanted to 
get fundamental institutional reform under way. 
321 Ibid, p. 53. 
m Ibid, p.54. 
323 Ibid, p. S3 and p. 54. 
324 Rede des SPD-Parteivorsitzenden, Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schr6der zum Themenbereich Aupen-
und Sicherheitspolitik, SPD-Party conference, Nuremberg, 20 November 2001, httj>:11200I.spd-
parteitag.de/servletlPB/menuJ 1 002034/index.html 
32S Ibid. 
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Although controversial in its details, such as the proposal to turn the Commission into 
a European executive and to have the Commission president elected by the European 
Parliament, it showed that Germany remained fundamentally committed to the reform 
debate and was not afraid to state its case. This was strengthened by the fact that the 
SPD's coalition partner in government, Bundnis 90lDie Grunen also published a 
document on the post-Nice reform debate, which stressed the same priorities for 
institutional reform326. 
The British Prime Minister made his own contribution to the approaching Laeken 
summit during a speech at the opening of the European Research Institute at the 
University of Birmingham. Blair set out the challenges the EU would face in the 
immediate future: successful enlargement, turning the Euro into a stable currency, 
economic reform, defence and substantial institutional reform327. Blair emphasised 
once again that his government would remain engaged in Europe and in the debate on 
the future of the EU in order to achieve the vision of an EU of strong member states 
which chose to co-operate closely in order to improve the quality of life for their 
citizens: 
'Britain's future is in Europe. I want a sovereignty rooted in democratic consent. 
Rooted in being, in this century, not just a national power in shifting alliances, but 
a great European power in a lasting Union. A Union of nations, of democracies 
with shared goals, delivering shared peace, stability and prosperity for our citizens. 
Ours will be a sovereignty rooted in being part not of a European superstate, but of 
a proud nation, proud of its own identity and of its alliance in Europe,328 
326 Like the SPD motion, the basic B90lGrune paper on the necessary institutional reforms after Nice 
focused on the need to clarify the division of powers within the Union on the basis of greater 
subsidiarity. It supported the SPD proposal for the inclusion of a Charter of Basis Rights into the EU 
treaties and especially emphasised the need to strengthen the European Parliament as the representation 
of the people of Europe on the Community level, as well as the extension ofQMV in the Council. 
(' "Post-Nizza" - Europa gemeinsam vertiefen, Bundnisgriine Eckpunkte fur den Reformprozess und 
die europtiische Verfassungsdebatte', 200 I, 
http://www.gruene-parteLde/rsvgn/rsrubriklO .. 694.00.htm). 
327 'Britain's role in Europe', Prime Minister's speech to the European Research Institute, 23 
November 2001, http://www.number-lO.gov.ukloutput/page393 7 .asp. 
328 Ibid. 
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The insistence on the clarification of the division of competences between the EU 
institutions and the member state level on both the British and the German side 
consequently contributed to the decisions reached at Laeken. The British and the 
German concern with regard to the lack of transparency and democratic 
accountability of the EU's institutional framework was taken up in the Laeken 
declaration, passed by the summit on December 15th 2001. In the declaration, the EU 
decided to set up a Constitution on the Future of Europe, consisting of representatives 
from each member state's government and national parliament, the European 
Parliament and the Commission329. 
The Convention, which started working on the March 1 st 2002 will work out 
proposals for institutional and procedural reform of the EU within a year, which will 
then be debated at the 2004 reform Intergovernmental Conference. 
As the principal aim of the reform of the EU framework, the Laeken declaration set 
out a new division of powers and responsibilities which would provide effective 
outcomes to improve the lives of Europe's citizens. It was stressed that a quasi-
automatic development towards further bureaucratisation and supranationalisation 
should be avoided in favour of enhanced co-operation in areas, which could not be 
dealt with effectively on the member state level: 
'What they expect is more results, better responses to practical issues and not a 
European superstate or European institutions inveigling their way into every nook 
and cranny of life. In short citizens are calling for a clear, open, effective, 
democratically controlled Community approach, developing a Europe which points 
the way ahead for the world. An approach that provides concrete results in terms of 
more jobs, better quality of life, less crime, decent education and better health care. 
There can be no doubt that this will require Europe to undergo renewal and 
reform,33o 
329 'The Future of the European Union', Declaration passed by the European Council in Laeken, 15 
December 200 I, p.5, http://ue.eu.intiNewsroom/related.asp?BID=76&GRP=4061&LANG=2. 
330 Ibid. 
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Laeken had set out a clear path towards European reform, which had been 
substantially neglected at previous summits. It had become clear that the future for the 
EU would not be a European superstate, but a strengthened Union, in which the 
member states would co-operate even more closely on issues, which they could no 
longer deal with independently on the national level. Both the British and the German 
government were therefore quite content with the outcome of the summit, which had 
taken on board their essential matters of concern. 
The British Prime Minister expressed his relief that with the Convention, the EU had 
finally decided to provide a framework, which would allow an open and fundamental 
debate on the future of Europe, involving the EU institutions, as well as the national 
governments and their citizens. During a press conference at Laeken, Blair pointed 
out that he believed that the argument on the future of Europe was moving in the 
direction Britain had wanted it to go: 
'There is going to be a real debate now over the next couple of years in the 
European Union about the future, but I am increasingly confident that those who 
believe, as we do, that Europe should co-operate more closely together, that is in 
the interests of our citizens, but it should do so on the basis of nations coming 
together' 33) 
In his official statement on the Laeken summit to the House of Commons, Blair 
emphasised that the UK would be ready to agree to further co-operation on important 
issues, such as asylum and immigration, which would have to be tackled on the 
European level. On the other hand, he welcomed the fact that the Laeken declaration 
had made clear that the fundamental powers of decision-making would rest with the 
member states and that some powers could even be returned to the national level : 
'The British view, widely shared, is that while it is right to co-operate ever more 
closely with our partners, democratic accountability is fundamentally and 
ultimately rooted in the Member State ( ... ) The Laeken Declaration, and the 
331 Edited transcript ofa Press Conference given by the Prime Minister, Tony Btair, and the foreign 
secretary, Jack Straw in Laeken, 15 December 2001, www.fco.gov.uklnews/newstext.asp?5693. 
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Convention, give us the opportunity to take a serious look at the division of 
competences between the Union and the Member States. For the first time in the 
Union's history we shall be looking at the prospect of restoring some tasks to the 
Member States. We now also have the chance to open up the European institutions 
to greater public scrutiny,332 
On the part of the German government, Chancellor Schroder once again set out the 
German priorities, which would now be discussed in the Convention on the Future of 
Europe. He underlined that the Convention would have to focus its reform proposals 
on greater institutional efficiency for the EU, including the return of powers to the 
member state level, which would then have to be included in a legal constitution: 
'What the member states can manage in a better, more proper and more popular 
way, has to be dealt with in their area of responsibility. We therefore have to re-
balance the relationship of the institutions. Here I would like to see a Commission, 
which represents a strong executive and a European parliament, which is 
strengthened in terms of its rights, including budgetary questions. The national 
parliaments have to get an outstanding place in the framework of the European 
institutions, like for example in terms of the scrutiny of the European security and 
defence policy. Finally, the Council, where it acts as a legislative, should turn into 
a second chamber. ,333 
In contrast to the portrayal of the alleged fundamental differences on institutional 
reform between Britain and Germany, especially in the British media, the reality after 
Laeken paints a different picture. Whereas the UK and Germany had traditionally 
been far apart on the concept of how Europe should be designed institutionally, after 
the post-Nice discussion process has brought the countries much closer together than 
ever before. 
332 'Laeken - Prime Minister's statement to Parliament', 17 December 2001, www.number-
1 O.gov .uk/printlpage4123 .asp. 
333 Regierungserkliirung von Bundeslcanzler SchriJder zum Europiiischen Rat in Laelcen. 12 December 
2001, http://www.bundesregierung.de/index-.413.65072lRegierungserklaerung-von-Bunde.htm. 
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Although the German government continues to support an institutional design for the 
EU which follows the federal tradition of the German state, it does not see its concept 
as the universal remedy for the Community's current institutional deficits. On the 
contrary, the German government accepts that its federal approach will almost 
inevitably meet the opposition of other member states, who come from a more 
centralist domestic perspective. As long as effective mechanism of co-operation on 
important issues such as defence and security, crime and immigration, the 
environment and economic reform can be found, the German side remains principally 
open to accept compromises on institutional reform. 
It was consequently crucial for British-German co-operation on institutional reform 
that Foreign Minister Fischer clarified this stance in the official Bundestag debate in 
on the Laeken summit: 
'My problem is rather, that I do not believe in the transfer of our federal 
concept( ... ) We are basically dealing with four principles, first with the integration 
principle - we want this Europe and European integration - and secondly 
furthermore with the national principle; we are therefore dealing with a parallelism 
of the two substantial principles. In addition to that, there are precise principles of 
procedure of a very high rank. - functionality, it has to function - and at the same 
time the democracy principle. Besides, we need an ability to compromise with 
regard to the different interests ( ... ) You will have the German federal orientation 
in mind, the accuracy of which I am profoundly convinced; I cannot imagine a 
different structure for the Federal Republic. On the other hand, we are dealing with 
powerful central states, which, because of their size and their evolved tradition, 
have no federal principle ( ... ) If we want to be successful though - I want success 
and we need success - then we have to add the differences in tradition from the 
outset,334 
334 Rede des Bundesministers des Auswartigen, Joschka Fischer, zur Tagung des Europiiischen Rates 
in LaekenlBriissel, 12 December 2001, http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/.-
65405/Bulletin.htm. 
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After Nice and Laeken, the British and the Gennan government hence find 
themselves on a common refonn platfonn, which aims at a profound clarification of 
the division of competences within the EU framework, based on greater subsidiarity 
and an enhanced influence of national parliaments in the decision-making process. It 
became obvious that both countries continue to see the European Council as the 
crucial decision-maker within the EU when the Gennan Chancellor and the British 
Prime Minister published a joint letter on Council Refonn in February 2002, a few 
days before the Convention on the Future of Europe was initiated. In the letter to the 
Spanish Prime Minister Aznar, whose country held the Council presidency at the 
time, Blair and SchrOder stressed the importance of an effective Council for the future 
of an enlarged EU: 
'The European Council plays a key role in providing the EU with strategic 
direction and a clear sense of purpose, such as driving forward the Lisbon and 
Tampere agendas ( ... ) We therefore need to ensure that we maximise the efficient 
use of European Council time, keeping our agenda focussed on key priorities,335 
The two leaders made a number of proposals for the refonn of the Council, including 
internal refonn (smaller agendas, limited number of submissions to the Council, focus 
on an annual agenda, strengthening of the Council Secretariat and reduction of sub-
councils), and greater transparency through public Council meetings (except for CFSP 
matters). Regarding the British position, it was remarkable that a general call for 
decision-making by QMV in the Council was proposed in the Blair-Schroder letter. 
The British willingness to accept that the use of QMV might be advantageous on a 
number of issues had brought its position very close to that of the Gennan 
government, which supports decision-making by QMV in most areas in the Council. 
The letter therefore stated that 'unanimity should only be applied in areas where this 
is provided for in the Treaties' and that 'decisions referred to the European Council 
under Treaty bases subject to QMV should be decided by QMV,336. 
33S 'Reform of the European Council', Joint letter by Prime Minister Tony B1air and German 
Chancellor SchrOder to Prime Minister Aznar of Spain, 25 February 2002, www.number-
10.gov.uklnews.asp?newsID=3671. 
336 Ibid. 
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On the reform of the most important institution within the framework of the EU, the 
two countries are hence closer than they had ever been before. It can be expected that 
Britain and Germany will strongly support reform of the Council towards greater 
efficiency, and also greater use ofQMV on a number of issues at the 2004 IGC. 
The British government has become very active in the post-Laeken reform debate and 
has put forward a number of constructive reform proposals to the Convention on the 
Future of Europe, which started working on March 1 st 2002. Foreign secretary Jack 
Straw and Europe minister Peter Hain who had both been newly appointed after 
Labour's re-election in June 2001, have taken an active role in the debate on the 
future of the EU. 
Peter Hain, who is still the government's official representative in the Convention, but 
was moved to cabinet rank as Secretary for Wales in a cabinet reshuffle in November 
2002, has become the British government's most active advocate for British 
. th EU337 engagement me. 
Since his appointment, Hain has made a number of significant speeches on Britain's 
role in Europe, which stress that the British government wants to be an active partner 
in the EU in order to avoid the mistakes of the past, in which the future of the 
Community was decided without British influence: 
'What I want, what this Government wants, and what the people of this country 
want is something else. A strong Britain, in control of its own destiny, advancing 
its own interests, working with our neighbours to make all of us safer, richer, and 
stronger. A Britain that is a European power - a power for good. ,338 
337 He was replaced as Minister for Europe by Foreign Office minister Denis MacShane. 
338 'What if we were out of Europe', Speech by Peter Hain at Chatham House, London, 7 May 2002, 
http://www. fco.gov .uk!servletlFront?pagename=OpenMarketlXcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid= I 007 
02939 1 647&a=KArticle&aid-l 020786226372. 
282 
In his speech on the occasion of the publication of the Centre for European Reform 
publication 'Germany and Britain, an alliance of necessity,339, Hain stressed the 
importance of British-German relations in an enlarging EU. He emphasised that both 
countries were trying to bring the EU closer to the people of Europe by trying to make 
it more transparent and less complicated in the way it functions: 
'Above all, I believe that the UK and Germany can form a 'strong partnership' in 
Europe which will lead the way to the EU delivering real benefits to real people, in 
a clear and easy to digest fashion C ••• ). The British-German alliance is much more 
than an alliance of necessity. It is a partnership of choice and we are both stronger 
for it. ,340 
The year 2002 has seen another remarkable step in the British government's approach 
towards EU reform. Whereas before, even the New Labour government had been 
rather reluctant to discuss the idea of a constitution for the EU and shown the 
traditional British reservation towards written legal constitutions. However, after 
Laeken a sea change in the government's position has occurred. In a speech by 
foreign secretary Jack Straw in The Hague in February 2002, the British government 
mentioned the notion of a written 'statement of principles' for the first time as an 
effective way of defining the division of competences within the institutional 
framework of the EU. Straw stressed that such a written document would not 
necessarily implicate that the EU would have state character, an accusation put 
forward by many Eurosceptics. On the contrary, it would help to make the EU better 
understood by its citizens and would lead to a clear definition of the subsidiarity 
principle: 
'The current lack of clarity here creates the impression that power is draining away 
from national governments to the centre, in Brussels C ... ). There is a case for a 
simpler statement of principles, which sets out in plain language what the EU is for 
339 Grabbe and MUnchau, 2002. 
340 'The UK and Gennany: A strong partnership in Europe', Speech by the Minister for Europe, Peter 
Hain, to launch the joint publication of the Centre for European Refonn and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
pamphlet 'Germany & Britain, an alliance of necessity', London, 13 February 2002, 
www . feo. gov. uklnews/speechtext.asp? 5908. 
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and how it can add value, and establishes clear lines between what the EU does 
and where the member states responsibilities should lie ( ... ). But call it a 
constitution, and suddenly for some it doesn't look like such a good idea ( ... ). But 
just because an entity has a constitution doesn't make it a state. Many 
organisations, including the Labour Party, have constitutions. It's the substance 
that matters, not the name. ,341 
The government's position on the matter has since been clarified further when, to the 
surprise of the rest of the EU, the British government actually submitted a draft 
constitutional treaty to the Convention on the Future of Europe on 15 October 
2002342• Britain has hence even gone a step further then Germany, which currently 
has not yet submitted an official complete draft for an EU constitution to the 
Convention. A few days earlier foreign secretary Jack Straw had laid out his ideas on 
a Constitution for Europe in an article for The Economist. In the article, Straw 
justified the British change of mind on the constitutional issue with the necessity to 
clarify the complicated treaty structure of the EU in a single written document. 
Straw underlined that the British government considered the EU to be 'a union of 
sovereign states, who have decided to pool some of that sovereignty, better to secure 
peace and prosperity in Europe and the wider world. ,343 Although this was another 
strong focus on the intergovernmental fundament of the Community, the UK position 
outlined in Straw's article shows that the government was willing to strengthen all 
institutional levels. In the process of redefining the powers within the EU, each of the 
three major institutions (Council, Commission and the European Parliament) would 
have to be strengthened, which is strongly supported by the German government. 
341 'Reforming Europe: new era, new questions', Speech by Foreign secretary Jack Straw in The 
Hague, 21 February 2002, 
http://www.fco.gov.uklservletlFront?pagename=OpenMarketlXcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007 
02939 I 647&a=KArticle&aid=1030405878065. 
342 Draft Constitutional Treaty of the European Union and related documents, submitted by Mr Peter 
Hain, Member of the Convention, Brussels, 15 October 2002, 
http://register .consilium.eu. intlpdf/ enl02/cv00/00345-r 1 en2 .pdf. 
343 'Jack Straw: A constitution for Europe', The Economist, 10 October 2002. 
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A new proposal on the British part is that of the replacement of the current system of 
rotating six-month Council presidencies by a permanent Council president, who 
would be elected by the heads of government. This would strengthen the Council's 
position in its task to 'set the strategic agenda for the Union,344. 
Straw also proposed to give national parliaments greater powers of scrutiny with 
regard to the proper use of the subsidiarity principle within the Community. This 
would mean that a majority of national parliaments would be able to force the 
Commission to 're-examine its approach' if it was considered that EU regulations 
would exercise too much power over independent national policies. In order to 
achieve this, the Commission would have to strengthened in its role as the 
representative of the Community interest, but at the same time would have to be under 
stricter control by the European Parliamene4s. The British government however 
remains firmly opposed to the German proposal of a directly elected Commission 
president, however, as Straw indicated in a government report submitted to the House 
of Commons: 
'The Commission's independence is what enables it to be the real guardian of the 
Treaties and guarantor of the rights of all. We therefore do not believe it would be 
sensible to politicise the Commission through the election of its President,346 
The draft constitution submitted to the Convention by the British government 
reconfirms the British view of the Union as an organisation which stands and falls 
with the consent of the member states: 
'The Union has only those powers which have been conferred on it by the Member 
States. All powers which the Member States enjoy by virtue of their sovereignty, 
and which they have not conferred on the Union, remain theirs exclusively. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Ibid. 
346 'Democracy and Accountability in the EU and the role of national parliaments: Government 
Obeservations on the Committee's Thirthy-third Report of Session 2001-02', House of Commons, 
European Scrutiny Committee, 30 October 2002, 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200 I 02/cmselectlcmeulegl12561 1256.pdf. 
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( ... ) 
The European Union is thus a constitutional order of a new kind, uniting the 
peoples of the Member States, while preserving the diversity of political 
institutions and of cultural and linguistic traditions that enriches European 
civilisation. ,347 
The British draft constitution for the EU would rename the EU into 'the Union', 
which would represent a 'constitutional order of sovereign States', in which 'the 
Member States have not divested themselves of their sovereignty in whole or in 
part' 348. Therefore, national sovereignty remains in the hand of the member states, 
which decide to pool it in certain areas of common interest. In terms of the Charter of 
Human Rights, it should not be included in the treaty structure of the Union, but 
simply be respected in the policies of the Community. As part of the discussion on a 
Constitution for the EU, the government has repeatedly made clear that it could not 
agree to a legally binding inclusion of the Charter into a Constitution. Peter Hain told 
the European Scrutiny Committee on the July 16th 2002 that the government had 
fundamental legal reservations concerning the full incorporation of the Charter: 
'I think the problem with the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
as it is presently constituted, just wholesale into the Treaty, is that it could - in fact 
would in our view - start to influence domestic law in a way that was never 
intended ( ... ) We do not mind incorporation in some form with those necessary 
safeguards built in, but not wholesale incorporation, which is just not 
acceptable .349 
The Prime Minister emphasised this stance again in his latest speech on European 
reform in Cardiff, where he refused any notion of the Charter being part of a 
constitutional treaty for the EU, as this would endanger national legislation: 
347 Draft Constitutional Treaty of the European Union and related documents, submitted by Mr Peter 
Hain, Member of the Convention, Brussels, 15 October 2002, proclamation, article 4 and 5, 
httj>:llregister.consilium.eu.intlpdflenl02/cvOO/00345-rlen2.pdf. 
348 Ibid, page 12, article 1 and commentary. 
349 Select Committee on European Scrutiny, Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses Rt Hon 
Peter Hain MP and Mr Nick Baird, 16 July, 2002, question 53, 
httj>:llwww.publications.parliament.uklpa/cm200102/cmselectlcmeuleglll12/2071601.htm. 
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'On the Charter of Rights, I repeat our clear view that though we welcome, of 
course a declaration of basic rights common to all European citizens and have 
ourselves incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights directly into 
British law, we cannot support a form of treaty incorporation that would enlarge 
EU competence over national legislation. There cannot be new legal rights given 
by such a means, especially in areas such as industrial law, where we have long 
and difficult memories of the battles fought to get British law in proper order.,3so 
As part of the British draft for an EU constitution, the fundamental rights which have 
been set out in the Charter should hence be respected, but not fully incorporated into 
the Constitution. Article 2 of the draft constitutional treaty submitted by the British 
government states that 
'The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed 
in Rome on 4 November 1950, as identified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, as general principles of Union law.,3S1 
Peter Hain further clarified the British stance on the issue in a recent examination in 
the European scrutiny committee. When questioned if the British government would 
agree to the incorporation of the Charter into the Treaty if safeguards against the 
infringement of national legislation would be included, Hain explained that the 
government would still prefer it as an attached protocol to the Treaty rather than as an 
integral part: 
350 'A clear course for Europe', Speech by the Prime Minister to an audience in Cardiff, 28 November 
2002, www.number-l0.gov.uk/printlpage6710.asp. 
m Draft Constitutional Treaty of the European Union and related documents, submitted by Mr Peter 
Hain, Member of the Convention, Brussels, 15 October 2002, proclamation, article 2, paragraph 2, 
httt>:llregister.consilium.eu.intlpdf7enl02/cvOO/00345-rlen2.pdf. 
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'C ... ) if it were to be incorporated and if all that necessary protection were built in 
and, in effect, a fire-break created through these horizontal articles, stopping the 
impact of the Charter coming down and changing our domestic law ( ... ) then the 
issue arises should it just be incorporated wholesale into the Treaty with those 
necessary horizontal clauses, or should there be an article in the new Treaty that 
cross-references to a protocol ( ... ) We favour the latter,352 
On this issue, the British government remains fundamentally at odds with the German 
government and the majority of the political elite in Germany. The German 
government representative in the Convention, Gunter Pleuger, set out the 
incorporation of the Charter into an EU Constitution as part of official German policy: 
'The European Charter of Basic Rights should, apart from indispensable technical 
adaptions, be incorporated as a catalogue of values into the Constitution in its 
original form. This should be listed as a separate chapter at the beginning of the 
constitutional chapter.,353 
In the SPD - Bfuldnis90/Grilne coalition agreement for the second term, both parties 
stressed that they strongly supported the legally binding incorporation of the Charter 
of FWldamental Rights into a European constitution: 
'The Charter of Basic Rights shall become legally binding and an enforceable part 
of the Constitution ,354 
352 Uncorrected evidence presented by Rt Hon Peter Hain. Government Representative on the 
Convention on the Future of Europe. Mr Nick Baird. Head of European Union department (internal). 
Ms Sarah Lyons. Private Secretary to the Government Representative on the Convention on the Future 
of Europe, European Scrutiny Committee. House of Commons. 20 November 2002. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uklpa/crn200203/cmselect/cmeuleglucl03/ucl0301.htm 
353 Europiiischer Konvent, Arbeitsgruppe Ill, Stellungnahme des deutschen Vertreters in der 
Arbeitsgruppe Ill, Dr Gunter Pleuger, http://european-convention.eu.intlbienvenue.asp?lang=EN. 
354 'Erneuerung, Gerechtigkeit, Nachhaltigkeit - Fur ein wirtschaftliches starkes, soziales und 
6kologisches Deutschland Fur eine lebendige Demokratie', Koalitionsvertrag SPD-BOndnis90/GrOne. 
16 October 2002, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Regierungl-.4311K0alitionsvertrag-I.-Praeambel.htm. 
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Although there are a number of disagreements on the reform of the EU institutions 
and procedures amongst the political parties in Germany, a broad consensus exists on 
the need to integrate the Charter into the EU's acquis communautaire in a legally 
binding form. 
This was already expressed in 2000, when all the parties represented in the Bundestag 
gave their opinion on the draft for a Charter of Fundamental Rights, which had been 
worked out by a Commission under the leadership of former German president 
Roman Herzog. In the final report of the Bundestag committee on EU matters, all 
parties agreed on the need to include a Charter of Fundamental Rights, which would 
determine the Community's values into the EU's treaty structure, respectively into an 
EU constitution3SS. Both the two main opposition sister parties, the CDU and the 
Bavarian CSU strongly support the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights into a European Constitution. In a joint paper for a European Constitution, 
published in November 2001, both CDU and CSU made clear that they supported the 
incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into EU law as part of a 
constitution: 
'All the essential regulations, especially those concerning the distribution of 
competences between the European Union and the member states, the budgetary 
arrangements, the institutions of the European Union and their procedures, shall be 
combined in a constitutional treaty (Basic Treaty). The fundament, the goals and 
the values of the European unification project shall be phrased in a preamble.'3s6 
However, especially the Bavarian CSU under the leadership of the defeated candidate 
for the Chancellery, Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber, does reject the notion 
that the Charter could be the basis for a European constitution. 
3S5 Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses jar die Angelegenheiten der Europaischen des 
deutschen Bundestages, Druclcsache 1414584, 10 November 2000, 
http://dip.bundestag.delbtdl14/045/1404584.pdf. 
356 Vorschlage von CDU und CSU jar einen Verfassungsvertrag vorgelegt von der CDUICSU 
Arbei/sgruppe 'Europaischer Verfassungsvertrag' unter der Leitung von Dr. Wolfgang Schauble, MdB, 
Bundesminister a.D. und Reinhold Boclclet, Bayerischer Staatsminister for Bundes- und 
Europaangelegenheiten, Berlin, 21 November 2001, http://www.cdu.de/presse/archiv-2002/europa-
verfassungsvertrag. pdf. 
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In a recent press release, the CSU pointed out that an EU constitution would have to 
be developed independently from the Charter. Only when such a constitution would 
have been set up, should those parts of the Charter, which are related to EU 
competences, be incorporated. The Charter should therefore not infringe on the 
national constitutions of the member states. The CSU stresses that an overload of the 
Charter with visionary political goals would have to be avoided at all costs, a position 
which is very close to that of the British government: 
'An overload of the Charter with pure political goals is especially problematic. 
They arouse false expectations among the citizens and contribute to an expansion 
of EU tasks by stealth. Besides, the constitutional arrangements of the member 
states have to remain unaffected by the Charter. The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights can only become part of the treaty, when its weaknesses have been removed 
and, at the same time, the competences between the EU and the member states are 
redefined in the treaty.,357 
A certain reluctance towards the incorporation of a Charter full of visionary political 
goals can therefore be found among the conservative opposition in Germany. With 
regard to many aspects of the constitutional settlement, Britain and Germany would 
therefore have been much closer in their approach, if Edmund Stoiber had been 
elected as Chancellor in the September 2002 election. Stoiber's party, the CSU, 
shares the British focus on a strong intergovernmentalist basis for the EU more than 
any other party in Germany. In its latest proposals for necessary reform of the EU 
prior to enlargement, the CSU once again stresses the intergovernmental character of 
the EU: 
'The CSU underlines: the EU will have to continue to build on the nation states in 
the future and must not become a European federal state. The responsibility for the 
distribution of competences has to rest with the nation states. All constitutional 
regulations on the basis of the European Union, especially concerning the content 
and the performance of EU competences will have to continue to be ratified by the 
m csu press notice, 'EU-GrundrechtsCharter, Positionen der CSU', 
www.csu.delDieThemenIPositionenA-ZlEuropalEu-GrundrechtsCharter.htm. 
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national parliaments in the future. Only in this way is the EU legitimised by the 
peoples of the member states. ,358 
Ingo Friedrich, MEP for the CSU and vice president of the European Parliament, 
expressed his party's caution towards a possible federalisation of the EU. When I 
interviewed him in his constituency in Gunzenhausen, Germany, Friedrich pointed out 
that, in his opinion, a basic treaty, which settles the division of competences within 
the EU should not be called 'constitution', but 'constitutional treaty', because the 
latter would not imply any state character for the EU359• The CSU thus initially 
showed a similar reservation towards a constitutional settlement for the EU like the 
many British elites, and shares the rejection of any integrative steps which would lead 
towards giving the EU state character. 
The red-green coalition is much less cautious in this respect, as has been shown by the 
federal approach of Joschka Fischer and the strong emphasis on the inclusion of the 
Charter in a constitution as part of a basic fundament of values for Europe. 
The latest basic manifesto of the Green party (Biindnis 90lGriine) makes clear, that 
they see a European constitution as part of a guarantee of basic rights for all EU 
citizens: 
'That constitution must guarantee fundamental and civil rights to all Europeans, 
and safeguard those rights through a European jurisdiction. ,360 
In a speech to the France centre in Freiburg during the German election campaign in 
April 2002, Chancellor Schroder reconfmned his government's commitment to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights as part of a European constitution, as the Charter 
would provide the section on basic rights, which is essential in any constitution: 
3S8 'Reformen for eine erweiterte EuropiJische Union'. Beschluss des Parteitags der CSu, 22123 
November 2002, http://www.csu.de!home/Display/PolitikffhemenlEuropalLeitantrag EU. 
359 Interview with Dr Ingo Friedrich, Gunzenhausen, Germany, 31 March 200 I. 
360 'The future is green -Alliance 90ffhe Greens Party Program and Principles (English version)" 
2002, p. 121, http://archiv.gruene-partei.de/dokumente/grundsatzprogramm-english.pdf. 
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'This European Charter includes everything, which is necessary for the section on 
basic rights within a constitution. It really includes precisely formulated basic 
rights for European citizens. 
The task is therefore, to take what is in there and to make it binding for all. Then 
you would have the section on basic rights of a European Constitution,361 
Because the Charter of Fundamental Rights as an integral and binding part of an EU 
institution is so essential from the point of view of the German government, there are 
great expectations on their part that the British government might in the end change 
its mind on the issue, similar to the change that occurred with regard to a constitution. 
The SPD delegate for the German Bundestag in the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, Professor Jiirgen Meyer, who already had submitted a draft for a European 
Constitution to the EU in 2000362, emphasised in the interview I conducted with him 
in November 2000 in Nuremberg, that he hoped that Britain would give up its 
reservations towards a European constitution in the long run. Meyer underlined that 
'this Charter of Fundamental Rights describes the European order of values, which 
should not only be a simple promise, but a binding catalogue of norms ,363. He only 
recently made concrete proposals in the Convention on how the legal enforceability 
could be ensured as part of a Convention, by e.g. including an article which states that 
every EU citizen would have 'the right to bring a claim due to a breach of the rights 
and freedoms recognised in this Charter' 364 . 
The present debate about the shape of a constitution for the EU in Britain and 
Germany once again reflects the different domestic constitutional traditions in both 
countries. 
361 Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder vor dem Frankreich-Zentrum der Albert-Ludwigs-
Universitiit Freiburg, 12 April 2002, http://www.bundeskanzler.de/Reden-.7715.65027/Rede-von-
Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-Schroeder-zum-The ... htm. 
362 See Entwurf der GrundrechtsCharter der Europiiischen Union, submitted by Professor JUrgen 
Meyer MdB, 6 January 2000, http://www.bundestag.de/ftp/pdf/anlage6.pdf. 
363 Interview with Professor JUrgen Meyer, MdB, SPD Bundesparteitag, Nuremberg, 20 November 
2001. 
364 Contribution by Mr JUrgen Meyer, member of the Convention: 'Enforceability of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and improvement of the individual's right to legal redress', Brussels, 29 
November 2002, http://register.consilium.eu.intlpdflenl02/cvOO/00439en2.pdf. 
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Whereas the present German elites have been politically socialised in a constitutional 
setting, in which the basic values and rules of the state and political system are 
determined in detail, the British are used to a system based on tradition and 
conventions, in which few written rules exist. 
In contrast to their German counterparts, British elites consequently find it difficult to 
accept aspects of continental constitutional traditions in the EU, such as a written set 
of basic rights and values. This inevitably has to lead to different priorities in the 
approach to a European constitution, even under a British government, which has 
shed the traditional British reservation towards a written constitution: 
'The gradual, unbroken development of British institutions ( ... ) is what decisively 
sets the UK apart from its European neighbours; the legacy is a unique, 
democratically updated system of seventeenth-century government ( ... ) This has 
important implications for the norms which guide the operation of UK institutions 
( ... ). The UK's institutional configuration and norms of political interaction are 
miles removed from those of the EU: institutional centralisation versus institutional 
pluralism; politics by convention versus legal formalism; adversity versus 
consensus ,365 
The British side hence tries to avoid overloading the acquis communtaire of a 
reformed EU with too many Community rules and tasks, but prefers a slimmed down 
version of the existing treaty structure, which focuses on efficient ways to enable co-
operation between the member states in crucial areas. The draft constitutional treaty 
worked out by the British government clearly shows this. It determines the principles 
of 'conferred powers', 'subsidiarity', 'proportionality' and 'loyal co-operation,366 as 
the basis for the way the Union operates. 
3M Bulmer and Jeffery, 2000, pp. 134-135. 
366 Draft Constitutional Treaty of the European Union and related documents, submitted by Mr Peter 
Hain, Member of the Convention, Brussels, 15 October 2002, page 22, article 7. 
http://register.consilium.eu.intlpdflenl02/cvOO/00345-rlen2.pdf. 
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It also sets out economic and social progress, the fight against discrimination, 
environmental protection, protection of its citizens, creation of an area of freedom and 
the external representation of the Community on the global stage as part of a CFSp367. 
The Union level should have exclusive competences in the areas of commercial 
policy, fisheries and monetary policy within the eurozone and coordinating 
competences in a number of other areas, including economic and employment policy, 
where it would not legislate, but only help to coordinate national policies between the 
member states. In most of the other areas, member states and the Union would share 
competences. 368. 
In terms of the distribution of powers between the institutions, the British draft 
constitutional treaty clearly designates the Council as the general pacesetter of 
progress in the Union, under whose agenda all the other institutions would have to 
subordinate themselves: 
'Under the guidance of its President, the European Council shall provide the Union 
with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political 
guidelines of the Union. It shall establish a programme of policy objectives to be 
achieved by the Union. The programme shall be implemented by the other institutions 
of the Union in accordance with their respective powers. ,369 
The European Parliament's rights of participation in the legislative process of the 
Union would be strengthened under the British draft treaty, as the EP would act as co-
legislator to the Council in the area of economic and social policy. Above that, the EP 
would act as the main supervisor of the Commission, through its rights of being able 
to pass a motion of censure against the Commission, as well as regular examinations 
of individual Commissioners and the participation in the appointment of the 
C ., 'd t 370 ommlsslOn presl en. 
367 Ibid, article 4, p.16. 
368 Ibid, pp. 27-28 and p. 30, article 11. 
369 Ibid, p. 36, article 16. 
370 Ibid, p.37, article 17. 
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In tenns of the Commission itself, the British government would prefer to leave things 
basically unchanged, with the Commission being strengthened in its present role as 
the guardian of the acquis communautaire of the Union. Any further powers for the 
Commission are not foreseen in the British draft constitution37 ). The definition of the 
role of the Commission in a refonned institutional framework of the EU is therefore 
the main disagreement in the present debate on institutional refonn. As a result, the 
British and the Gennan government basically pursue two different structural models 
for the EU. Both sides agree that the EU does not have state character and can 
therefore not be refonned along the lines of any national political system. They also 
strongly support the refonn of the Council in order to make sure that it continues to 
secure a strong intergovernmental basis for the EU, through which member states 
governments maintain their influence on the key decisions in the Community. Both 
countries' support for an enhanced influence of national parliaments over the 
decision-making process of the EU stresses the mutual British-Gennan focus on the 
importance of the national level of decision-making within the EU. The difference in 
the two countries' models for the future of the EU lies in the question how to refonn it 
institutionally in order to reconnect the EU with its citizens, an issue which lies at the 
heart of both British and Gennan support for fundamental refonn. 
The German side in this respect favours the model in which the Commission president 
should be elected by the European Parliament, the only institution whose members 
have been directly elected by the people of Europe. This position has now officially 
been adopted as the Gennan government's position in the refonn debate. In his first 
official statement to the Bundestag after his re-election as Chancellor, Gerhard 
Schroder confinned that his government wanted to see the election of the Commission 
president by the EP included in the Constitution: 
'It has to include the creation of a strong and also politically responsible 
Commission, whose president is to be elected by a strengthened European 
Parliament' 372 
371 Ibid, pp. 39-40, article 19 and commentary. 
372 Regierungserklarung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 29 
Oktober 2002, Berlin, hru>:llwww.bundeskanzler.de/Regierungserklaerung-
.8561.446416/Regierungserklaerung-von-Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-S ... htm. 
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The government's position on this issue is also strongly supported by the CDU/CSU 
opposition, which stressed in its November 2001 joint proposals for a constitutional 
treaty that it wanted to see the Commission be developed into a strong European 
executive: 
'The politically responsible executive is the Commission. The Commission 
president is directly elected by the Parliament with the consent of the Council. The 
Commission he puts together, needs the consent of the Parliament and the 
Council' 373 
The British government is completely opposed to this model, as it fears that this 
would fundamentally endanger the role of Commission as the independent guardian 
of the treaties, which is controlled in equal terms by the Council and the European 
Parliament. 
The British Prime Minister emphasised this point in his latest speech on European 
reform in Cardiff, when he warned that the election of the Commission president by 
the EP would turn into a partisan election campaign, which would endanger the 
political independence of the president's post: 
'We must avoid at all costs turning the election of its President into a partisan 
wrangle, or allowing the Commission to become a prisoner of the Parliamentary 
majority. We cannot simply see the Commission as an executive accountable to the 
Parliament. The Commission also has a crucial partnership with the Council which 
we must not weaken, and a vital independence which we must protect. ,374 
373 Vorschlage von CDU und CSU fur einen Verfassungsvertrag vorgelegt von der CDUlCSU 
Arbeitsgruppe 'Europaischer Verfassungsvertrag' unter der Leitung von Dr. Wolfgang Schauble, MdB, 
Bundesminister a.D. und Reinhold Boc/det, Bayerischer Staalsminister fUr Bundes- und 
Europaangelegenheiten, Berlin, 21 November 2001, p. 11, http://www.cdu.de/presse/archiv-
2002/europa-verfassungsvertrag.pdf. 
374 'A clear course for Europe', Speech by the Prime Minister to an audience in Cardiff, 28 November 
2002, www.number-10.gov.uklprintlpage6710.asp. 
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The concern of a partisan campaign is not shared in Germany, where election of the 
federal president (Bundespriisident) is usually a very partisan affair, in which each of 
the main political parties put forwards candidates for the Bundesversammlung, an 
assembly to which all parties send a certain number of delegates for the purpose of the 
president's election375. 
In Britain, the election of the Commission president through the European Parliament 
is even opposed by fundamentally pro-European politicians amongst the opposition, 
like Nick Clegg, MEP and Trade and Industry spokesman for Liberal Democrats in 
the European Parliament. In a telephone conversation I had with Mr Clegg in March 
2002, he told me that he was personally not in favour of the idea, as 'it would paralyse 
the deliberate political ambiguity of the European Commission, which is partly an 
executive administration and partly a political body,376. 
The opposition towards the German model in the UK is thus unlikely to be overcome. 
Britain's model for the reconnection between the EU and its citizens is to create a 
permanent president of the European Council, who would be elected by the heads of 
the member state governments. As Peter Hain has made clear to the House of 
Commons European Scrutiny Committee, the British government sees this model as 
the only way to achieve greater accountability within the EU: 
'The other model, which is one we favour, is that you have a much clearer chain of 
accountability, with the European Council reconfigured and reformed in such a 
way that you have an elected president of the European Council who is a full-time 
figure rather than rotating every six months, as is the present situation, who is 
elected by elected heads of government, those heads of government themselves 
elected and answerable to their national parliaments and thereby to voters. That is a 
chain of accountability much more readily understood by the average citizen. If 
you then introduce greater transparency into the Council's decisions then I think 
m German CSV MEP and vice-president of the European Parliament, logo Friedrich, told me that he 
favours a full-scale election campaign for the election of the Commission president during each 
election for the EP. Parties taking part in the European Parliament elections should therefore nominate 
candidates for the Commission president (possibly MEPs), whom they would later support if they gain 
the majority in the EP. (Interview with Or Ingo Friedrich, Gunzenhausen, Germany, 31 March 2001). 
376 Telephone interview with Nick Clegg, Liberal Democrat MEP, 21 March 2002. 
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you get a much clearer picture for the average citizen and a better connection to 
what is going on in Europe,377 
The British side will therefore remain focused on strengthening the Council as the 
main institution of legitimacy in the EU, and will oppose any moves towards 
fundamentally changing the present division of power within the Community 
framework378. The other disagreement between Britain and Germany in this respect is 
the extent to which the use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) should be extended. 
Although both countries are generally in favour of the greater use of QMV in the 
Council, Britain still wants to retain some crucial 'red line' areas379 for member states, 
where unanimity should prevail. Germany has moved to a position where it now 
wants a general move towards QMV in the Council, which would include the general 
use of QMV in the Common Foreign and Security Pillar380. For the British 
government this is unacceptable. Although it now favours the extension of QMV to 
asylum and immigration as part of the move towards a common European asylum and 
immigration pOlicy381, a general reluctance to transfer all major policy areas to 
decision-making by QMV is rejected. 
377 Uncorrected evidence presented by Rt Hon Peter Hain, Government Representative on the 
Convention on the Future of Europe, Mr Nick Baird, Head of European Union department (internal), 
Ms Sarah Lyons, Private Secretary to the Government Representative on the Convention on the Future 
of Europe, European Scrutiny Committee, House of Commons, 20 November 2002, question 25, 
http://www.publications.parliament.ukJpalcm200203/cmselect!cmeuleglucI03/ucI0301.htm 
378 In his Cardiff speech, the Prime Minister called for the preservation of the present institutional 
setting in its basic form: 'We should not sanction any dramatic departures from the Community model 
as we know it' (' A clear course for Europe', Speech by the Prime Minister to an audience in Cardiff, 28 
November 2002, www.number-IO.gov.ukJprint/page6710.asp.). 
379 Tony Blair named taxes as the definite 'red line' for the British government in his Cardiff speech 
(('A clear course for Europe', Speech by the Prime Minister to an audience in Cardiff, 28 November 
2002, www.number-IO.gov.ukJprint!page6710.asp). 
380 See SPD-B90/GrUne coalition agreement 2002, p. 78: 'In the area of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), decision should in principle be reached by Qualified Majority Voting', 'Erneuerung, 
Gerechtigkeit, Nachhaltigkeit - Fiir ein wirtschaftliches starkes, soziales und okologisches 
Deutschland. Fiir eine lebendige Demokratie', Koalitionsvertrag SPD-BUndnis90/Gtilne, 16 October 
2002. 
381 See 'Jack Straw: A constitution for Europe', The Economist, 10 October 2002. 
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In an examination by the European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons in 
March 2002, Foreign secretary Jack Straw pointed out that the British government 
would see CFSP as a definite no-go area for QMV, but would, apart from that, remain 
basically open to any future moves towards QMV in other areas, if it was in the 
British national interest. This could include border controls, which, at least for now, 
the British government wants to retain under its own national control: 
'If you are asking me am I going to say to you now that whatever the arguments 
put forward by the Convention, and whatever the change in circumstances, we 
regard the current position on QMV and unanimity as fixed in concrete, the answer 
is no because I do not believe that would be in the interests of the British people 
( ... ). What we have said and what I have said in my speech is that where key 
national interests apply that is the test. The most obvious one is defence and linked 
into that foreign policy. We do on many areas at the moment, and this was decided 
by the Conservative Government 30 years ago (not all of them) in respect of 
taxation, ditto social security. Do you close your ears and your eyes to future 
arguments? No. ,382 
Especially because of the generally open attitude of the British government towards 
future developments with regard to the deepening of integration, the scope for British-
German co-operation on institutional reform is bigger than ever before. In spite of the 
differences in both countries' domestic constitutional tradition, British and German 
leaders share a fundamental concern about the lack of transparency and democratic 
legitimacy of the EU's institutional framework. The British-German commitment to 
reconnect the EU with its citizens is certainly based on two distinguished domestic 
state structures and political cultures. In the British case, a rather centralised state 
framework, based on the rule of law and an unbroken tradition of the gradual 
development of costums, checks and balances, rather than a single written 
constitution. 
382 Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, The Rt Hon 
Jack Straw MP, Peter Ricketts CMG and Mr Kim Darroch CMG, 13 March 2002, questions 17 and 19, 
www.publications.parliament.uk/palcm200102/cmselectlcmfaffl698/2031303.htm. 
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On the German side, a newly created federal state after the total collapse of previous 
state structures during WW2, characterised by a clear division of powers between the 
federal and the regional (Liinder) level, in which the interaction between the different 
levels of the state are clearly determined in the written constitution, the Grundgesetz. 
In this system even the regional units, the Liinder own state character, based on their 
own regional constitutions are represented in a second legislative chamber, the 
Bundesrat, which ensures that the regional level has sufficient influence on the 
passing of federal legislation. (Maunz and Zippelius, 1998, pp. 103-104 and p. 115). 
It is therefore not surprising that two countries with such fundamentally contrasting 
state structures and political systems approach the fundamental questions of 
institutional and procedural reform of the EU from a different point of view. The 
British viewpoint tends to be fundamentally intergovernmentalist, anxious not to 
endanger the crucial position member state governments currently hold within the 
Community'S decision-making process. 
The New Labour government agrees in principle to the greater pooling of sovereignty 
in crucial areas and also wants to strengthen the institutional framework of the EU as 
a whole, in order to achieve greater efficiency in the way EU legislation and policies 
are decided and implemented. In the British context, even a suprisingly pro-
integrationist government like the Blair administration however cannot be expected to 
completely abandon the British tradition of perceiving European integration as a 
process in which strong member states remain fundamentally in control of their 
sovereignty, and decide which national decision-making powers are being pooled on 
the European level. 
As William E. Paterson points out, the context of the traditional British reluctance to 
transfer sovereignty to a supranational level and the lack of experience with regard to 
power-sharing within the British state itself, continue to prevail in the British 
perception of European integration. In the process of devolution in the UK, British 
elites are hence only gradually coming to a better understanding of the point of view 
of states like Germany, which are used to multi-level governance and federalist 
distribution of power between different levels of the state: 
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'British views of German European policy were formed within a state committed 
to ceding the minimum possible external sovereignty and where "the crown in 
Parliament", that singular combination of executive and legislative authority 
brooked no check on its unbridled supremacy. The electoral system produced 
single party governments who had no experience of the coalition governance 
which forms the background for much of the EU's negotiating and governance 
style.' (Paterson, 2002, p.30) 
The same is true for the German side, where elites have been politically socialised in a 
state environment, where power-sharing between various levels is part of the daily 
agenda of decision-making. Based on the domestic experience, German elites 
therefore tend to favour federal structures, as they consider them to be an effective 
way to take into account the various interests which exist on the supranational, 
national and regional level. 
In this respect, the differences in the German and the British approach towards 
institutional reform provide a sensible counterweight against the danger that the 
discussion on the future of Europe might tilt too much towards a fully 
intergovernmental or federal direction. While Britain acts as the guardian of the 
member state influence in the EU383, Germany dares to put forward a more visionary 
approach on how far the integration process could advance towards further 
supranationalisation384. 
383 The British Prime Minister stresses that Britain is supported by the majority of member states in its 
opposition to the development of the EU into 'some federal superstate' ('A clear course for Europe', 
Speech by the Prime Minister to an audience in Cardiff, 28 November 2002, www.number-
I 0.gov.ukIprintlpage67I O.asp.). 
384 Chancellor SchrMer makes clear that he thinks that some form of federal structure for the EU will 
be inevitable, although he stresses that this does not necessarily mean that the EU would gain a state 
structure along the lines of Germany: 'Europe will probably - in whatever form - be organised in a 
federal way. In this respect, one does not necessarily have to think of the German model. But that it 
will be some form of federal Europe, is obvious' (Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder vor dem 
Frankl'eich-Zentrum der Alberl-Ludwigs-Universiliit Freiburg, 12 April 2002, 
http://www.bundeskanzler.delReden-. 7715.65027IRede-von-Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-Schroeder-zum-
The ... htm.). 
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If both countries respect each other's state tradition and try to come to an 
understanding of each other's point of view without falling back on the old prejudices 
(the Germans accusing the British of being anti-European and the British accusing the 
Germans of wanting to force the whole of Europe into a superstate along the lines of 
the German model), the perspectives for British-German co-operation on institutional 
reform will be positive. 
German elites do not want to turn the EU into a federal superstate. Their aim is to 
introduce federal elements to the Community structure, in order to achieve a more 
transparent and efficient distribution of powers between the Community, national and 
regional level, based on the German state tradition of strict subsidiarity between the 
higher and the lower levels (federal government, Lander and regions). The strong 
support for a written EU constitution, including a binding Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, stems from the positive experience Germany has with its written basic law, 
the Grundgesetz. Although it often slows down the decision-making processes and 
makes them more difficult than in more centralised states, it ensures that the interests 
and opinions of all the levels, which are affected by federal legislation, are taken into 
account before a final decision is reached. 
The British, on the other hand, are not anti-integrationist but, based on their tradition 
of intergovernmentalist power-sharing, rightly analyse any proposals which will lead 
to the deepening of integration and the supranationalisation of decision-making with 
caution and emphasise possible shortcomings. Consequently, if these two countries 
were able to form a strong working relationship on institutional reform in the 
Convention on the Future of Europe, and attempted to come to a coordinated 
approach at the 2004 IGC, where the crucial decisions on institutional reform will be 
made, a far more effective institutional framework for the EU could be achieved. 
Even if British and German leaders would fail to do so, it is obvious that the two 
countries will find much agreement on the reform of the EU Council as the crucial 
decision-maker within the Community. 
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In contrast to the prevalent perception, the differences in British and German 
approaches on institutional and procedural reform are not fundamental enough to 
prevent the two countries from co-operating effectively towards trying to achieve a 
fundamentally reformed institutional framework for an EU of 25 member states or 
more. As both countries are the strongest advocates of the enlargement process among 
the larger member states, their interest in the reform of the Community structure is 
genuine and important for the final outcome of the debate on the future of Europe. 
This is recognised by both sides and will hopefully be the basis for a successful 
outcome of the pre-enlargement reform debate. 
4.2. E(:onomi(: and Monetary Union 
Regarding possible enhanced co-operation between Britain and Germany in the EU, 
the Single European Currency is a crucial issue. The UK's decision not to join the 
group of 12 countries, which have abandoned their national currencies and introduced 
the euro as legal tender on January 1st 2002, certainly has wide implications in terms 
of the British influence within the EU. Although Britain has become an active and 
engaged EU member state under New Labour, the fact remains that the UK is yet still 
not part of a project, which apart from imminent enlargement towards Central and 
Eastern Europe, is the crucial integration project the EU has achieved during the last 
ten years. Because the British government has committed itself to holding a public 
referendum on membership of the eurozone, the persistent scepticism towards the 
euro in large sections of the British elites, the media and the public has made it more 
unlikely that Britain will be able to introduce the euro in the foreseeable future. 
This poses a major dilemma for the British endeavour to take on a leadership role 
within the EU. Outside the eurozone, Britain will not be able to exercise the influence 
on crucial decisions for economic and fiscal policy-making that it would have had, if 
it had introduced the euro. As Heather Grabbe and Wolf gang Milnchau point out in 
their assessment of present British-German relations in the EU, 
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'The euro has begun to transform the dynamics of EU policy-making. It will create 
a hard core of member-states, whose economies are increasingly integrated and 
whose destinies are intertwined C ••. ). If one member-state is not fully involved in all 
areas, it has fewer means of influencing other countries. It cannot be in the inner 
circle of policy-making' (Grabbe and MUnchau, 2002, p.39) 
It would therefore be a self-deception on the part of the British leaders, if they would 
assume that they could play the decisive leadership role in the EU they apparently 
desire, without taking their country into the eurozone. The problematic aspect of the 
decision whether or not to join EMU in this respect is an obvious contradiction 
between the official government line, and the actual domestic debate about the issue 
in the UK. While the government argues that the decision will be made solely on the 
basis of strict economic convergence between the British economy and those of the 
eurozone, the public debate in Britain focuses far more on the political and 
constitutional implications of euro membership. 
The Eurosceptic argument put forward by some of the British elite and media, 
especially the tabloid press, strongly emphasises the implications membership of the 
euro would have on British sovereignty. Conservative Eurosceptic MP and former 
leadership contender John Redwood is one of the strongest campaigners against 
Britain joining the single European currency. Like most Eurosceptics, Redwood 
stresses the constitutional and consequently political implications of British 
membership of EMU. When I asked him about his position on the Euro in a telephone 
interview in February 2001, Redwood confirmed his view that he could foresee no 
circumstances at all in which he could ever support British membership of the 
eurozone. The main reason he gave for this fundamental opposition towards the single 
currency were constitutional barriers. Redwood stressed that as an independent 
country, Britain would have to keep in control of its own currencl85 • 
For him, like for most opponents of the euro in Britain, the political implications of 
the irreversible loss of national monetary sovereignty to the European level, are much 
more important than any economic arguments in favour of joining EMU. 
385 Telephone interview with John Redwood MP, 7 February 2001. 
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The criticism of the euro project is hence mainly directed towards the alleged lack of 
democratic accountability of the European Central Bank: 
'A nation has its own bank account and its own currency. The country's elected 
government decides on the movements into and out of the account. Foreign 
exchange reserves of the country are under the direction of the central bank, which 
is in turn under the direction of the central government and elected parliament ( ... ). 
Based upon a misunderstanding of how the German system worked in the post-war 
period, the European Central Bank has sole charge over interest rates, the stock of 
money, and the general conduct of monetary policy. The body is directed by a 
group of board members of the Central Bank governing body who are appointed 
for long single terms, who are not answerable to any elected parliament, and who 
are effectively in place for the duration however they perform or behave.' 
(Redwood, 2001, pp. 88-90) 
One may wonder if this criticism of the 'lack of accountability' of the ECB is fair, 
regarding the fact that the Bank of England has also been made independent by the 
New Labour government in 1997, and has now sole control over British interest rates. 
For Eurosceptics, this objection is countered by the claim that within a nation state, 
even an independent national Central Bank will be called to account if it makes grave 
errors of judgement which seriously harm the national economy. This would not be 
the case on the EU level, where democratic accountability is much harder to achieve: 
'If the Bank of England made enough mistakes, bankrupted enough people, or 
drove inflation up too far, there would be a strong democratic pressure to change 
the system. Any sensible government would give in to such pressure.' (lbid, p. 92) 
In contrast to the continental perception of monetary union as an economic project, 
which provides a monetary basis for the completion of a competitive single European 
market, British Eurosceptics therefore assess EMU in terms of the loss of national 
sovereignty. It is stressed that joining the single European currency means the loss of 
a member state's control over its interest rates, which would in the long run lead to 
greater harmonisation in other areas, such as taxation. 
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The euro project is therefore portrayed as the first step towards ever deeper political 
union, in which member states would lose complete control over their national 
economies in the long run. 
This is exactly the point the present Conservative Shadow Chancellor Michael 
Howard, a staunch Eurosceptic, pointed out in a speech in Madrid in July 2002: 
'( ... ) I believe in common with Gerhard Schroeder [sic], that the European single 
currency is but a stepping-stone to a political union. I imagine most of you would 
agree. I believe, in common with Jacques Chirac and Pascal Lamy, that the next 
step for members of the EMU will be genuine fiscal harmonisation. But that, too, is 
deeply unpopular in Britain - so again supporters of Britain's entry find 
themselves in denial ( ... ) transferring the power to decide on interest rates to the 
European Central Bank to do the best it can, setting a single interest rate for all the 
countries in the Eurozone, each with its different circumstances, involves a 
significant loss of national ability to influence the conduct of its economic 
affairs' 386. 
In this respect it is remarkable to note that British Eurosceptics manage to push the 
discussion about the political implications of EMU to the limits of rational debate, 
turning the issue into a choice between maintaining national liberty and independence 
or becoming submerged in a bureaucratic superstate, dominated by French and 
German interests. 
Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stresses in her latest publication that the 
euro would be nothing but a purely political project, gradually depriving the 
participating member states of their sovereignty and forcing them into the artificial 
structure of a European superstate: 
386 'Howard: the European single currency is but a stepping-stone to a political union', July 2002, 
Michael Howard speech on the single currency at a conference in Madrid, 
httj>:1 Iwww.conservatives.com!news/article.cfm?obj id=34439&SPEECHES= I. 
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'The most substantial manifestation of the design to create a fully-fledged 
superstate so far is the European single currency. This project is essentially 
political, rather than economic ( ... ). The power to issue and control one's own 
currency is a fundamental aspect of sovereignty ( ... ) But it is clear, alongside the 
other transfers of power which have taken place and are taking place, our transfer 
to the European Union of the authority to issue currency would move us a long 
way towards losing our sovereignty' (Thatcher, 2002, p. 351 and pp. 382-383). 
The Conservative peer Lord Rees-Moog, who contributes a regular column on the 
latest European developments in The Times newspaper, does not grow tired of 
warning about the real intentions of the European integration process, which would 
intend to deprive member states of their core sovereign powers: 
'The European nations will have lost their independence; they will, in effect, be 
colonies of a centralised European empire, ruled by the Franco-German political 
class ( ... ). The British electorate will have lost the core power of democracy, the 
ability to throw out a failing government ( ... ). The real power, the European centre, 
will never be thrown out. It will be a self-perpetuating bureaucratic oligarchy,387 
After two successive electoral defeats at general elections in 1997 and 2001, the 
Conservative Party is currently firmly in the hands of a staunch Eurosceptic 
leadership, which has gone as far as to rule out membership of the euro for good388. 
The main opposition party is therefore officially firmly on the line of the Eurosceptic 
political argument, which tries to give priority to the political disadvantages of EMU 
membership rather than to engage in a serious debate about the economic 
implications. 
387 'William Rees-Mogg: The ultimate betrayal, no questions asked', 9 December 2002. 
388 Tory leader lan Duncan Smith has made clear that under his leadership, a Conservative government 
would rule out joining the Euro for the long term: '( ... ) Joining the euro means giving away the ability 
to control our own economy ( ... ) I believe it is simply not in our long-term economic interest to enter 
the Euro' ('Duncan Smith: The Iron Chancellor has got fatigue', Speech to the Confederation of British 
Industry, 2 December 2002, 
hm>:llwww.conservatives.comlnewsiarticle.cfm?obj id=46756&SPEECHES= I ). 
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Under these circumstances it is at least debateable, if it is WIse for the British 
government to focus mainly on the economic conditions for joining the eurozone 
rather than to engage in a fundamental public debate on the political benefits of EMU 
membership for the UK. Although the economic aspects are very important in order 
to ensure that membership will not affect the British economy in a negative way, it is 
doubtful if the British public can be won over by the economic argument only. 
Its seems that the constitutional arguments of the Eurosceptics have a far too profound 
effect on British public opinion to allow the government to neglect the political side 
of the argument for the euro. In an excellent analysis of the 1975 referendum 
campaign on British EC membership and its conclusions for a euro referendum by 
Robert M. Worcester, Leonard and Leonard emphasise in the foreword that the 
government and the supporting pro-euro interest groups will not win a referendum if 
they continue to concentrate on the economic arguments: 
'They risk losing their way by relying on a traditional case that no longer connects. 
There are limits to how far the pro-Europeans can campaign on fears about the 
possible loss of inward-investment or the impact of a high pound on manufacturing 
- even after BMW's sale of Rover. Because people rate the Government's 
handling of the economy they do not believe the apocalyptic scare stories about 
Britain's economic fragility.' (Leonard and Leonard, 2000, xii) 
Worcester himself underlines that political leadership will be essential in order to 
counter the scaremongering of the Eurosceptics and to convince the British public 
which is, at present largely sceptical British public, to vote for the euro in a 
referendum: 
'What will be needed to win this debate is political leadership. Not by politicians 
blindly following the polls or focus groups, not worrying about the editorials in 
'opinion-forming' broadsheet newspapers, or headlines in the red tops, but old-
fashioned political leadership from the top by the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, 
convinced politicians, business leaders, academic and journalistic pundits and 
commentators and others in the 'chattering class', leading and speaking with the 
same conviction and commitment shown by the anti-Europeans and Euro-Sceptics 
who, at the moment, are running rings around those who believe, along with 
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successive American governments, that Britain's role in the world of the 21st 
Century is "at the heart of Europe". ' (Worcester, 2000, p.7). 
The Blair government currently continues to argue for EMU membership mainly on 
economic grounds. When New Labour came into power in 1997, the new government 
stressed it saw no constitutional barriers which in principle would stand against 
British membership of the eurozone. The economic aspects of EMU membership 
were thus given clear priority, as explained by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his 
first statement on the single currency to the House of Commons in October 1997: 
'The potential benefits for Britain of a successful single currency are obvious: in 
terms of trade, transparency of costs and currency stability ( ... ) if it works 
economically, it is, in our view, worth doing ( ... ). If a single currency would be 
good for British jobs, business and future prosperity, it is right, in principle, to join. 
The constitutional issue is a factor in the decision, but it is not an over-riding one 
{ .... }. So we conclude that the determining factor as to whether Britain joins a 
single currency is the national economic interest and whether the economic case 
for doing so is clear and unambiguous,389 
This 'clear and unambiguous' economic case for or against the euro would have to be 
decided by five economic tests, which the Chancellor named in his October 1997 
statement as: sustainable cyclical convergence between the UK and the eurozone 
economies, sufficient flexibility of the British economy to cope with the changes 
caused by introducing the euro, effects on investment in the UK, the impact on 
financial services and finally, the effects on the British job markee90. 
389 Statement on Economic and Monetary Union by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 27 October 1997, 
http://www.hmtreaswy.gov.ukINewsroom and Speeches/speeches/statementlspeech statement 27109 
7.cfm? 
390 Ibid. 
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Already in October 1997, the government also decided to start working on the 
'detailed transition arrangements for the possible introduction of the Euro in 
Britain,391 in order to be prepared for close co-operation with and possible entry into 
the eurozone at a later date. The Treasury therefore has released regular reports on the 
state of the preparations for possible changeover from the pound to the Euro in the 
UK392, and also a recent summary of reports by private organisations in Britain on 
conclusions from the changeover from national currencies to the euro in participating 
countries393. The outcome of the assessment of the five economic tests will be 
announced by mid-2003394. The Chancellor has pointed out in his speech at the 
Mansion House in June 2001 that before the assessment could be made 'necessary 
preliminary work for our analysis - technical work that is necessary to allow us to 
undertake the assessment' will have to be be undertaken395. 
The assessment of the five economic tests was put in concrete form in a paper for the 
Treasury committee in September 2002. In the paper, the Treasury re confirmed its 
point of view that possible British entry into the eurozone would be based on 
economic criteria only: 
'The determining factor underpinning any Government decision is the national 
economic interest and whether the economic case is clear and unarnbiguous,396 
391 Ibid. 
392 See the latest 6th report on the state of the Euro preparations, July 2002, 
http://www.euro.gov.uklprep reports.asp. 
393 HM Treasury, 'Lessons from the Changeover in the Euro Area: a Summary of Reports by Private 
Sector Organisations in the UK', July 2002, http://www.euro.gov.ukIprep reports.asp. 
394 The paper on the Treasury's approach to the five tests states that 'a comprehensive and rigorous 
assessment of the five tests will be made within two years of the start of this Parliament' (Paper for the 
Treasury Committee on the Treasury's approach to the preliminary and technical work', 6 September 
2002, pp. 1-2, www.hm-treasury.gov.uklDocuments/TheEuro/euroselcom0509.cfin?). 
395 Chancellor'S speech at the Mansion House, 20 June 2001, http://www.hm-
treasurv.gov.uk/Newsroom and SpeecheslPress/2001/press 69 0 l.cfm? 
396 Paper for the Treasury Committee on the Treasury's approach to the preliminary and technical 
work', 6 September 2002, pp. 1, 
www.hm-treasury.gov.ukIDocuments/TheEuro/euroselcom0509.cfin. 
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The paper explains the details of each of the five economic tests and emphasises that 
there will be further additional studies undertaken for each of the tests. The test on the 
convergence between the British economy and those of the members of the eurozone, 
will be supported on a comparative analysis on monetary transmission mechanisms, 
housing markets, factors influencing differences in national business cycles and 
different approaches to sustainable exchange rates. Moreover, it will concentrate on 
trade and investment linkages, the sectoral composition of output and general 
structural differences between the UK economy and those of the eurozone 
countries397• The test on the degree of flexibility between the UK economy and the 
eurozone will include an assessment of the British labour market in terms of the 
mobility of labour and changes in wages and prices, the response of the British 
economy to economic shocks and the role of fiscal policy in stabilising the 
economl98• The test on how the introduction of the euro would affect investment in 
the VK will be extended to studies on the impact on the cost of capital and possible 
relocation of manufacturing and service sector businesses399• The fourth test on the 
financial services will include a study on factors that lead to the aggravation of 
financial sectors in certain areas, including the changes in the eurozone countries 
since the introduction of the single currency400. The fifth and final test, assessing the 
impact of euro membership on the long-term performance of the economy and the job 
sector in Britain will also look at impacts on external trade inside and outside the euro 
area, experiences from the creation of the V.S. dollar as a national currency in the 
United States and the adequacy of current stability policies (including the euro 
stability pact) in terms of providing economic stability. An additional assessment of 
the impact of EMU on prices will also be undertaken, an issue which will be 
important in order to counter the fears of British costumers with regard to rising 
inflation in the eurozone.401 
397 Ibid, pp. 3-4. 
398 Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
399 Ibid, pp. 6-7. 
400 Ibid, p. 8. 
401 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
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The British government hence considers the assessment of the economic implications 
of membership of the eurozone as the defining criteria, which will decide if the 
government recommends entering EMU. Only if the outcome of the assessment of the 
five economic tests in 2003 is positive, will the government recommend membership 
of the eurozone to the British people. The basis for any future political debate on the 
benefits of EMU membership for the UK will therefore only be made on the basis of a 
clear economic case for joining. The Chancellor underlined this stance in his latest 
speech at the Mansion House: 
'( ... ) I reject those who would urge us to join regardless of the assessment of the 
five tests. To join without a proper, full assessment of the five tests could, in my 
view, prejudice our stability, risk repeating past failures of exchange rate 
management and could return us to the days of stop-go at the expense of our 
ambitions for high investment, full employment and high and sustained levels of 
growth' 402 
His chief economic advisor at the Treasury, Ed Balls, confirmed the government's 
focus on the economic assessment of the issue in a speech at the 2002 Caimcross 
Lecture. Balls pointed out that the government would avoid the mistakes of previous 
administrations to neglect economic considerations in favour of political goals on a 
crucial decision: 
'The observation I make is not that it is wrong to make commitments - political 
commitments, principled commitments - but that decision requires a proper 
assessment of the long-term economic case and the short-term transition. Getting 
the politics right demands that we get the economics right. So the right conclusion 
is the basis on which the government is proceeding: that it makes sense to commit 
to joining in principle, but the practical decision requires the hard and detailed 
k d · ,403 wor we are omg 
402 Chancellor's speech at the Mansion House, 26 June 2002, 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uklNewsroom and SpeecheslPresS/2002/press 62 02.cfm? 
403 'Why the five economic tests?', Speech by the Chief Economic Adviser to the Treasury, Ed Balls at 
the 2002 cairncross lecture, 4 December 2002, 
http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uklNewsroom and Speeches/speeches/Chief Economic Advisor to the 
Treasury Speeches/cea speech 041202.cfin? 
312 
The Prime Minister, whose political leadership on the issue will be crucial for the 
successful outcome of a referendum campaign, has recently started to focus more on 
the political side of euro entry. A strong advocate of British membership of the eum. 
Blair made it absolutely clear at the Labour Party Conference in October 2002 that the 
government would try to take Britain into the eurozone if the five economic tests were 
met. At the same time he stressed that Britain could only play a full part in the debate 
on the crucial issues facing the EU if it was part of the major Community project of 
EMU: 
'For Britain to help shape this new world, Britain needs to be part of it ( ... ). And in 
Europe, never more so than now ( ... ). That's why the Euro is not just about our 
economy but our destiny. We should join the Euro if the economic tests are met. 
That is clear. But if the tests are passed, we go for it.,404 
British membership of the eurozone would be all the more important at a point, where 
the existing members have initiated a debate about the criteria included in the EMU 
stability pact. 
Especially Germany, which, under the leadership of the Kohl/Waigel administration, 
had insisted on the inclusion of the stability criteria40S into the Maastricht Treaty, at 
present troubled by a declining economy, is now increasingly struggling to keep 
within the limits of the criteria. Germany has so far been the major advocate of the 
criteria and defended the strict criteria as an efficient means to provide economic and 
monetary stability within the eurozone, even in times of economic crisis, as stressed 
by German fmance minister Hans Eichel in May 2002: 
404 'At our best when at our boldest', Speech by Tony Blair, Prime Minister andL Leader of the Labour 
Party, Labour Party conference, Winter Gardens, Blackpool, www.labour.org.ukltbconfspeech. 
405 The convergence criteria which are determined in the EMU stability pact consist of: I. Sustainable 
price performance, based on an inflation rate which does not exceed the performance of the three 
members with the best result by 1.5 %, 2. the national deficit must not exceed 3% of the GDP and 
national public debt in total should not be above 60%, 3. before joining, any aspiring member state's 
national currency must be able to remain within the fluctuation margins of the ERM for two years 
without major difficulties (Tsoukalis, 2000, p. 163). 
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'The cooling of the global economic climate has reached Europe with full force. 
The Euro has prevented things getting worse. Because it has prevented us to 
attempt to overcome the economic crisis at the expense of our partners. The 
coordination of economic and financial policy has worked. ,406 
In the course of 2002 it became increasingly clear, however, that Germany would 
violate the national deficit limit of 3% of its GDP, which has been determined in the 
stability pact. German finance minister Eichel had to admit after the re-election of the 
red-green coalition that Germany would break through the 3% hurdle of the 
Maastricht criteria in terms of its annual new borrowings for 2003407. 
Chancellor Schroder called for greater flexibility in terms of the interpretation of the 
stability pact according to the respective national economic conditions of each 
member state408 • The German government nevertheless had to accept an official 
warning from the European Commission, advising them that the Commission would 
initiate proceedings against Germany, which could lead to a substantial fine409• 
The resulting domestic debate in Germany about the point of the stability criteria 
found support amongst the French elites who had never been at ease with the strict 
limits the stability pact sets to national economic policy for member states. After his 
second election victory in May 2002, French president Jacques Chirac had repeatedly 
refused to follow the European Commission's call to reduce the amount of public 
spending in France in order to reduce the deficit, which is also approaching the 3% 
hurdle41O• 
406 'Der Euro - Bilanz und Ausblick', Rede des Bundesministers der Finanzen im Forum der 
Landsebank Baden-Wiirttemberg, 15 May 2002. 
407 Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 'Deutschland reifJt 3-Prozent-Hiirde', 16 October 2002. 
408 Suddeutsche Zeitung, 'Schroder fordert mehr Flexibi/itiit bei Stabilitiitspakt', 20 October 2002. 
409 The Commissioner for financial and economic affairs, Pedro Solbes, had announced on 13 
November 2002 that the Commission would initiate legal proceedings against Germany, because it 
'would clearly exceed' the 3% hurdle of public debt (,Bundesregierung akzeptiert Defizitverfahren der 
Europiiischen Kommission', German government press release, 13 November 2002, 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/index-.413.449282IBundesregierung-akzeptiert-Def.htm ). 
410 See Financial Times, 'French President refuses to back hard line immigration curbs and wins time to 
control deficit', 24 June 2002. 
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At a bilateral meeting between Schroder and French president Chirac in Paris only a 
day after the Commission had announced the official proceedings against Germany, 
both leaders announced that they had found agreement on a call for a more 'political' 
definition of the stability pact. This would include an individual assessment of the 
political aspects of national economic growth, rather than a fixed one size fits all 
interpretation 411. Both leaders were supported by Commission president Romano 
Prodi, who called the stability pact 'stupid and stiff' in an interview with the French 
newspaper Le Monde and called for 'a more intelligent interpretation' of the 
criteria412. 
Heavily criticised for his economic policy at home, SchrOder was therefore not afraid 
to keep the issue on the agenda. In his inaugural speech after the September 2002 re-
election, Schroder emphasised that his government would not want to abolish or 
weaken the stability pact, but would push towards a more flexible interpretation of its 
criteria: 
'One thing has to be clear: the stability pact itself is not under discussion. What we 
need, however, is a form which adapts to the economic situation. Especially in the 
present situation it has to be possible to let the automatic stabilisers have an effect. 
What is needed is greater flexibility, in order to be able to take counter-measures 
against an economically difficult situation,413. 
German and France reconfirmed their determination for a reform of the interpretation 
of the Stability Pact, during bilateral talks between the French and German finance 
ministers at preparations for a regular meeting of Ecofm. 
411 'TrefJen von Bundeskanzler SchriJder mit Staatsprtisident Chirac', German government press 
release, IS October 2002, http://www.bundesregierung.de/index-.413.443963ffreffen-von-
Bundeskanzler-Schr.htm. 
412 Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 'Romano Prodi: "Der Stabilittitspakl ist dumm und starr" " 17 October 2002. 
413 Regierungserk/arung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, Berlin, 
29 October 2002, http://www.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserklaerung-
.8561.446416IRegierungserklaerung-von-Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-S ... htm. 
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Both countries proposed to enhance the assessment of a member state's economic 
performance in the eurozone by analysing national inflation, employment policy and 
the pensions system on top of the level of public debt and borrowing414. SchrBder 
explained these proposals in an interview with the German weekly paper Die Zeit on 
November 28th 2002: 
'I want to make the corset more flexible, in order to be able to breathe in it. We do 
not want to go away from the stability pact. I am interested in the question: Is there 
actually only the one criteria as the content of this pact and therefore as the content 
of economic policy in Europe, or do we not have to make sure that those other 
criteria - namely the national debt in total, the rate of inflation and the level of 
unemployment - have some influence on the assessment of economic policy in the 
nation states, as it is made by the Commission? I doubt that you would need a 
formal alteration of the pact for that. But it is important to me that one considers 
h · . ,415 suc mterpretatIOns. 
The British government certainly strongly supports such proposals towards a more 
flexible interpretation of the stability pact. The original stability pact is very much a 
German Bundesbank design, focused on monetary stability and leaving little room for 
national economic policy adjustment. In contrast, the Blair government has stressed 
that its relatively successful economic policy is based on sufficient flexibility to react 
to economic disturbances. The British government thus uses a much wider and 
flexible range of criteria for the assessment of its monetary and fiscal policy than the 
EU. As the Chancellor Gordon Brown explained in his autumn 2002 pre-budget 
statement, the UK assesses a variety of criteria, which would be much closer to the 
new demands put forward by French and German leaders: 
'As with monetary policy, so also our fiscal policy is designed to help sustain 
growth at every stage in the economic cycle, with our fiscal rules set for the long 
term and based on deliberately cautious assumptions including for revenues. 
414 The Times, 'Germany and France seek Pact reform', 5 November 2002. 
4IS Interview with Chancellor SchrOder, Die Zeit, 28 November 2002. 
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These assumptions which are independently audited by the National Audit Office 
mean that when stock market values fall we take this fully into account, not just in 
assessments of the current year's stamp duty, capital gains tax revenues and 
corporate tax returns, but build these falls fully into revenue projections for future 
years. And the assumptions include not only a cautious view of tax receipts from 
growth, of oil prices and of the impact of revenue gains from, for example, our 
V AT anti-fraud strategy, but cautious assumptions about unemployment, where we 
claim no social security savings when unemployment is forecast to fall' 416 
The British government would therefore very much welcome changes in the stability 
pact criteria. A more flexible system would make it easier for the government to sell 
EMU to the British public, and would substantially weaken the Eurosceptic argument 
that the UK economy is not suited for membership of EMU. Based on Prodi' s 
comments about the stability pact, the European Commission only recently published 
proposals for a fundamental change to the rules of the stability pact towards greater 
flexibility. The Commission proposals call for a new way of assessing the budgetary 
situation of member states and taking into account the economic cycle a country finds 
itself in: 
'Due account should be taken of the economic cycle when establishing budgetary 
objectives at EU level and when carrying out the surveillance of Member States 
budgetary positions. The 'close to balance or in surplus' requirement of the SGP 
would be defined in underlying terms. This isolates out the impact of the economic 
cycle on budgetary positions. As such, it provides a better picture of the true state 
of public finances in a country, and enables the Commission to carry out a better 
assessment of compliance with budgetary commitments given in the Stability and 
C ,417 onvergence programmes 
416 Chancellor of the Exchequer's pre-budget statement, House of Commons, 27 November 2002, 
http://www.hm-treasury .gov.uklPre _ Budget_ Report/prebud j>br02/prebud j>br02 _ speech.cfm? 
417 'Commission calls for stronger budgetary policy coordination', European Commission press release, 
Brussels, 27 November 2002, 
hm>://europa.eu.intlrapidlstartlcgilguesten.ksh?p action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/02/l74210IRAPID&lg=EN 
&display=. 
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Although it would leave the fundamental criteria of the stability pact unchanged, this 
more flexible interpretation would come very close to the Franco-German demands 
on a new interpretation of the stability pact. Previously, Chancellor Gordon Brown 
had pointed out in an interview with the Financial Times on November 20th 2002 that 
the EU would have to come to a more flexible system for EMU in order to allow 
member states to pursue their national economic counter-measures against global 
economic downturn418 . In this respect, the UK would consequently be an ideal 
partner for Germany (and even France in this case) in the drive towards the reform of 
the stability pact, if it were in the eurozone. Although France and Germany will 
certainly welcome the British calls for a more flexible stability pact, the question in 
this case is in how far the British government is having an influence on detailed 
reform measures as long as it remains outside EMU. It is quite unlikely that as a non-
member of the eurozone, it will be able to have a significant impact on changes in the 
structure or the policies of the project. The decisions on EMU will be made by the 12 
member states of the euro club, and as long as Britain remains outside it will not be 
able to take on a leading role in these discussions. 
Moreover, in spite of the government's commitment to Europe, outside EMU Britain 
is still seen as a not fully engaged EU member state. In contrast to the widespread 
belief among the British political elite that Britain could play a leading role in the EU 
even if it decided to stay outside the eurozone for much longer419, the perception on 
the continent is quite different. As Charles Bremner reported in The Times on 
December 2nd 2002, the renewed co-operation between France and Germany on a 
number of issues, such as the compromise on CAP, are a sign that especially the 
German leaders see Britain as a half-hearted European, because it still has not joined 
the euro: 
418 Interview with Gordon Brown, Financial Times, 20 November 2002. 
419 Labour MP Gisela Stuart told me that she believed that Britain 'would be a leading player in the 
European Union as long as the economy remains alright C ... ) provided that these engines are occuring 
and producing, then you are a political player' (Interview in at the House of Commons, 25 July 2002). 
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'However, London's influence has waned as Mr Blair's support for Washington 
has grown and amid signs that Britain will stay out of the euro for years,420 
Professor JUrgen Meyer, vice-chairman of the Bundestag EU committee and official 
representative in the Convention on the Future of Europe called for the British 
government to sort out the euro issue as soon as possible, in order to be able to 
profoundly influence the reform agenda in Europe: 
'Entry into the Euro is a very important, almost obligatory precondition. I cannot 
imagine that a country plays a leading role, if it remains outside the door with 
regard to this important question. ,421 
Gary Tidey, who in his role as newly elected leader of the Labour MEPs in the 
European Parliament gets more of a perception of the continental view of Britain's 
European policy, admitted in an interview in March 2002 that, although Britain has 
been leading on a number of issues in the EU, remaining outside the euro would mean 
to gradually lose more and more influence: 
'Ultimately it has to be recognised that in the long run, if you are not in the euro, 
you are not part of the most important discussions ( ... ) The most important 
discussions are taken by the finance ministers and there are times when we are not 
in the room ( ... ) The longer we are out, the more, gradually, we get excluded from 
these main issues ( ... ) The core in the European Union is the euro. It's either that or 
in the end you gradually lose influence,422 
More than any possible economic difficulties regarding the EMU entry into EMU, the 
government will thus have to be most concerned about the long-term political 
implications should it not be able to convince the British public of the case for the 
euro. If the British government genuinely seeks a leadership role besides France and 
Germany in the EU, it will have to be part of the crucial project of EMU. 
420 The Times, 'Paris and Berlin renew marriage of convenience', 2 December 2002. 
421 Interview with Professor JUrgen Meyer, SPD Party conference, Nuremberg, 20 November 2001. 
422 Interview with Gary Titley, MEP, Manchester, I March 2002. 
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Issue-related short-term leadership will still be possible for the UK, but a profound 
impact on crucial, especially economic issues for the long term can only be achieved 
inside the eurozone. 
As Mark Leonard argued in the Observer on November 3rd 2002, close personal 
relationships between the British Prime Minister and other EU leaders will in the long 
term not be good enough, if Britain decides to remain a second-class member state: 
'Advisers in Downing Street glow with pride as they tell you that Blair has a closer 
relationship with all the key players in Europe than any other leader: who else can 
claim to be best friends with Aznar, Ahem, Schroeder, and even the Poles ( ... ) But 
the fact that Britain is not in the euro means that Prime Minister [sic] cannot cash 
in his chips for leadership. This has been apparent in the proceedings of the 
Convention on the future of Europe. Peter Hain has played a constructive role and 
won many of the arguments on the detail - but the mood music coming out of 
Brussels still sounds like the old elitist tunes ( ... ) All this could be reversed if Blair 
lives up to what he has often called his "historic mission".,423 
The latest warning call came from the Portugese Prime Minister Jose Durapo Barroso, 
who warned Blair that Britain could not expect to have the right to lead on the major 
issues within the EU, if it decided to take part in the most important project of the 
Community: 
'If the UK does not share the duties of membership in the euro, [it] cannot have the 
right to lead in defence, where traditionally Britain has a very important profile on 
the institutional debate ,424 
The outcome of the economic assessment of the five tests for EMU entry and a 
possible referendum afterwards will consequently mark important milestones in 
Britain's future role in Europe. 
423 The Observer, 'The price we pay for staying out', 3 November 2002. 
424 The Times, 'Strike-hit Portugal gives BIair euro alert', 11 December 2002. 
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If the alleged media reports about an increasing private disagreement between the 
Prime Minister and the Chancellor on the issue are true 425, a decision on the issue in 
this parliament is unlikely. This would seriously undermine British leadership 
ambitions in the EU and would especially prevent Britain and Germany from being 
able to co-operate effectively on making a success of the eurozone. British entry into 
the eurozone would fundamentally change the present conditions under which the UK 
government can develop its European policy and would also reshift the power balance 
within the EU. 
It would turn Britain into a whole-hearted EU member state and would therefore 
ensure that Britain has an influence in all areas of EU policy-making. Inside the 
eurozone, Britain would certainly become the reliable working partner Germany longs 
for on a number of issues, where the disagreements with France are reluctantly swept 
under the carpet, mainly because of a lack of alternatives. 
Heather Grabbe and Wolfgang Miinchau hence rightly emphasise the crucial 
importance of the euro for British-German relations and for the EU as a whole: 
'The question of monetary union overshadows many aspects of the relationship 
between the two countries, and it also hangs over the whole British debate about 
European integration. The Germans feel they cannot rely on the British because a 
new twist in the domestic wrangle over the euro can cause a sudden weakening in 
the British commitment to other European initiatives ( ... ). If the UK were in the 
monetary union, it would have as much to offer Germany as France does. The 
UK's decision is thus a vital interest for Germany because it affects the political 
dynamics of the EU as a whole.' (Grabbe and Miinchau, 2002, p. 37 and p. 41). 
m See e.g. Andrew RawnsJey in the Observer, who reports that Blair and Brown are increasingly 
divided on the euro issue, with the Chancellor obviously not wanting to risk entry when the eurozone is 
on the brink of recession, which makes a negative assessment of the five tests in 2003 likely (The 
Observer, 'Why Tony didn't laugh at Gordon'sjoke', 1 December 2002). 
See also The Times, 'Treasury doubts on euro widen Blair-Brown gap', 2 December 2002, based on a 
document released by the Treasury as part of the 2002 pre-budget report, which stresses the superiority 
of Britain's fiscal framework over that of the eurozone {'Macroeconomic frameworks in the new global 
economy', November 2002, hm>://www.hm-treasury.gov.uklmediastore/otherfilesladmacro02-
249kb.pdO. 
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4.3. Economic reform and social policies 
Britain and Germany have a lot of common interests in the further liberalisation of the 
EU's single market, as well as co-operation on economic reform among the member 
states. However, like on institutional reform, the two countries approach the issue of 
economic reform from two opposing perspectives, which again relate back to the 
background of domestic political tradition. Germany's proposals on economic reform 
are made from the experience of a national economic system, which is characterised 
by a high level of wages, social security and strong corporatist influence in 
comparison with the rest of Europe. In the so-called Rhineland capitalism, which 
emerged from the West German Bonn republic, where trade unions and employers 
interest groups have traditionally found a relatively smooth way of co-operating with 
one another, economic flexibility is limited and fundamental reform is difficult to 
achieve. 
The focus is very much on the protection of the rights and welfare of employees and 
an adequate participation in the way a business or company is run. In contrast, the 
Anglo-American system of liberal capitalism focuses on high labour flexibility 
through relatively low wages and a minimum of social costs for the employer. Britain 
and Germany thus come from completely opposing strands of the economic spectrum: 
'The "Rhenish" model, found in Switzerland, Germany, the Benelux countries, and 
Japan, rests on the idea that prosperity demands consensus, the pursuit of collective 
success, and concern for the long-term. The "Anglo-Saxon" model, associated with 
the United States of America and the UK, is characterised as being driven by the 
need to provide opportunities for individual success and short-term profit. The two 
models are sometimes contrasted as "organised capitalism" versus "disorganised 
capitalism".' (Meehan, 2000, p. 225) 
Whereas the consensual model of corporate capitalism has been traditionally adhered 
to by all major parties, in Britain the division on economic policies between Labour 
and Conservatives has at times been stark. 
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This was most obvious by the end of the 1970s, when the Conservatives supported 
U.S. style economic liberalisation, then known as 'Reagonomics', whereas the Labour 
Party stood for old style socialist interventionist tax-and-spend economic policies. It 
was only in the early 1990s, when the German economy came under increasing 
pressure due to the burden of reunification that a domestic debate about the state of 
the German structural framework emerged. It had mainly been characterised by two 
opposing camps, who both claimed to have found the right recipe to get the motor of 
the German economy, which used to be Europe's powerhouse, running again. On the 
one side one could find the supporters of Keynes, who argued that the German 
economy needed more public sector investment in order to stimulate demand, lead by 
the former SPD leader and fmance minister Oskar Lafontaine. On the other side stood 
the right wing of the CDU and CSU and especially the free traders within the FDP, 
who made the case for deregulation, cutting of social benefits and labour costs and 
drastic tax cuts. 
As none of the two groups could never fully get their way in the cumbersome political 
and economic framework of Germany, the corporatist model has basically been 
preserved. After the election victory of the SPD and the Greens in 1998, many 
expected that the pendulum would swing towards a more interventionist economic 
and financial policy, especially as Lafontaine had become finance minister. In 
contrast, the German Chancellor himself had initially flirted with a reform of the 
economy more towards the Anglo-Saxon model. The joint Schroder-Blair paper on 
economic reform, which is now almost forgotten and cannot even be found in the 
archives of the SPD's official website, had caused a major stir in Germany and 
especially within the SPD. Based on Schroder's election slogan 'Die neue Mitte', it 
had called for a new third way in European economic policy, based on fundamental 
reforms. The paper had shocked the traditionalists within the SPD, because, although 
it rejected neoliberal 'laisser-faire' capitalism, it had called for an end to further 
increases in public spending and demanded radical reform of the state bureaucracy: 
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'The necessary cut in public expenses demands a radical modernisation of the 
public sector and an increase in performance and a structural reform of public 
administration C ... ) The social security systems have to adapt to the changes in life 
expectancy. family structure and the role ofwomen.,426 
Regardless of Lafontaine's sudden departure from government in March 1999, the 
paper was quickly forgotten and, at least in its first term in office the Schroder 
government has tended to return to the traditional German priorities of social 
inclusion. In spite of Schroder's initial flirtation with Labour's third way, it was clear 
that from the outset. the Chancellor's focus was on economic reform combined with a 
strong social element on the European level. Whilst still in opposition, Schroder had 
already pointed out that. once in government. he wanted to push towards greater 
harmonisation of economic, social and employment policies on the EU level, as 
national measures alone would not be able to improve the state of the German 
economy: 
, A Social democratic government will. in order achieve the long overdue 
watershed on the job market, pursue an active common policy in the EU, serving 
the purpose of the reduction of unemployment. With this goal before us we should 
try to advance the coordination of economic and financial policy together, push 
through basic rules for a fair taxation of business and an effective taxation on 
energy, remove tax and social dumping and therefore press for an alignment of the 
conditions for fair competition amongst the members of the Union,427 
426 'Der Weg nach vorne flir Europas Sozialdemokraten', SchrOder-Blair paper, 8 June 1999, printed 
in: Internationale PolitiJe. S, August 1999, Dokumentation, 
http://www.dgap.orglIP/ip990S/positionspapierOS0799.htm. 
427 Rede des SPD-Kanzlerkandidaten, Gerhard Schroder, vor der Fraktion der Sozialistischen Parteien 
Europas (SPE) im Europdischen Parlament, Strasbourg, 14 July 1995, printed in Internationale 
Politik, 9, September 1995, http://www.dgap.orglIP/ip9S09/redeschroeder14079S.htm. 
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In his first statement to the Bundestag on October 20th 1998, SchrOder emphasised 
that his government wanted to develop the EU into a 'social and environmental 
union', based on the further harmonisation of policies, something which the Kohl 
government had rejected only in June of the same year at the EU's summit in 
Amsterdam: 
'Through change in government in Germany and the new political realities in 
Europe, finally the chance for a European social- and employment policy emerges. 
The battle against unemployment can finally be dealt with as a European question. 
It is no longer a footnote to the decisions of the Council of Ministers, but stands at 
the top of the European agenda ,428 
In the work programme for its first presidency of the EU Council in the first half of 
1999, the red-green government consequently strongly emphasised the importance of 
the EU as a social and environmental union. The coordination of social and 
environmental policies was considered as the basis for a reconnection between the EU 
and its citizens. This should be complemented not through the full harmonisation, but 
through a much closer coordination of national employment policies on the European 
level, based on an EU employment pact: 
'The German presidency is determined to work towards advancing the integration 
process and to develop the European Union into a political union but also into a 
social and environmental union. Only then will it be possible to bring the European 
Union closer to its citizens ( ... ). The German presidency will therefore 
emphatically push towards the realisation of a European employment pact, which 
pursues two goals. First: more employment in the macro-economic context of 
wage, monetary, and employment policy. Secondly: the coordination of national 
measures on employment policy, which was based on a workable basis with the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the decisions of the Luxembourg employment summit'429 
428 Regierungserkltirung von Bundeskanzler Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 10 November 
1998, www.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserkUlrungen-. 7561.5857 5IRegierungserklaerung-von-
Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-SchrMer.htm. 
429 Programm der deutschen EU-Ratsprasidentschaji. 21 December 1998, printed in: Internationaie 
Politik. 6, June 1999, http://www.dgap.orglIP/ip9906/eude211298.htm. 
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Foreign Minister Fischer called for 'a social policy addition' to EMU in terms of the 
fight against unemployment. He called on the EU to pass a European employment 
pact as a basis for the development of a European employment policy: 
, The people in Europe are right to expect that not only the national governments 
act against unemployment, but that the European level also makes its contribution. 
We want clear progress towards an effective employment policy in the European 
Union and to pass a European employment pact at the European Council in 
Cologne,430 
These priorities were confirmed in the detailed programme of the German presidency 
on labour and social affairs. The programme underlined the need to develop a 
common European employment policy, based on an employment pact and stressed 
that Germany would also try to involve the Labour and Social affairs Council more in 
h d .. ak' 431 t e eClSlon-m mg . 
The British New Labour government, as part of its general openness towards further 
deepening of European integration, had made a symbolic step with the signing of the 
Social Chapter after it had come to power. 
This showed that it was no longer as hostile as its Conservative predecessors towards 
the pooling of efforts on economic and social issues on the European level. The 1997 
Labour manifesto had already promised that, as part of a new active role within the 
EU, Britain under Labour would push towards the completion of the Single Market 
and sign the Social Chapter. In contrast to the German perspective, however, the focus 
was very much on making the European economies more competitive on the global 
economic stage and making sure that Britain would have a say on the development of 
EU social policies. 
430 Rede des Bundesministers des Auswartigen Joschka Fischer in 
Nationaiversammiung, Paris, 20 January 1999, 
amt.de/6 archiv/99/r/R990 120a.htm. 
der jranz6sischen 
www.auswaertiges-
431 Objectives and programme of work of the German EU presidency in the 1st half of 1999 in the area 
ofthe Labour and Social Affairs Council, December 1998, www.bma.bund.de/gb/europalziele.htm. 
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Especially in the latter area, New Labour promised not to agree to measures on the 
EU level, which would lead to higher costs of Labour for British business and for the 
British taxpayer: 
'We will open up markets to competition; pursue tough action against unfair state 
aids; and ensure proper enforcement of single market rules. This will strengthen 
Europe's competitiveness and open up new opportunities for British firms ( ... ) 
The Social Chapter is a framework under which legislative measures have been 
agreed ( ... ) The Social Chapter cannot be used to force the harmonisation of social 
security or tax legislation and it does not cost jobs. We will use our participation to 
promote employability, not high social costs. ,432 
The UK priorities for the first British Council presidency under New Labour in the 
first half of 1998 focused on 'creating a more effective single market and improving 
labour market regulation to reduce burdens on business ,433. The government also 
announced that it would 'seek to develop the theme of economic reform, to bring 
excluded groups into the labour market, and to reduce barriers to employment,434. 
With the crucial Lisbon summit on economic reform ahead in March 2000, both the 
German and the British government stressed the need to further liberalise the 
European single market, to enable better access to modem communications 
technology for everyone and to improve funding for trans-European research. 
Blair emphasised in a doorstep interview with the Dutch Prime Minister before the 
start of the Lisbon summit that it would have to manage to provide a basis for the 
modernisation of the EU single market. This would have to be strongly focused on 
making sure that the citizens of Europe would gain from such a reform in terms of 
jobs and social inclusion: 
432 'New Labour - because Britain deserves better', Labour party 1997 general election manifesto, 
p.37. 
433 'UK Presidency of the European Union: Britain's Priorities for the Presidency', 1998, 
http://presid. fco. gOY. uklpriorities. 
434 'UK Presidency of the European Union: Work Programme' 1998, 
ht1;p://presid.fco. gOY. uk/workprogljobsummit.shtml. 
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'C ... ) We both really emphasized both the importance of the summit and the need 
for Europe to take a step forward on both economic reform and how we make sure 
that we develop this new economy in the interests of all our people C ... ) I think the 
idea both of developing a more dynamic European economy and combining that 
with modem measures that deal with the problems of social exclusion and social 
deprivation is absolutely at the heart of today's European project'435 
Earlier, in a speech in Belgium, the Prime Minister had already laid out the UK 
priorities for the Lisbon summit. He stressed that the choice for the reform of the 
European economy would be between 'uncontrolled change forced by the markets, or 
a process of economic reform that delivers both economic dynamism and social 
justice,436. In order to compete with the U.S. economy on the global stage, the EU 
would have to push through economic reforms towards 'a whole new single 
market,437, focused on job creation, market liberalisation, welfare reform, life-long 
learning, and technological change. In terms of common social and economic policies 
on the EU level, Blair called for new legislation on liberalisation of the single market 
and to establish successful national social and employment strategies as EU norms: 
'I also hope that Lisbon will mark a turning point in Europe's approach to 
economic and social policy at the European level. Legislation to push through 
liberalisation, enforced by strong independent institutions. Benchmarking and peer 
review to make best practice the norm in areas where member states have the sole 
or main responsibility, such as social and employment policy,438 
435 Transcrip of doorstep statement given by the Prime Minister, Mr Tony Blair and the Dutch Prime 
Minister, Mr Wim Kok, London, 15 March 2000, www.number-
I O.gov .uklnews.asp?N ewsld=691 &Sectionld=32. 
436 'Committed to Europe, refonning Europe', Prime Minister's speech at the Ghent City Hall, 
Belgium, 23 February 2000, www.number-lO.gov.uklnews.asp?Newsld=579&Sectionld=32. 
437 Ibid. 
438 Ibid. 
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The German government strongly shared the British priorities for Lisbon. Both 
countries pushed towards market liberalisation at Lisbon, closely connected with the 
desire to fight unemployment and to transfer the EU single market into a modem 
knowledge-driven economy, based on modem technology, science and research, and 
the desire to enable all EU citizens to participate and benefit from it. 
Especially the creation of jobs is a crucial matter of concern for Germany, which has 
been troubled by persistent high levels of unemployment (between 3 and 5 million) 
since reunification. Chancellor Schroder hence summed up the decisions reached at 
Lisbon, where the EU had decided to create 20 million new jobs within the single 
market and to increase the EU GDP by 40%439, as a serious commitment of the 
European leaders to transform the former industrial-based economies of the EU into 
modem information technologies: 
'Lisbon has to be understood as a sign of earnestness, to tackle the future 
challenges, namely the change from the old industrial society to an industrial 
society, which is, above all, based on knowledge and which therefore rightly puts 
the information and communication technologies at the centre of an industrial 
policy strategy.'440 
In his official statement to the Bundestag on the outcome of the Lisbon summit, 
Schroder underlined that a consensus among the EU member states could be achieved 
that the Lisbon process will turn the single market into an open economy, which will 
enable all parts of society to participate: 
'A European way into the knowledge and information-driven society exists. This is 
the way towards a society of participation. Therefore away, which the whole 
society will be able to go along with. ,441 
439 See presidency conclusions for the Lisbon European Council, 24 March 2000, 
htt;p:llue.eu.intINewsroomlrelated.asp?BID=76&GRP=2379&LANG=1. 
440 Abschluss-Pressekonferenz von Bundeslcanzler Gerhard Schroder aut dem EuroptJischen Rat in 
Lissabon, 23/24 March 2000, htt;p:I/www.bundeskanzler.de/Findulin-Spiel-.8442.7363/Abschluss-
Pressekonferenz-von-Bundeskanzler-Gerh ... htm. 
441 RegierungserkltJrung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder zu den Ergebnissen der Sondertagung 
des EuroptJischen Rates in Lissabon, 6 April 2000, 
329 
In terms of economic liberalisation, Schroder expressed general support but also 
warned the other EU member states that Germany would not accept that 'grown and 
well-established structures of public existential provision would be put up for 
consideration,442. This was a clear indication that, although the German government 
generally agrees to the necessity to further reduce trade barriers and tariffs within the 
EU's, it would not accept a single market, in which free trade is the ultimate principle. 
The Schroder administration has thus been much more careful to protect national 
industries against outside competition than Britain443. 
At the same time, in spite of its strong urge for radical market liberalisation in the EU, 
the British government showed that there would also be red lines in terms of 
economic and social policy. The Chancellor Gordon Brown welcomed the progress 
made at Lisbon, especially with regard to job creation and market liberalisation but he 
warned that the British government would resist any moves towards tax 
harmonisation in Europe, especially a European withholding tax on the financial 
sector: 
'We should see the billions of trade and the 3 million jobs that come from the 
European single market as only a beginning. Instead of seeing Britain posed 
against Europe, we should see Britain working constructively in Europe to 
complete the single market in energy, telecommunications, the utilities and 
financial services. In this lies more business and more jobs for Britain and Europe 
together Coo.). And it is for the best economic reasons therefore that in Europe we 
will continue to support fair tax competition, and not tax harmonisation. And we 
will continue to argue the case for exchange of information and continue to refuse 
to allow a withholding tax to be imposed on the City of London. ,444 
htt]:/ /www.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserklaerung-.8561. 58570IRegierun gserklaerun g -von-
Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-S ... htm. 
442 Ibid. 
443 The German Chancellor promised the insolvent German building company Holzmann substantial 
government aid in 1999, for which he was criticized by other EU member states and the European 
Commission (Die Welt, 'Schroder driingt Banken zur Holzmann-Rettung', 25 November 1999). 
444 Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the Mansion House, 15 June 2000, htt]://www.hm-
treasury.gov.ukINewsroom and Speeches/Press/2000/press 75 OO.cfm? 
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In contrast to the British position, the SchrOder administration considers closer 
harmonisation of taxes as a necessary step towards achieving a more stable 
framework for investment and job creation in the EU. This was already expressed in 
the official German position paper for the European Council in Stockholm in March 
200 I, where the EU member states had planned to undertake further steps towards 
achieving greater economic and social cohesion within the single market. The paper 
emphasised the need create a secure basis for business through greater tax 
harmonisation as part of the Lisbon liberalisation agenda: 
'The ability to compete and its own economic dynamic are crucial to achieve the 
strategic goal, to turn Europe into the most competitive and knowledge-based 
economic area in the world by 2010. For this, the scope for business in Europe has 
to be enhanced through an improvement of the basic conditions concerning taxes, 
capital markets and the legal framework. Liberalisation and the opening of markets 
have to be accelerated in crucial areas.,445 
The paper named greater coordination of business taxes, EU directives on energy and 
sales tax and on the deductions before tax as concrete steps446. In the area of 
liberalisation, further steps would have to be achieved in the areas of postal services, 
gas and electricity, telecommunications and financial market integration447. The 
paper also explicitly stressed the need to improve framework of the single market 
towards greater harmonisation of the conditions for trans-border investment and 
economic activity448. This was a matter of concern strongly shared by the British 
government. In a joint article published by Tony Blair and the Finnish Prime Minister 
Lipponen, the two leaders called for equal rules for competition amongst businesses 
across the single market in order to strengthen the single market in the global 
economy: 
44S Deutsches Positionspapier for den Europiiischen Rat in Stockholm, 25 March 200 I, p. I, 
www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/ArtikeVix 31948.htrn 
446 Ibid, p.2. 
447 Ibid, p. 3. 
448 Ibid, p. 2. 
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'Too often in the past, Europe has lost its economic advantages to others because 
of an unwillingness to capitalise on its advantages C ... ). But Europe's small firms 
are exactly those least able to cope with poorly thought out, unnecessarily 
burdensome, levels of regulation. For these small firms, as well as more 
established ones, a key requirement is a coherent, well functioning and efficiently 
implemented competition policy. The firms are justified in demanding a level 
playing field: a single market in which the rules of the game are applied equally 
and the referee, i.e. the competition authorities, is strong and impartial. ,449 
Like the German government, the British side therefore put the emphasis for 
Stockholm very much on the reduction of unnecessary tariffs and trade barriers for 
businesses in Europe, as part of the external strengthening of the single market. 
As at Lisbon, the British government led the drive towards economic liberalisation at 
Stockholm within the EU. Although further liberalisation could not be achieved in all 
areas at Stockholm, mainly because of French opposition against liberalisation of 
national energy and transport markets450, progress was made in the areas of financial 
services. The Stockholm Council also decided to establish a European patent, a 
crucial issue for trans-European research and technology development451 • In total, the 
outcome of the summit was disappointing for the British side, as it was hoped that 
opposition to fundamental liberalisation could be overcome452• Prime Minister Blair 
hence stressed the positive results of the summit, but could not fully conceal his 
disappointment that only limited progress had been achieved: 
449 Joint article by Prime Minister Lipponen and Prime Minister Blair, March 2001, www.number-
10.gov.ukldefault.asp?PageId=3658. 
450 Bannermann (2001), CER Bulletin, Issue 17. 
4S1 Stockholm European Council Presidency conclusions, 23/24 March 2001, 
http://ue.eu.intlNewsroorn!related.cfin?NOREFRESH=1&MAX=1&BID=76&GRP=3314&LANG=1. 
452 A few weeks before the Stockholm EU Council, Blair had told the Canadian Parliament in a speech 
that the EU would have the chance to make a fresh start on economic reform at Stockholm and clean up 
the leftovers from the Lisbon agenda: 'The EU is engaged in a radical programme of economic reform. 
We are committed to opening up markets, reducing the burden of regulation and encouraging enterprise 
and new technologies. The forthcoming summit in Stockholm will take this a step further forward.' 
(Speech by the Prime Minister to the Canadian Parliament, 23 February 2001, www.number-
10.gov.uklprintlpage2780.asp). 
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'So while I regret we could not go further at Stockholm, the prospects for 
agreement at European level are good ( ... ) Taken together, these changes are 
further steps along the way to an efficient and competitive economy. ,453 
During the 2001 British general election campaign, Blair emphasised his commitment 
to continue to push forward the agenda of economic reform in the EU in a historic 
second term in office. In a speech on Britain's role in Europe during Labour's second 
term, the Prime Minister promised to 
'continue to take a leading role in setting the agenda in Europe. We will take 
forward the case for further structural reform to make European economies more 
flexible and more dynamic,454 
This was confirmed in the 2001 general election manifesto. The government 
confirmed that in a second term, it would be committed to continue to play the leading 
role on economic reform in the EU. The liberalisation of financial services and 
utilities, further reduction of red tape, enhanced common research, the realisation of 
the European patent and a common European air traffic system were named as the 
areas in which further progress would have to be made455. Overall, the UK would 
work towards a genuine single market for the EU, in which the removal of trade 
barriers enabled it to compete on the global scale: 
'Britain has secured a shift in economic policy in Europe - away from 
harmonisation of rules and towards a system based on dynamic markets allied to 
comparison and promotion of best practice ( ... ). Trade has been a vital source of 
prosperity for Europe's citizens. Our vision is of an open European economy. That 
requires a genuine single market, in an open world trading system. ,456 
453 Stockholm European Council: Prime Minister's Statement to the House of Commons, 26 March 
200 I, www.number-IO.gov.uklnews.asp?NewsId=1941&SectionId=32. 
454 'Britain's role in the Europe and the world of today', 25 May 2001, 
www.labour.org.uklURBANITY.PORC NEWS DlSPLA Y?p rowid=AAAHzjAAFAAAHukAA. 
455 'Ambitions for Britain', Labour general election manifesto 2001, p. 38. 
456 Ibid. 
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At the same time, it was stressed that Britain would not only support EU subsidies for 
national economies, provided that they were based on welfare system modernisation 
and helped to reduce inequality within the single market. Likewise, the national 
control over taxes should remain and the UK would therefore not be up for 
consideration: 
'We support efforts being made across the EU to reform welfare states, modernise 
social partnership and advance social inclusion. EU state aid policy should bear 
down on aids that distort the single market while supporting economic 
modernisation. We will keep the veto on vital matters of national sovereignty, such 
as tax and border controls. ,457 
The German government also continued to focus on the issue of further economic 
reform in the aftermath of Lisbon and Stockholm. For Germany the issue continues to 
be crucial, as it continued to be plagued by economic troubles, which especially 
worsened as part of the global economic downturn which had been affected by the 
events of September 11th 2001. The motion 'Verantwortung fur Europa' on 
Germany's role in Europe for the SPD party conference in Nuremberg in November 
2001, underlined that the European single market would have to be extended by 
ending national protectionist policies in crucial areas: 
'We need to continue to extend the European single market systematically. This 
includes that all member states comply with their duties to open their markets on 
energy, gas, post within the period stipulated, in order to prevent distortions of 
.. ,458 
competltIOn. 
This would however exclude the public financial service sector, which would be 
crucial to maintain support for the majority of the citizens and the subsidy of small 
d d· b' 459 an me lUm usmesses . 
457 Ibid, p. 38. 
458 'Verantwortung for Europa - Deutschland in Europa', SPD leadership motion for the Party 
conference in Nuremberg, http://www.spdde/servletIPB/show/JOJOJ38/beschlussbuchpdf, pp. 43. 
459 Ibid, p. 44. 
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The motion called for a greater harmonisation of taxation in Europe, especially on 
business taxes, taxes on capital gains, energy, V AT and the creation for a common 
capital market as part of a general coordination of employment policies based on an 
EU-wide reform of wages460• As part of a stronger environmental component 
according to the Kyoto protocol, the EU should also consider the harmonisation of 
energy taxation461 . Chancellor Schr<Sder clarified this point in an interview with the 
Spanish newspaper El Pais. In the interview, Schr<sder rejected calls for fully 
harmonised fiscal policies on the EU level, and insisted that the basic competence for 
tax policies would have to remain with the national governments. Instead, especially 
with regard to the taxation of business, the EU member states should try to achieve 
better coordination in order to avoid a distortion of free competition within the single 
market: 
'The full integration of fiscal policies should not however not be our goal. The 
national parliaments have to continue to be responsible for the national budgets. 
Competition between the tax systems of the EU member states will also play a role 
in the future. But this competition has to take place within a framework, which 
secures two things: On the one hand we have to prevent one section of the 
taxpayers from escaping taxation through international mobility. On the other 
hand, the economic potentials of the single market must not be affected ( ... ) The 
behavioural codex for business taxation shall counter the distortion of the choice of 
location in the single market. ,462 
Schr<Sder also repeatedly pointed out the differences between the European social and 
economic model in comparison with other models, such as that of the U.S. or Asian 
countries. The European model would not just promote free trade and profit but 
ensure the participation of the majority of its citizens in the economic process. 
460 Ibid, p. 44. 
461 Ibid, p. 44. and p. 46. 
462 Bundeskanzler Schroder im Interview mit der spanischen Zeitung El Pais, 28 November 2001, 
www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/ArtikeVix_63697_1499.htm. 
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In the debate on the European policy motion at the SPD party conference in 
Nuremberg, Schroder made clear that 
'we see Europe not just as a market, but we want to see very specific political 
ideas, which are in line with our social democratic values, and for which we fight 
in the domestic political arena, realised on the European political level ( ... ). We do 
not see Europe simply as a model, which has shown, how to solve conflicts, but 
also as a model of participation of the broad masses of the working people in 
wealth and decision-making within society. ,463 
The insistence on the preservation of this distinctive model of economic balance 
between the interests of industry and business on the one side and the employees on 
the other side is an issue which Schroder has used prudently during the 2002 German 
general election campaign. By contrasting the socially balanced German model of 
'RheinischerKapitalismus' (,Rhineland capitalism') with the Anglo-Saxon and Asian 
model of free-market liberalism, Schroder managed to portray himself as the defender 
of German social cosiness against radical free market forces. His widely criticised use 
of 'der deutsche Weg' (the German way) to describe the German economic tradition 
of social balance and participation focused strongly on the preservation of high social 
standards: 
'My Germany is not dominated but those, who own big capital. On the contrary, its 
biggest capital are its people. Morality and responsibility of course also apply to 
the economy and the stock exchange. In my Germany, predators belong in a cage, 
not in a wrongly perceived market economy ( ... ). This is our German way. I work 
and fight for this vision. ,464 
463 Rede des SPD-Parteivorsi!zenden, Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder zum Themenbereich AufJen-
und Sicherheitspolitik, SPD-Party conference, Nuremberg, 20 November 2001, http://2001.spd-
parteitag.de/servletIPB/menulI002034/index.html. 
464 'Gerhard Schroder: Meine Vision von Deutschland', 8 August 2002, 
www.spd.de/servletIPB/menuJ1009368/1019636.html. 
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Outside the heat of an election campaign, the German Chancellor usually prefers to 
maintain the linkage between the German economic model and the European level, 
and hence stresses that the broad participation of workers in an open economy is the 
right way forward for the EU. It is nevertheless obvious that the Chancellor insists on 
maintaining the basic framework of the German welfare state: 
'The German welfare state ( ... ) guarantees social security. It promotes the integrity 
of society and it strengthens solidarity. The German, one could also say, the 
European model of participation is one of our trump cards in the global 
competition. ,465 
The German emphasis with regard to European economic reform is consequently 
much more on social cohesion than on liberalisation, which makes it distinctive from 
the British approach, where liberalisation is the main priority. Although it is important 
to keep this essential difference in mind when assessing British and German positions 
on economic reform, it would nevertheless be wrong to assume that, as a result, 
Britain and Germany would not be able to find common ground on economic and 
social reform in the EU. 
The SPD draft motion on Europe at Nuremberg stressed the importance to maintain 
basic social standards, but at the same time also stressed the need to fundamentally 
reform the European economic and social model in order to achieve better job 
prospects for the whole of the Community: 
'We support the modernisation of the European economic and social model. This 
especially includes to make the social security systems fit for the future. ,466 
465 Grundsatzrede des SPD-Parteivorsitzenden, Bundeslcanzler Gerhard Schrode aul dem Parteitag der 
Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands in Nurnberg, 19 November 2001, 
http://de.srd.yahoo.comlS=9167327:WSIIR =2ffR=86/K =Grundsatzrede+Gerhard+Schroeder+SPO+P 
arteitag+Nuemberg+200 I/*http://2001.spd-parteitag.de/servletIPB/menu/l 00 1930/. 
466 'Verantwortung fiJr Europa - Deutschland in Europa', SPD leadership draft motion for the Party 
conference in Nuremberg, http://www.spddelservletlPB/show//OIOIJ8/beschlussbuch.pd[, pp. 44. 
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At the same time, the SPD motion took up the British demand to open up the single 
market for external trade, especially with third world countries. A fairer global world 
trade system should thus be achieved through a reduction of external trade barriers 
and tariffs, especially for developing countries467. 
In spite of the different emphasis of the British and German government in the 
discussion on economic reform, the two sides were not far apart at all in the run-up to 
the EU Council in Barcelona in March 2002, which was of course overshadowed by 
the global economic downturn in the wake of September 11 th. 
The British Prime Minister underlined the common British-German commitment to 
economic reform in his guest speech at the SPD party conference in Nuremberg 
'( ... ) Free trade will in itself not deliver prosperity and justice for all. We need to 
match our passion for free trade with an equal passion to better policies for 
development and aid. Again Britain and Germany - Labour and SPD - stand as 
,468 
one. 
In spite of the two countries' support for economic liberalisation and reform, which is 
much stronger than that of France, the March 2002 Barcelona summit also again 
showed the differences. The British government once again strongly pushed towards 
the completion of the reform agenda in terms of market liberalisation and labour 
market reform. The British focus in this respect was very much on flexibility, 
enhanced competitiveness in the global market and full employment through labour 
market reform and life-long learning. Amongst the priorities listed in the white paper 
on economic reform issued by the Treasury ahead of the Barcelona summit were the 
liberalisation of risk capital markets until 2003 and financial markets until 2005, as 
well as the removal of trade barriers in the energy, telecommunications, transport, gas 
467 Ibid, p.50. 
468 Speech by Tony Blair at the SPD party conference, Nuremberg, 20 November 200 I, 
http://2001.spd-parteitag.de/servletIPB/menuJI002017/index.html. 
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and electricity sectors469• The reform of the labour market should be achieved through 
life-long learning and equal opportunities, reduced state aid, better acceptance of 
national qualifications and enhanced research and development47o• 
In a joint statement by Tony Blair and the Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, both 
governments stressed that the Barcelona Council would be a challenge for the EU 
member states to continue to pursue the agenda of economic reform against the 
background of global economic troubles: 
'The Barcelona European Council will be a test of our commitment to reform. It 
takes place against the challenging background of a world economy poised to 
recover from a downturn. But this is not a reason to postpone or dilute action: it 
strengthens the case for quickening the pace. ,471 
Although the Barcelona summit achieved further steps towards the liberalisation of 
the electricity, gas and postal services sectors (by 2004) and the move towards 
integration of financial services, a common European patent could still not be agreed 
on and there had also been no fundamental progress on the deregulation of energy and 
transport sectors472• The German reaction to the outcome of the summit was one of 
cautious optimism, but there had been certain bewilderment that the British Prime 
Minister sided with conservative free-market reformers like Italian Prime Minister 
Berlusconi during the summit. In his assessment of the Barcelona summit, the 
German Chancellor therefore stressed that Germany would make sure that economic 
reform would not lead towards a direction of free market capitalism with increasingly 
shrinking social standards: 
469 'Realising Europe's potential: Economic Reform in Europe', European Economy Reform Treasury 
White paper, summary leaflet, February 2000, p. 7., hm>:llwww.hm-
treasury.gov.uklmediastore/otherfileslleaflet.pdf. 
470 Ibid. 
471 Joint statement by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair and Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, at 
the Anglo-Italian summit, 15 February 2002, www.number-
1 O.gov. ukldefault.asp?pageid=6132&this=6131. 
472 See Barcelona European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15/16 March 2002, 
http://ue.eu.intlnewsroom!related.asp?BID=76&GRP=4304&LANG=I. 
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'The interim balance of Barcelona shows: The direction is right. Europe is on a 
good way into the 21 st century. But I do also promise: We will be very careful not 
to lose those on the way, who see themselves as disadvantaged by the changes and 
as losers of a globalised and digitalised economy. ,473 
Schr5der also emphasised that he would not allow moves towards a European law on 
industrial takeover, which had been proposed by the European Commission. Again it 
became clear that for the German government there are clear limits to the 
liberalisation process within the EU. On the background of increasing domestic 
economic troubles, the Schr5der administration refuses to give away too much 
national control over its economic policy to the European level: 
'Like any other country in the Community, we Germans also have the right to 
defend our well-perceived own interests in Europa (oo.) I have therefore strongly 
argued for bringing the interests of industrial policy in line with the European 
reform agenda (oo.) I am not willing to expose the German industry to an 
experiment of competition law of a "European law on industrial takeovers", which 
only aims at a clear balance sheet. ,474 
Schr5der confirmed this stance in an article on European industrial policy for the 
German issue of the Financial Times in April 2002, where he stressed the need to 
recognise the interests and concerns of employees in the process of economic 
modernisation: 
'We should recall, that solidarity and participation are also part of the models of 
. . l' ,475 
our actlOns on economlC po lCY 
473 Regierungserklarung von Bundeskanzler Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zu den 
Ergebnissen des Europaischen Rates von Barcelona, 21 March 2002, Berlin, 
www.bundeskanzler.defFindulin-Spiel-.8442.62515/a.htm?printView=y. 
474 Ibid. 
475 'Kommentar: Industriepolitik - eine Aufgabe jUr Europa', Financial Times Deulschland, 29 April 
2002. 
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In spite of growing economic problems and spiralling unemployment, the Schr6der 
administration has not yet found a clear line on its social and economic policy476. The 
German government seems to sway between holding on to the well-established and 
costly structures of the German economic model, and cautious attempts to initiate 
substantial reforms towards greater flexibility and competitiveness. 
The post-2002 general election coalition agreement between the SPD and the Greens 
was not a big success in terms of substantial steps towards economic and social 
reform in Germany, and was accompanied by conflicting public statements on policy 
measures by members of the government. In terms of further reform on the EU level, 
the coalition agreement confirmed the fundamental German commitment to further 
market liberalisation in the areas of energy, capital markets (by 2003) and now also 
financial services (by 2005)477. Moreover, it called for greater harmonisation on 
taxation as well as well as enhanced effort to coordinate employment, economic, 
structural and industrial policies. The members of the eurozone would have to come 
to coordinated statements within the IMF, a proposal which would leave the British 
government out in the cold on certain decisions478. 
The domestic economic problems in Germany could endanger the country's standing 
within the EU, if serious reforms of the German economy and social system continue 
to be postponed. So far, the Schroder administration has only made cautious steps 
towards a fundamental reform of the structures of the country's social system and has 
mainly concentrated on an austerity policy. There are hopeful signs that the 
Chancellor and his new economics minister, Wolf gang Clement, formerly Prime 
Minister of North Rhine-Westfalia, might finally undertake serious steps towards 
economic reform in order to get the German economy back on track. In a recent 
interview, Clement called for a fundamental reconsideration of the vested rights on all 
sides in Germany as a basis for the overdue reform of the German economic model. 
476 See Financial Times, 'Gennany's benchmark status under threat', 12 December 2002. 
477 'Erneuerung, Gerechtigkeit, Nachhaltigkeit - Fur ein wirtschajiliches starkes, soziales und 
okologisches Deutschland Fur eine lebendige Demokratie', Koalitionsvertrag SPD-BOndnis90/Grflne, 
16 October 2002, p. 80. 
478 Ibid. 
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Clement emphasised that under the present senous economic circumstances In 
Germany, everybody would have to be aware of their responsibility to send positive 
signals towards willingness to accept reform: 
'We need signals to set off for Germany and from Gennany. Many are waiting for 
th· 1 . E ,479 IS, not on y In urope. 
The UK would definitely support serious refonns of the Gennan economy, as this 
would have implications for the whole of the EU and would ensure that Germany is 
not lost as a partner for economic liberalisation. The French government has already 
expressed its opposition to a German economic reform course. The French Prime 
Minister Raffarin criticised the German government's austerity policy as 'brutal' and 
warned about negative implications for the whole of the EU48o• The French have little 
sympathy for German and British calls for the reduction of trade barriers within the 
single market, as they consider it to endanger their freedom to exercise national 
economic policies. 
The completion of the Lisbon agenda will consequently only be achieved, if Britain 
and Germany both remain leading partners in the process. Both countries will not 
abandon their traditional approach to economic reform as part of the process, but, like 
on institutional reform, they should be able to find a lot of common ground, if they 
accept the differences in each other's domestic economic model. 
Germany will only remain a leading voice in the economic and social reform debate if 
it can show the rest of Europe that it gets a grip on its ailing economy. This will 
demand fundamental structural reforms, which must not necessarily lead to the 
abolition of the consensual model of German capitalism. On the contrary, a reformed 
German economy could become a blueprint for the rest of Europe and it will 
definitely have to contain elements of the rather more flexible British example. 
479 Interview with Wolfgang Clement, Suddeutsche Zeitung, 11 December 2002. 
480 The Times, 'Raffarin hits out at 'brutal' German austerity policy, 12 December 2002. 
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It could be based on a mixture between the German emphasis on 'the connection 
between initiative of one's own and community spirit, individuality and solidarity,481 
and the British desire to achieve 'greater financial market integration and a tougher 
pro-competition regime on products and takeovers ,482. 
The relatively successful British economic balance in comparison with the rest of 
Europe at present, gives the British government a strong asset in order to lead the 
debate on economic reform. The British influence would be even stronger on the 
issue, however, if Britain would be part of the eurozone, as it cannot expect to be able 
to influence reform steps in all areas of economic social policies (such as refonn of 
the euro stability pact) as a non-EMU member. 
Notwithstanding these fundamental challenges for the two countries, Britain and 
Germany can be expected to continue to push towards further liberalisation of the 
single market, especially in terms of external global trade. They will therefore 
continue to call for the abolition of protectionist practices and policies, such as the 
Common Agricultural Policy against member states, such as France, who favour the 
protection of vested rights in many areas483. 
481 Regierungserklttrung von Bundeskanzler SchriJder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, Berlin, 29 
October 2002, 
http://www.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserldaerung-.8S61.446416IRegierungserklaerung-von-
Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-S ... htm. 
482 Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the CBI national conference, Manchester, 2S 
November 2002, www.hm-treasury.gov.uklNewsroom and SpeecheslPressl2002/press 122 02. 
483 British MP Gisela Stuart and British MEP Gary Tittey were both in agreement that the Lisbon 
agenda could only be pushed through, if Britain and Germany co-operated closely towards its 
realisation. Gary Titley stressed that economic co-operation is more than likely 'even though Britain 
and Germany had such a different economic culture' (Interview with Gisela Stuart, 2S July 2002 and 
Gary Titley, I March 2002.) 
343 
4.4. Common Foreign and Security Policy 
European defence and security is an area, where Britain and Germany have so far not 
lived up to the high expectations they had raised by the late 1990s. The Blair 
government's change of attitude towards CFSP in 1998 and the German government's 
new willingness to shed the constraints of the past and to fully engage the 
Bundeswehr in military conflict resolution in Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 
2001 made it likely that both countries would co-operate strongly on the issue. Based 
on the Anglo-French declaration on European defence of December 1998484, the 
British Prime Minister had taken on a leading role in the discussion about the 
development of a European defence and security framework for the EU. The tragic 
events of the Kosovo crisis in 1998/99 had made the EU leaders realise that, without 
U.S. support, they did not possess adequate military means and the surrounding 
political framework, in order to solve a crisis in their own backyard. In contrast to the 
traditional reluctance of British Prime Ministers to consider the notion of a common 
defence and security policy for Europe, Tony Blair became the leading advocate for a 
European crisis reaction force and an efficient CFSP framework that would go with it. 
Blair had made it clear from the outset, that he did not want to create a European army 
as an alternative to NATO, but was rather interested in strengthening the European 
pillar within NATO by providing it with the necessary military and political 
capability. 
At the informal EU summit at Portschach in October 1998, where EU leaders 
discussed defence and security issues, Blair made clear that the Europeans had to take 
on greater responsibilities for their own defence and security within NATO: 
'C ... ) We need to make sure that that institutional mechanism in no way undermines 
NATO but rather is complementary to it, we need to recognise that that will mean 
changes in our own defence capability and we also need the political will to back 
h t d ,485 upw a ever we o. 
484 Joint declaration issued at the British-French summit, Saint Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, 
www.fco.gov.uklnews/newstext.asp?1795. 
485 Tony Blair press conference at the informal European summit, P~rtschach, 24/25 October 1998, 
www.weu.intlinstitute/chaillotlchai47e.html. 
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Based on the British-French proposals for a European force, which could react 
militarily to any evolving crisis, the EU had decided to initiate the Rapid Reaction 
Force at the December 1999 summit in Helsinki. The Rapid Reaction Force, which 
will be set up by 2003 out of between 50,000 and 60,000 troops from participating 
European states (including non-EU members), should act as a rapid deployment force 
within 60 days in case of a crisis486• All EU member states (except Denmark) will 
participate in the force and it will act rather as a complementary than a rival force to 
NATO. The Helsinki presidency conclusions emphasise that the purpose of the RRF 
IS 
'to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a 
whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-Ied military operations in 
response to international crises. ,487 
Although the creation of the RRF marks a significant step forward in the move 
towards a greater European defence and security identity, an issue which had been 
repeatedly put aside since the failure to create the European Defence Community in 
1954, it is only a first step towards a proper CFSP for the EU. Both the British and the 
German government have therefore repeatedly underlined that, the EU would have to 
work towards the creation of a proper foreign and security policy on the basis of the 
RRF. 
The British Prime Minister had already indicated before the Helsinki decisions that 
the outcome of the debate about European defence and security would have to 
produce a much more substantial outcome than simply a crisis deployment force: 
'( ... ) It is only a start. There is much talk of structures. But we should begin with 
capabilities. To put it bluntly, if Europe is to have a key defence role, it needs 
modem forces, strategic lift, and the necessary equipment to conduct a campaign. 
No nation will ever yield up its sovereign right to determine the use of its own 
armed forces. We do, however, need to see how we can co-operate better, 
486 See Helsinki European Council presidency conclusions, 10/11 December 1999, 
htt]:/lue.eu.intlNewsroomlrelated.cfm?NOREFRESH= 1 &MAX = 1 &BID=76&GRP=2I 86&LANG= I. 
487 Ibid, section 11, paragraph 27. 
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complement each other's capability, have the full range of defence options open to 
us. This also means greater integration in the defence industry and procurement. If 
we were in any doubts about this before, Kosovo should have removed them. ,488 
During his conference speech at the annual Labour Party conference in September 
1999, Blair clarified the British role in the debate on CFSP, when he claimed that the 
UK would use its leading role on the issue in order to act as a guardian over the 
transatlantic link between the EU and NATO. By promoting both the strengthening of 
the European defence and security identity, and maintaining the close bilateral 
relations with the U.S., the British government would therefore try to safeguard the 
link between European and American interests: 
'There is no choice between Europe and America. Britain is stronger with the US 
today because we are strong in Europe. Britain has the potential to be the bridge 
between Europe and America and for the 21 5t century ( ... ),489 
For the British government the new openness towards a Common European Foreign 
and Security Policy was thus clearly based on then necessity to maintain the link with 
NATO. Any notion that the RRF and a CFSP could become an alternative to NATO, 
an intention which France subliminally continues to pursue490 would be unacceptable 
for the British. 
488 Speech by the Prime Minister on the occasion of the acceptance of the Charlemagne Price, 20 May 
1999, www.number-IO.gov.uklounmtlpage922.asp. 
489 Tony Blair's speech at the annual Labour conference 1999, 28 September 1999, 
www.guardian.co.uklPrintl0.3858.3906870.00.html. 
490 The then French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin stressed the political aspects of the RRF in terms of 
defming European interests against those of the V.S.: 'Europe is now acquiring a rapid reaction force 
within a permanent political and military institutional structure. The Union now needs a comprehensive 
doctrine on intervention and use of this force ( ... ) At the same time, Europe must define its long-term 
defence strategy in line with its own interests and in compliance with its alliances. This means, in 
particular, that it must have a consistent position on the controversial misile shield initiative taken by 
the United States.' ('On the future of an enlarged Europe', Speech by French Prime Minister Lionel 
Jospin, 28 May 2001, www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/enlp.cfm?ref=24924 (2001).) 
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The German government takes a similar stance. In spite of Germany's traditional 
closeness to France, the red-green coalition in Berlin had never at any time in its 
period in office tried to challenge the transatlantic link between the EU and NATO. 
On the contrary, the German government did not grow weary of emphasising that the 
strengthening of the EU's foreign and security identity could only take place as part of 
a strong transatlantic alliance. In contrast to the widespread expectations of many 
among the left in the Green Party, the first coalition agreement between the SPD and 
the B90/Green Party underlined the continuing crucial importance of NATO for 
Europe's security: 
'The participation of the United States of America through the Alliance and their 
presence in Europe remain preconditions for security on the continent. ,491 
Complementary to that, the SchroderlFischer administration had always promoted the 
deepening of the CFSP pillar of the EU, based on increasing decision-making by 
Qualified Majority Voting: 
'The new federal government will make efforts to develop the CFSP in the spirit of 
enhanced pooling of foreign and security policy further. It will therefore push 
towards majority voting, greater foreign policy competences and the strengthening 
of the European defence and security identity.,492 
When the discussion on the EU's role in the settling of the crisis in Kosovo was in full 
force, Foreign Minister Fischer told the French national assembly unambigously that, 
in spite of its strong support for a stronger CFSP identity for the EU, the German 
government would not support any attempts to weaken NATO: 
491 Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und BUndnis 
90lDie GrUnen, 20 October 1998, chapter 3, www.dgap.orglIP/ip9812Ikoalitionsvereinbarung.htm. 
492 Ibid. 
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'The collective defence will continue to remain NATO's task and - as SFOR 
shows in Bosnia- the alliance also plays an important role in terms of crisis 
management. But the EU also has to develop the ability for its own military crisis 
management, whenever need for action arises from the point of view of the 
EU/WEU and the North American partners do not want to take part. ,493 
Defence minister Scharping issued a strong warning that the strengthening of 
Europe's capability to act should not be allowed to lead towards the weakening of the 
transatlantic alliance. On the contrary, Scharping called for the strengthening of the 
transatlantic ties within NATO as part of the restructuring of European defence and 
security and rejected the need to create new independent European command or 
planning structures: 
'We want to strengthen the transatlantic link further. It continues to remain the 
crucial stay of a policy, which is aimed at peace, security and democracy in the 
whole of the Euro-Atlantic area in the future. It would be an illusion and a 
dangerous mistaken belief to assume that a Europe with greater capability to act 
would reduce the meaning of the new NATO and our American allies for European 
security ( ... ) We also do not want any independent European planning process for 
the military forces as competition for the forces management of NATO ( ... ). ,494 
Like for the British government, the main emphasis as a result of the lessons of 
Kosovo consequently was put on making up for the lack of European military and 
political capabilities which would enable them to act independently in a crisis, should 
NATO choose not get involved. For Germany, which had finally shed the constraints 
of limited military engagement from its semi-sovereign past, it was almost natural that 
the Kosovo experience would lead towards the deepening of European multilateral 
efforts on defence and security. 
493 Rede des Bundesministers des Auswartigen Joschka Fischer in 
Nationalversammlung. Paris, 20 January 1999, 
amt.de/6 archiv/99/r/R990 120a.htm. 
der Jranzosischen 
www.auswaertiges-
494 Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Rudolf Scharping. anlasslich der XXXVI. 
Internationalen KonJerenz Jur Sicherheitspolitik. Munich, 5 February 2000, 
www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_9116.htm. 
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As shown in chapter 2, Gennany had traditionally pmsued a multilateral foreign and 
security policy after the end of the Second World War. This had been the only way 
for Gennany to regain international standing as a credible peaceful and democratic 
nation. The strong Gennan support during the 1990s for a greater multilaterilisation of 
Europe's defence and security within a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
framework was consequently a logical next step. Gennany could however only 
credibly advocate the deepening of the EV's defence and security framework once it 
was ready to fully engage in military crisis management. The fact that the SclutSder 
administration used the Kosovo crisis to end Gennany's policy of semi-engagement 
in military tenns, had turned Gennany into almost the natural advocate of the 
deepening of CFSP: 
'The detennination of the Europeans, to do more, is a consequence of the European 
weakness, which we had clearly been made aware of during the military operation 
in Kosovo, when the major part of the military risks and responsibility lay on the 
part of the V.S. ( ... ). The Europeans, who almost had to be forced into the creation 
of a co-operative international order by American statesmen after the war, today 
promote the advantages of multilateralism towards the V.S. Especially for 
Gennany, in the face of its geographical position and its historic experience, a 
multilateral foreign policy has become a leitmotif. The European capabilities for 
crisis management therefore have to be expanded consistently as part of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, but - the federal government will strongly 
push towards this - in a way which is transparent for the V.S. and compatible to 
NATO.'49s 
Because with Britain and Gennany, two of the larger member states were in 
agreement that the RRF and a possible accompanying Common Foreign and Security 
Policy should not be allowed to weaken the European commitment to NATO, great 
expectations had been raised. It was widely expected that the Helsinki decisions 
would be followed by more concrete steps on CFSP. The terrorist attacks on the V.S. 
on September 11th 2001 made the EU member states' commitment to make greater 
efforts to provide for their own security even more likely. 
m Rede des Bundesministers des Auswiirtigen Joschka Fischer aul der 36. Miinchener Konferenzfiir 
Sicherheitspolitik, 5 February 2000, www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_9117.htm. 
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With the post-September 11th U.S. foreign policy focused on a global war against 
terrorism, it would be even more crucial for the Europeans to finally to settle their 
national differences and come to a coordinated approach to world affairs. When the 
immediate shock about the attacks had started to gradually settle and a discussion 
about the political implications emerged, it looked promising that the EU leaders 
would try to push forward the issue of CFSP. Especially Britain and Germany, which 
had both shown unambiguous military and political support for the war on terror in 
Afghanistan in the wake of September 11th, were expected to lead the agenda on the 
development of enhanced mechanisms of co-operation on foreign and security issues 
in the EU. 
The red-green coalition had, in contrast to widespread expectations, managed to 
maintain its foreign policy course on the Afghanistan issue. It was thus able to 
commit Bundeswehr forces to the military operation in Afghanistan in December 
2001, after Chancellor Schroder had linked the issue with a vote of confidence in 
parliament. This showed that Kosovo was had not a one-off, but that Germany had 
seriously changed its foreign policy and was now fully committed to multilateral 
international crisis management as part of NATO and based on U.N. mandates. 
As a result, in principle no major hurdles stood in the way of Germany exercising a 
leadership role on the issue of CFSP in the EU. Immediately after September 11 th, it 
looked as if Germany would be ready to take on such a leadership role, as the 
Schroder administration did not grow weary of publicly emphasising the importance 
to create 'a common voice' for Europe in the post-September 11th global security 
environment. Both the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister focused on the need 
to create an enhanced identity for Europe in terms of foreign and security policy: 
'Especially now, Europe has to speak with one voice ( ... ). Our goal has to be to 
integrate as many countries as possible into a global system of security and 
't ,496 prospen y. 
496 Regierungserkliirung von Bundeskanzler Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zu den 
Anschlagen in den USA, Berlin, 19 September 2001, htt]://www.bundesregierung.de/emagazine entw,-
56381 /Regierungserklaerung -von-Bunde.htm. 
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'September the 11 th has led to a shift of the axis and we Europeans have to be 
careful not marginalized. We therefore have to create a European Union with the 
capability to act. The weaknesses of today's Europe have after all been exposed in 
the glaring light of the terrorist attack of September 11 tb. If we remain separated, 
we will not be able to fulfil or role in the world and in terms of shaping it ( ... ) We 
therefore are only left with the alternative to move closer to one another, in spite of 
all the differences that come with it. Under the pressure of the circumstances, 
Europe has always moved in the right direction. Crisis pressure from outside 
works.,497 
By the end of 200 I, a strong consensus between Britain and Germany on the need to 
create a proper Common Foreign and Security Policy for the EU seemed to exist. 
At the SPD party conference in Nuremberg in November 2001, the British Prime 
Minister and the German Chancellor were in full agreement about the need to provide 
joint leadership on the issue. Tony Blair especially welcomed in this respect that 
Germany had shown a clear commitment to the military campaign against terrorism in 
Afghanistan, which would enable the UK and Germany to work towards a defence 
and security identity for the EU. Blair even called for a German seat in the U.N. 
security council, in order to be able to come to British-German co-operation on a 
more global scale: 
'Since the 11th September atrocity, Germany has shown real leadership ( ... ).We 
both want to see the instruments of international governance made more effective. 
That requires reform of the United Nations where I hope that before too long 
Germany will take the seat on the Security Council that on merit it deserves. We 
need also more than ever a meaningful European security and defence identity, 
fully compatible with NATO but able to act where the Americans decide not to be 
involved but where Europe has a clear responsibility ( ... ). The biggest contribution 
we can make together is to a stronger more effective European Union. ,498 
497 'Wir mUssen die Terroristen bekampfen und besiegen', Interview with Joschka Fischer, Suddeutsche 
Zeilung, 18 October 2001. 
498 Speech by Tony Blair at the SPD party conference, Nuremberg, 20 November 2001, 
http://2001.spd-parteitag.de/servletIPB/menull 0020 17 /index.html. 
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The German Chancellor strongly supported the British position on the issue when he 
stressed that his government wanted to create a European Common Foreign and 
Security Policy as an integral part of the transatlantic alliance and not as an 
independent pillar outside NATO: 
'The key word is: a foreign and security policy identity, it is thus about creating a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy in and for Europe ( ... ). What it is about is to 
create European common ground, which is an important cornerstone within the 
Atlantic, the transatlantic partnership and within NATO and which consequently 
does not weaken the Alliance, but strengthens it ( ... ) It is hence about a European 
Foreign and Security Policy - within NATO and in order to strengthen it - and not 
at all in the place ofNATO.'499 
The resolution on German foreign policy at the party conference stressed that the role 
of NATO as the indispensable basis for European security and 'the crucial political 
and institutional link for the Euro-Atlantic Community of democratic nations'Soo 
would have to be maintained. At the same time, the resolution called for the creation 
of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy, which would include a 
comprehensive security concept with military, economic, social and ecological 
elements. Through a crisis prevention policy, based on enhanced military and civilian 
resources, the EU would have to be able to settle local conflict and crises. This would 
also have to include a substantial structural reform of the Bundeswehr in order to be 
able to become more efficient in terms of crisis intervention501 • 
499 Rede des SPD-Parteivorsitzenden, Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schroder zum Themenbereich AufJen-
und Sicherheitspolitik , SPD-Bundesparteitag, Nuremberg, 20 November 2001, http://2001.spd-
parteitag.de/servletIPB/menulI002034/index.html. 
SOO 'lnternationale Kooperation und Verantwortung - Leitlinien zur A ufJen- und Sicherheitspolitik', 
motion for the SPD Bundesparteitag, Nuremberg, 19-22 November 2001, p. 48, 
http://www.spdde/servlet/PB/show/l 010 138/beschlussbuch.pd(. 
SOl Ibid, p. 49. 
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Britain and Germany were therefore closer on the issue of European foreign and 
security than ever before. In contrast to the high expectations raised at the time, little 
progress has been made in the area since September 11 th. Although the Rapid 
Reaction Force will now definitely be established by 2003502, the political 
declarations of intent on both the British and the German side have been watered 
down by lack of practical progress. The successful completion of the military 
operation in Afghanistan has not led to greater unity and coordination of the EV 
member states' national foreign and defence policies. On the contrary, the debate on 
Common Foreign and Security Policy in 2002 has been dominated by national 
egoisms and domestic constraints, rather than by a spirit of common action. 
This is especially the case with regard to Britain and Germany. Although both 
countries continue to publicly advocate the development of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, they have gone separate ways in its pursuit. After Afghanistan the 
British government has mainly focused on its bilateral relationship with the V.S., 
while the German government has so far only paid lip service to its commitment to 
reform the Bundeswehr. 
In the debate about possible military action against Iraq, Britain and Germany have 
found themselves on two opposing ends, with the VK basically supporting military 
actionS03 and the German Chancellor having determined that it would not participate 
in any military operation against Iraq504. 
S02 See Copenhagen EU Council presidency conclusions, 12/13 December 2002, chapter Ill, pp. 7, 
http://ue.eu.intlnewsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=73774&from=EuropeanCouncil&LANG=I. 
S03 The British Prime Minister stressed in his annual speech at the 2002 Labour Party conference that 
Britain would join a military campaign against Iraq, if Sadam Hussein does not comply with the U.N. 
resolution, asking him to get rid of all weapons of mass destruction and to fully open his country for 
U.N. weapons inspections: 'If at this moment having found the collective will to recognise the threat 
we lose our collective will to deal with it, then we will destroy not only the authority of America or 
Britain but of the United Nations itself. Sometimes and particular dealing with a dictator, the only 
chance for peace is a readiness for war.' ('At our best when at our boldest', Speech by Tony Blair, 
Prime Minister and Leader of the Labour Party, Labour Party Conference, Blackpool, I October 2002, 
www.labour.org.uk/tbconfspeech). 
S04 SchrOder had turned the question of German pariticipation in an V.S.-Ied attack on Iraq into a major 
issue during the fmal weeks of his 2002 general election campaign. Already in August, SchrOder 
pointed out that under his leadership, Germany would not participate in a military operation against 
Iraq in any form, as this would lead to greater instability in the Middle East: 'The Middle East needs 
new peace and not a new war. Our policy is committed to that goal. And this alone does justice to the 
political and economic necessities. Anything else would deepen the crisis of the global economy and 
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With regard to the debate on Iraq and the resulting accusation that Britain would 
increasingly act as the United States' 'poodle' 505, instead of exercising a bridge 
function between Europe and America, the Prime Minister has made clear that British 
engagement in Europe must not be allowed to hamper strong bilateral relations with 
the U.S.: 
'I think that it was right for this country to stand shoulder to shoulder with America 
post-I I September, I think it is right for Britain to be a close ally of America and I 
think it is right for us as a country to say to our European partners, we are a 
changed government in respect of Europe, we are pro-Europe, we are in favour of 
Europe, but it should never be at the expense of our relationship with the United 
States, not the British relationship, not the European relationship.,506 
The issue of Iraq shows that the UK, when in doubt, still rather chooses to come to an 
agreement with the U.S. position rather than to consult its partners within the EU in 
order to come to a coordinated stance on global issues. As a result, Iraq has made 
obvious that the political declarations of intent on the CFSP issue in reality still 
amount to nothing concrete. The European discord on Iraq is the result of a lack of 
political will on the side of all member states to overcome their national preferences 
for the sake of the common goal of creating a European CFSP identity. In this respect, 
the British support for the U.S. position poses a catch-22 for the other member states. 
They are split between those who choose to either follow the British and U.S. hardline 
position on Iraq, or like in the German case, fundamentally oppose it. 
also only cause economic problems for us.' (,Schroder schlieftt deutsche Beteiligung an moglichem 
Angriff aul den Irak aus " German government press release, 1I August 2002, 
http://www.bundeskanzler.delPressemitteilungen-.7717s3.htm). The German Foreign Minister stressed 
that an attack on Iraw would lead to 'a completely restructuring of the Middle East, not only in 
military, but especially in political terms' and that 'we Europeans as immediate neighbours of this 
region would have to bear the fatal consequences' ('Ich sehe keine Verbindung zwischen [rak und AI-
Quaida', Interview with Joschka Fischer, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 6 August 2002). 
505 Hugo Young accused the British government of following any American military adventure only to 
maintain the supposed political influence in Washington: '( ... ) the convenient rationale, now much 
heard in Whitehall, that Britain has a selfless duty to act alongside the US in its military ventures 
precisely in order to show the world that Washington is not alone? Is that what we have come to? To be 
America's badge of multilateralist pretence? As the price of access to the Pentagon, it appears to 
important people worth paying.' (The Guardian, 'Why our leaders love to get cosy with Washington', 
3 September 2002). 
506 Press Conference by Prime Minister Tony Blair, 20 June 2002, www.number-lO.gov.ukloutputlPage 
5390.asp. 
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For the creation of a CFSP this is fatal, as an essential precondition would be a 
willingness on all sides to coordinate national foreign policies on major issues. 
On the Iraq issue, the Blair administration has therefore failed to provide the 
leadership that would have been necessary in order to fulfil the bridge function 
between the EU and the U.S. it had originally strived for. Iraq shows that the British 
government follows the false assumption that the other EU member states would 
basically share the British obedience towards V.S. strategic interests and would 
therefore almost automatically provide the OK with a leadership position on defence 
and security issues within the EV. This was clearly shown when foreign secretary 
Jack Straw recently called on the rest of Europe to settle its differences with the V.S.: 
'The truth is that all European nations have ties of family, friendship and culture 
with the VS, which are often as close as those we enjoy with each other ( ... ). 
We should conduct our relations with the V.S. on the same basis. Our fundamental 
interests are the same. We have everything to gain from continuing a robust, 
confident partnership in the future.'so7 
The British government fails to notice that its continuing closeness towards the V.S., 
even on the most controversial issues like Iraq, is perceived by many EV partners as 
proof that Britain remains the 'exclusive Albion', which still values its bilateral 
relationship with the Americans much higher than any commitment to European 
unity. Again, amongst those of the British political elite, who work on the EU level, 
this is much more recognised than on the British government level. 
Asked about the present British relations with the V.S., the leader of the British 
Labour MEPs in the European Parliament pointed out to me that in terms of the 
traditional British-American closeness on international issues, 'Iraq is another matter'. 
S07 'EU-US relations: the myths and the reality', Speech by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw at the 
Brookings Institute, Washington, 8 May 2002, 
httj>:llwww.fco.gov.uklservletlFront?pagename=OpenMarketIXcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007 
029391647 &a=KArticle&aid= 1 020868115823. 
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Titley emphasised that, although it would generally have to be welcomed that the 
government attempted to co-operate with an even less pro-European V.S. 
administration like the one of George W. Bush, British military involvement in an 
attack on Iraq could cause serious problems for the rest of Europe508 . 
The Liberal Democrat MEP Nick Clegg underlined his belief that the Prime Minister 
would live under 'a comfortable illusion' if he thought that he could be 'America's 
closest ally in Europe and also trusted in Europe', especially with regard to Blair's 
rather uncritical attitude towards V.S. foreign policy. Clegg called for a clear choice, 
which would be either between greater involvement in the building up of a European 
Foreign and Security Policy or a continuing focus on the U.SS09• 
The British Prime Minister himself appears to remain convinced that the British 
support for possible military action against Iraq will not hamper relations with the rest 
of the EU. Quite the opposite, Blair insists that in the long run, Europe will come 
together on the issue of Iraq: 
'C ... ) There is all this talk about Britain and America and whether we are too loyal 
towards America, to me that is a concept from people who aren't thinking the thing 
through. These issues are being raised rightly by the United States, they are raised 
by us too C ... ). But America shouldn't be left to face these issues alone, the rest of 
the world has a responsibility, not just America to deal with this. And if Britain and 
if Europe want to be taken seriously as people facing up to these issues, too, then 
our place is facing them with America, in partnership with America.,SIO 
The Schroder administration, in contrast, sticks to its opposition towards any 
involvement in a military attack against Iraq. 
S08 Interview with Gary Titley, MEP, Manchester, I March 2002. 
S09 Telephone interview with Nick Clegg, Liberal Democrat MEP, 21 March 2002. 
510 Prime Minister'S Press Conference, 4 September 2002, httj):llwww.pm.gov.ukloutput/Page6006.asp. 
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In this respect, the German Chancellor however also strongly denies any anti-
American tendencies in his administrationS I I and stresses that the opposition towards 
the U.S. policy on Iraq is solely based on political reasons. In terms of the impact of 
the British-German disagreement on the American position on Iraq, Schroder calls for 
greater coordination of national positions on foreign policy issues: 
'In the case of Iraq we consider the setting of priorities to be wrong and we will 
therefore not take part militarily ( ... ). Above that, I hope that the Iraqis fully 
comply with the resolution and a war can be avoided ( ... ). For me it seems to be 
important that greater common ground is being developed with regard to Europe. 
There will of course always be situations, where this is not possible, because of 
very specific relationships like for example between the V.S. and Britain. What we 
attempt here, is a renunciation of national sovereignty on the possibly most 
sensitive issue for the nation states, which exists, namely the question of the right 
of disposal over foreign policy. ,512 
The Schroder statement on Iraq and the implications for the creation of a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy also show the fundamentally different approach, which 
hampers British-German co-operation on the issue. While the British government 
insists that foreign policy is an issue which has to remain in the hands of sovereign 
national governments, the German government wants to see foreign policy 
increasingly turned into a Community issue: 
'The European Union has to increase its ability to act on foreign policy matters. In 
the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), decisions should in 
principle be reached by Qualified Majority Voting. The foreign policies of the EU 
and the member states have to be meshed better.,S13 
511 He was already keen to avoid this impression when he sacked the former minister of justice, Herta 
Dllubler-Gmelin, after she had compared Bush's policy on Iraq with that of Adolf Hitler in the final 
days of the election campaign (The Guardian, 'Close fmish predicted in German elections', 22 
September 2002). 
m Interview with Chancellor SchrOder, Die Zeit, 28 November 2002. 
m 'Erneuerung, Gerechtigkeit, Nachhaltigkeit - Fur ein wirtschaftliches starkes, soziales und 
okologisches Deutschland Fur eine lebendige Demokratie', Koalitionsvertrag SPD-BUndnis90/GrUne, 
16 October 2002, p. 78. 
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In this respect, the British Prime Minister has made it absolutely clear that his 
government would not agree to the communitisation of national control over defence 
and security. Blair underlined, that from the British point of view these areas would 
have to continue to be decided by the member state governments in the Council: 
'I favour the strengthening of European foreign policy, step by step, from the 
Balkans, to Europe's "near abroad" and then beyond. In this area, however the lead 
responsibility should remain with the Council of Foreign Ministers. Britain cannot 
agree to the communitisation of defence or foreign policy. It is not practical or 
right in principle. Foreign policy can only be built by gathering a consensus among 
the Member States who possess the resources necessary to conduct it - the 
diplomatic skills, the bulk of aid budgets, and of course the armed forces. ,514 
Foreign secretary Jack Straw clarified in his latest examination before the Foreign 
Affairs committee of the House of Commons on the NATO summit in Prague, that 
the British government would under no circumstances agree to decide foreign and 
security issues by QMV. Straw stressed that a sovereign state would have to remain in 
full control over the deployment of its forces and could not hand it over to some 
supranational authority. Moreover, and probably more important in terms of the 
British stance on European defence and security, Straw pointed out that the British 
government continues to consider NATO as more important than any European 
defence identity: 
'You cannot have QMV on intergovernmental matters. We cannot have decisions 
about where we send our forces determined by other countries. Full stop. Let us be 
clear about that. It is not a red line, it is a huge red wall ( ... ) The crucial thing is, 
two things, one is that as an independent sovereign state we have to decide, the 
United Kingdom government and Parliament, on the deployment of our troops. 
514 'A clear course for Europe', Speech by the Prime Minister to an audience in Cardiff, 28 November 
2002, www.number-lO.gov.uklprintlpage6710.asp. 
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The second thing is, ( ... ) in these matters our alliance with NATO has to be the 
superior alliance in terms of defence. ,515 
The British government's continuing focus on NATO as the main guarantor of 
security in Europe is also shown in the British demand to put the European Rapid 
Reaction Force under NATO command, every time the RRF makes use of NATO 
assetsSl6• Under the current circumstances, this would leave the RRF under NATO 
control most of the time, as the EU member states are lacking essential military 
capacities. They will therefore, at least for the foreseeable future, strongly depend on 
NATO equipment in order to make the RRF effective. 
Although the desire to maintain a strong link with NATO is shared by the German 
government, the British position shows that the Blair administration still has doubts 
about the European's willingness to get their act together on defence and security. The 
British government therefore prefers to deal with fundamental defence and security 
issues within NATO and is not at all ready to abandon the unanimity principle as part 
of a stronger European defence and security identity. From the British point of view, 
the notion of an integrated European foreign policy, possibly represented by an EU 
Foreign Minister, is consequently not even worth considering. Apart from the national 
sovereignty issue, the main reason behind this is a profound British distrust about the 
EU partner's willingness to support their political declarations of intent on defence 
and security by concrete financial resources. Labour MP Gisela Stuart stresses in this 
respect that the British side is becoming increasingly impatient with the continental 
Europeans' lack of commitment in order to provide the necessary structural reforms 
and financial backing for their national forces. Stuart calls especially on Germany, as 
a crucial member state, to undertake fundamental reforms of the structure of the 
Bundeswehr: 
m House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Examination of Witnesses, uncorrected 
evidence, Mr Jack Straw, Secretary of State, Mr Peter Ricketts, CMG, Political Director, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Air Commodore Dick Lacey, NATO director, Ministry of Defence, Prague 
NATO summit, 19 November 2002, questions 26, 27 and 28, 
htq>:llwww.publications.parliament.uklpa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaffluc066-iluc06601.htm. 
SI6 Ibid, question 17. 
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'( ... ) Although the European Common Foreign Security Policy is so highly 
developed, we still need agreement from Colin Powell. So it's one of those areas 
where it can actually get me really, really angry. And the reason why I do is 
because there is a lot of posturing going on ( ... ). What the Europeans will now have 
to get up to is to get real on this thing. Which is one thing - start coming up with 
the finances, anything like in the German case, it is necessary to have Bundeswehr 
reform, so get on with it.,517 
The strong support for the development of a European Common Foreign and Security 
Policy with an integrated crisis reaction force as part of NATO on the part of German 
government is therefore not taken seriously in the UK, as long as Germany neglects 
its defence sector and fails to prepare the Bundeswehr for new tasks. The Blair 
administration has repeatedly criticised other EU member states for not providing 
adequate financial resources for their troops and for thus failing to enable them to take 
part in efficient crisis management as part of the RRF: 
'We in the UK spend more on defence than any other EU ally, in absolute terms 
and as a percentage of GDP. But I certainly accept that spending just 1.5% of GDP 
on defence, as some other European allies do, is simply not enough to make a 
'b' ,518 proper contn utlOn. 
Especially Germany, the leading advocate of the deepening of CFSP in the EU, has a 
poor record in this respect. While it struggles with a severe economic and financial 
crisis, it has neither managed to provide sufficient funds for a better equipment of its 
national forces, nor managed to push through a much needed reform of the 
Bundeswehr, which is still stuck in the structure of its pre-1990 role as a 
Verteidigungsarmee ('defence army'). 
517 Interview with Gisela Stuart MP, House of Commons, 25 July 2002. 
518 'EU-US relations: the myths and the reality', Speech by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw at the 
Brookings Institute, Washington, 8 May 2002, 
http://www .fco.gov .uklservletlFront?pagename=OpenMarketlXcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid= 1 007 
02939164 7 &a=KArticle&aid= 1 020868115823 
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While other EU member states, like France, have managed to transform their armies 
from conscription into professional forces after the end of the Cold War, the German 
government gives out conflicting signals on this issue. Immediately after its narrow 
September 2002 election victory, the red-green coalition announced that conscription 
would have to be reconsidered as part of a fundamental reform of the German army 
by the end of this parliament: 
'In order to do justice to the changes in international politics and in the national 
context, a revision and further adaption of the conscription will take place in the 
coming parliament. As part of this, conscription remains and will not be adjourned. 
It will however be put to the test and brought into line with new tasks ( ... ).519 
More recently, the new German defence minister Peter Struck has however indicated 
that the government would stick to the principle of conscription as part of a reform of 
the Bundeswehr520, 
Should this be the case, it would seriously weaken Germany's influence on the 
European defence and security agenda, as a conscription army will certainly not be 
prepared to fulfil the tasks which are essential as part of a European rapid crisis 
deployment force. This could only be done by a slimmer, more professional force. 
And at present the Bundeswehr is nowhere near achieving that goal, mainly due to 
lack of political leadership on the issue. This is also recognised on the British side. 
Foreign secretary Jack Straw pointed out that the British government considers it to 
be essential for a European defence and security capability that member states move 
away from the principle of conscription as part of a transformation of their armies 
from defence into crisis reaction forces: 
519 'Wehrpj1icht auf dem Prufstand', German government press release, 8 October 2002, 
htm:llwww.bundesregierung.de/indexo.413.443108IWe!u:pflicht-auf-dem-Pruefstand.htm. 
520 Suddeutsche Zeitung, 'Struck: Abschied vom Vorrang der Landesverteidigung', 5 December 2002, 
see also statement by Peter Struck during the Bundestag debate on the 2003 budget, where the defence 
minister confirmed that conscripition 'on my opinion remains without alternative for the readiness for 
action, efficiency and the profitability of the Bundeswehr. ' (,Keine Reform der Reform', Punlctation des 
Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Dr. Peter Struck, anlasslich der 1. Lesung des Bundeshaushaltes 
2003 im Deutschen Bundestag, 4 December 2002, 
Berlin, www.bmvg.de/archiv/redeniminister/printl021204 _ bundesta!L haushalt.php) 
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'They [conscript armies] may be able to fight an invasion, a traditional land 
invasion, but they are not particularly good for the kind of demands being made 
now of military forces. You can do more for the same amount and you can do more 
for less but we want to see an increase in their spending also.'521 
The spending issue is the other crucial hurdle which will define Germany's future 
influence in the debate about Common Foreign and Security Policy in the EU. The 
red-green coalition does not grow weary of publicly committing itself to a stable 
financial framework, which would enable the Bundeswehr to fulfil its new 
international duties. The 2002 red-green coalition agreement states that, as part of a 
reform of the Bundeswehr towards greater efficiency, the government will come to a 
constant revision of the cost-effectiveness of the forces in terms of their international 
duties. The main emphasis for the financial planning in the military sector would have 
to be focused on making sure that the Bundeswehr can be an effective part of a 
flexible, modernised European defence capability within NATO: 
'The future spectrum of tasks for the Bundeswehr is essentially determined by the 
developments in terms of security policy and the change of the Bundeswehr to an 
army in action ( ... ). Modem, well-equipped and rapidly available forces are needed 
for this. Their modernization has to strengthen the integrated European capabilities 
in NATO and the EU. The weighting of these tasks fundamentally characterises the 
future role and the material equipment of the Bundeswehr. ,522 
It has become clear however that, under its present financial constraints, the German 
government has only limited resources available to substantially increase expenditure 
on the national defence sector. Germany still spends substantially less on defence than 
other EU member states, especially Britain, which is shown in the financial planning 
521 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Examination of Witnesses, uncorrected 
evidence, Mr Jack Straw, Secretary of State, Mr Peter Ricketts, CMG, Political Director, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Air Commodore Dick Lacey, NATO director, Ministry of Defence, Prague 
NA TO summit, 19 November 2002, questions 58 and 59, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselectlcmfaff/uc066-i/uc06601.htm. 
522 'Erneuerung, Gerechtigkeit, Nachhaltigkeit - Fur ein wirtschaftliches starkes, soziales und 
okologisches Deutschland. Fur eine lebendige Demokratie', Koalitionsvertrag SPD-BUndnis90/GrUne, 
16 October 2002, p. 76. 
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for the year 2003, where Germany allocates £18.27 billion for defences23, compared 
to £24 billion in 2002-2003 British budgetS24• The German government justifies this 
continuing neglect of the national defence sector by pointing out that with 10.000 
soldiers, Germany deploys the largest amount of troops worldwide after the United 
States52S• 
In order to make up for its refusal to take part in any military action against Iraq, the 
German government has committed the Bundeswehr involvement in Afghanistan for 
another year526 and has also declared its readiness to take over the joint leadership of 
the international force in Afghanistan with the Netherlandss27• 
In the short term, it is rather unlikely that the German government will spend 
substantially more on defence, in spite of severe criticism from the opposition528 and 
also amongst the government's own supporters529• The German defence minister has 
S23 Source:Bundeshaushalt 2003, Bundesjinanzministerium, 
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.delFinanz-und-WirtschgftspolitiklBundeshaushalt-
.433. 1 5292/Bundeshaushalt-2003-Tabellen-und-Uebersichte n-S/ ... htm. 
S24 Source: HM Treasury, gO'/emment spending by functions, 
treasury.gov.uklmediastore/imageslACFIFA.gif. 
www.hm-
S2S RegierungserkJarung von Bundeslcamler Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundeslag, Berlin, 29 
October 2002, htq>:llwww.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserklaerung-
.8561.446416IRegierungserklaerung-von-Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-S ... htm. 
S26 This was decided by the German Bundestag on December 20th 2002, see 'Bundeswehr fUr ein 
weiteres Jahr in Afghanistan " German government press release, 20 December 2002, 
http://www.bundesregierung.delNachrichten-.417.452580IBundeswehr-fuer-ein-weiteres-J.htm. 
S27 'Deutschland will/SAF-Fuhrung in Afghanistan ubernehmen', German government press release, 6 
November 2002, htll.:llwww.bundesregierung.delNachrichten-.417.447924IDeutschland-will-ISAF-
Fuehrung.htm. 
S2B The Bavarian Prime Minister ~toiber, official CDUlCSU candidate for the Chancellory at the 2002 
general elections, repeatedly attacked the SchrOder administration for its lack of spending on defence. 
Stoiber accused the government of a gap between its official rhetoric on the issue and its actual policy: 
'It is unbearable, that Germany 's the tailender with regard to defence expenditure per capita income. 
We have to undertake a clear adjustment here and strengthen the investment share of our expenses.' 
(Rede des bayerischen Mini,'iterprtisidenten, Edmund Stoiber, beim 21. Franz-Jose/-StraujJ-
Symposiumllnternationale Fachtagung fUr Politik und Strategie, Munich, 5 July 2002, source: 
Internationale Politik, 9, September 2002, Dokumente, p.115). 
S29 MEP Gerhard Schmid called on the European governments, including the German finance ministry, 
to provide the resources needed in order to transform the EU's military capabilities, which would be 
insufficient at present to fulfil the upcoming tasks of crisis, management (Interview with Gerhard 
Schmid, MEP, Regensburg, 18 June 2001). 
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made clear that under the current financial constraints, the government will rather 
focus on more efficient spending of resources than on an general increase of the 
defence budget: 
'In the face of limited resources, the most like spectrum of action has to determine 
the role and the resources of the Bundeswehr more consistently than before. The 
reality of Bundeswehr deployment needs to find expression in structures, scope, 
abilities and equipment of the forces.' 530 
Chancellor Schroder confirmed in his last major interview before the parliamentary 
Christmas break in Germany on December 22nd 2002 that any spending increases on 
defence in this parliament would be out of question: 
'We also have to deliver on other things. Especially through inner reforms of the 
Bundeswehr, we have to make sure that our army is more capable to do justice to 
the asymmetrical threat and less to the unlikely symmetrical one.,S31 
The latest reports on planned cuts of German domestic defence spending of up to £ 
3.7 billion until the year 2006 are not encouraging in this respectS32. If Germany does 
not find a way out of its present financial and economic crisis, it will remain to be 
considered to unsuitable as a serious partner on the issue of European defence 
security. The perception expressed by MP John Maples during the examination of 
Foreign Minister Jack Straw that 'France and the United Kingdom are really the only 
two serious players in Europe in this regard' should be seen as a warning sign for the 
German government that it risks losing influence on the issue of CFSP if it does not 
seriously start to tackle the issue of military reform and spending increases. 
530 'Keine Reform der Reform', Punktation des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Dr. Peter Struck, 
anlasslich der 1. Lesung des Bundeshaushaltes 2003 im Deutschen Bundestag, 4 December 2002, 
Berlin, www.bmvg.de/archiv/redeniminister/printl021204 bundestag haushalt.php. 
53) 'Es geht um die Verteidigung unserer Wertvorstellungen', IntJlrview with Chancellor SchrMer, 
Suddeutsche Zeitung, 22 December 2002. 
S32 See Suddeutsche Zeitung, 'Bundesregierung streicht RUstungsprojekte zusammen', 5 December 
2002. 
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Fran~ois Heisbourg hence rightly stresses the political implications of the present 
German failure to deliver on military spending and structural reform: 
'Concerning the military potential and the structure of the forces in Germany, the 
situation is mediocre in a number of ways. Firstly, the contribution of conscription 
to the 'man material' of the Bundeswehr acts as a restricting element with regard to 
the participation of ground troops in high-risk combat missions. Secondly, the 
German force structure, with regard to its size and in general, does certainly not fit 
in with the tackling of the Petersberg tasks ( ... ) Germany does not spend the 
resources for defence, which would be in line with the most ambitious Petersberg 
tasks ( ... ) The German contribution to a European defence policy is indispensable. 
A Germany, which would find it hard to essentially participate in bigger Petersberg 
tasks would, through this fact alone, limit the political ability to choose its 
partners' (Heisbourg, 2002, pp. 2000). 
The different priorities on foreign policy and security issues make CFSP a difficult 
area for Britain and Germany to co-operate. The Blair administration's inability to 
perform its desired role as a bridge between American and European interests, 
because of its lack of distance from the Bush administration, and the red-green 
government's neglect of its defence sector have tom the two countries further apart on 
the issue. 
After promising developments in the wake of Kosovo in the late 1990s, one cannot 
see any common ground between Britain and Germany on foreign and security issues, 
apart from both countries' commitment to the transatlantic alliance, which is not 
shared to the same extent by France. They disagree on the framework for a CFSP, 
where Germany favours general decision-making by QMV and Britain insists on 
unanimity. Britain does also not share Germany's call for a merger between the role 
of the position of the High Representative of the Council and the Commissioner for 
External RelationsS33, another issue which clearly shows that the British 
533 The 2002 SPD-B90/Greens coalition agreement calls for a merger between the two positions: 'The 
posts of Commissioner for External Affairs and the High Representative for CFSP should be exercised 
by one person' ('Erneuerung, Gerechtigkeit. Nachhaltigkeit - Fur ein wirtschaftl;ches storlces. soziales 
und 6kologisches Deutschland Fur e;ne lebendige Demokratie', Koalitionsvertrag SPD-
BOndnis90/GrUne, 16 October 2002, p. 78). The British government sees such a merger as an attempt 
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intergovernmental approach clashes with the German communitisation attempts on 
CFSP. 
The British Prime Minister may have played a role in the attempts to mediate between 
the Schroder and the Bush administration after they had fallen out diplomatically 
because of former justice minister D~ubler-Gmelin's comparison with Hitler and 
Schroder's refusal to back the V.S. policy on Iraq534. Due two the two countries' lack 
of common ground on the issue of foreign and security policy, it is a fact however that 
the traditional groupings have recently re-emerged. Britain prefers to side with the 
V.S. and thus focuses on NATO as the main institution for defence and security issues 
in Europe, whereas Germany, in order to avoid being completely marginalised, has 
tried to revive the partnership with France on the issue. 
This has resulted in two new Franco-German initiatives on CSFP, the Schwerin 
declaration of the Franco-German defence and security council in Jull35 and a joint 
contribution to the Convention on the Future of Europe in November 2002536• In the 
two documents, the French and the German government express their renewed 
determination to push forward the development of an effective CFSP for the EV, 
including enhanced co-operation and a more flexible decision-making process: 
to communitise he CFSP, which should be decided by the member state governments and favours 
stronger coordination between the two positions: 'So it is a question of how you co-ordinate those two 
roles. We are not in favour of a straight merging or a Commission takeover because that would 
effectively communitise foreign policy ( ... ) there is a continuum and a continuous linkage between the 
different roles, but it being a matter ultimately for Member States to decide.' (Uncorrected evidence 
presented by Rt Hon Peter Hain, Government Representative on the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, Mr Nick Baird, Head of European Union department (internal), Ms Sarah Lyons, Private 
Secretary to the Government Representative on the Convention on the Future of Europe, European 
Scrutiny Committee, House of Commons, 20 November 2002, question 32, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uklpalcm200203/cmselectlcmeuleglucI03/ucI0301.htm). 
534 The first foreign visit Chancellor SchrOder made after his re-election was a trip to Number 10 
Downing Street in order to get the Prime Minister's backing in an attempt to settle the row with 
Washington ('SchrOder heads for London for meeting with Blair', The Guardian, 24 September 2002 
and Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 'Blair soli helfen', 25 September 2002). 
m 'Erkliirung von Schwerin', Deutsch-Jranzosischer Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrat, 30 July 2002, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/ de/infoservice/downloadlpdf/laenderin fos/79 _ de vtg. pdf. 
536 Contribution by Mr Dominique de Villepin and Mr Joschka Fischer, members of the Convention, 
presenting joint Franco-German proposals for the European Convention in the field of European 
security and defence policy, 22 November 2002, 
http://register.consilium.eu.intlpdt7enl02/cvOO/00435en2.pdf. 
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'Germany and France support ( ... ) the strengthening of the co-operation between 
the fifteen, as well as especially a harmonisation of military requirement planning 
and a concentration of capabilities and resources, wherever possible ( ... ). Germany 
and France, which have always represented the motor of the European construction 
work, want to give a new impetus to the security and defence dimension of the 
Union. They have therefore instructed the Franco-German defence and security 
council, to work out proposals for the further development of the ESDP in the run-
up to the 40th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty, in order to make a contribution to 
the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe through this. In this respect 
they will also examine the possibility of an enhanced co-operation, which is tailor-
made for the area of EDSP and new possibilities in the area of the decision-making 
processes. ,537 
The resulting contribution to the Convention by Fischer and Villepin called for the 
development of a comprehensive CFSP, which would include 'judicial and police co-
operation, economic and financial instruments, civilian protection, as well as military 
means' and the inclusion of a political declaration on the need to provide a 'common 
solidarity and security' for the whole of the EU into the Community treaty 
structure538• The Franco-German initiatives have already borne fruit with regard to 
pushing the discussion on CFSP into a more integrative direction, away from the 
intergovernmental focus of the UK. A big group within the Convention on the Future 
of Europe has proposed the creation of a real European foreign policy, which would 
be represented by an EU Foreign Minister539. 
S37 'ErkJiirung von Schwerin', Deutsch-Jranzosischer Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrat, 30 July 2002, 
chapter II and IV, 
http://www.auswaertige-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/downloadlpdf/laenderinfos/79 df vtg.pdf. 
S38 Contribution by Mr Dominique de Villepin and Mr Joschka Fischer, members of the Convention, 
presenting joint Franco-German proposals for the European Convention in the field of European 
security and defence policy, 22 November 2002, p. 2, 
http://register.consilium.eu.intlpdf/enl02/cvOO/00435en2.pdf 
S39 Suddeutsche Zeitung, 'Konvent will einen EU-Auftenminister', 21 December 2002. 
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The British government should therefore be careful not to lose the momentwn by 
leaning to close towards the U.S .. In spite of Germany's weak standing on the issue, 
the French prefer to side with the German government on CFSP, as they consider it 
more likely to achieve their goal of a relatively strong EDSP identity than if they 
would attempt to co-operate with Britain. The Blair administration has disappointed 
many hopes that it would seriously commit itself to a CFSP for the EU, as it continues 
to refuse to abandon its insistence on unanimous decision-making and basically want 
to put the RRF under NATO command. The relatively uncritical British support for 
the policy of the Bush administration towards Iraq has not helped to improve the 
government's standing on the issue amongst its partners in the EU. 
Any hopes that Britain could capitalise from the German weakness on defence and 
security, could be seriously disappointed if France and Germany continue to keep up 
their renewed co-operation on the issue. As things stand at present, Britain will not be 
able to play a decisive role in the determination of the CFSP framework of the EU, if 
it does not shift its focus from America towards the European continent. 
Germany will remain a junior and rather willing partner for France on CFSP, which 
means that the final shape of a European foreign policy and security identity might 
look more independent from NATO than both the British and the German 
governments would want. In order to achieve any substantial progress on the issue, all 
EU member states and especially Germany, will however finally have to show a 
serious commitment to the CFSP by substantially increasing their spending on 
defence and by overcoming national vanity on foreign policy matters. 
The failure of the British and the German government to do so in recent years is a 
symbol for the general lack of commitment towards the issue of CFSP at present. The 
prospects for substantial British-German agreement on the shape of a European CFSP 
will depend on the willingness on both sides to achieve progress. At present, the 
outlook for a strategic alliance between the two countries in this respect is not very 
promising at all. 
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4.5. Enlargement 
The one area in which Britain and Germany show the greatest correspondence of 
interests is certainly that of the enlargement of the European Union. Both countries 
have traditionally supported the continuing enlargement of the Community as part of 
a desire to unite Europe, which had been divided by force during two World Wars, in 
an area of freedom, democracy, security and economic stability. For the unified 
Germany, the strong support for enlargement of the EU since 1990 has been based on 
a deep sense of gratitude towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe for their 
support towards German reunification. Moreover, having been a divided nation for 
more than 40 years itself, Germany sees the process of enlargement into Central and 
Eastern Europe as an inevitable process of ending the Cold War for good through the 
reunification of the European continent as an area of democracy, economic prosperity 
and peaceful stability. Adrian Hyde-Price stresses in this respect that the German 
desire to take the former communist countries on board the EU stems from a mixture 
between wanting to provide a secure neighbouring environment, which also does 
provide an area of trading opportunities for Germany, and a feeling of post-Cold War 
obligation to compensate: 
'Berlin's continuing commitment to EU enlargement reflects Germany's role 
conception as a 'bridge' between East and West, and the German government's 
decision to respond to the dilemmas of the Mittellage by enlarging Euro-Atlantic 
structures eastwards ( ... ). The memory of the war has generated a sense of moral 
responsibility that has been an important factor in German support for East Central 
European aspirations to "return to Europe". 
Many Germans also feel indebted to the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians for their 
part in ending the cold war and making possible the peaceful unification of 
Germany.' (Hyde-Price, 2000, pp. 182-183) 
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The red-green coalition under the leadership of Chancellor Schroder had, straight after 
it came into power in 1998, shown strong support for the eastward enlargement of the 
EU. In its coalition agreement of September 1998, the SPD and the B90/Greens 
clearly stated their commitment to swift enlargement of the EU into Central and 
Eastern Europe: 
'The historic chance of the enlargement of the European Union into Central- and 
Eastern Europe has to be taken advantage of resolutely. The new federal 
government will support the European Union actively in contributing to the 
economic and democratic stabilisation of the Central and Eastern European 
countries through an effective accession strategy and aid, which show 
solidarity. ,540 
Summarising the outcome of the Berlin European Council, where the EU had passed 
the Agenda 2000 and thus paved the way for enlargement, Chancellor Schroder told 
the European Parliament on April 14th 1999 that his government had strongly pushed 
towards the passing of the Agenda 'out of the awareness that European integration 
can only succeed, if this Europe does not end at the borders of the former Iron 
Curtain,54). The German Foreign Minister stressed in his landmark speech on the 
future of European integration that Germany showed such strong support for the 
enlargement process, because it would be fundamentally in the German national 
interest to turn it into a success: 
'Enlargement is a supreme national interest, especially for Germany. It will be 
possible to permanently overcome the risks and temptations objectively inherent in 
Germany's dimensions and central situation through the enlargement and 
simultaneous deepening of the EU C ••• ) 
540 Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bundnis 
90lDie Grunen, 20 October 1998, p. 8, www.dgap.orglIP/ip9812/koalitionsvereinbarung.htm. 
541 Bilanzrede des deutschen Bundeskanzlers und EU-Ratsvorsiztenden, Gerhard Schroder, zum 
Europaischen Rat in Berlin vor dem Europaischen Parlament, Strasbourg, 14 April 1999, source: 
Internationale Politik. 6, June 1999, http://www.dgap.orglIP/ip9906/schroederI40499.htm. 
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( ... ) Enlargement will bring tremendous benefits for German companies and for 
employment. Germany must therefore continue its advocacy of rapid eastern 
enlargement. ,542 
The SchroderlFischer administration hence remained firmly in the tradition of post-
war West German and all-German governments, which have traditionally acted as the 
advocates of the interests of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 
European Community. The Ostpolitik, which had been initiated by the first SPDIFDP 
coalition under the leadership of Willy Brandt in West Germany after 1969, became 
part of the German foreign policy tradition. Germany consequently developed close 
diplomatic and trade links with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and many 
of them considered Germany as their main contact in Western Europe543. 
The red-green coalition nevertheless shows a new approach towards enlargement, 
because it combines a sincere commitment to swift enlargement with the frank 
admission that the process would have to be based on a fair share of the financial 
burden between the EU member states. In contrast to its predecessors, and especially 
the Kohl/Genscher administration, the red-green coalition is not willing to take over a 
greater financial burden in the course of the process. This was already one of the 
central demands of the German Council Presidency in the first half of 1999: 
'The German presidency will ( ... ) strongly push towards a solution of the problem 
of the high net burden of some member states ( ... ) the efforts on financial policy 
have to concentrate on creating the necessary fmancial scope for future 
enlargement through budget discipline and reform of the most important 
Community policies. ,544 
542 'From Confederacy to Federation - Thoughts on the finality of European integration', 
Speech by Joschka Fischer at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000, 
http://www.dgap.orglIP/ip9906/schroederI40499.htm). 
543 For the Polish perspective in this respect see Buras and Cichoki (2002), p. 202, for the Hungarian 
perspective Kiss (2002) p. 215 and the Czech perspective Handl (2002), p. 232. All authors express the 
view that Germany is seen as a gateway to Western Europe, i.e. traditionally the main advocate of 
Eastern enlargement in the EU. 
544 Program m der deutschen EU-Ratsprdsidentschaft, 21 December 1998, p. 8, source: Intemationaie 
Po/itilc, 6, June 1999, www.dgap.orglIP/ip9906/eude211298.htm. 
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In this respect, Chancellor Schroder has never tried to conceal that his government 
would stick up for Germany's national interests in the process of enlargement. 
As Schroder pointed out in his speech at the regional talks of the SPD parliamentary 
party on EU enlargement in April 2001, a successful enlargement process would have 
to take into account the benefits, as well as the concerns of the German people with 
regard to possible negative implications: 
'C ... ) There are also concerns with regard to enlargement. Who overlooks these 
concerns or talks over them with regard to the big entirety, risks the support of the 
citizens for the opening of the European Union as a whole C ••• ). The federal 
government has never left any doubt that we wish for a swift conclusion of the 
accession negotiations. However, there must be no cutback at the expense of the 
quality. Every negotiation result has to stand the test of reality. We will therefore 
only agree to a common position, if the objective German concerns on this issue 
have been taken into account. ,545 
The Schroder administration has consequently linked its essentially strong support for 
enlargement with demands for transitional periods, budgetary limits and a substantial 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). With regard to transitional 
periods, the SPD had demanded transitional periods for the candidate countries in the 
areas of agriculture, transport, environmental standards and especially on the free 
movement of labour and service industries in the motion passed at the Nuremberg 
party conference in 2001. 
With regard to the free movement of labour and service industries, the motion called 
for transitional periods of seven years for the new member states546• 
S4S Rede von Bundeskanzler Schroder auf der Abschlussveranstaltung der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion, 
Berlin, 3 April 200 1, ht1;p://www.bundeskanzler.de/Reden-. 7715.27667 /Rede-von-Bundeskanzler-
Schroeder-auf-der-Abschlu ... htm. 
S46 'Verantwortung fur Europa - Deutschland in Europa', SPD leadership motion for the Party 
conference in Nuremberg, http://www.spd.de/servletlPB/show/lO 1 0 I 38/beschlussbuch.pdf, p.52. 
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It becomes clear that these substantial demands had already become official 
government policy by the time the motion was passed, when one considers Chancellor 
Schroder's official statement in Nice in January 2001. 
In the statement, Schroder told the Bundestag that the government would insist on the 
transitional periods the free movement of labour and service industries in order to 
avoid substantial disadvantages for regions in within Germany, which border the 
accession candidates: 
'If there would be complete and immediate free movement of labour in the process 
of enlargement, we would be confronted with increased influx into Germany. In 
the face of the far too high unemployment, the receptiveness of the German labour 
market will be substantially limited for the foreseeable future ( ... ), 
The right solution for the present problem can therefore only consist of a limited 
transitional period. Reasonable transitional periods are however also in the interest 
of the accession candidates. They prevent social tensions and make sure that 
candidate countries do not lose their urgently needed, most qualified employees 
( ..• ). ,547 
Schroder stressed that his government would see such transitional periods as the only 
way to counter resentment against the enlargement process amongst the German 
population. Especially those living in the border regions were sceptical about the 
process because they feared an influx of cheap labour as a result of the accession of 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Chancellor therefore insisted that the 
only way to maintain public support for enlargement in Germany would be to 
introduce free movement gradually: 
'We need an identification with the enlargement process. This is especially the 
case for the border regions. Without this identification and without transitional 
periods it will be really very difficult, to find the necessary consent. 
S47 Regierungserklarung von Bundeskanzler Schr6der vor dem Deulschen Bundeslag 
Ergebnissen des Europaischen Rales in Nizza, Berlin, 19 January 
http://www.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserklaerung-.8561.21773IRegierungserklaerung-von-
Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-S ... htm. 
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We altogether gain nothing if we push through enlargement not with the citizens, 
but especially against those affected by it.,548 
The Schroder administration has also made clear to its EU partners that it would not 
agree to further budgetary increases as part of enlargement. As part of demands for an 
end to Germany's paymaster role in Europe, the Chancellor pointed out that there 
could be no further spending increases above what had been agreed in the Agenda 
2000 at the 1999 Berlin summit: 
'Everything has to be affordable within the framework of the Agenda 2000 and 
must also not wear out the budgets of the accession candidates.,549 
The 2002 coalition agreement between the SPD and the B90/Green Party explicitly 
emphasised that the red-green coalition would work towards a fairer distribution of 
the financial burden sharing within the EU as part of the enlargement process. In this 
respect, the German government's position focuses on the need to set clear limits to 
the size of the EU budget after 2007, which would have remain 'clearly below the 
upper limit of 1,27% of the GDP of the enlarged EU,550. This is closely linked to 
demands to reduce the expenditures for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and 
to ensure a more frugal concentration of structural and regional funds 'to the really 
d . ,551 nee y regIons . 
The issue of CAP reform is one which has been at the heart of the red-green 
coalition's European reform programme since it came into power in 1998. 
548 Ibid. 
549 Rede von Bundeskanzler Schroder aul der Abschlussveranstaltung der SPD-Bundestagslraktion, 
Berlin, 3 April 200 I, http://www.bundeskanzler.delReden-. 7715 .27667IRede-von-Bundeskanzler-
Schroeder-auf-der-Abschlu ... htm. 
550 'Erneuerung, Gerechtigkeit, Nachha/tigkeit - Far ein wirtschaftliches starkes, soziales und 
okologisches Deutschland. Far eine lebendige Demokratie " Koalitionsvertrag SPD-BUndnis90/GrUne, 
16 October 2002, p. 81, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Regierung/-.43I1Koalitionsvertrag-I.-
Praeambel.htm. 
5S1 Ibid. 
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The first coalition agreement promised that the new government would push towards 
a fundamental reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, with an emphasis on more 
efficient, cost-effective and environmentally friendly farming. In this respect, the 
focus was very much on cutting the cost of CAP as part of the EU budget: 
'European agriculture has to become more competitive and environmentally 
friendly. Public funds have to be targeted more towards environmental and 
employment policy criteria and as efficiently as possible towards those targets. In 
this respect, attention has to be paid to reduce the European Union expenditure for 
the Common Agricultural Policy. ,552 
The Chancellor himself did not grow weary of calling for a completely new system of 
funding for the CAP, consisting of direct income support for farmers rather than 
overall subsidies, which encourage mass production and waste. Such as system of 
income support payments would have to be partially controlled by the member states 
governments themselves, amounting to a return of agriCUltural funding powers to the 
national level: 
'Where the alignment of prices with the level of the global market disadvantages 
the German farmers, we have to accomplish a system of direct income support in 
Europe, which can also be amended nationally. ,553 
Because a substantial reform of the CAP had not been achieved at the December 2000 
IGC in Nice, the government continued to express its strong support for a 
fundamental reform of the system of agriCUltural funding in the EU. 
m Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemolcratischen Parte; Deutschlands und Biindnis 
90lDie Granen. 20 October 1998, December 1998, chapter 2, 
www.dgap.orgIJP/ip9812Ikoalitionsvereinbarung.htm. 
553 Reg;erungserklarung von Bundeskanzler Schroder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, Berlin, 10 
November 1998, www.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserklarungen-. 7561.58575IRegierungserklaerung-
von-Bundeskanzler-Gerhard-SchrOder.htm. 
375 
Especially the Greens tried to make sure that the issue would remain on the agenda of 
German European policy priorities. The Green agriculture and consumer minister 
Renate Kiinast, who took over the resort from SPD minister Karl-Heinz Funke in 
January 2001 in the wake of the German BSE scandal, became the leading advocate 
of environmentally friendly reform of the CAP within the government. After she had 
taken over her ministry, Kiinast did not grow weary of calling on the rest of the EU to 
end the wasteful system of CAP subsidies and to develop a reformed system, in which 
the member states would have a greater say over how their national agricultural sector 
is funded. In her first statement to the Bundestag, KUnast strongly criticised the 
existing system of agricultural funding in the EU and proposed a reformed CAP, 
which would be based on 'class instead of mass'. A new CAP would have to be based 
on environmental standards and consumer protection and would have to be able to fit 
into a non-protectionist fair trade system as part of the World Trade Organisation: 
'Agricultural policy is European policy. The signals from Brussels are encouraging 
and I hope, we will manage ( ... ) to alter the course. We therefore propose, to 
extended the national scopes of action for the change of the agricultural subsidies. 
I share the view of the EU Commission: consumer protection, environmental 
standards and social issues belong on the very top of the agenda of the WTO 
., ,554 
negotlatIOns. 
In the meantime, KUnast's ministry developed a concrete set of proposals for a new 
CAP, based on a mid-term review report of the Agenda 2000. The report is severely 
critical of the present system of CAP funding and accuses it of encouraging 
overproduction and waste 
'( ... ) EU agricultural policy contributes to overproduction and a lack of market 
orientation, as well as international competitiveness and negative consequences for 
nature and the environment, as well as the protection of animals could not fully be 
compensated through the introduction of agricultural environmental measures ( ... ) 
the large majority of the state expenses for the agricultural sector is still distributed 
SS4 'Regierungserk/tirung zur neuen Verbraucherschutz- und LandwirtschaJtspolitik', Rede der 
Bundesministerinfur Verbraucherschutz, Ernahrung und LandwirtschaJt, Renate Kunast im Deutschen 
Bundestag, 8 February 2001, www.verbraucherministerium.de/pressedienst/pd200)-06-7.htm. 
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regardless to ecological and other social achievements on the part of the 
agricultural sector and the agricultural policy is connected with a high level of 
bureaucracy. ,555 
Through a reformed CAP, orientated towards market demand and competition in 
tenns of the quality of agricultural products instead of production output, European 
agricultural products would become more competitive on the global scale. Instead of 
subsidising massive production outputs, the Kiinast paper calls for a gradual end to 
the link between production and payments and the introduction of a system of rewards 
for environmentally and animal friendly farming, based on national co-financing. This 
would have to include financial support for non-agricultural activities as part of a 
comprehensive program for the preservation of rural life. The aim of the German 
agriculture and consumer protection ministry's plan is the development of a more 
consumer-orientated agricultural CAP, which would end protectionism and artificial 
market interference: 
'Germany pursues the goal to orientate the Common Agricultural Policy more 
towards the interests of the consumers and therefore more towards the market. 
Agricultural production has to be orientated far more than at present towards 
economic, social and environmental principles. ,556 
During the 2002 German general election campaign, Chancellor Schroder himself 
emphasised that, as part of the completion of the enlargement negotiations, his 
administration would put substantial CAP reform high on the European reform 
agenda in a second term, Schroder focused strongly on the financial aspect of the 
CAP and made clear that his government would not agree to any further increases in 
the EU budget in order to subsidise the agricultural sectors of the accession 
candidates: 
S5S 'Position der Bundesregierung zur Zwischenbewertung der Agenda 2000 (Mid-Term-Review), 27 
February 2002, p. 2, http://www.verbraucherministerium.de/aktuelleslagenda-2000-
zwischenbewertung-27-2-2002:htm. 
SS6 Ibid, p.2. 
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'The extension of the existing agricultural policy to 25 member states would, in the 
final stage lead to annual costs of 8 billion Euros - a quarter of that, two billion 
Euros per year, would have to paid for by Germany ( ... ) We cannot agree to that, 
even if we wanted to ( ... ) The maximum limit of Germany's financial burden-
sharing has been reached.,557 
In contrast to his earlier stance and to the demands of his agricultural minister, the 
Chancellor made clear, however, that Germany would not call for a system of national 
co-financing in the upcoming negotiations on the budgetary arrangements for 
enlargement. Schroder rejected demands for such a system, because 'it will inevitably 
lead towards direct confrontation with France.,558 The way to the compromise on 
CAP between Schroder and French president Chirac at the EU summit in Brussels in 
October 2002, which surprised many, and especially the British government, can 
therefore already be detected in Schroder's statements during the election campaign. 
Against the background of scarce public finances in Germany, the uppermost priority 
with regard to CAP in the short term for Schroder was to limit the financial costs of 
CAP as part of the accession of the first ten new members from CEE in 2004. 
Because Schroder realised that this could only be achieved with the consent of France, 
he was ready to postpone fundamental reform of the way the CAP operates to a later 
date. 
This is certainly disappointing if one considers the ambitions in terms of CAP reform, 
which had again been set out in the red-green coalition agreement, which followed the 
narrow general election victory of Schroder's coalition in September 2002. 
The section on agricultural policy promises that the government would 'speak up for 
fundamental reform of the Common Agricultural Policy,559. 
557 'Die Erweiterung muss bezahlbar sein', Article by Gerhard SchrMer in the Frankfurter A//gemeine 
Sonntagszeitung, 16 July 2002. 
558 Ibid. 
559 'Emeuerung, Gerechtigkeit, Nachhaltigkeit - Fur ein wirtschafiliches starkes, soziales und 
okologisches Deutschland. Fur eine lebendige Demokratie', Koalitionsvertrag SPD-BUndnis90/GrUne, 
16 October 2002, p. 81, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Regierungl-.4311Koalitionsvertrag-I.-
PraeambeI. htm 
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A strong emphasis was put on the need to re-orientate the CAP towards consumer 
demands and to end distortions of competition through artificial subsidies and price 
setting in order to bring it in line with WTO standards of fair trade: 
'European agriculture has to be aligned with the principles of sustainability, 
compatible with the standards of the World Trade Organisation and orientated 
more towards consumer interests. Through a reduction of measures which distort 
the market, like internal price support, export refunds and state interventions in 
case of non-saleable surpluses, the producers shall be enabled to react to the 
signals of the market and the needs of consumers in a better way. This increases 
the conformity of the Common Agricultural Policy with the WTO and contributes 
to fair trade chances, especially for the developing countries. ,560 
Although the coalition agreement did not specifically mention the introduction of a 
system of national co-financing for the CAP, it was made clear that the German 
government would push towards greater independence with regard to the use of direct 
agricultural payments on the national level. The use of these payments would have to 
be determined by the individual national circumstances in each member state, based 
on environmentally friendly farming practices: 
'At the same time, these payments have to be linked with the fulfilment of certain 
standards in the area of environmental and animal protection. The proposals for a 
fairer social arrangement of the direct payments in the present member states and 
the use of the payments in each of the member states have to be arranged in a way, 
in order to achieve greater fairness, so that branches of production are assessed 
individually and no one-sided discrimination of regions continues or is brought 
about.,56! 
None of these far-reaching goals have been achieved in the compromise reached 
between France and Germany at the November 2002 Brussels summit. 
560 Ibid. 
561 Ibid. 
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The cap on expenditure for agriculture in the EU budget after 2007 until 2013 and the 
limitation of direct payments for the national agricultural sectors of the ten new 
member states between 2004 (25%) and 2007 (40%)562 is certainly a success for the 
German government in terms of limiting the costs of enlargement. Chancellor 
Schroder therefore pointed out that the Brussels compromise had achieved one of the 
essential German priorities in the enlargement process. The limitation of further 
expenditure for agriculture would be crucial for Germany in its desire to prevent any 
further increases in its role as the main net contributor to the EU budget: 
'It was also a big success, that the Brussels compromise on the stabilisation of the 
agricultural expenditure until the year 2013, which was based on the agreement 
between president Chirac and myself, has not been touched. Through this we have 
finally managed to get a permanent grip on the far biggest risk of expenditure.' 563 
Although the expenditure for agriculture will not rise for the foreseeable future as a 
result of the compromise, the substantial reform of how the CAP operates has been 
postponed once again, but certainly remains on the agenda. Schroder's current need to 
focus on urgent domestic political issues and his relative political weakness due to a 
majority of only six seats in the Bundestag, explain why the German government has 
not pushed towards a more substantial reform of the CAP at Brussels. 
Struggling to cope with Germany's economic problems, the Chancellor not only was 
anxious not to open another political front on the EU level, he also did not want to 
risk the start of enlargement by 2004 because of a row with France on agriculture. 
It can be expected, however, that Germany will again put the issue on the table at a 
later date. This will be the case either under a strengthened red-green coalition, once 
he Germany's economic performance has improved, or under a Conservative 
Chancellor, who will push even more towards fundamental CAP reform. 
562 Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions, 24/25 October 2002, pp. 4-6, 
http://ue.eu.intlnewsroom!makeFrame.asp?MAX=&BID=76&DID=72968&LANG=I&File=/pressDat 
aieniec172968.pdf&Picture=0. 
563 Regierungserklarung von Bundeskanzler Schroder zu den Ergebnissen des Europtiischen Rales in 
Kopenhagen. 19 December 2002, www.bundeskanzler.de/Regierungserklllrung-
8561.4555711a.htm?printView=y. 
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Schroder himself has already announced that his government will try to play a greater 
role 'in the active development of the reforms in the European Union' in the weeks 
and months to comeS64• 
At the December 2002 EU summit in Copenhagen, where the EU finalised the first 
wave of enlargement for 2004, Schroder has again shown that he is still strong enough 
to fight for German interests. He not only opposed Polish demands for additional 
support for its agricultural sectorS6S, but also insisted that Germany would only agree 
to the abolition of border controls with the new CEE member states, if they had 
reached the Schengen standardsS66 
Schroder's challenger for the Chancellorship at the 2002 general election, CSU leader 
Edmund Stoiber has for years shown a very critical attitude towards the enlargement 
process, which focuses even more on German interests than the red-green coalition. 
Stoiber, who has expressed his clear intentions to stand again as candidate in case of 
an early election in this parliament and his Bavarian CSU have close links with the 
German associations of exiles. The latter oppose the accession of countries such as 
Poland and the Czech Republic to the EU, as long as the issue of reparations for 
expulsions of Germans during the Second World War is not settled. This position has 
been adopted by the CSUS67• 
564 Regierungserklarung von Bundeskanzler Schroder zu den Ergebnissen des Europaischen Rates in 
Kopenhagen. 19 December 2002, www.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserkUirung-
8561.4555711a.htm?printView=y. 
565 The Times. 'Poland accepts compromise to join enlarged EU', 14 December 2002. 
566 In his statement on the Copenhagen summit in the Bundestag SchrMer emphasized that his 
government would see this as part of safeguarding security in an enlarged Europe 
(Regierungserk/arung von Bundeskanzler Schroder zu den Ergebnissen des Europaischen Rates in 
Kopenhagen, 19 December 2002, www.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserklarung-
8561.4555711a.htm?printView=y.). 
567 The CSU called for the rejection of set accession dates for the new members from Central and 
Eastern Europe and demanded 'a recognition of the legitimate demands of the German expellees' 
(,Position der CSU zur Osterweiterung der EU: Keine voreilige FestJegung von Beitrittsterminen', 
www.csu.delDieThemenlPositionen A-ZlEuropalOsterweiterung). 
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Both the CSU and its sister party outside Bavaria, the CDU568, have strongly 
supported the Schroder administrations demands for transitional periods. Especially 
the CSU, representing the interests of voters living in the regions of Bavaria, which 
border the Czech Republic, have called for long transitional periods with regard to the 
abolition of border controls with the new member states569, something which the red-
green coalition has supported at the Copenhagen summit. 
Both parties have also been very critical of the Franco-German compromise on CAP 
and have stressed that fundamental reform of the system of CAP would have to take 
place before the first CEE accession candidates enter the EU. The Bavarian Prime 
Minister Stoiber, who is dependent on strong political support of the rural regions of 
Bavaria, has called for a reform of the CAP, which would maintain the system of 
direct payments for farmers. This is very much in the interest of the large Bavarian 
agricultural sector, where farmers benefit from the present system of direct payments 
which are linked to production output. Even Stoiber has however supported the 
introduction of national co-financing into CAP as the only way of preventing the 
spiralling costs for agriculture in the long term570• 
The German insistence on a limitation of costs and a substantial reform of CAP would 
consequently remain after a change in government and would even become stronger 
should Stoiber again become official CDU/CSU candidate for the Chancellorship at 
the next election. Because of the strong impact the enlargement process will have on 
Germany as a country situated on the borderline between East and West, it is bound to 
raise demands to safeguard its own national interests and to take into account the 
concerns of the German people. However, these details should not lead one to lose 
sight of the fact that a general consensus amongst the German political and economic 
elites exists in favour of enlargement. 
568 For the latest CDU demands concerning the enlargement process see 'Wolfgang Schauble, Karl 
Lamers: Oberlegungen zur europllischen Politik', 1 September 2002, p. 10, http://www.cdu.de/politik-
a-zJeuropalschaeuble Jamers --papier _1 994.pdf. 
569 'Reformen fUr eine erweiterte Europllische Union', leadership motion passed at the 67th CSU party 
conference, 22/23 November 2002, Munich, pp. 4-5, 
http://www.csu.de!homelUploadedFiles/DokumentelLeitantrag Europa Beschluss 11.22.23.pdf. 
570 'Stoiber und EU-Agrarkommissar Fischler in MUnchen', CSU press notice, 7 November 2002, 
www.csu.de!home/DisplaylPolitiklThemenlEuropaleuosterw_290402. 
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The accession of the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe to the 
EU is seen as a historic chance to reunite the European continent and to bring security 
and economic stability to the whole of Europe. For Germany, the enlargement process 
is hence seen as the final removal of the results of the Second World War and the 
resulting division of Europe into two opposing ideological blocks. 
The strong German support for the process, which goes through all political parties is 
based on a mixture between historic compensation for the effects of the German 
hegemony during WW2, the desire to create an area of stability and security in 
Germany's immediate Eastern neighbourhood and to open up new export markets for 
German businesses and industry. 
As Foreign Minister Fischer pointed out in his speech to the Belgian parliament in 
November 2000, for Germany eastward enlargement 
'is an act of justice towards our Eastern neighbours and it is a compelling political 
necessity. Our continent could not withstand a permanent division between a 
Europe of integration and a Europe of balances, hegemonies and nationalism ( ... ) 
Enlargement is also a real win-win situation in economic terms, exactly as it was 
the case with the Southern enlargement ( ... ). We therefore do not integrate 
petitioners, but a booming region. With enlargement, the Union will gain in terms 
of political stability, economic, dynamic and international importance. We 
therefore have the greatest interest in realising enlargement as soon as possible. ,m 
Chancellor Schroder stressed in the wake of the December 2002 Copenhagen summit, 
where the details of the accession of ten new member states in 2004 were finalised by 
the EU heads of state, that the enlargement process provided the whole of Europe 
with 'the historic chance to turn this continent into an area of lasting peace and 
S7I Rede des Bundesministers des Auswiirtigen Joschka Fischer im be/gischen Par/amenl, Brussels, 14 
November 2002, 
http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/de/eu politik/aktuelles/ausgabe archiv?archiv id=1017&tvoe i 
d=3&bereich id=O. 
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welfare for its citizens,572. The Chancellor also emphasised the cross-party consensus 
on support for enlargement when he called the successful conclusion of the 
Copenhagen summit as 'a late - and well-earned success of Willy Brandt and Helmut 
Kohl,573. However, Schroder admitted that Germany did not only support the 
enlargement process out of a feeling of gratitude but that there were also essential 
benefits for Germany in terms of security and economic development: 
'It would be insincere to deny that the enlargement, which has been decided in 
Copenhagen is also very much in our own national interest ( ... ) The advantages for 
our employers are obvious: accelerated growth increases the demand for imports in 
these countries and through that improves our export chances. But it would be 
wrong to limit the view to economic issues. We will gain an increase in terms of 
security ( ... ). Enlargement will contribute to the further improvement and the 
intensification of the co-operation between the police forces in Europe. ,574 
For Germany, enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe will certainly bring 
substantial economic benefits. The CEE applicant countries have become crucial 
trading partners for Germany. German business and industry have an especially high 
trade turnover with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The annual German 
trade turnover with Poland grew from £ 17.2 million in 2000 to £ 18.7 million in 
2001, the Czech Republic from £ 16.7 million to £ 19.1 million, and with Hungary 
from £ 13.6 million to £ 14.6 million575. In terms of the order of rank of trading 
partners for Germany, the CEE countries are high up on the list. 
S72 'Auf dem Weg zu einer erweiterten Eurpiiischen Union', Gennan government press release, 13 
December 2002, http://www.bundesregierung.de/N achrichtenl Artikel-,434 .454 204IEU-kann-zehn-
neue-Mitglieder-a.htm. 
573 Regierungserklarung von Bundeskanzler Schroder zu den Ergebnissen des Europiiischen Rates in 
Kopenhagen, 19 December 2002, www.bundeskanzler.de/Regierungserklllrung-
8561.4555711a.htm?printView=y 
574 Ibid. 
575 'Au,Penhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland mU der GUS, den mittel- und osteuropiiischen 
Liindern und dem ehemaligen Jugos/awien " source: Statistisches Bundesamt. 
http://www.destatis.de/themenld/tbrnaussen.htm. 
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Especially with regard to exports, which is crucial for an export nation like Germany, 
Poland was 10th in the list of main trading partners in 200 I, followed by the Czech 
Republic Cllth) and Hungary CI5th)s76. 
The German government has pointed out that the importance of trade with the CEE 
applicant countries is expected to increase even further in the coming years. 
Chancellor Schroder told German business representatives on the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the Eastern Europe committee of Gennan business that German trade 
with the CEE candidate countries has grown by 13% in 2001 to £ 91.8 million. This 
would turn the CEE region into a more important export-trading partner for German 
business and industry than the United StatesS77. Schroder therefore again stressed the 
economic potential that eastward enlargement will bring for Germany, especially in 
terms of improving the country's weak post-unification economic perfonnance: 
'If you look at the growth estimates of the countries in Central- and Eastern Europe 
and consider the German share in it, then it becomes obvious, that this process of 
the unification of Europe is a process, which is not only owed to peace and balance 
and welfare for all, but literally lies in Germany's very own national interest C ••• ) 
Higher investment, greater flow of capital and a close co-operation between West-
and East-European businesses will accelerate growth. ,578 
Foreign Minister Fischer even called it an 'economic program for East Germany,S79, 
which would open new economic opportunities for the economically still relatively 
weak East German regions. 
S76 'Rangfolge der Handelspartner im Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 200]', source: 
Statistisches Bundesamt, 2002, httj?:llwww.destatis.de/downloadlausshlaussh dlrang 1 d.pdf. 
S77 'Schroder: EU-Erweiterung brigt gewaltiges wirtschaftliches Potential for Deutschland', Gennan 
government press release, 3 December 2002, httj?:llwww.bundesregierung.delNachrichtenlArtikel-
,434.452579/Schroeder-EU-Erweiterung-birgt.htm. 
S78 Ibid. 
579 'Die Osterweiterung der EU wird ein Konjunkturprograrrun ftIr den Osten', Interview with Foreign 
Minister Fischer with the Volksstimme Magdeburg. 15 August 2002, httj?:llwww.auswaertiges-
amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitiklausgabe archiv?archiv id=3470&bereich id=17&tvpe id=4. 
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The main German trade association, the German Industry and Trade Conference 
(Deutscher Industrie und Handelskammertag) is therefore strongly supportive of swift 
enlargement in order to extend the Single European Market and to provide German 
business and industry with a larger export market. In its 13 demands on EU reform 
and enlargement, the DIHK states that EU enlargement is 'indispensable, has to come 
quickly and must not be delayed'. The paper emphasises the advantages of 
enlargement for Gennan business and calls on the Gennan government not to hamper 
the process by demands on transitional arrangements: 
'Accession to the EU has a twofold effect: on the one hand it helps to ease the 
process of renewal and modernisation in the accession countries and therefore 
contributes to political, economic and judicial stability and creates positive 
impulses for domestic businesses. On the other hand, enlargement creates the 
biggest economic area world-wide: The enlarged Single Market enables all 
businesses use common procedures and allows business engagement on all markets 
of the European Union under the same conditions ( ... ),580 . 
The DIHK wants enlargement as quick as possible, and therefore opposes the 
introduction of transitional periods for the applicant countries with regard to the free 
movement of labour and service industries. From the point of view of Gennan 
industry, such transitional periods would not protect the German labour market but 
make its overdue recovery much more difficult: 
'If too many transitional periods and expectations are pennitted for the European 
Single Market in the negotiations with the accession countries, the desired effects 
of the accession with regard to prosperity will not be achieved. This is especially 
the case, if the four basic freedoms of the Single European Market (free movement 
of people, services, goods and capital) are affected in principle ( ... ). Generally, the 
limitation of the accession to the labour market is hardly useful in fighting 
unemployment. 
580 'Warum Ja zur EU-Erweiterung? 13 Thesen und Forderungen des DIHK zum Rejormprozess der 
EU und zur Erweiterung', p. 3, www.diht.de/inhaltldownloadlThesen-EU.de. 
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The comprehensive movement of production of German businesses to Central and 
Eastern Europe show that, under such circumstances, the investments 'travel' 
towards the employees in order to secure competitiveness. ,581 
For Germany, eastward enlargement is consequently a necessity in order to ensure 
that economic prosperity, security and democracy prevails on the whole of the 
continent. From the German perspective, the strengthening of the ideal of European 
unity can only be achieved if it is not limited to the Western half of the continent, but 
includes Central and Eastern European countriesS82• In the words of Chancellor 
Schroder, who uses Willy Brandt's famous quote on German reunification: 'What 
belongs together, now grows together in Europe,s83. 
The UK strongly shares Germany's commitment towards the enlargement process. 
Britain has traditionally been a staunch supporter of the widening of the Community. 
Under Conservative administrations, the accession of new member states were mainly 
seen as an opportunity to slow down the process of the deepening of integration 
(Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 2001, p. 7). New Labour approaches 
enlargement from a different perspective and sees it as an opportunity to enhance 
security and economic stability for the whole of Europe. The focus in this respect is 
very much on finally removing the leftovers of the Cold War division in Europe. The 
New Labour government thus shares the German feeling of owing gratitude to the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe for the fact that they had not been able to 
share freedom and economic prosperity after the end of WW2. As Labour MP Gisela 
Stuart explained during our conversation in the House of Commons: 
581 Ibid, p. 4. 
582 In his statement on the EU summit in Copenhagen, Foreign Minister Fischer said: 'We face a 
historic decision, namely the decision, that the European Union develops from the West European 
Union into a Common European Union.' (Rede von BundesaufJenminister Fischer vor dem Deutschen 
Bundestag im Rahmen der Haushaltsdebatte u.a. zur Bekdmpfung des Internationalen Terrorismus, 
zum Irak, zum EU-Gipfel in Kopenhagen und der Frage des EU-Beitritts der Turkei, 4 December 2002, 
http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/de/infoservice/ausgabe _ archiv?archiv _id=3 832&type _id=3&ber 
eichjd=O). 
583 'SchrOder: Jetzt wachst zusammen, was zusammen gehOrt', German government press release, 13 
December 2002, http://www.bundesregierung.delNachrichtenlArtikel-.434.454823/Schroeder-Jetzt-
waechst-zusamm.htm. 
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'For the Brits it's about bringing back into Europe countries who they have always 
felt rightfully belonged to Europe. Particularly if you talk about Poland and the 
Czech Republic- it's about redefining Europe again ( ... ) To me that's the big idea, 
even 10 or 20 years ago, that has always been the big idea behind the Union, with 
the back against the Berlin Wall. I had to explain to my kids - what's so important 
about it - is to make enlargement happen. ,584 
Moreover, for the British government, enlarging the EU further is seen as the only 
way to overcome the problems facing Europe today. Economic division, political 
instability and resulting mass migration into the present EU member states could only 
be stopped, if the latter would be willing to share the advantages of the Single Market 
with their neighbours in the East and the South-East of Europe. The Prime Minister 
has therefore repeatedly expressed his government's strong determination to act as the 
leading advocate for enlargement within the EU: 
'Without enlargement, Western Europe will always be faced with the threat of 
instability, conflict and mass migration on its borders. Without enlargement, the 
political consensus behind economic and political reform in the weaker transition 
countries may splinter. Should that happen we would all lose. That is why 
supporting enlargement in principle but delaying in practice is no longer good 
enough. ,585 
While most other member states, including Germany were at times undecided about 
the timetable for the first wave of enlargement, the Blair administration has followed 
a consistent line. Throughout all the negotiations on enlargement, it became the main 
promoter of entry of the first group of candidates before the next European Parliament 
elections in 2004, so that the new member states would be able to participate in them 
as full members. 
584 Interview with Gisela Stuart MP, House of Commons, 25 July 2002. 
585 Prime Minister'S speech to the Polish Stock exchange, 6 October 2000, 
www.number-IO.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId= 1341 &Sectionld=32. 
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The Prime Minister was the ftrst EU leader to commit himself to that date in his 
Warsaw speech in October 2000586. The 2001 Labour general election manifesto 
pledged that the government would 'do all it can to enable the ftrst group of applicant 
countries to join in time to take part in the next European Parliamentary elections in 
2004,587. 
In contrast to Germany, which as a border country in the heart of the European 
continent has reason to consider safeguards on border controls, free movement of 
labour and services, Britain has fewer reservations about the implications of the 
enlargement process. As a country which is distant from Central and Eastern Europe 
and rather isolated from the continent in geographic terms, it therefore adopts a much 
wider focus on enlargement than Germany. Especially since the events of Kosovo and 
September 11 tb, the British government strongly supports membership of countries, 
which are considered to be at or even beyond the margins of Europe. While the strong 
British support for Turkish membership is controversial amongst the present 15 EU 
member states, the British call to include the states from former Jugoslavia is met 
with huge scepticism, especially in Germany. 
In his speech on the occasion of the reception of the Charlemagne prize in Aachen in 
1999, Tony Blair had spoken of a 'moral duty' to extend the EU to the battered 
Balkan countries: 
'Events in Kosovo also bring home to us the urgency of enlargement. The things 
the front line states want from us above all else is the prospect of membership of 
the European Union. I do not underestimate the difficulties involved in extending 
enlargement to these countries, or in the necessary transition to their economies. 
586 In his speech at the Polish Stock Exchange, Blair said: 'I will be urging Europes political leaders to 
commit themselves to a specific framework leading to an early end of the negotiations and accession. I 
want to see new member states participating in the European Parliamentary elections in 2004 and 
having a seat at the table at the next IGC.' (Prime Minister's speech to the Polish Stock exchange, 6 
October 2000, www.number-IO.gov.uk/news.asp?Newsld=1341&Sectionld=32). 
587 'Ambitions for Britain', Labour general election manifesto 200 I, p.38. 
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But I do believe we have a moral duty to offer them the hope of membership of the 
EU and move as fast as we can to make that prospect a reality. ,588 
The British government has since then remained committed to the long-term goal of 
not letting enlargement end at the borders of the present accession candidates. The 
former Minister for Europe, Peter Hain, now Secretary of State for Wales, only 
recently confirmed that the British government still sees Balkan countries such as 
Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro as potential EU candidates. This would be part of an 
attempt to 'accelerate modernisation and democratisation in that part of the world' 589. 
The British government has also been a strong advocate for early entry of the two 
CEE countries, which were not able to fulfil the accession criteria in the first place, 
namely Romania and Bulgaria. Britain hence pushed towards the acceptance of 2007 
as a definite accession date for these two countries at the Brussels and Copenhagen 
summits. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw made clear in a press conference on October 
2rd 2002 that the British government would see this as a necessary step in order to 
show that the EU is determined not to let enlargement end after the accession of the 
first 10 applicants: 
'Brussels must also agree m our view that European Union expanSIOn IS a 
continuing process, not a one off. Whether it is agreed at Brussels or at 
Copenhagen, we strongly support Romania and Bulgaria's objective of a 2007 
target date for entry into the European Union. ,590 
With regard to the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the British government was 
strongly supported by Germany. 
588 'The new challenge for Europe', Tony Blair's speech at Charlemagne Prize reception, Aachen, 20 
May 1999, www.number-IO.gov.uk/ouqmt/page 922.asp. 
589 'The case for EU enlargement', Statement given by FCO minister for Europe, Peter Hain, 
Westminster Hall, 16 April, 2002, www.fco.gov.uklnews/newstext.asp?6136. 
590 Government press briefing by the Foreign Secretary, 23 October 2002, 
www.pm.gov.uklprintipage6361.asp. 
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Gennan Foreign Minister Fischer told the Frankfurter Rundschau in the run-up to the 
EU summit in Copenhagen that the German government would 'support Romania and 
Bulgaria in their goal, to become members in 2007'591. The British-German support 
for the accession of Romania and Bulgaria was a crucial factor in setting out the 
objective of accession by 2007 in the Presidency conclusions of the Copenhagen 
summit592 
While widespread consent between British and German elites exists that Romania and 
Bulgaria should become part of the EU before the end of the decade, Britain and 
Germany still disagree on the scope of the enlargement process. While the British 
hardly see any limits to the enlargement process as part of a desire to bring democracy 
and economic stability to as many parts of the European continent as possibles93, 
German political elites are much more sceptical about the notion of an 'open Europe'. 
The issue of Turkish EU membership continues to be very controversial in Germany, 
with the red-green coalition only cautiously having agreed to open up a membership 
option. Although the government basically supports Turkish entry into the EU, it was 
not ready to go as far as the British, who wanted a 'flrm date set'594 for the beginning 
of accession negotiations with the country. 
591 Interview with Foreign Minister Fischer in the Frankfurter Rundschau, 13 December 2002, 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/index-.413.454707IInterview-von-Bundesaussenmini.htm. 
592 See Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 12/13 December 2002, 
htm://ue.eu.intlnewsroom!LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=73774&from=EuropeanCouncil&LANG=I. 
593 A Foreign and Commonwealth Office representative from the enlargement section, who prefers to 
be anonymous told me in February 200 I that there would be no official government line on where 
enlargement should end or which countries should defmitely be excluded from the process (Interview 
with desk officer from the FeO enlargement section, 26 February 2002). 
The new Minister for Europe, Denis MacShane told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee during his 
first examination in December 2002 that the British government would support further waves of 
enlargement towards the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the Balkan region (House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Examination of Witnesses Mr Denis Mac Shane MP, Minister for 
Europe, Mr Peter Ricketts, Political Director and Mr Simon Featherstone, Head, European Union 
Department (External), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 December 2002, question 64, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uklpa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/ucI76-ilucI7601.htm). 
594 See 'Critical decisions for the EU', Address of Foreign Secretary jack Straw to the Press Gallery of 
the House of Commons, 5 December 2002, 
http://www. fco.gov .uklservletlFront?pagename=OpenMarket/XceleratelShowPage&c=Page&cid= I 007 
029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1039013805106. 
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Germany was much more cautious in this respect and sided with France, traditionally 
a sceptical country with regard to eastward enlargement, in only agreeing to the start 
of accession talks with Turkey in 2005, after the country's progress will have been 
reviewed again in 2004595 . The British Prime Minister expressed his disappointment 
about the decision reached at Copenhagen596, but stressed that Britain would continue 
to support Turkish membership as part of a desire to include Turkey into the Western 
family of democratic nations: 
'I believe it is massively in our interests to see Turkey as a modem democratic 
partner in Europe. For that reason, 1 have been urging our partners to offer Turkey 
a date to open negotiations for membership provided that the so called Copenhagen 
criteria are met.' 597 
For the British government, Turkish EU membership is indispensable in order to 
succeed in the efforts to maintain a link between the West and the Islamic world. 
Membership of the EU should prevent this country, which is situated at a crucial 
strategic position between Europe and the Middle East, from turning its back on the 
West and Europe, which, from the British point of view, would be a major setback in 
the fight against international terrorism: 
'Britain has taken a lead in this and not just, as much of the press have reported, 
out of a geostrategic interest because Turkey obviously is a very important nation, 
but also because the Turks, who seek modernisation, who support democracy and 
human rights, are all looking to the EU for encouragement. Also, because the prize 
of having an Islamic or Moslem democracy operating internationally, abiding by 
European values, is an enormous prize.' 598 
S9S The Guardian, 'Franco-German show of strength puts America and friends in their place', 14 
December 2002 and Financial Times, 'Setback for Turkey over EU entry', 13 December 2002. 
596 At a press briefmg in Copenhagen, Blair stated: 'Turkey would have liked an earlier date ( ... ) Now I 
think it is always the case that people at these European Councils, I think we all know this, never get 
absolutely everything they want, but this is a huge step forward after four decades of trying.' (Press 
briefmg during a doorstep interview in Copenhagen, www.number-1O.gov.uklprintlpage6832.asp). 
597 Prime Minister's state on European Council in Copenhagen, House of Commons, 16 December 
2002, www.number-IO.gov.uklprintlpage6843.asp. 
598 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Examination of Witnesses Mr Denis Mac 
Shane MP, Minister for Europe, Mr Peter Ricketts, Political Director and Mr Simon Featherstone, 
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The German government supports the British desire to take Turkey into the EU in 
order to prevent it from falling increasingly under Islamic influence instead of 
continuing a course of modernisation. Foreign Minister Fischer defended the 
government's principal support for Turkish membership against fierce criticism from 
the opposition in the Bundestag. Fischer pointed out that the EU would have a duty to 
offer Turkey a realistic perspective towards entry if it wanted to be successful in its 
attempts to prevent further terrorism against the West: 
'Since September 11th the question of the Eastern border of the European Union 
has to be seen differently from before - we have to finally realise this - and the 
strategic threat to our security will basically come from this area ( ... ) The decisive 
question will be: ( ... ) Is there a big Islamic country that is able to take the path 
towards successful modernisation based on the principles of the rule of law and a 
market economy, yes or no? If Turkey succeeds in doing that, then this will be the 
most important success in the fight against international terrorism, more important 
than what we discuss with regard to the military budget and other things.,S99 
Chancellor Schroder justified the German government's position on Turkey by 
stressing that Turkey could have a crucial bridge function between Europe and the 
Middle East. Schroder emphasised that Germany would in the end only support 
Turkish membership if the country fulfilled all the membership criteria by 2004. 
However, to rule out Turkish membership in principle would amount to a cultural 
battle between Europe and the Islamic region: 
'Turkey can - and I say again: if its citizens want it - become an important, maybe 
the most important bride between continental Europe and the Eastern 
Mediterranean ( ... ). Who however approves Turkish membership of the Alliance, 
but rules out its membership of Europe - acts contradictory ( ... ). Who wants to 
initiate a new cultural battle on the issue of Turkish accession - according to the 
Head, European Union Department (External), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 December 
2002, question 12, http://www .publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaffluc 176-
ilue 1760 l.htm 
S99 Rede von BundesaujJenminister Fischer vor dem Deutschen Bundestag ;m Rahmen der 
Haushaltsdebatte, 4 December 2002, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/www/de/infoserviee/ausgabe archiv?archiv id=3832&type id=3&bereich id=O. 
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motto: Christian West against Islam - tries to fool people to believe that Muslims 
could be kept out of our cultures and religions. ,600 
The CDU/CSU opposition in Germany strongly opposes the government's position on 
the issue. Both parties have made it clear that they want to fundamentally rule of 
Turkish EU membership on the grounds that Turkey as a semi-Islamic nation would 
not fit into an EU, which is based on the values of Christianity and Enlightenment. 
The CDU European policy spokesman Wolf gang Schauble has called on the 
government to stop sending false signals to Turkey, which would raise hopes that the 
country could become a EU member. Schauble called for an honest admission on the 
part of Germany and the EU, that Turkey could not belong to the EU, because it 
would not be part of the historic set of values, which have developed in Central 
Europe: 
'The truth is however, that countries, like Turkey or also Russia, which are only 
situated in Europe to a smaller extent anyway, cannot belong to a European Union, 
which wants to be more than a free trade area. The European Union is based on a 
common history, corresponding values and a grown identity of the citizens in the 
member states. You cannot simply put this on. And therefore it is also not in the 
interest of the Turks to deny their own roots and to give up the Turkish identity.,601 
The CSU is even fiercer in its opposition towards Turkish entry into the EU, CSU 
leader and Bavarian Prime Minister Stoiber has categorically ruled out Turkish 
membership of the EU, and has instead called on the EU to offer Turkey a special 
associated status, based on bilateral agreements,602 Ingo Friedrich, member of the 
CSU's leadership committee, has emphasised that Turkish membership would bring 
serious problems for both the EU and the country itself. 
600 Regierungserkliirung von Bundeskanzler Schroder zu den Ergebnissen des Europdischen Rates in 
Kopenhagen, Berlin, 19 December 2002, www.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserklaerung-
.8561.4555711a.htm?printView=y. 
601 'EU-Beitritt der Tllrkei ist "falsch und gefilhrlich"', Interview with CDU European spokesman 
Wolfgang Sch1!uble, www.cdu.de/ueber-uns/buvo/schaeuble/ws-271102.htm. 
602 Suddeutsche Zeitung, 'Stoiber und Merkel gegen Aufnahme der Turkei in die EU·. 22 November 
2002. 
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Friedrich argues that Turkey would not only be split between a European and an 
Islamic identity but would also be far too big with regard to the size of its population 
in order to fit into the 'delicate structural framework of the EU'. Moreover, Friedrich 
points out that a real prospect of EU membership might lead to the political break up 
of Turkey and to possible mass migration from neighbouring countries, such as 
Iran603• 
Opposition to Turkish membership and to an unlimited expansion of the EU in 
general does however, also meet the opposition of members within the government's 
own camp. The German EU Commissioner Giinter Verheugen, a former party 
chairman of the SPD, has warned about making promises on early entry for Turkey. 
Verheugen named the year 2013 as the earliest possible date on which Turkey would 
be able to join the EU without seriously disrupting EU business604• 
The SPD MEP Gerhard Schmid, vice president of the European parliament is part of 
those within Schr<>der's party, who share the Conservative opposition's reservations 
about Turkish membership. Schmid told me in June 2001 that his opposition to 
Turkish membership is based on a general refusal to accept that the enlargement 
process should have no limits. Schmid is generally critical of the speed of the 
enlargement process, which he sees in danger of 'neglecting the effects on ordinary 
people' 60S. He would therefore like to see the process of enlargement come to an end 
after the accession of the 10 new member states in 2004 and would not only want to 
rule out the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, but also of Turkey or countries from 
any other regions, such as the Balkans. Like the CDU/CSU, Schmid believes that an 
unlimited expansion would only be possible if it would be a free trade area. 
Because the EU is based on a social and cultural model, characterised by the 
participation of labour and solidarity mechanisms, as well as a set of values which 
developed out of the enlightenment and Christian belief, there would be limits to how 
603 Interview with Ingo Friedrich, MEP, Gunzenhausen, Germany, 31 March 200 I. 
604 Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 'Zeitplanfiir Beitritt der Tiirlcei bleibt stritfig', 10 December 2002. 
605 Interview with Gerhard Schmid, MEP, Regensburg, Germany, 18 June 2001. 
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far it could absorb countries from different cultural areas. Schmid therefore would 
even reject the membership of a fully democratic and modernised Turkey606. 
This shows that in terms of the definition of the extent of Europe a fundamental gap 
between British and German elites remain, as the uneasiness about enlargement of the 
EU into a Community of 27 and more is still met with great scepticism amongst 
representatives from any political direction. In this respect Germany will always be 
slightly closer to France than to the British perspective. 
While Britain favours an EU which includes as many countries as possible as a 
safeguard against instability and ethnic conflict, France and Germany are much more 
concerned about the negative effects of such a Europe 'from the Atlantic to the Ural'. 
For France, the main fear is that it might be increasingly marginalised in its leadership 
role in a Union, which continues to enlarge. 
France has traditionally had closer links with the Southern Mediterranean countries 
than to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The fear that Germany might 
become the centre of attention in such a Europe, and form leadership coalitions with 
other big member states, such as Poland and the UK, is still prevailing amongst the 
French political elite (Guerin-Sendelbach and Schild, 2002, p.51). From the German 
perspective, the major concern with regard to a swift enlargement process, which goes 
beyond a Europe of 27 or even 25, is an ever-increasing financial burden on the 
existing member states, especially Germany itself. Moreover, amongst the opponents 
of further enlargement in Germany, a widespread feeling exists that the political elite 
in Europe would expect too much from the citizens in present member states, if they 
continued to enlarge the EU further and further. As MEP Gerhard Schmid made clear 
in his press release on Turkish membership in 2001 
'An endless enlargement would weaken the EU and in the end lead to its 
destruction. What would then remain would be nothing else but a gigantic, 
Eurasian free trade zone with an intensive political co-operation of its member 
states ( ... ). 
606 Ibid. 
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( ... ) Above all, a democratically drawn up EU cannot be enlarged arbitrarily ( ... ). 
The European Union, in which solidarity amongst its members and associated 
financial transfers have to exist, will only last. if this is indeed supported by its 
citizens. ,607 
For Germany as a country which finds itself in the immediate geographical 
neighbourhood of the applicant countries, the discussion about enlargement has been 
and will continue to be more controversial than in the British case. 
Britain is the only EU member state which not only has established bilateral action 
plans with every single candidate country, which provide financial support in order to 
speed up the accession process608. It has also abstained from demanding transitional 
periods for the 10 new member states. As a result, citizens from each of the ten new 
member states will be allowed to move to and work in the UK once their countries 
have joined the EU in 2004 609. Because of its geographical proximity to the new 
members, Germany, on the other hand, had to insist on a transitional period on the 
free movement of people and services in order to calm domestic fears about mass 
immigration and the influx of cheap labour, especially in the border regions. 
Although Germany has hence sided with France on slowing down the accession 
process of Turkey and has insisted on transitional periods for the new member states, 
it is still a fully committed supporter of enlargement. Further waves of enlargement 
would certainly find less German support under a government led by a CDU/CSU 
Chancellor than under the present leadership. 
607 'Teilnahme der Turkei am RatstrefJen in Malmo - Ein falsches Signal', Press release by Gerhard 
Schmid, vice president of the European Parliament, 25 April 2001, www.euroschmid.derrEXTElOl-
04-25 turkei-beitritt.html. 
608 See 'The case for EU enlargement' , Statement given by FCO Minister for Europe, Peter Hain, 
Westminster Hall, 16 April 2002, www.fco.gov.uklnewslnewstext.asp?6136. 
609 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Examination of Witnesses Mr Denis Mac 
Shane MP, Minister for Europe, Mr Peter Ricketts, Political Director and Mr Simon Featherstone, 
Head, European Union Department (External), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 December 
2002, question 32, http://www .publications.parliament.uklpa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc 176-
iluc 1760 l.htm 
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However, any German government would be interested in working towards the swift 
integration of the 10 new members which will join in 2004. In spite of their different 
approaches to the enlargement issue, Britain and Germany are therefore the two larger 
member states among the present 15, which have a definite interest in successfully 
concluding the accession of the ten candidates (and very likely Romania and Bulgaria 
in 2007). In this respect, they have a number of corresponding interests related to the 
process. 
Both the UK and Germany are basically in favour of fundamental reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy. This will therefore be an issue, which will definitely be 
on the agenda again, once the first members states have gained entry and the 
accession of further member states loom. Especially Britain will continue to press the 
other EU member states on the issue and is likely to win support not only from the 
new members but also from the German side once its domestic problems have eased. 
The Prime Minister has made clear that the Franco-German compromise on a limit for 
CAP spending is not an acceptable substitute for substantial reform of the structure of 
CAP: 
'( ... ) There were two quite separate aspects to the French-German deal ( ... ). 
The positive one was to put a cap on CAP spending after 2006 ( ... ). What is 
unacceptable as the price of that though, is that you take Common Agricultural 
Policy reform prior to 2006 off the table.'6lO 
In Germany, the discussion about CAP reform is certainly driven much more by the 
issues of environmental and consumer protection, areas which have traditionally been 
more important in Germany than in any other member state and which are kept on the 
agenda by the Green Party, especially by the agricultural minister Kiihnast. However, 
both Britain and Germany favour reform of the CAP towards deregulation and market 
liberalisation in order to bring it in line with WTO standards. As Peter Hain stressed 
during his examination at the House of Commons Foreign Affairs committee in July 
2002, Britain wants a system that is close to the proposals of the German agricultural 
ministry. 
610 Prime Minister'S press conference,S November 2002, www.pm.gov.uklprintlpage6475.asp .. 
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Such a reformed system would have to focus on encouraging competitiveness and 
support for rural life in general, leading to a fairer deal for the developing countries 
within the WTO system: 
'There is quite a long way to go on all of this, but we want to see a situation where 
direct payments supporting production, often wastefully and artificially, are 
replaced by development assistance to support the rural economy, rural enterprise 
including agriculture, diversification, value added products and so on, so that 
Europe's agricultural sector becomes much more modem and competitive, and that 
is the way we would want to see it go ( ... ). A very important factor in all of this 
which is often neglected is opening up markets to developing countries. If we are 
serious about poor countries in Africa, for example, being able to generate strong 
economies and create strong economies which make them less dependent on 
ourselves for aid and help them to escape from poverty, then we need to have a 
Europe which is not a fortressed Europe against poor countries but one that lifts its 
tariffs and its agricultural barriers including massive bloated subsidies. ,611 
The essential consensus between Britain and Germany on the issue, which has 
temporarily been blurred by the Franco-German compromise at Brussels, is therefore 
a strong fundament for a future initiative on real reform. Should such an initiative find 
the support of a number of the new member states after 2004, France could indeed 
finally find itself sidelined by a large reform coalition on CAP, led by Britain and 
Germany. The strong British support for EU enlargement is consequently also rooted 
in the hope that new member states will further weaken the influence of traditional 
interests and alliances, such as that of France on CAP. As the Prime Minister stressed 
in his assessment of the Copenhagen results, Britain supports the accession of new 
members from Central- and Eastern Europe because these countries would show a 
similar reluctance to accept centralism and protectionism as the British: 
611 House of Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny, Examination of Witnesses, Rt Hon 
Peter Hain MP and Mr Nick Baird, 16 July 2002, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uklpalcm200102/cmselect/cmeuleg/1112/2071601.htm. 
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'The new member states are countries who have only recently rediscovered their 
national identity. They, like us, will want the further integration of the Union to be 
firmly rooted in the democratic accountability of the nation state. They shall be our 
allies in developing a European Union on those lines. ,612 
Germany and the UK also have a common interest in enhancing security in Europe as 
a result of the enlargement process. Both countries support the accession of the new 
member states in order to integrate them into a common security framework, which 
will combine enhanced co-operation on defence and justice and home affairs. 
In this respect, it is important to note that the British government is now ready to 
agree to an extension of QMV to most matters concerning justice and home affairs. 
However, Britain still wants to retain control over its own national borders and simply 
enhance co-operation between border police services on an intergovernmental 
level613 . As the Prime Minister stressed, this could result in the development of a 
fully integrated Justice and Home Affairs pillar in an enlarged EU, where the member 
states co-operate ever closer on the fight against crime and terrorism: 
'I do believe it is time to communitise much of the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar 
( ... ). It will mean integrated and effective action on issues to do with organised 
crime, drug dealing, asylum and immigration that affect all of Europe, cause huge 
distress and difficulty and cannot seriously be tackled by nations alone. ,614 
The new British stance on JHA in the run-up to the accession of the first CEE member 
states corresponds with the German position, with the exception that Germany would 
also like to see the development of an integrated European police force as part of the 
612 Prime Minister's statement on the Copenhagen European Council, 16 December 2002, 
www.number-IO.gov.uk/printJpage6843.asp. 
613 See House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Examination of Witnesses, the Rt Hon Jack 
Straw MP, Peter Ricketts CMG and Mr Kim Darroch, 13 March 2002, questions 5 and 8, 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselctJ698/2031304.htm. 
614 'A clear course for Europe', Speech by the Prime Minister to an audience in Cardiff, 28 November 
2002, www.number-IO.gov.uklprintJpage6710.asp. 
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harmonisation of border controls61S• Britain and Gennany are nevertheless closer on 
the issue of the harmonisation of JHA than ever before. 
This is also the case with regard to the economic interests in the enlargement process. 
Whereas trade with the CEE region has traditionally been less important for the UK. 
than for Gennany (Lippert, Hughes, Grabbe and Becker, 2001, p. 9), its importance 
for British businesses and industry continues to grow. 
In 2001, Poland and the Czech Republic were ranked at the lower middle of Britain's 
top 50 export markets616 and the British government estimates that the enlargement to 
the first group of new members will boost the British GDP by up £2 billion617• 
Although the UK's economic links with the region are not as strong as those of 
Gennany at present, they are likely to gain greater importance for British business and 
industry after 2004. 
In contrast to France, which has reluctantly agreed to the process to slow it down as 
much as possible, Britain and Gennany share a lot of common interests on 
enlargement. Both support the model of an EU which goes beyond that of the present 
15 member states and brings in those countries which had been imprisoned behind the 
Iron Curtain for more 40 years, while the French would prefer to focus on the 
deepening of integration amongst the present 15 members618• The enlargement 
process offers British and Gennan leaders the chance to realise their ambition to 
enhance security and stability for the European continent, an issue which has become 
crucial in the face of the post-September 11 rh global situation. 
615 see 'Erneuerung, Gerechtigkeit, Nachhaltigkeit - Fur ein wirtschaftliches starkes. soziales und 
okologisches Deutschland Fur eine lebendige Demokratie', Koalitionsvertrag SPD-BOndnis90/Glilne, 
16 October 2002, p. 79, http://www.bundesregierung.delRegierungl-.431IKoalitionsvertrag-I.-
Praeambel.htm 
616 National Statistics: Monthly review of External trade statistics, October 2002, HM Stationary 
Office, http://www.statistics.gov.ukldownloadsltheme economyIMm24 Oct02.pdf. 
617 Government press briefing by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, 23 October 2002, 
www.pm.gov .uk/printlpage6361.asp. 
618 Jacques Chirac stressed in his speech in the German Bundestag in June 2000 that the process of 
enlargement should not be swift, but rather a gradual, emerging process, in which new Community 
members fit into the existing framework of the EU (Rede von Jacques Chirac, dem Prlisidenten der 
Republik Frankreich, vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 27 June 2000, www.bundestag.de/cgi-
binldruck.pl?N=default). 
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Moreover, an enlarged EU holds the prospect of shifting the centre of gravity towards 
new leadership coalitions, which could make it easier for both Britain and Germany to 
achieve the fundamental institutional and procedural reforms they strive for. 
Especially for Britain, an enlarged EU offers the chance to reposition itself within the 
Community and to become one of the leading address contacts for the new member 
states besides Germany. In spite of their different approaches and interests in the 
process, the British and German drive towards reform will be crucial for the 
successful integration of the first 10 members in 2004. Both countries are also likely 
to be the main advocates for further waves of enlargement, although admittedly with a 
different degree of enthusiasm, which is bound the be less in the German case, as long 
as its economic performance remains poor. Overall, however, enlargement remains 
the one major EU project, on which British-German co-operation is not only most 
likely to occur, but where it is also indispensable in order to make the process work. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion: The significance of British-German 
co-operation for the future of the EU 
At the end of a comparative analysis of British and German interests in EU reform 
and enlargement the question remains why the results of such a study will be of any 
significance to the future of the Community. As shown in chapter one, a consensus 
seems to emerge among analysts of the nature of the EU, which characterises he EU 
as a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational elements. The member states 
governments still continue to determine the strategic direction of the Union, but they 
are no longer in full control of the details of policy-making on the micro level, which 
they have increasingly transferred into the hands of the Community institutions. The 
emerging picture is therefore one of a system of a growing multiplicity of 
responsibilities and a division of powers amongst various levels. 
Because Nation states remain the principal actors in this system of multiple power 
sharing, the EU continues to be based on a strong intergovernmental base. However, 
as Peter Katzenstein points out, 'the Europeanization of that context has itself become 
very important for how states ( ... ) conceive of their national interests' (Katzenstein, 
1997, p. 19). 
Each member state's European policy priorities are hence still decided on the 
domestic level, but the process of preference formation is increasingly influenced by 
transnational factors, such as Community rules and obligations, which are an 
inevitable part of the membership in an international organisation like the EU. 
Moreover, the development towards the 'erosion of the defining features of the 
Westphalian system' (Hyde-Price, 2000), means that nation states are no longer the 
autonomous actors they used to be before they decided to pool their sovereignty as 
part of the process of European integration. As members of the EU, the countries of 
Europe are deeply embedded in a complex system of fine balances, which is in a 
constant process of change. Their interests and preferences will nonetheless remain 
crucial for the integration process, as member state institutions, such as national 
parliaments and governments, continue to provide the legitimate basis, which links 
the Union with its citizens. 
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However, in the EU of the 21 st century, which will comprise 25 members in 2004 and 
possibly a greater number thereafter, a single bilateral relationship, like the Franco-
German alliance will no longer be able to exercise the influence it could in the initial 
Community of the six. Instead, a regularly changing pattern of multiple working 
relationship between various member states is likely to emerge, which makes an 
assessment of individual member state European policy interests with regard to 
correspondences more important than ever. Britain and Germany, who are both 
undergoing a process of redefinition in terms of their traditional post-war role in 
Europe, are a significant example of how the process of European integration changes 
the national preferences of member states. 
Germany became a larger and fully sovereign nation once again in 1990, when the 
two German states were peacefully reunited as part of the fall of the Iron Curtain and 
the end of the Cold War. With the move of Germany's centre of political power from 
Bonn to Berlin, it became obvious that Germany had returned to its central position in 
Europe. It has therefore once again adopted the role of a bridge between Western 
Europe and the aspiring new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Situated 'at the heart of a Europe growing together' (Hyde-Price, 2000, p. 4), the 
unified Germany has become the centre of Europe's attention, both from the Western 
and the Eastern perspective and consequently a crucial player in the process of 
enlargement. The logical consequence, which became part of Germany's inevitable 
post-unification re-positioning in Europe, is the willingness to take on greater 
responsibilities for Europe's security. As part of having regained the full sovereignty 
over their country's internal and external affairs, the new generation of post-war 
German leaders, which had come into power after the end of the Kohl era in 1998, 
therefore gradually abandoned the constraints that characterised the semi-sovereign 
West German Bonn Republic. 
The tragic events in Kosovo in 1998/1999 and the terrorist attacks on the United 
States on September 11 th 2001 gave the German government the chance to prove that 
the new chapter in Germany's foreign policy would last and not simply remain an 
episode. 
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For the first time since the Second World War, German troops were actively engaged 
in combat missions and hence fully shared the risk of military engagement with their 
partners in Europe. 
As a consequence, of this 'normalisation' of its foreign policy, Germany now holds 
the same rights and responsibilities as any other EU member state and is no longer 
trying to buy its freedom from military risks. With this comes a greater readiness on 
the part of the German elites to defend their own national interests against other EU 
member states. Germany has consequently also become more 'normal' in openly 
speaking up for its interests like any other country in Europe. The pretence not to have 
any national foreign policy interests other than the deepening of European integration, 
which had been maintained by the leaders of the Bonn republic to an almost unnatural 
extent, has come to an end as part of this process of 'normalisation'. Without having 
abandoned its traditional focus on multilateralism, Germany has consequently brought 
its foreign policy in line with the changes in its post-unification status as a sovereign 
state. The country has therefore made a transformation which was inevitable in order 
to avoid a situation where its increased external political weight would fundamentally 
contradict a foreign policy stance in which 'neighbours and partners would no longer 
simply buy the moralising confessions of post-national altruism' (Mertes, 2002, p. 
21). 
The UK has undergone a similar transformation. After 18 years of continuous 
Conservative rule, during which European integration was seen mainly as 'a threat to 
the heart and the soul of Britishness' (Young, 1998, p. 375), the British people elected 
the most pro-integrationist British government since the Second World War in May 
1997. The New Labour administration shares none of the traditional fundamental 
objections against European integration and has agreed to more pro-integrationist 
measures (e.g. the Social Chapter, the Rapid Reaction Force and a substantial 
extension of QMV) than any previous British administrations. It has also started to 
reform the political structures of the UK along the lines of the political framework of 
continental European states. 
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The decision to make the Bank of England independent and to give it control over the 
setting of interest rates is an important precondition for possible British membership 
of the eurozone. Moreover, through devolution, which gave regional assemblies to 
Scotland and Wales and will possibly be extended to English regions at a later date, 
the government has initiated a process of decentralisation within the British state, 
where power has traditionally been centred in Westminster. Although it is still a 
cautious government with regard to Europe in comparison to most other continental 
administrations, its election marked a fundamental shift in British behaviour within 
the EU. 
While towards the end of the Major administration, Britain had been isolated within 
the EU, as a result of a fundamental rift on European issues within the government 
and the Conservative party, the country has become an active player in the EU policy-
making process and reform discussion under New Labour. Britain took a leading role 
in the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction force as a result of the events in 
Kosovo in 1998/99. It has also become strongly engaged in the discussion about the 
reform of the EU in the run-up to enlargement in 2004, both inside and outside the 
Convention on the Future of Europe. Like for most other member state governments, 
there are certainly still limits as to how far the British government is willing to agree 
to the pooling of national sovereignty on the EU level. This is especially 
understandable if one considers the British domestic political background, where the 
commitment to further European integration is still mainly discussed with regard to 
the loss of national sovereignty, much more so than in any other EU member state. 
In spite of this continuing scepticism towards the EU at home, the British government 
has therefore expanded the scope for British engagement in Europe substantially. 
The process of change in both British and German European policy certainly comes 
with a number of unresolved problems, the solution of which will be crucial for both 
countries' standing in Europe. Germany continues to be troubled by economic and 
financial problems, which, contrary to the expectations of the early 1990s, have not 
improved but have got significantly worse in the more than ten years since 
reunification. 
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The former economic powerhouse of Europe is now no longer the economic role 
model it used to be and is likely to endanger its traditional post-war leading role in 
Europe if it does not manage to stop its economic decline. Ironically, the main worry 
for Germany's European partners is therefore no longer the possible threat of a 
'German Europe', but the failure of Germany to exercise its traditional leadership 
role. 
Michael Mertes therefore rightly concludes that for the rest of Europe, it is 'no longer 
the German strength, but the German weakness which is a cause for concern today': 
'Ten years ago, the anxious question was if Europe would be able to cope with the 
unified Germany. Today, on the evening before enlargement, it would have to be: 
is Germany able to cope with an enlarged Europe? Does it remain tailender in 
many areas - or does it manage to depart towards ambitious reform targets? 
Will it become the locomotive again - or does it continue to break the European 
train with its heaviness?' (Mertes, 2002, p. 24). 
The improvement of its economic performance, based on a fundamental reform 
course regarding the structures of its national economy and social system will be 
indispensable for Germany, if its leaders want to achieve the ambitious European 
policy goals they have set out. The new German commitment to full military burden 
sharing as part of the development of a European Rapid Reaction Force and, possibly 
an integrated Common Foreign Security Policy, will only be credible if the German 
government is able to substantially boost its domestic spending on defence. To 
restructure the Bundeswehr simply in terms of cost-saving will be no acceptable 
substitute for a fundamental reform of the German army, which will have to be based 
on effective and well-funded crisis deployment forces, as part of an end to 
compulsory military service. Without the latter, Germany will not be able to exercise 
its desired role as a pacemaker in the development of an effective CFSP framework 
for the EU, because it will not be seen as a serious player on this issue by its European 
partners (Janning, 2002, p. 14). 
A persistently weak economic performance and a failure to push through fundamental 
reform would also undermine the German government's influence on the discussion 
about economic reform and liberalisation in Europe. 
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As a member state which continues to remain below the European average with 
regard to its annual growth, Germany will not be able to convince others in the EU to 
support its proposals for economic reform. This is especially important in terms of the 
role Germany will be able to play in the enlarged EU after 2004. The German 
economic weakness is a big factor in the general economic weakness of the EU as a 
whole and the lack of global confidence in the euro. 
The psychological impact of a lack of German economic confidence and a failure to 
avoid falling deeper into economic recession would consequently not only seriously 
endanger the long-term economic success of the eurozone as a whole. Above all, it 
would gradually cause the prospective member states in Central and Eastern Europe 
to shift their focus away from Germany towards other member states with a better 
economic performance, such as the UK. 
German leaders therefore not only have to seriously worry about the consequences of 
Germany's weak economic results on the standard of life for German domestic life, 
but will especially have to consider the long-term political impact of such a 
development. As David Marsh argues, Germany is in danger of losing its traditional 
economic role model status to other, economically more flexible member states, with 
a potentially serious impact on its influence in Europe: 
'Today, no German company is anywhere near the top 10 and Deutsche Bank has 
been outstripped by rivals in Britain, Switzerland and France. The lacklustre 
performance of the euro ( ... ) has undoubtedly helped exporters, yet the negative 
psychological effects have contributed to flagging confidence.' (Marsh, 2002, p. 2) 
There are hopeful signs that the German government has finally realised the extent of 
the problem. Chancellor Schroder emphasised in his New Year's message to the 
German people on December 30th 2002 that Germany would have to be ready for 
change if it wanted to maintain its traditionally strong position in an enlarged EU: 
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'If we want to maintain what has really made us strong in Germany and in Europe, 
we have to initiate the necessary changes resolutely ( ... ) We will only be able to 
maintain our prosperity, our social security, our good schools, streets and hospitals 
- which are the envy of so many peoples - if we consider our strengths and 
together find the courage for fundamental changes. ,619 
Germany's future role in an enlarged EU will hence stand and fall with its economic 
performance, based on the willingness to undertake serious reforms and to abandon 
cumbersome and growth-inhibiting elements of the traditional post-war German 
economic system of Rhenish capitalism. A strong national economy will be the basis 
for the maintenance of its post-unification role as a self-confident promoter of 
multilateralism and the further deepening of European integration. 
Only through substantial economic recovery will Germany also prevent itself from 
ending up imprisoned in a revived Franco-German alliance, which returns to the pre-
unfication situation, where Germany acted as the junior partner of a France, which is 
once again bursting with self-confidence. The recent Franco-German compromise on 
agriculture at the Brussels summit has shown that, in the face of its present weakness 
and overwhelming domestic problems, Germany is not able to exercise leadership on 
controversial issues but rather limits itself to agree to half-hearted compromises. New 
opportunities for German leadership in an enlarged EU will therefore only occur if 
German European policy is based on a sound economic footing. 
The same is true for Britain. To assume that the change in attitude towards European 
issues under the present British government would be sufficient to secure the UK a 
place amongst the EU's top rank of leaders would be an illusion. On the contrary, as 
long as a fundamental gap between the rhetoric and the attitude of British leaders on 
the EU level and the widespread domestic scepticism towards Europe in Britain 
persists, the country will only remain a second-class player in the Community. 
619 Neujahrsansprache von Bundeskanzler Schroder zum Jahreswechsel 200212003, 30 December 
2002, www.bundeskanzler.de/Findulin-Spiel-.8442.456970/a.htm?printView=y. 
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Through a policy 'which draws Britain closer to its neighbours on the continent' 
(Paterson, 1999, p. 271), the Blair administration has certainly managed to convince 
Britain's European partners that, under New Labour, it is possible to do business with 
the UK. On the other hand, the continuing portrayal of Brussels as the root of a 
conspiracy against the British economic and political independence by the large 
sections of the British media and the Conservative opposition, has prevented the UK 
from becoming a seriously committed player in Europe in the eyes of most of its 
continental neighbours. 
When speaking to German political representatives, a general consensus emerges that 
the Blair administration's attempts to lift the 'fog in the channel' between continental 
Europe and the UK have so far not been sufficient to transform the image of the 
country as a reluctant European. In this respect, the emphasis from the German side is 
put on the lack of support for the British government's pro-European attitude amongst 
the British public, media and the majority of the Conservative Party. Social Democrat 
MEP Gerhard Schmid stressed that, from the continental perspective, the British 
government's claim to be committed to Europe still lacks credibility, as long as a 
majority of the British public and the British political elite continues to cling to the 
self-deception that Britain is still a global power. 
This would include Britain's refusal to make a decision between a stronger 
commitment to Europe and its traditionally strong transatlantic ties with the United 
states, which would result in 'having one foot in Europe and one foot on the other side 
of the Atlantic,62o. The Bavarian CSU MEP Ingo Friedrich pointed out that the fact 
alone that Britain is now lead by a basically pro-European government would not be 
sufficient to shed its traditional post-war role as an 'obstructer of progress in the 
EU,621. For Friedrich, the UK would only have a realistic change to realise its 
leadership ambitions in Europe, if a basically co-operative attitude towards European 
integration would not be limited to the majority of the governing Labour party and the 
620 Interview with Gerhard Schmid, MEP and vice president ofthe European Parliament, Regensburg, 
Germany, 18 June 2001. 
621 Interview with Ingo Friedrich, MEP, vice president of the European parliament and member of the 
CSU leadership, Gunzenhausen, Germany, 31 March 2001. 
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Liberal Democrats, but would be shared by the Conservatives as the main opposition 
party and the British pUblic. 
Especially with regard to the crucial issue of membership of the eurozone, Friedrich 
insisted that a clear majority for entry amongst the British public and the majority of 
the political elite would have to exist in order to make Britain's full European 
commitment credible. In the end it would all boil down to the fact that 'those member 
states, who are expected to agree to be led have confidence in the pro-Europeanness 
of the member state, which aspires to lead,622. 
The positive changes made under New Labour with regard to British European policy 
cannot deflect from the fact that the government has so far failed to bridge a persistent 
gap between government policy and public opinion on Europe. A long-term 
comparative survey by opinion pollster MORI shows that the number of British 
people who would vote for staying inside the EU, if there would be a referendum on 
British EU membership, has never exceeded 62% since 1997. In the latest surveys on 
the issue in May 2001, only a small majority (51 %) of those questioned would vote in 
favour of staying inside the EU, while 49% would vote to get out. Two months 
earlier, the poll even recorded a slight majority (52%) in favour ofleaving the EU623. 
The government has thus failed to create a political climate in Britain, in which 
membership of the EU is seen as beneficial and strong engagement is backed by a 
substantial majority of the British people. Instead, the perception still prevails that 
Britain's EU membership comes with a number of substantial disadvantages for the 
country, especially in terms of a loss of national control over the country's own 
domestic affairs and the financial contributions to the EU budget. This has not been 
helped by the Prime Minister's personal focus on the transatlantic partnership with the 
United States. Although Blair insists that Britain would not have to make a choice 
between Europe and America, the government's closeness to the U.S. on foreign 
policy issues has not contributed to improving its credibility in Europe. 
622 lngo Friedrichs interview. 
623 MORI long-term comparative poll on European Union membership 1975-2001, 
www.mori.comleurope/mori-eu-ref.shtml. 
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It can also only have strengthened the prevailing perception amongst the British 
public that Britain's main interests are still anywhere else but in Europe. 
The government's failure to make the case for Europe is especially obvious with 
regard to the debate about possible membership of the euro, the outcome of which 
will be crucial for Britain's future standing in the ED. Although a public referendum 
on the issue is still possible in 2003, after the outcome of the five economic tests have 
been announced by the Chancellor, the chances that the government will be able to 
overcome public opposition against entry are getting slimmer every day. Because the 
government has so far left the argument on the issue largely with the (mainly 
Eurosceptic) media, public opinion against entry into the eurozone seems to have 
hardened. Opinion polls show a persistent negative trend against euro entry since 
1999, with between 50-60% of the British public intending to vote against 
membership of the eurozone in a referendum and only 30-40% voting in favour. The 
latest MORI poll in November 2002 reports 31 % in favour of the euro, with 51 % 
• 624 
agamst . 
These results are largely due to of the government's failure to make the political case 
for euro entry and to focus solely on economic criteria instead. A gap has 
consequently opened up between the public debate on the euro, where constitutional 
issues such as the loss of economic and political sovereignty as part of EMU 
membership are in the foreground, while the government continues to insist that 
Britain will join if the five economic tests on the euro have been met. 
On the background of general scepticism about the benefits of British membership of 
the EU, it is not surprising that the negative public attitude towards the euro prevails 
as long as the government does not engage in a serious public debate about the 
political benefits of euro entry, such as the gain in political influence as a fully 
committed member state. 
624 MORI financial services poll on voting intentions in a euro referendum, 20 November 2002, 
http://www.mori.com!polls/2002/sssb-nov.shtml. 
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The former cabinet minister Mo Mowlam, who has turned into one of the biggest 
critics within the government's own political ranks, made an important point when 
she called on the government to finally start to make the political case for entry into 
the eurozone: 
'On the issue of the euro, we need to grow up. Whether or not we should join the 
euro is not an economic issue but a political one. If the Government believes in 
Europe, it should make the case to the people. We need a Chancellor who can 
make this clear and who stops hiding behind economic tests,625 
The apparent disagreement between the Chancellor and the Prime Minister on how to 
deal with the issue is in danger of seriously undermining the government's intentions 
to bring the issue to a successful conclusion. 
As long as the Treasury continues to insist that the decisive factor for euro entry must 
be economic advantages626, while the Prime Minister obviously considers the political 
aspects to be more important, but chooses to remain silent, mixed signals are sent to 
the British public and Britain's European partners. Even if the government decides to 
postpone a referendum on the euro once again in 2003 on the grounds that the five 
economic tests have not been fully met, it is not likely to improve the situation, 
neither domestically nor inside the EU. The government is in danger of becoming 
trapped into a vicious circle on the issue. The principally sceptical attitude of the 
British people towards membership of the EU could only be overcome if the 
government would be able to prove that Britain is indeed a leading player inside the 
Community, hence strongly influencing EU decision- and policy-making on all levels. 
As long as it remains outside the eurozone, however, Britain will remain a second-
class member state and never be able to get into a position where it can exercise 
leadership on all fronts. 
62' 'Why Gordon must never be PM', Mo Mowlam comment in the Observer, 5 January 2003. 
626 The Times, 'Economics "must be deciding factor on euro" ',5 December 2002,. 
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Especially on the issues of institutional and economic reform, especially the reform of 
the Stability Pact and the ECB, other member states will not be ready to follow the 
advice of a country, which does not share the risks and constraints that come with the 
major project of Economic and Monetary Union. This will be even more so the case 
in an EU of 25 and more members in which, as soon as they manage to fulfil the 
Maastricht criteria, the membership of the eurozone will also grow substantially. 
Although, once inside the eurozone, Britain could potentially627 become a leading 
player within an enlarged EU, it is also more than likely that it will be increasingly 
sidelined once the new members have joined the euro. 
As Andrew Rawnsley pointed out in the Observer, with the EU facing the first wave 
of enlargement in 2004, the British government should beware of delaying the 
decision on the euro for much longer: 
'The new entrants to the European Union are all gagging to join the single 
currency. If Mr Blair does not realise his ambition before the next election, it is 
entirely plausible that he will be in a minority of one among 25. ,628 
Like in the case of Germany, with regard to its urgent need of structural reform, the 
British government seems to have grasped the scope of the decision on the euro. As 
the Prime Minister stated in his 2002 New Year message, with regard to entry into the 
eurozone, Britain 'will face what may be the single most important decision that faces 
this political generation' 629. The question remains, will the government finally draw 
the necessary conclusions from this insight in order to secure the leading position for 
the UK, which it should have taken up a long time ago and definitely try to achieve in 
a larger EU. 
627 The practical accomplishment of this goal would certainly also depend on the willingness of French 
leaders to accept Britain at the leadership table. A British leadership role, which would aim at generally 
side lining French interests is unlikely to be successful under the present circumstances, as it would 
meet the opposition of Germany. More likely would be a leadership triangle between Britain, France 
and Germany. 
628 'Why Tony didn't laugh at Gordon 's joke', Andrew Rawnsley comment, The Observer, I December 
2002. 
629 'A year of challenge', Prime Minister's New Year message, 31 December 2002, www.number-
10 .gob. uk/printlpage6904 .asp. 
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It will be crucial for the whole of the EU that Britain and Germany overcome these 
domestic constraints, in order to be able to fill the leadership gap, which has opened 
since the traditional motor of the EU, the Franco-German relationship started to 
disintegrate. 
In spite of renewed recent public displays of harmony between French and German 
leaders, both countries cannot conceal the fact that fundamental disagreements on 
major European issues exist between them and that they no longer share the same 
European policy priorities. France continues to act as the brake pad on institutional 
reform, especially with regard to the crucial overhaul of the Common Agricultural 
Policy. 
In this respect, it is clear that France continues to act as the guardian of the current 
setting of the EU, trying to preserve the structural funds for the Southern periphery 
amongst the member states and refusing to abandon the costly agricultural system of 
artificial price support and funding for mass production. Germany, on the other hand 
is much more outward looking and sees enlargement as an important process in terms 
of its own national interests and in the interests of the whole of Europe. Chancellor 
Schroder stressed once again in his New Year message for 2003 that Germany 
remains committed to the enlargement process: 
'Something about which our ancestors could only dream - to be able to build a 
common Europe - has now become a tangible reality. This helps us politically and 
it provides our economy with new opportunities. We all can take part in turning 
Europe into a continent of peace, freedom and prosperity. ,630 
While France continues to side with those among the present 15 member states, who 
are opposed to structural and budgetary reform in the EU, Germany pushes towards a 
fundamental overhaul of the EU's structures. Side by side with the UK, German 
leaders want to make sure that the EU will still remain effective with 25 members and 
more. 
630 Neujahrsansprache von Bundeskanzler Schroder zum Jahreswechsel 200212003. 30 December 
2002, www.bundeskanzler.delFindulin-Spiel-.8442.456970/a.htm?printView=y. 
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In the 1990s, a fundamental rift on French and German interests in the EU has thus 
opened up. On the one side of the divide, France is leading a group of (mainly 
Southern European members) which are cautious about reform and enlargement and 
would rather prefer to deepen political and economic integration amongst the present 
15 and within the present structural framework. On the other side, Germany and 
Britain are promoting a larger and reformed EU, which ends the political and 
economic divide between East and West in Europe. Due to its geographic proximity 
to the CEE region, Germany is certainly much more cautious and selective than the 
UK towards swift enlargement beyond the first 10 applicants, which will join in 2004. 
France is therefore not completely sidelined in the process, as it can make use of the 
reservations held by parts of the German public and political elite towards further 
enlargement. 
On the other hand, these individual occasions, such as in the case of Turkey, where 
Germany does rather support the French caution towards determining a swift 
accession date than to go along with British demands, cannot hide the fact that the 
traditional post-war consensus between France and Germany on European integration 
has come to an end. 
In the post-war period up to Maastricht, French and German leaders had been able to 
form a good working relationship, which aimed at advancing the process of European 
integration both in political and economic terms. The end of the Cold War and the 
reunification of Germany changed the long-established balance between the two 
partners, where France provided mainly political and Germany mainly economic 
leadership. With the larger Germany now being situated at the heart of an EU, which 
finds more and more of the Eastern countries, which have established close relations 
with Germany as part of the Ostpolitik, knocking at its door, Germany has 
undoubtedly gained in political stature. The resulting end of the German role of a 
junior partner in the Franco-German relationship has caused French leaders to try to 
dominate the integration process even more, in order to make sure that Germany 
continues to be integrated into a framework, which has been strongly shaped by 
French terms. 
416 
The resulting institutional and procedural structure of the EU, which was created at 
Maastricht, has however had the undesired side-effect for France that Germany 
became more sceptical about the integration process itself and consequently started to 
stress its own national interests in a similar way to other member states. 
The intensification of this process, which had already started during the final years of 
the Kohl era, under the leadership of a new post-war generation of pragmatic centre-
left leaders in Germany, led to French acts of defiance and finally to a breakdown of 
the personal chemistry between French and German leaders. The German political 
elite have certainly made every effort to publicly maintain a display of harmony, 
mainly because the French 'c/asse politique has expressed its concern that the Franco-
German partnership is no longer as important to the Germans as it once was' (Guerin-
Sendelbach and Schild, 2002, p.55). 
The resulting new bilateral Franco-German initiatives on CFSP, and Turkey, do 
however not change the lack of personal understanding between the current French 
and German leaders, especially between Chirac and Schroder, leave little room to 
revive the Franco-German relationship to its traditional way. The sequence of events 
at the Nice summit has shown that a general mistrust between the French and German 
leaders exist. The partnership is therefore miles away from the mutual willingness to 
compromise that had existed under Schmidt and Giscard or Kohl and Mitterand. 
This situation seriously undermines the bilateral relationship. 
As losef lanning rightly emphasises, there is little chance that France and Germany 
will return to the traditional closeness under Chirac and Schroder: 
'The French manoeuvres at the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice destroyed 
the rest of interpersonal chemistry. Neither common finger exercises of the foreign 
policy leadership panels, nor the higher tracts, which were stage-managed in order 
to calm the criticism, could remove this disruption. Kohl's maxim, to always give 
priority to French sensitivities may, in comparison, have proven to have been the 
more successful one, but it neither suits the governing style of Schroder, nor the 
real situation of European policy.' (lanning, 2002, p. 16). 
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There is also little prospect that this would change under different governments in 
France or Gennany, even if they would give renewed priority to the Franco-Gennan 
partnership, like the red-green administration does at present63I . The coordinate 
system of the relations between France and Gennany has simply shifted to far from 
the pre-unification and pre-Maastricht situation in order to be able to simply be able to 
carry on as usual after the events of Nice. 
French leaders are far too worried about the increase in German influence in an larger 
Europe to be able to engage in a new bilateral relationship with Germany without 
special demands and prejudices. Moreover, any Gennan government, regardless of its 
political colours, will in the long term reject a return to the pre-1990 junior role 
alongside France, especially not once Germany has managed to improve its economic 
standing once again. The edginess between France and Germany is therefore likely to 
remain for the foreseeable future, even if governments change. 
On top of that, it is important to realise that even if France and Germany would find 
ways to return to their former confidentiality, it is certainly the case that the influence 
of this bilateral tandem would be far less important in an EU of 24 and more members 
than under the present setting. This is not to say that it will no longer be important for 
the EU that Franco-Gennan try to find common ground on major issues. As the two 
big founding members of the Community, they will always be able to profoundly 
influence developments, provided they manage to pull together. However, in a larger 
ED, a variety of changing short-term and mainly issue-related working relationships 
will dominate the agenda even more than they already do amongst the 15 member 
states at present. Hence the prospect of a bilateral leadership constellation dominating 
events in the way France and Germany were able to do in the first 45 years of the 
Community existence is more than remote. 
631 Chancellor SchrMer said in his inaugural speech to the Bundestag after the September 2002: '( ... ) 
we will not be able to create a citizen's Europe, the use of which through deepening and enlarging shall 
be of benefit to all Europeans, without common Franco-German action - even if sometimes painful 
compromises have to be made.' (Regierungserkliirung von Bundeskanzler Schroder vor dem Deutschen 
Bundestag, 29 October 2002, http://www.bundeskanzler.delRegierungserklaerung-
.8561.446416/Regierungserklaerung-von-B undeskanzler-Gerhard-S ... htm.) 
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The German side does also no longer wish to maintain such an exclusive bilateral 
leadership constellation for a larger EU. The representative for the German parliament 
in the Convention on the Future of Europe confirmed, that he considered 'it to be 
important, that the leadership of the European Union is exercised by more than two 
countries, let alone by only one country' 632. A leadership triangle between Britain, 
France and Germany is therefore a realistic option in a larger EU, provided that 
French leaders would agree to such an option. 
Chancellor Schroder himself continues to stress the importance of the partnership 
between France and Germany for the EU, but has also made clear that he would like 
to see other member states, especially the UK, to take on a more prominent role in the 
future. 
In this respect, Schroder has not publicly repeated his earlier support for a 'triangle' 
leadership model between Britain, France and Germany, but he would still like to see 
a continuing and strengthened British engagement in Europe: 
'One should not think in terms of mathematical or geometrical formulas. Britain 
plays an enormously important role in Europe ( ... ) Tony Blair has acquired really 
great respect among the European Council. You know the special relations 
between Germany and France. We do not want to let them be called into question. 
But they are directed against no one, but the expression of certain historic 
developments. They continue to be important for Europe at present, but the closer 
and the more intensely Britain becomes noticeable in Europe, the more I prefer 
it. ,633 
632 Interview with Professor JUrgen Meyer, SPD party conference Nuremberg, 20 November 2001. 
633 'Wir miissen weiter reformieren·. Interview with Chancellor SchrOder for the German-British forum 
by David Marsh, 2002, www.gbf.comJcgi/publisher/display.cgi?1935-51 02-80853+interview. 
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The main reason why Britain would be a prime choice for German leaders with regard 
to the establishment of a working relationship on crucial issues for the future of 
Europe is that, in contrast to France634, Britain has abandoned its post-war 
reservations against Germany. While the Conservative administration's antipathy 
towards engagement in Europe had been largely motivated by a fear of German 
domination, under New Labour Britain has shed any of these resentments. 
As a result, fears of an almighty Germany, which had still been predominant among 
the British media and the public at the time of German unification, are now only 
expressed by a small minority of right wing Eurosceptics and anti-European tabloid 
journalists. This was also the general consensus among the British political 
representatives I had the chance to interview635• 
William E. Paters on consequently sees a basis for a working relationship between 
Britain and Germany, which is completely different from the one that exists between 
France and Germany and other EU member states: 
'In a number of European member states, including France and some sections of 
German elite opinion, there is a concern that the coincidence of the move of the 
German capital to Berlin and the imminence of eastwards enlargement will 
somehow undermine Germany's postwar western identity and its European 
634 In a very recent assessment of the state of Franco-German relations on the occasion of the 40th 
anniversary of the Elysee Treaty, former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who has always been a leading 
adovocate of Franco-German co-operation, argues that the peak of relations between France and 
Germany, which occurred under him and Giscard d'Estaing and was continued under Kohl and 
Mitterand, came to an end after German reunification. Schmidt points out that after 1989/90 
'reunification caused old fears of the new German weight in Paris', which is why he argues 'that it 
would at present be a hackneyed phrase without concrete substance to talk of a Franco-German 
European policy' ('Freunde ohne Ziele', Helmut Schmidt in Die Zeit, 04/2003,22 January 2003). 
France expert Ulrich Wickert, a leading German journalist, commented on the Franco-German 
anniversary by pointing out to the persisting prejudices against each other on both sides: 'It is 
incredible, how long prejudices are able to persists. The Germans still think, the French see their nation 
as a Grande Nation, something they have stopped doing for a quite a while - which also makes them 
suffer slightly though. The French, on the other hand, have not yet noticed that the Germans are no 
brutally shouting Nazi soldiers, but have in the meantime developed into one of the most modem 
democracies in Europe' (Interview with Ulrich Wickert for tagesschau.de, 21 January 2003, 
www.tagesschau.de/aktuell1medlungenlO.2044.OIDI462172_TYP4.00.html). 
63S The representative at the FCO, Labour MEP Gary Titley and Lib Dem MEP Nick Clegg, MP Gisela 
Stuart and even Conservative MP John Redwood, who usually shows a tendency to warn about 
German economic dominance, all agreed that Germany had proven that it had become a team player 
rather than a dominant force in Europe. 
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vocation. These fears are seen as largely unreal and irrelevant in Britain, where it is 
felt that Germany's western identity is securely anchored in terms of identity, 
interests and institutions.' (Paterson, 2002, p. 26) 
The gap between the former WW2 enemies has therefore constantly narrowed since 
the end of the War. Even the negative portrayal of Germany during 18 years of 
Conservative rule in Britain or the occasional extreme tabloid reference to the War 
years could not seriously affect the increasing cultural and political closeness between 
the UK and Germany. As Wolf gang Mommsen stresses, none of these 
'( ... ) memories of national socialism which are continued to be well looked after, 
could change nothing of any consequence with regard to this fundamental change 
of attitudes towards Germany. Since then, normality has occurred in the relations 
between Britain and the newly constituted German state. The shadows of two 
world wars do no longer weigh oppressively on them. The common interests in the 
economic, cultural and the political area have been generally made aware of more 
and more and have pushed other factors, which stood between the two peoples 
during the last century, into the background.' (Mommsen, 1999, p. 214) 
Because no concealed suspicions exist between themselves, the British and the 
Germans would hence be ideal partners in Europe and would be able to jointly 
influence the future of Europe substantially, if they managed to summon up the will to 
do so. In spite of the differences in their domestic state structures and political 
systems, they both share a strong and determined commitment to substantially reform 
the procedures and institutions of the EU in order to make it fit for enlargement. 
Based on their domestic political cultures, both countries certainly take a different 
approach to the solution of the individual reform necessities. 
As part of their generally intergovernmental approach to European integration, British 
leaders consequently emphasise the necessity to reform and strengthen the European 
Council and also to find ways to include national parliaments more in the EU's 
decision-making processes. 
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In contrast, German leaders would prefer to reform the Community along the lines of 
German federalism, with the Commission being developed into a strong EU 
executive, led by a directly elected Commission president and controlled by a 
strengthened European Parliament. Although these two models seem to be far apart 
from one another at first glance, they in fact share the common goal of wanting to 
make the EU more transparent and effective in order to narrow the increasing gap 
between the Community and its citizens. 
It is also undeniable that, in spite of the German tendency to go much further in the 
promotion of the harmonisation of policies than Britain, that both countries agree 
towards a strong intergovernmental foundation for the EU. 
No German leader could ever agree to a complete merger of the German state into an 
EU superstate, where the main powers would be exclusively centred on the 
Community level. Instead, by sticking to its traditional post-war pro-integrationist and 
multilateralist principles, Germany continues to promote the harmonisation of 
procedures and policies in areas where it is obvious that national governments are 
stretched beyond their capabilities. 
The British are still more reluctant than Germany or any other pro-integrationist 
member state to agree to the transfer of national powers if it is not unequivocally 
considered to be in the British national interest. The Blair administration nonetheless 
generally shows a greater readiness to agree to the harmonisation of policies and the 
pooling of national sovereignty, provided it helps Britain to achieve its national goals. 
This is shown by the rather surprising fact that the British government has given up 
the traditional British reluctance towards a European constitutional treaty and has 
even agreed to extend QMV to crucial areas, such as asylum and immigration, as part 
of the creation of a Common Asylum Policy for Europe. 
The main reason why Britain and Germany would have the potential to co-operate 
effectively on institutional and procedural reform lies in both countries' readiness to 
accept each other's differences in political culture, and state tradition, and to consider 
mutual reform proposals under that aspect. 
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As Chancellor Schr5der stresses, Gennany would not reject British proposals on 
institutional refonn, simply because the British are emphasising an intergovernmental 
approach: 
'Gennany has always been integrationist with regard to European policy and will 
continue to remain like that. There is a tendency to compare, ones are 
integrationists, the others intergovernmentalists. But in reality there is not only 
black and white, but a process in Europe. When there are proposals from countries, 
which are for example seen as classic intergovernmentalist, then I plead for 
looking at them in great detail, each individual proposal, and not to place them in a 
certain categories. I am against thinking in categories.' 636 
The crucial issue is that both countries share the same priorities with regard to the 
refonn process of the EU. Both Britain and Gennany want to make the EU more 
transparent and effective in terms of reducing unnecessary red tape and expenditures, 
such as those for the agricultural policy. The support for a written European 
constitutional treaty, which is now finally shared by the British government, is part of 
this desire to clearly determine the distributions of power in the EU, based on the 
principle of subsidiarity. The UK and Gennany are strong allies in pushing towards a 
fundamental overhaul of the budgetary arrangements of the Union in order to come to 
a fairer share of the financial burden among the member states. They also share a 
commitment to further liberalisation of the Single Market, with a strong emphasis on 
the reduction of external trade tariffs and artificial market interferences, as part of a 
fairer global trading system within the framework of the WTO. This is especially 
important with regard to the CAP, where the UK and Germany stand against French 
opposition in their desire to open up Europe's agricultural markets for the developing 
countries. 
636 'Wir miissen weiter reformieren', Interview with Chancellor Schroder for the German-British forum 
by David Marsh, 2002, www.gbf.comlcgi/publisher/display.cgi? 1935-51 02-80853+interview. 
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On enlargement, British and German leaders share a fundamental desire to not let the 
process of European integration end at the borders of the former Iron Curtain, but to 
instead include those countries that fulfil the membership criteria as members, in 
order to create an area of freedom, democracy and stability for the whole of the 
European continent. Although both countries have different priorities in the process, 
such as e.g. on Turkey or the Balkans, where Britain is a much stronger advocate of 
expansion than Germany, they both share a commitment towards enlargement, which 
cannot be found among any of the other big member states, especially France. 
Even on the foreign and security policy issues, the UK and Germany would basically 
be ideal partners in pushing forward the creation of a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy for the EU. In contrast to French leaders, who would like to create a European 
CFSP as an alternative to American influence on European defence and security 
issues within NATO, British and German elites are firm in their commitment to the 
transatlantic partnership with the U.S as part of a stronger European role on defence 
and security. The potential for a strong partnership on the issue is however still 
seriously hampered by a lack of commitment on both sides. British leaders would 
need to lean less towards V.S. foreign policy interests and show a greater commitment 
to the creation of a European CFSP, which would require the acceptance of QMV on 
foreign and security issues in the EV on the part of the British. 
Germany would finally have to push through a fundamental reform of the 
Bundeswehr from a defence army based on conscription, into a professional force, 
which is capable of being rapidly deployed in military crisis settlement anywhere 
inside or outside Europe. This would have to include a substantial boost to German 
spending on defence, which will certainly only be affordable under improved 
economic conditions and a general reform of German public sector spending. 
With the existence of a general trust between British and German leaders on European 
issues and the readiness on both sides to agree and disagree on certain issues, British-
German relations have every potential to be turned into an effective working 
partnership of great significance for an EV of 25 and more members. 
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As British foreign secretary Jack Straw stressed in his address to the British-German 
forum in October 2002, 
'Today this partnership has never been stronger. We may differ on individual 
aspects of EU policy, but we share a strong commitment on the fundamental: a 
reunified Europe which delivers practical benefits to our citizens, be they jobs and 
investment or cleaner beaches and safer streets. We agree on the importance of 
Europe having a stronger voice in the world. ,637 
It would certainly be wrong to suggest that closer co-operation between the UK and 
Germany could lead to the establishment of a new bilateral axis, similar to the one 
which was built up by France and Germany after WW2. In a larger EU, leadership 
will be exercised by a variety of partnerships between member states and the course 
of European integration will no longer be able to be determined by two countries in 
the way it was possible in a Community of six or, up to a point, even 15. 
This new flexible framework of multiple leadership coalitions however makes it even 
more important to look at correspondences in the interests of individual member 
states. With Britain and Germany being the two large member states, whose roles 
within the Community have changed most dramatically in recent years, they also offer 
the greatest potential for open, mutual co-operation if they manage to overcome their 
current constraints. 
In the case of Germany, this will certainly be the need to reform its domestic 
economic and social framework in order to be able to compete in an increasingly 
competitive global economy, and to maintain the leading role it has in Europe. For 
Britain, the crucial challenge will be to finally end its ambiguous and undecided 
position between the United States and Europe and to show a clear dedication to 
engagement in the latter. 
637 'Leadership in Europe', Speech by foreign secretary Jack Straw at the British-German forum, 17 
October 2002, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk!servletlFront?pagename=OpenMarketlXcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007 
02939 I 647&a=KArticle&aid=10347866 I 8438. 
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Apart from a stronger orientation of its foreign policy towards European rather than 
American interests, the most credible move towards a new European vocation for the 
UK would be the entry into the eurozone. 
If it were to become a fully engaged member state, Britain could then make use of the 
fact that, as Grabbe and MUnchau point out, it has in fact more in common with 
Germany than any other of its partners in the EU: 
'In many areas of European policy, the UK and Germany are now closer to one 
another than they are to France or Italy. Their partnership could be crucial to the 
EU's progress. If the UK were in the monetary union, it would have as much to 
offer Germany as France does. The UK's decision is thus a vital interest for 
Germany because it affects the political dynamics of the EU as a whole.' (Grabbe 
and Miinchau, 2002, p. 41). 
Although it is indeed very difficult to predict anything in a European Union, which 
not only faces the most important enlargement in its history but which is also 
characterised by constant political change, it is nevertheless far from being unrealistic 
that 'a "golden age" in British-German-European relations is just round the corner' 
(Larres, 2000, p. 24). In view of the current lack of strategic leadership in the EU, 
many of the new members states from Central and Eastern Europe would certainly 
appreciate more common initiatives between the these two big member states, who 
both strongly advocate enlargement. 
In order not to let this golden opportunity slip away for good and to allow a situation, 
where 'tensions would be likely to re-emerge and a pattern of greater divergence set 
in' (Paterson, 2002, p. 31), British and German leaders need to start exercising 
practical leadership and overcome the mentioned hurdles that hamper working 
relations between both countries. For the sake of the future of the EU, if they manage 
to make use of the good personal atmosphere between the British and the Germans, 
they will be able to overcome what the British Prime Minister called the mutual 'time 
of challenge' in his address to the November 2001 SPD Party conference in 
Nuremberg: 
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'Britain can't play its part in developing a more stable and peaceful world but shy 
away from Europe, its most powerful alliance right on its doorstep. Germany can't 
play its part in helping lead this new world, without accepting its full international 
responsibilities. So both our nations face a time of challenge ( ... ) It is a time for 
boldness, courage and strength ( ... ). For our sake as well as yours, I wish you 
well. ,638 
638 Speech by Tony Blair at the SPD party conference, Nuremberg, 20 November 2001, 
http://2001.spd-parteitag.de/servletIPB/menulI002017/index.html. 
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2+4 Treaty. The final peace treaty, which determined the conditions for German 
reunification, signed in 1990. The two German states, the U.S., Britain, France and 
the Soviet Union agreed that the unified Germany would regain the full sovereignty 
over its internal and external affairs, including the choice of membership in 
international alliances like NATO, provided that its Eastern border was final and 
irreversible. 
10 point plan (Zehn Punkte-Plan). Plan introduced by German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl in the Bundestag in November 1989, which proposed a confederation between 
the two existing German states. Kohl was heavily criticized for the plan by the 
Western European partners, whom he had not consulted beforehand about it. 
Agenda 2000. Financial package for the enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe 
agreed at the EU Council in Berlin in 1999. 
Acquis Communautaire. The legal body of the European Union, including its 
institutions, policies and laws. 
AWACS. Airborne warning and control system used by NATO for air surveillance 
missions. 
Berlin agreement. Signed in 1971 by the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and 
France. The Western Allies formally accepted that West Berlin would not be an 
integral part of the West German state and in return, the Soviet Union loosened its 
though transit regime regarding West Berlin. 
Brezhnev doctrine. The claim put forward by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in 1968 
that the Soviet Union would have the legal right of intervention into the inner affairs 
of its Central and Eastern European satellite states, if necessary through military 
force. Brezhnev consequently tried to justify the Soviet military oppression of the 
Prague spring as an act of maintaining the 'community of socialist states'. 
Bundesbank. The German federal bank, which is politically independent and 
exercises strong influence on Germany's economic policy through its focus on 
monetary stability. 
Bundestag. The German federal parliament, which was situated in Bonn between 
1949 and 1990 and moved to Berlin in 1999. It consists of 603 MPs from the 
CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and the B90/Griine. 
Bundesrat. The second legislative chamber, in which the German regions, the Lander 
are represented. The Bundesrat has a rotating presidency and consists of 68 seats. 
Crucial legislation, which affects the interests of the Lander can only be passed if the 
Bundestag and the Bundesrat agree. Disagreements are settled in the 
VermittlungsausschujJ, a committee of 16 representatives from both chambers. 
Bundesvetfassungsgericht (BVG). The German federal constitutional court, which 
acts the guardian of the German constitution by assessing if laws are in accordance 
with constitutional norms . It consists of 16 judges, one half is elected by the 
Bundestag, the other half by the Bundesrat. 
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Bundeswehr. The German army, which before 1990 was a pure Verteidigungsarmee, 
meaning it would only be allowed to operate in order to defend NATO territory. After 
reunification, parts of the East German Nationale Volksarmee were integrated into the 
Bundeswehr. The 2+4 treaty of 1990, which enabled German reunification, 
determines that the number of Bundeswehr troops must not exceed 370,000. 
Biindnis 90IDie Griinen. Germany's green party which emerged from various left-
wing groups and peace activists in 1979. First elected into the German federal 
parliament in 1983, the West German Die Grunen for a long time pursued radical left-
wing and pacifist policies. After German reunification, the West German Greens 
merged with the East German civil rights group Biindnis 90 and developed a more 
mainstream approach to political issues, especially towards military engagement. 
CAP (Common Agricultural Policy). The EU's agricultural policy which is based 
on a system of artificial market interference and direct financial support for farmers 
according to their production output. The CAP was gradually introduced during the 
1960s. 
CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union). Germany's Christian-Democratic Party, 
which emerged from its predecessor during the Weimar Republic, the Zentrumspartei. 
The CDU's policies are based on Christian values and a Conservative approach 
towards social and economic issues. It merged with its mainly Protestant East German 
namesake in 1990. The CDU is represented in all parts of Germany, expect Bavaria, 
where its sister party, the CSU is the dominating political force. CDU and CSU 
appear as an alliance of sister parties on the federal level in the Bundestag. 
CEE (Central and Eastern Europe). The EU accession candidates in Central and 
Eastern Europe, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania. 
Civilian Power. The definition of a country, which safeguards its international 
influence by emphasising multilateralism and non-military conflict resolution. 
Committee of the Regions. 222 representatives from the various regions in each 
member state who mainly exercise advisory powers within the political framework of 
the EU. 
Confederalism. A loose federal system, in which the basic units remain essentially 
sovereign and retain a substantial degree of autonomy. 
Convention on the Future of Europe. Established at the Laeken summit in 
December 2001 with the aim of developing a program for the EU's institutional and 
procedural reform in preparation for the next wave of enlargement. The Convention 
consists of 102 representatives from member state and accession candidate 
governments, national parliaments, the European parliament and the Commission. It 
is headed by the chairman Valery Giscard d'Estaing, a former French president. 
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CSU (Christlich Soziale Union). The CDU's Bavarian sister party, which has held an 
absolute majority in the Southern region of Bavaria since 1957. Although only 
represented in one region, the CSU has strong political influence in Germany. It has 
twice provided the candidate for the post of Chancellor, first in 1980 with then CSU 
leader Franz-Josef StrauJ3 and in 2002 with Edmund Stoiber. 
CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy). Introduced as the third pillar of the 
temple structure of the European Union in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. The aim 
is to create a European defence and security identity within NATO, based on greater 
military capabilities of the EU member states. 
Delors Report. Published in 1989 by an expert group headed by the then Commission 
president Jacques Delors, including the heads of the national central banks, it 
proposes to move towards Economic and Monetary Union in three stages. 
Deutsche Mark. The German national currency, which was established as the 
currency of the Federal Republic of West Germany after WW2 and replaced the East 
German mark in the new Liinder as part of the reunification process. It became a 
symbol for West Germany's post-war economic boom. 
Deutschlandvertrag. Ratified by the Western Allies 1955, the United States, Britain 
and France gave West Germany limited sovereignty over its internal and external 
affairs as part of the creation of the Bundeswehr and its integration into NATO. 
Deutsche Industrie und Handelskammerlag (DIHK). Germany's main industry and 
trade representation, of which all German businesses are a member. The DIHK 
subdivided into 82 regional divisions all across Germany. 
Double containment. The U.S. strategy of limiting both German and Soviet power in 
Europe. In the case of Germany, it was achieved through the determination the deep 
integration of the Federal Republic into the West (Westbindung) through membership 
of NATO and the European Community. Soviet expansionism was countered by 
strong U.S. military presence in Europe and the diplomatic propaganda war called the 
Cold War. 
ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community). Established by France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy in 1951. It represented the pooling 
of the national coal and steel sectors of the six member states in a common market 
and provided the basis for further European integration. 
EC (European Community). The fusion treaty of 1967 combined the ECSC, the 
EEC and Euratom and created the European Community. 
EEC (European Economic Community). Founded as part of the Treaty of Rome in 
1957 by the six ECSC member states, based on a complex institutional framework 
including a European Parliament, European Court of Justice, Council of Ministers and 
Commission. It also created the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 
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EFT A (European Free Trade Association). Free trade organisation created by the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Austria, Portugal and Switzerland in 
January 1960 as an alternative to the EEC. 
Elysee Treaty. Signed by France and Germany in 1963 as a symbolic document of 
post-war Franco-German reconciliation and friendship. The treaty institutionalised the 
Franco-German partnership by providing regular consultations between French and 
German elites on various issues. 
EMS (European Monetary System). Established by France and Germany in 1979, 
based on a European Currency Unit (ECU), an exchange and intervention system and 
various credit mechanisms. With a fixed range of fluctuation between the 
participating currencies, the EMS became the institutional basis for monetary 
integration in Europe. Britain, Greece and Sweden have opted out of the EMS. 
EMU (Economic and Monetary Union). Established in the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1993 as a process of three stages which led to the replacement of the national 
currencies in the participating member states through the Single European Currency, 
the euro on January 1 sI 2002. EMU is based on a growth and stability pact, which sets 
strict limits to national fiscal and economic policies. Of the 15 EU member states, at 
present only the United Kingdom and Sweden have not yet joined EMU. 
Ethics of ultimate ends. Sociologist Max Weber's moral classification of politics 
based on the belief that force is not an acceptable means to achieve political ends. 
Ethic of responsibility. Weber's classification of the political attitude which accepts 
the reality of the world as a place of violent disorder in which the use of force is 
necessary in order to achieve peace and stability. 
European Commission. The president of the Commission and his 20 
Commissioners, sent by the member states, act as the guardian of the EU treaties. The 
Commission is supported by a civil service which develops policy and legislative 
proposals, which are submitted to the Council. 
European Council. EU institution, in which the heads of state from each member 
state meet at least twice a year to decide on crucial policies and treaty changes. The 
Council of Ministers brings together ministers from the various political resorts on a 
more regular basis. 
European Defence Treaty. Signed in 1951 by the six ECSC member states in an 
attempt to create a European Defence Community. Final ratification failed because of 
the veto of the French national assembly in 1954. 
European Parliament. 626 MEPs from the 15 member states who mainly exercise 
control and consultative functions with regard to the Council and Commission. The 
EP has no full legislative powers like most national parliaments. 
European Union. Created in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, it enhanced the European 
Community with a temple structure based on three pillars (European Community, 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Home Affairs). 
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Federalism. A structural political design which is based on a written constitution and 
a clear division of power between the upper and lower levels of decision-making. 
FDP (Fre;e Demokratische Parte;). German liberal party, based on free market 
economic policies and liberal social values. It was the main coalition partner for either 
the CDU/CSU or the SPD before the Green Party became an acceptable alternative. 
The FDP was part of every West German and all-German government since 1949, 
with the exception of the period between 1966 and 1969, when CDU/CSU and SPD 
formed a governing coalition and since 1998, when the SPD formed a government 
with the Green Party. 
Federal Republic of West Germany (FRG). The West German state which emerged 
from the three Western sectors of occupation (American, British and French) in 1949. 
West Germany was governed from Bonn and merged with the East German GDR 
after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1990. 
Functionalism. A theory of international politics which argues that the nation state is 
incapable of effectively providing for the basic wants and needs of the people, 
because it is mainly based on power politics and political dogma. Hence functionalists 
therefore call for the establishment of a framework of international institutions, each 
of which should be focused on an individual task. 
German Democratic Republic (GDR). The East German communist satellite state, 
which was created in the Soviet zone of occupation in 1949. It was fIrmly integrated 
into the Warsaw Pact and fully controlled by the SED (Socialist Unity Party), which 
maintained its power through a massive state intelligence service (STASI) and Soviet 
military support. 
'Genscherism'. The foreign policy represented by Germany's longest-serving foreign 
minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), which favoured multilateralism, preventative 
non-military crisis resolution. During his period in office (1974-1990), Genscher was 
often criticized for his willingness to pay for the continuing German opt-out with 
regard to out-of-area military engagement. 
Grundgesetz, The German basic law, which came into effect in 1949 as part of the 
foundation of the West German Federal RepUblic. Since reunifIcation in 1990, the 
Grundgesetz is also applied in the territory of the former East Germany. It acts as the 
country's written constitution which determines the values and principle of the 
German state and also provides detailed regulations regarding its domestic political 
process. 
Grundlagenvertrag. The bilateral treaty between the Federal Republic of West 
Germany and the East German Democratic Republic signed in 1972. The treaty 
enhanced the diplomatic relations between the two German states and led to the 
abolition of the Hallstein doctrine. This meant that West Germany officially accepted 
the existence of two German states (although it did not recognize the GDR as a state 
under international law). 
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Hallstein doctrine. The claim to the sole representation of all German people by the 
West German Federal Republic, which had first been made by foreign office minister 
WaIter Hallstein (CDU) in 1951. 
IFOR. NATO peace implementation forces. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Organisation of 184 member countries 
which aims at promoting international monetary co-operation and economic stability, 
established in 1945. 
Institutionalism. A theoretical approach which emphasises the importance of 
institutional designs for the process of European integration. 
Intergovernmentalism. European integration theory which considers the member 
states and their national government representatives to be the primary actors within 
the European Union. 
Liinder. 16 German regions with their own constitutions, regional parliaments and 
prime ministers. They are represented in the second chamber, the Bundesrat. After 
reunification in 1990, East Germany was divided into 5 Liinder, which brought the 
number up from the previous 11 West German regions to 16. 
Ministerprlisidenten. The prime ministers of each of the 16 German regions, the 
Liinder. They are elected by the majority of parliamentarians in each of the regional 
parliaments, the Landtage and have strong political influence on the federal level 
through the Bundesrat. The role of a Ministerprasident is often a prerequisite for a 
political role on the federal level, e.g. candidate for the Chancellory. 
Mittellage. Middle position, referring to Germany being located between the Western 
Europe and the Central and Eastern European countries. 
Moskauer VeTtTag. Bilateral treaty between West Germany and the Soviet Union 
signed in 1970, in which both sides commit themselves to settle disputes by peaceful 
means only and to accept the invulnerability of each other's border. It provided the 
basis for the Ostpolitik and further treaties between West Germany and its neighbours 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Multi-level governance. Theory of European integration which describes the 
European Union as a system of governance upon multiple levels, in which the 
member states are one actor amongst many. 
Multilateral responsibility. The new foreign policy of military engagement as part of 
international crisis resolution based on U.N. mandates. 
Musterschiiler. The German ambition to act as a role model in Europe and on the 
international political stage, which had been pursued especially by West German 
leaders before the reunification of the two German states. 
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Neue Mitte. Term used by Gerhard Schroder to describe the growing middle class in 
Germany, which he managed to win over during his 1998 general election campaign. 
As a result, Schroder now leads the first coalition government between the SPD and 
the Biindnis 90/Griine in Germany's history. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The transatlantic military alliance 
founded in 1949 in an attempt to counter Soviet expansionism in Europe. While its 
Cold War rival, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in 1991, NATO aspires to become a 
pan-European security alliance and currently includes 19 member states, including 
former Warsaw Pact countries. 
NVA (Nationale Volksarmee). The military force of the East German communist 
state, the German Democratic Republic. The NV A was integrated into the military 
alliance of the Warsaw Pact, which was controlled by the Soviet Union. 
Ostpolitik. The policy of reconciliation and 'change through rapprochement' with 
Eastern Europe, which was developed by the West German SPDIFDP coalition of 
Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel after 1969. It was based on a number of bilateral 
treaties with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite states. 
Out of area. Any military engagement which is not part of the defence of NATO 
territory. 
Parlamentsvorbehalt. The need to consult the German federal parliament before a 
decision can be made. For example it applies e.g. to sending German troops into 
combat missions under article 24 of the Basic Law, and to the transfer of national 
sovereignty towards the EU level under article 23, paragraph 2 and 3. 
Prager Vertrag. Bilateral treaty between West Germany and the CSSR signed in 
1973, determining the invulnerability of borders, non-aggression and enhanced co-
operation. 
Personalised Proportionality. The German electoral system, where half of the 328 
members of the federal parliament are elected by a simple majority and the other half 
chosen from lists drawn up by the parties in each region. Voters cast two votes, the 
first determines the winner in each constituency and the second one influences the 
national percentage of votes for each party. 
Pleven plan. Proposal by French prime minister Pleven in 1950 to establish a 
European army and a European defence minister, which aimed at the exclusion of 
Germany from the commando structure. The plan was designed by the French to be 
able to exercise strong control over possible German rearmament. The Pleven plan 
was never realised but became the basis for the new proposals for a European Defence 
Community (EDC), which was rejected by the French national assembly in 1954. 
PDS (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus). Successor of the communist SED, 
which was installed in the Soviet zone of occupation after 1945 and governed the 
communist East German state with an iron grip. The PDS promotes radical socialist 
policies and finds its electoral base exclusively amongst the electorate in the Eastern 
part of Germany. 
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Rapid Reaction Force. Based on the Anglo-French declaration in St. Malo and the 
EU summit in Helsinki in 1999, the European Union decided to create a military force 
by 2003, which will intervene in any crisis in which NATO decides not to get 
involved. Member states will deploy 50,0000-60,000 troops within 60 days for any 
military engagement. Participation is open for non-EU members. 
Realism. International politics theory based on an anarchistic view of the world, 
where states have to fight for their own survival and consequently are predominately 
occupied with maintaining their own security. From the realist point of view, 
international organisations or institutions are not capable of substantially improving 
this essentially hostile international environment. 
SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands). The ruling party of the 
communist East German Democratic Republic. The SED was committed to Stalinist 
policies and oppression of opposition groups through its state intelligence service. 
Semi-sovereignty. The post-WW2 position of the West German Federal Republic 
under international law, in which the three Western Allies (U.S., Britain and France) 
had to be consulted before German leaders were able to sign international agreements. 
SFOR. NATO peace stabilisation forces. 
Single European Act. Signed in 1986. The act determined to establish a Single 
European Market until 1992 and deepened integration in a number of areas. It 
provided the basis for the far-reaching integrative steps of the Maastricht Treaty of 
1993. 
Sonderweg. The policy of pursuing a 'special way', which is different from the 
mainstream political agenda. In the case of Britain, this relates especially to its alleged 
'awkward' position towards European integration. 
Soft power. The influence on global affairs through diplomatic, economic or financial 
means. 
SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands). The Social Democrats are 
Germany's oldest political party, which has traditionally acted as the guardian of the 
German welfare state and the promoter of social justice. While West Germany elected 
only two SPD Chancellors, Willy Brandt (1969-74) and Helmut Schmidt (1974-82), 
the East German SPD was forced into a political union with the communist KPD as 
part of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei (SED) after the Second World War. In the 
reunified Germany, the SPD managed to regain power under the leadership of 
Gerhard Schroder by forming the first coalition government with the Green Party in 
Germany's history. 
Stabilitiitspolitik. The policy orientated towards monetary stability exercised by the 
German Bundesbank Its main goal was to maintain a strong Deutsche Mark 
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Sterling Zone. Currency area in which the British pound sterling was the main 
currency, developed as an integral part of the British Empire. It was the backbone of 
Britain's global economic power and collapsed after serious devaluation set in during 
the late 1960s. 
Subsidiarity principle. The principle which determines that powers should only be 
transferred to a higher level if the matters can not be dealt with on a lower level in a 
satisfactory way. 
Three circles. The three areas of British foreign policy interest as defined by Winston 
Churchill after the end of the Second World War, in order of preference: 1. Relations 
with the countries of the British Empire, 2. the 'special relationship' with the United 
States and 3. Europe. 
United Nations (U.N.). Successor organisation of the League of Nations in 1945, 
which promotes peaceful co-operation and collective security among the nations of 
the world. It is based on the U.N. Charter, a treaty which determines the rules of the 
international co-operation. Its main seat is in New York. 
Verteidigungsarmee. The role previously exercised by the Bundeswehr as part of 
West Germany's semi-sovereign status. The Bundeswehr would only act in defence of 
NATO territory in case of an attack and could therefore not operate 'out of area'. 
Warschauer Vertrag. Bilateral treaty between West Germany and Poland signed in 
1970. The crucial point of the treaty was Bonn's acceptance of Poland's Western 
border, which led to the fierce opposition among the right wing of the CDU/CSU. 
Westbindung. Germany's firm integration into the West through the transatlantic 
alliance (NATO) and the European Community. 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). Established in 1995 as a result of the Urugay 
Round negotiations, currently including 146 countries. It maintly provides a forum for 
trade agreements and disputes. 
Zahlmeister. Germany's role as the largest net contributor to the EU budget among all 
member states, often labelled as the 'paymaster of Europe'. 
Zentralmacht. The description of the unified Germany as the central power in 
Europe. 
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Appendix 1 
The theoretical background: The EU - an intergovernmental or a supranational 
entity? 
The European Union is a unique organisation in which 15 member states pool parts of 
their national sovereignty in order to co-operate within a framework of supranational 
institutions and policies. Initially, the pooling of sovereignty was limited to specific 
areas, such as coal and steel (European Coal and Steel Community, 1951), and atomic 
energy research and development (Euratom, 1957). However, over the years the 
development of European integration has resulted in the creation of an ever more 
complex institutional and procedural framework that provides for the implementation 
and maintenance of common policies across a broad variety of industrial, political 
and economic areas. 
After the 1957 Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and triggered moves to standardise external tariffs, there followed a period of relative 
inactivity in the 1970s. However, economic pressure to realise the benefits of a 
common market led in 1987 to the Single European Act, which in turn led to a 
realisation that increased political and financial co-operation would be required to 
manage the new Single European Market. A realisation that was eventually expressed 
in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which represented a major step towards the 
economic and political integration of the Member States, rather than merely providing 
a framework for simple co-operation. The Maastricht treaty established a European 
Union (EU), based on a temple structure with the supranational European Community 
(EC) pillar, supported by two intergovernmental pillars to co-ordinate Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). 
The supranational character of the Maastricht Treaty is demonstrated by the fact it 
presupposes the gradual transfer of the two intergovernmental pillars of CFSP and 
JHA into the supranational EC pillar. 
This literally means that more and more common EU policies and institutions in the 
area of foreign and security I ,justice and home affairs are meant to be developed. 
1 A major step towards the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy has of course been 
achieved through the decision to create a European Rapid Reaction Force by 2003. 
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Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty created the Committee of the Regions which 
provides for direct regional representation at the European level, bypassing the 
constraints of nation states. With Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Maastricht 
also set in motion and provided the time frame for the completion of the first major 
integrative project of the EU - the creation of a single European currency. This 
project was realised in January 2002, when 11 member states joined the new currency 
zone and surrendered currency control to the supranational European Central Bank in 
Frankfurt, which was established in June 1998. 
Although it is mainly an economic project, the political and fiscal implications of 
EMU cannot be overlooked. The participating 13 member states will definitely have a 
greater say on the general development of the future integration process, as many 
monetary issues will be decided primarily among the Euro Member States. The 
creation of the single European currency has certainly led to a debate on the need to 
standardise fiscal policies, which would in turn fundamentally affect the ability of 
member state governments to finance their domestic political priorities. Both 
Maastricht and the succeeding treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (1999) have 
also led to the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to an increasing 
number of areas, not only to enable a more effective management of the Single 
European Market and currency zone, but also to facilitate decision- making within the 
European Union as a whole (Weidenfeld, 1998, pp. 19-85; Weidenfeld, 2001, pp. 11-
51). 
This continuing development of the European integration process since the 1950s has 
been stalked by a theoretical dispute over the question of who is actually in charge of 
it. There is no doubt that the origin of the integration process stemmed from the 
initiative of a group of individual, West European nation states. 
Member state governments have therefore dominated the strategic integration process 
right from the beginning. However, at a tactical level, the challenge has arisen to try 
and assess to what extent supranational actors and institutions have gained control 
since their inception managed to wrest control of policy and institutional evolution 
away from the nation states and their representatives. 
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If it is accepted, that to some degree supranational authorities have gained control of 
the process and management of European integration, then this raises the question 
whether the European integration process has turned into a quasi-automatic 
development, in which the move towards economic integration has inevitably 
triggered moves toward closer political integration, primarily managed by Community 
institutions rather than Member State governments. 
The mam matter of dispute among analysts of European integration therefore 
continues to be the question of national autonomy. I.e. are the member states still 
autonomous in their decision-making with regard to how much of their sovereignty is 
transferred to the community level or are an increasing number of responsibilities 
from the originally fully autonomous member states gradually being taken over by the 
supranational community institutions? 
The two major opposing strands of European integration theory are therefore the 
state-centric theories on the one hand and the supranational theories on the other hand. 
The former are united in their view that the process of European integration has 
mainly been shaped by fully sovereign nation states and their governments and that 
they remain in fundamental in control of the whole process. In contrast, the 
supranational theories argue that the control exercised by the member states is 
gradually but inevitably being eroded away by the integration process and more 
exactly the needs of supranational institutions created to manage the Community 
(such as the Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank. and 
the European Court of Justice). 
In order to attempt an assessment in how far member state interests and policies are 
still significant for the development of European integration in the present 
institutional and procedural setting of the EU, a critical analysis of the major 
intergovernmental and supranational approaches will be necessary. 
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1.1. Functionalism 
The most influental theoretical approach within the supranational paradigm, 
neofunctionalism, had its origins in the functionalist view of the international 
environment. Functionalism was never really a theory, but rather a new approach to 
the question of how the world and an international society could be restructured after 
the devastation the two World Wars had caused. Developed in the 1940s, even before 
the end of the Second World War, it was mainly championed by the writings of David 
Mitrany. He based his exposition on a generally positive view of the ability of the 
human race to change the world for the better, provided it followed the right 
approach. Mitrany was not so much interested in putting forward grand visions of an 
ideal world order, but rather wanted to define the basic functions the international 
society would have to fulfil to provide for the basic needs and welfare of the people. 
Therefore, Mitrany's functionalist approach focused on the mechanisms that would be 
necessary in order to achieve these ends. As a result, functionalism breaks with the 
traditional view of the world, which saw the nation state as the main centre of 
attention, an attitude which had repeatedly led to outbursts of nationalism and wars 
(Mitrany, 1943, pp. 191-195). Functionalists still see the nation state as an important 
point of reference for human beings in terms of their cultural origins, which is why 
they argue that it could not simply be abolished over night. 
Still, because of the incapacity of the nation states and governments to provide for the 
basic wants and needs of their people, functionalists like Mitrany believed that a 
peaceful and prosperous world order could only be achieved through the gradual 
transfer of certain functions towards new international organisations. From the 
functionalist point of view, it was the traditional focus of the inherently selfish nation 
state and national governments as the main provider of peace and welfare, that 
directly led to the political and economic catastrophies of two World Wars. As a 
result, functionalism suggests nationalism has made the world unstable and thereby 
less secure. Because nation states and their governments are mainly interested in 
national dogmas and power politics, functionalists call for a new, trans-national 
approach to solve global problems (Mitrany, 1943, pp.131-132). 
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Functionalists consequently call for the creation of a variety of flexible international 
institutions, which should gradually take over functions which traditionally have 
fallen into the exclusive area of competence of the nation state. The functionalist 
concept is thus not interested in the creation of a centralised global administration but 
rather wants the establishment of a set of flexible institutions, which enable the 
effective management of international and economic relations at a trans-national 
level. In the functionalists' opinion this flexibility is necessary because people's needs 
undergo a constant change, which is why international institutions have to be open to 
change if they want to remain effective and relevant. Moreover, it is argued that if 
they were created in a functional way, they will gradually attract more and more of 
the people's trust, because people will realise that these institutions are better suited to 
provide for them than the nation state. Nevertheless, functionalists like Mitrany, stress 
that the creation of such institutions and the shifting of loyalties has to be a gradual 
process. Therefore, nation states will not be abolished overnight, but will have to be 
willing to let go of parts of their sovereignty voluntarily in a gradually evolving 
process (Mitrany, 1965, pp. 141-145). 
The federalist idea that these institutions could be designed in a similar way to the 
nation-state, as a kind of reproduction on the supranational level is fundamentally 
rejected by functionalists. As Mitrany stresses, the federalist idea of creating 
international 'superstates' is not suitable for the goal of a peaceful and prosperous 
global order. In his opinion, federalism rests on the outdated concept of 'the 
territorially sovereign conception of political relations' (Mitrany, 1965, pp. 141-142). 
This is why Mitrany was also extremely sceptical about European institutional 
integration, a development which he considered to be an attempt to recreate the 
concept of the territorial-bound nation state on a larger, regional scale (Mitrany, 1975, 
pp. 69-70). 
Because, from the functionalist point of view, the focus on a territorially limited 
nation-state leads to nationalist dogma and power gambles, it hampers the ability to 
develop innovative concepts for a new global order. For Mitrany and his followers, 
the functional approach includes the necessary pragmatism which is needed in order 
to 'translate the instruments and experience of national life into the needs of an 
international order' (Mitrany, 1943, p.132). 
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1.2. Neofunctionalism 
As explained above, functionalism was not a properly elaborated theory, but rather an 
idealistic approach to the possible development of a peaceful global framework. 
It was therefore not sufficient to explain the complexity of the development of 
economic and political integration in Europe, which had gradually started to emerge 
after 1945. Moreover, as mentioned, Mitrany had shown no intention to deal with 
European integration, because he considered it to be a federalist and not a 
functionalist project. 
Because of that, analysts of European integration built on the basic ideas of Mitrany's 
functional approach by developing neofunctionalism, a theory of European integration 
which did influence the theoretical political debate immensely. Both Mitrany's 
functionalist approach and neofunctionalism were products of the unique political 
environment created by the two World Wars. By the end of the 1950s, 
neofunctionalist thinking dominated the theoretical analysis of the emerging European 
integration process by arguing the process was an inevitable consequence of 
economic determinants and needs. 
The most influental neofunctionalist analyst, Emst Haas, tried to provide a theoretical 
explanation for the emerging institutional structures of European integration, such as 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. Haas sees European 
integration as a process which emerges mainly because of the necessity to pool 
national sovereignty in the economic field in post-war Europe. Nation states and their 
governments realise the need to co-operate in economic terms, in order to be able to 
survive, which is why they agree to the integration of parts of their national economic 
sectors on a supranational level. The creation of the ECSC in 1951 therefore mainly 
emerged because of a 'convergence of demands within and among the nation states 
concerned' (Haas, 1968, pp. 286-9). 
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Because parts of the elites2 within the participating nation states came to the 
conclusion that national interests in respect of coal and steel would be better served by 
integrating them into a national framework, they decided to set up the ECSC. In order 
to function properly, the ECSC needed at least a basic supranational institutional 
framework, which included a High Authority that supervised the harmonization of the 
national coal and steel sectors. According to Haas, the creation of a basic pattern for 
supranational institutions in one economic sector (such as coal and steel), gradually 
engendered a process of integrational 'spill-over' into other sectors of the national 
economies. 
The drive behind this process of increasing integrational 'spill-over' from one sector to 
another emerged from two sides: Firstly, officials representing established 
supranational institutions (such as the High Authority of the ECSC), tend to try and 
extend their influence by pushing for further integration of the member states' national 
economies. Secondly, national elites and representatives also gradually agree towards 
the increasing entanglement of the member states' economies, because the realise that 
it is necessary in order to achieve domestic economic prosperity. As Haas argues, 
once the process of sectoral economic integration has begun, an increasing number of 
national interest groups gradually transfer their loyalties to the supranational 
institutions (Haas, 1968, p.317). They do so, because they realise that they stand a 
better chance to maintain their welfare interests by lobbying the representatives of the 
supranational institutions, than they can achieve through lobbying within the more 
limited national political arena. As a result, national interest groups team up with 
interests groups from other member states in order to exercise joint lobbying. They 
also demand greater integration because they assume that the supranational level will 
help them to maintain their interests better than it would be possible on the national 
level. 
2 Haas defines elites in the way neofunctionalists understand them as 'the leaders of all relevant social 
groups who habitually participate in the making of public decisions, whether as policy-makers in 
government, as lobbyists or as spokesmen of political parties' (Haas, 1968, p. 16-19). 
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Haas gives the example of industrial interest groups in Europe, whose initial 
opposition towards greater integration changed as a result of their experiences of 
interacting with the supranational institutions and led to 
'the readiness of industrial groups to accept integration if accompanied by 
supranational institutions possessing powers of direction and control, potentially 
'dirigistic' in nature. In 1951, all groups without exception opposed such an 
approach and were compelled by national legislative action to accept the ECSC 
rules. Four years later this unqualified opposition had changed to a demand for 
more supranational powers and control if specific benefits were expected from 
this' (Haas, 1968, p. 317). 
Neofunctionalists such as Haas believe that the 'spill-over' of economic integration 
into an increasing number of sectors of the national economies inevitably leads to the 
deepening of political integration. As the deepening of economic integration raises an 
increasing need for political supervision of the process, the emergence of a parallel 
process of political institutionalisation is unavoidable from the neofunctionalist point 
of view. 
The gradual 'spill-over' process described by neofunctionalists is therefore twofold: At 
first the integration of one sector of the national economy creates pressures to 'spill 
over' into an increasing number of economic sectors. As a result, because greater 
institutional capacity is needed on the supranational level in order to supervise the 
process of economic integration, the integration process 'spills over' from the 
economic into the political field. The outcome would be the establishment of an 
increasingly dense and complex supranational institutional framework, towards which 
the nation states have lost large parts of their autonomy. Haas thinks that the 
institutionalisation of European integration in the 1950s, up to the Treaty of Rome, 
has already shown such a process is evolving: 
'Economic integration - with its evident political implications and causes - then 
became almost a universal battlecry, making complete the 'spill-over' from ECSC 
to Euratom and its promise of independence from oil imports, from sector common 
markets to the General Common Market' (Haas, 1968, pp. 317). 
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Although neofunctionalists such as Haas remain quite vague about the possible final 
outcome of this process, they are determined in their belief that the nation states will 
gradually become less and less important. Nation states and their representatives 
realise that national solutions will be no longer be sufficient to provide for the needs 
of the people in an increasingly interdependent world. As a result, an increasing 
number of national elites will shift their loyalties to the supranational institutions, 
which manage the process of political 'spill-over' from the national to the 
supranationallevel: 
'Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political 
activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction 
over the pre-existing national states. The end result of political integration is a new 
political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones' (Haas, 1968, pp. 
16). 
The problem with the neofunctionalist way of defining European integration is that it 
contains a contradictory gap between its description of the 'spill-over' process and the 
possible end result. While neofunctionalists see it as almost inevitable that the 
integration process, once it has been initiated in one economic sector, will 'spill over' 
into other economic, and later political sectors, they remain cautious to determine the 
final outcome. As can be seen in the quote above, in his earlier writings Haas still 
expected European integration to develop towards a new supranational community 
which would gradually replace the nation states. Haas therefore had no doubts that 'it 
is unlikely that the General Common Market can avoid a species of political 
federalism in order to function as an economic organ' (Haas, 1968, p. 317). In later 
reflections, Haas is more cautious and even criticizes neofunctionalism for failing to 
determine the end result of 'spill-over' processes. He states that 'neo-functionalist 
practitioners have difficulty achieving closure on a given case of regional integration 
because the terminal condition being observed is uncertain' (Haas, 1971, p. 23). 
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Haas now also realises the major weakness of neofunctionalist thinking. It concerns 
the question why, in spite of early neofunctionalist predictions, the major 
developments in European integration since the 1950s have mainly been initiated by 
national political leaders and governments. Although Community institutions have 
undoubtedly contributed to the development of supranational policies and regulations, 
they have not really taken over the leadership of the integration process from the 
national level. Therefore, a major transfer of loyalties from the national level to the 
Community level has only partially occurred. As Haas admits, the neofunctionalist 
prediction, that a new supranational centre would replace the nation state as the focus 
for national elites, cannot be maintained: 
'In short, while authority is certainly withdrawn from the preexisting units, it is not 
proportionately or symmetrically vested in a new centre; instead it is distributed 
asymmetrically among several centers ( ... ) The ensemble would enjoy legitimacy 
in the eyes of its citizens though it would be difficult to pinpoint the focus of the 
legitimacy in a single authority center; rather, the image of infinitely tiered 
multiple loyalties might be the appropriate one'. (Haas, 1971, p. 32). 
The main problem of neofunctionalists is therefore that, although they correctly 
describe the policy-making structure of the European Community, they come to 
unrealistic conclusions with regard to who is in charge of the integration process. The 
supranational Community institutions (such as the Commission, the European 
Parliament (EP) and the European Court of Justice) have undoubtedly taken over an 
increasing number of tasks from the member states. With the continuing extension of 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) into further areas of policy-making, the member 
states have voluntarily agreed to hand over a substantial part of their formerly 
autonomous decision-making powers to the supranational community level. 
This process has definitely been influenced by the 'spill-over' processes 
neofunctionalists describe, meaning that successful integration in one area (e.g. coal 
and steel) leads to interest group pressures towards further integration in other areas 
(e.g. nuclear energy). 
XII 
However, while member states were ready to give up parts of their sovereignty in 
certain areas and have hence also handed over the right of policy implementation in 
these areas to the supranationallevel, they have not abandoned their overall control of 
the integration process. With regard to the fundamental decisions on the development 
of European integration, which include institutional and procedural changes, member 
state governments remain firmly in charge. The major steps in European integration 
(such as the deepening of political and economic integration in the Maastricht Treaty) 
have only come about, because a group of member state governments wanted them to 
happen, and were then able to convince the others. 
The Community institutions such as the Commission3 and the European Parliament 
have certainly contributed to the proposals. As the final decision-making on major 
issues rests with the Council, no supranational institution has so far been capable of 
initiating major institutional or procedural changes without the consent of the member 
states. The intergovernmental council consequently remains the most powerful 
institution of the community, although it undoubtedly increasingly depends on the 
advice and the co-operation of the other institutions, especially the Commission. (Hix, 
1999, p. 360, Wessels, 1991, p.l48). The neofunctionalist assumption that the 
supranational institutions, such as the Commission, would become powerful enough 
to replace the nation state as a focus for the loyalties of national elites, has therefore 
turned out to be unrealistic. As Stephen George illustrates, none of the major loyalty 
shifts from the national to the community level, envisaged by neofunctionalists have 
in reality materialised: 
'With the exception of agriculture, there was no marked tendency for interest 
groups to operate at the EC level rather than at the national level in the 1960s and 
1970s. Euro-groups did appear, but the major thrust of political lobbying remained 
at the national level. ' (George, 1996, p.43) 
3 Especially under the leadership of Jaques Delors, Commission president between 1985 and 1995, the 
Commission took an active role in co-operating with the national governments in order to initiate major 
steps towards the deepening of economic and political integration (Wallace and Wallace, 2000, p. 15 
and p. 94) 
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The concept of economic and political 'spill-over', as it was defined by 
neofunctionalists, therefore remains rather vague and is certainly not able to predict 
the development of European integration accurately. Although 'spill-over' processes 
do certainly happen, neofunctionalists tend to exaggerate the role of interest groups in 
the process (George, 1996, p.46 and p. 277, Pierson, 1998, p.29). 
This leads them to jump to conclusions about the possible outcome. Rather than to 
focus more on the actual development process of European integration, 
neofunctionalists tend to put forward a simplistic and mechanistic hypothesis about 
the possible outcome of the process, before it has even been properly analysed. This 
is why, instead of analysing the actual process, neofunctionalists rather tend to assume 
the effect of sectional integration on the behaviour of national elites and interest 
groups and consequently on the importance of the nation state as a whole. 
Neofunctionalism has hence been rightly criticised for its lack of empirical detail and 
its tendency to make unfounded predictions: 
'There are no certain outcomes from the processes of political change, whether at 
the level of the state or in international politics ( ... ) As such, the 'spillover' concept 
is suggestive more than it is precisely analytical or empirically accurate. The 
neofunctional model does identify some of the principal supranational agencies at 
work in the processes of international change. What it fails to offer, however, is 
any plausible account of how such actors manipulate or direct the regional 
process.' (O'Neill, 1996, p. 130) 
In spite of its weaknesses, neofunctionalism should not be simply dismissed as a 
worthless approach, because it has rightly drawn attention to the 'spill-over' processes 
that continue to take place in many policy areas. They lead to an increasingly dense 
network of shared responsibilites between the different levels (regional, national and 
the supranational Community level) in terms of policy-making. In this respect, 
neofunctionalists offer a valuable perspective for an analysis of a process which will 
definitely continue. 
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In an EU which has to deal with a rising number of issues that can no longer be solved 
on the regional or the national level in a sufficient way, national governments will in 
many cases willingly share responsibilities with the Community institutions. 
Neofunctionalists are wrong after all when they conclude that the decline of the nation 
state will be the end result of this process of 'spill-over' of responsibilities. In spite of 
neofunctionalist predictions, the EU member states have basically preserved their 
ability to act as autonomous nations. None of the Community institutions has so far 
become powerful enough to deprive the national level of fundamental powers without 
the specific consent of the latter. Neofunctionalists should therefore accept that 'states 
possess formal sovereignty, and only the recognized legitimate representatives of the 
state can agree to surrender or "pool" that sovereignty' (George, 1996, p. 54). 
1.3. Intergovernmentalism 
The dominance of the neofunctionalist interpretations of the European integration 
process in the 1950s and 60s led to the rise of a number of approaches, which 
essentially questioned the basic assumptions of neofunctionalism. Especially the 
unfounded neofunctionalist assumption, that the nation state would be increasingly 
weakened by the process of integrational 'spill-over'. Critics countered the 
neofunctionalist argument by pointing out that, contrary to the neofunctionalist 
predictions, national governments still remain the essential players, which initiate 
most of the major developments in European integration. From the point of view of 
this opposing strand of European integration theory, the process of European 
integration remains mainly an intergovernmental one. Therefore, any coherent 
explanation of major developments in the integration process would have to be based 
on an analysis of the member states' national interests and preferences. From the 
intergovernmentalist point of view, integrational progress could only be achieved if 
there was a correspondence of national preferences among a group of member states 
in a certain area. 
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The briskest rebuttal of the neofunctionalist approach came from Stanley Hoffmann's 
realist intergovernmental analysis of European integration. Hoffmann's 
intergovernmental approach was based on the realist view of the world, a classic 
theory of international relations. From the realist point of view, international politics 
takes place in an environment which is basically characterized by a state of anarchy. 
Hence, nation states are important entities as only they would be capable of providing 
the international environment with a basic structural order. 
Because nation states operate in an anarchic international environment, they find 
themselves in a constant process of fighting for their own survival against other states. 
It is for that reason that their main interest lies in providing for their own security. The 
realist view of international relations consequently remains very pessimistic about the 
successful establishment of any supranational institutional framework which goes 
beyond the national level. Realists are especially sceptical regarding the ability of any 
supranational institution to bring an end to the anarchic state of the international 
environment, because the supranational level would never be able to adequately look 
after domestic wants and needs. 
Stanley Hoffmann's analysis of the European integration process adopts these realist 
assumptions, and hence concludes that the idea that the integration process could 
fundamentally weaken the nation state's sovereignty is flawed. From Hoffinann's 
point of view, nation states voluntarily decide to co-operate within regional 
organisations, such as the European Community. In spite of this, they remain firmly in 
control of the process and even in full control of any supranational entity that has 
been created. He especially points out that the functionalistlneofunctionalist notion of 
the inevitable gradual transfer of national loyalties to the supranational level has been 
proven wrong by the post-war development of European integration: 
'So far, the 'transferring [of] exclusive expectations of benefits from the nation-
state to some larger entity' leaves the nation-state both as the main focus of 
expectations, and as the initiator, pace-setter, supervisor, and often destroyer of the 
larger entity: for in the international arena the state is still the highest possessor of 
power, and while not every state is a political community there is as yet no 
political community more inclusive than the state.' (Hoffinann, 1966, p.908). 
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For Hoffinann, the major flaw in neofunctionalist thinking is the assumption that 
sectoral economic integration will inevitably lead to the transfer of national loyalties 
and thus result in increasing political integration. In his opinion, the creation of a 
European state could not happen as a gradual functional process of 'spill-over', but 
only by general agreement among the people of Europe 'by consent and through the 
abdication of the previous separate states' (Hoffinan, 1966, p. 910). 
Considering Hoffmann's realist background, it is not suprising that he considers this 
outlook to be rather utopian (Hoffinann, 1966, p. 911), as he believes that the people 
of Europe will only agree to limited co-operation among strong and sovereign nation 
states. He accepts, however, that the process of limited European integration does not 
leave the nation state unchanged. Although the nation state remains robust in its 
defence against any attempts which would threaten its sovereignty, European 
integration has enhanced the national political arena of decision-making. With the 
establishment of supranational institutions, each member state hence faces a much 
more heterogeneous set of actors which influence the decision-making process on the 
national level. (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 911). 
In his earlier writings, Hoffmann is still unsure about the possible outcome of 
European integration. He does not rule out the possibility that the nation state could 
one day be made redundant by a bigger entity, as 'there are many ways of going 
"beyond the nation-state" , (Hoffinann, 1966, p.911). Hoffmann nevertheless refuses 
to accept the utopian outlook of neofunctionalists and federalists who tend to make 
predictions about the future of European integration which cannot yet be proven by 
evidence. His rather pragmatic analysis of the integration process mainly focuses on 
what has been achieved at the time of investigation. That is why, contrary to his 
earlier assumptions, in his later writings, Hoffmann accepts that the European 
Community can no longer simply be described as an 'intergovernmental regime ( ... ) 
but as a network involving the pooling of sovereignty' (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991, 
p.l0). Hoffmann now accepts that the increasingly complex political process of the 
Community takes place among a multiplicity of actors on different levels (lbid, p.l 0). 
However, Hoffmann still emphasizes that it is the process of interstate bargaining 
which continues to determine the course of the integration process. 
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As he rightly explains, the fact that policy processes within the European Community 
take place amongst a network of multiple actors on different levels, does not mean 
that national governments have lost their powers to determine fundamental decisions. 
No single Community institution is able to initiate fundamental changes in the 
European integration process without the consent of (at least a majority) of member 
states in the Council. Consequently, in order for any new policy sector to be 
transferred to the Community level, consent among member state is indispensable and 
continues to be achieved in the form of intergovernmental bargains. 
For Hoffmann, a coherent analysis of the integration process thus has to take account 
of domestic member state preferences, which the latter then try to defend in a process 
intergovernmental bargaining. He presents the establishment of the ECSC and the 
EEC as well as the groundbreaking Single European Act as examples (Keohane and 
Hoffmann, 1991, pp. 16-22). In Hoffinann's opinion, none of these major steps in 
European integration would have ever come into existence without a general 
correspondence of the national interests of a group of member states. 
The neofunctionalist focus on the influence of supranational actors and institutions 
would consequently lead to a one-sided interpretation of the development of European 
integration: 
'Our argument is that successful spillover requires prior programmatic agreement 
among governments, expressed in an intergovernmental bargain ( ... ) The analyst 
must eventually go beyond these interstate bargains to the domestic political 
processes of the member states, on the one hand, and to the constraints of 
international institutions, on the other. Yet these interstate bargains remain the 
necessary conditions for European integration and must be recognized as such.' 
(Keohane and Hoffinann, 1991, p. 17). 
The main weakness of Hoffmann's approach is probably his neglect of the influence 
supranational actors have on the process of national preference formation on the 
domestic level, as well as on the process of interstate bargaining on the supranational 
level. 
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Although Hoffmann accepts that the Community's policy-making process has become 
more heterogenous and is influenced by a multiplicity of actors, he does not really 
analyse how the supranational level influences the national level of decision-making 
(O'Neill, 1996, p. 65 and pp. 68-69). 
More modern intergovernmentalist accounts of European integration have tried to 
approach this fundamental weakness of the Hoffmann thesis by taking account of the 
growing influence of supranational actors. While they still insist that the EU member 
states remain the crucial actors in the decision-making process of European 
integration, they tend to accept that transnational interests have become part of it. 
Probably the most prominent example for this 'modern' state-centric approach is 
Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalist theory, developed in the 1990s. 
Moravcsik's basic hypothesis is that member states are still essentially in control of 
the integration process. From Moravscik's point of view, a complete account of the 
community'S decision-making process has to consist of an analysis of two levels: 
firstly the domestic political environment of each member state, secondly the 
supranational level of the Community, where interstate bargaining among member 
states takes place. 
Moravcsik's analysis of the basic level, the domestic political environment of each 
member state, is based on a liberal theory of national preference formation. Moravscik 
considers national preferences of member states to emerge in a process of interaction 
between state and societal actors. This effectively means that state and government 
representatives negotiate with interest groups in order to determine the national 
preferences in a variety of policy sectors. However, what Morvacsik means when he 
speaks of 'preferences', goes far beyond the determination of policy goals and includes 
'a set of underlying national objectives independent of any particular international 
negotiation to expand exports, to enhance security vis-A-vis a particular threat, or 
to realise some ideational goal ( ... ) Preferences reflect the objectives of those 
domestic groups which influence the state apparatus.' (Moravcsik, 1998, p.20 and 
p.24) 
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That Moravscik goes beyond Hoffmann's realist intergovernmentalist approach is 
shown by the fact that he already sees the domestic political process of national 
preference formation 'determined by the constraints and opportunities imposed by 
economic interdependence' (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 482). This means that from 
Moravscik's point of view, no member state's domestic political arena is isolated from 
outside influences but, on the contrary, strongly influenced by the global economy 
and coalitions between national and transnational interest groups (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 
481). 
The next step in Moravscik's European integration model takes place after the process 
of national preference formation has been completed on the domestic political level. 
Then, national governments and their representatives officially determine their 
preferences and present them to other member states in a process of interstate 
bargaining on the Community level (mainly in the Council and at IGCs). In this 
process of interstate bargaining, each member state tries to hold on to as many of its 
own preferences as possible. It is for that reason that member states look out for other 
member states with similar national preferences in certain areas, in order to perform 
coalition building. This will facilitate the successful outcome of the bargaining 
process for them. For Moravcsik, the analysis of this second stage results in an 
intergovernmentalist account of the bargaining process between member states and 
their outcomes. (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 298). 
Concerning the question why states are willing to enter processes of interstate 
bargaining at all, Moravcsik sees one reason in the desire of each national 
government to remain in office as long as possible. As Moravcsik argues, national 
governments are strengthened domestically if they manage to present successful 
outcomes of the bargaining process at home (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 483 and p.S1S). 
Moreover, the main reason why states enter a bargaining process, which very often 
results in the partial pooling of sovereignty, stems from the fact that in an increasingly 
gIobalised world they gain from a process of transnational co-operation and partial 
integration. Moravcsik adds a third and final step to his two-level analysis of the 
integration process, which follows the conclusion of the intergovernmental bargaining 
process. 
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By pointing out that member states tend to determine themselves to what extent they 
delegate parts of their sovereignty onto the supranational institutional level, they 
remain in firm and final control of the results of the interstate bargains: 
'They choose whether to delegate and pool sovereignty in international institutions 
that secure the substantive agreements they have made.' (Moravcsik, 1998, p.20). 
It is at this point that Moravcsik makes a clear distinction between his approach and 
neofunctionalism. Whereas neofunctionalists assume that state representatives 
gradually lose control of the integration process and supranational actors thus take 
over more and more responsibilities, Moravcsik insists that national representatives 
remain basically autonomous in their choice. Consequently, which powers community 
institutions are allowed to adopt, depends on the willingness of the national 
governments to transfer parts of their sovereignty: 
'Where neofunctionalism emphasized the active role of supranational officials in 
shaping bargaining outcomes, liberal intergovernmentalism stresses instead passive 
institutions and the autonomy of national leaders. ' (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 517-519). 
Moravcsik has tried to prove his theoretical assumption in a profound study of the 
negotiations that led to the Single European Act in 1987, which became the basis for 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. In his study published in 1991, Moravcsik argues that 
the decisions included in the SEA only came about because of a convergence of 
national interests between the three largest member states, namely Britain, France and 
Germany (Moravcsik, 1991, pp. 48-53). As Moravcsik shows, especially in terms of 
economic policies, the three major European states could agree on a basic integrative 
framework, which would enable the establishment of a Common Market. The basis 
for this major step in the development of European integration which also led to 
increasing flexibility through Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), was a process of 
interstate bargaining between the member states. Moravcsik illustrates that the rather 
anti-integrationist British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher could only be convinced 
to agree to abandon the principle of unanimous decision-making in some areas 
because she was interested in making the internal market project work (Moravcsik, 
1991, p.61). 
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In his study, Moravcsik especially stresses that during the SEA negotiations, 
supranational actors such as the Commission did not acquire the role which 
neofunctionalists had foreseen for them. Although the Commission under the active 
leadership of Jaques Delors influenced the discussions on the SEA significantly by 
putting forward its own proposals, the fmal contents of the SEA were determined by 
the leading figures of the member state governments: 
'Cockfield and Delors acted on the margins to broaden the White Paper and the 
SEA, and they may have contributed to the remarkable speed of decision making at 
the intergovernmental conference. Nevertheless, the broader outlines of both 
documents were proposed, negotiated, and approved, often in advance of 
Commission initiatives, by the heads of governments themselves. Indeed, the 
breakthrough in the relaunching of the EC had already occurred before Delors 
became president of the Commission.' (Moravcsik, 1991, p. 65) 
By providing a modernised version of intergovernmentaIism, Moravcsik has certainly 
made an important contribution to the theoretical debate on the development of 
European integration. His state-centric two-level model of national preference 
formation on the domestic level and interstate bargaining on the supranationaI level 
usefully describes how, even today, major decisions are still being achieved in the 
community. However, although Moravcsik takes the possible influence of 
supranational actors into greater account than Hoffmann's classic 
intergovernmentalism has done, he is still being criticised for being too narrow in his 
approach. Moravcsik mentions the influence of supranational actors on the domestic 
process of preference formation, but he provides no deeper analysis of the possible 
effect of the increasingly shared responsibilites with regard to policy-making among 
different levels. 
Ben Rosamond therefore accuses him of a circular argument, which is determined to 
lead back to the hypothesis that national interests and bargaining powers are the 
crucial factors in the integration process: 
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'For liberal intergovernmentalists, the chosen level of analysis is national 
governments and the key research questions concern the ways in which these 
emissaries of national interests interact when placed in the institutional confines of 
the EU. What is studied as integration outcomes is the product of these games 
This may be a route to theoretical parsimony, but it also threatens a circular form 
of argument that excludes alternative explanations which might emphasize the 
importance of non-state variables (Rosamond, 2000, pp.152-153). 
Such criticism is certainly legitimate, especially if one tries to assess Moravcsik's 
approach in terms of its analytical completeness. In spite of this, Moravcsik's claim 
that member states continue to have the most crucial role in determining the outcome 
of fundamental decisions in the Community, remains valid. In contrast, the 
Commission has in fact lost influence in the course of the last ten years4 • He is also 
correct in his assumption that the process of European integration has so far rather 
helped the nation states to survive in an increasingly globalised environment than it 
has weakened them. 
The latter hypothesis is supported by a number of other intergovernmentalist, among 
them Alan Milward. He claims that national governments decided to start the process 
of European institutional integration after 1945, because they felt the need to establish 
an institutional framework which would enable them to co-operate effectively. For 
Milward, member states created supranational institutions such as the ECSC in order 
to achieve better results on the supranational level than would have been possible at 
the independent, domestic level. 
European integration has therefore contributed to the rescue of the nation state, which 
would otherwise have found it hard to compete in the increasingly globalised post-war 
environment (Milward and Sorensen, 1993, p. 5 and p. 21). 
4 By referring to the post-Delors Commissions of Jaques Santer and Romano Prodi, WiIliam Wallace 
argues that the more recent loss of influence for the Commission has been 'the result of weak internal 
management and coordination, overstretched staff, and lacklustre leadership ( ... )'. Wallace also comes 
to the conclusion that the general trend seems to lead towards 'an underlying shift of influence away 
from the Commission towards other EU institutions and the member governments'. (Wallace, 2000, 
p.l5) 
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From Milward's point of view, the national governments have at all times been in full 
control of the integration process, and have not abandoned their essential decision-
making powers to the supranationallevel: 
( ... ) the ECSC, the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Market were 
indispensable pillars of Europe's reconstruction. But each was and is designed to 
resolved a particular and limited, not a generalized and universal, problem. 
(Milward, 1984, p. 495). 
Milward strongly rejects the neofunctionalist expectation that the nation state 
gradually loses its sovereignty to the supranational institutional level in a process of a 
'spill-over' of loyalties. He argues that the development of European integration since 
the 1950s has proven neofunctionalists wrong. Contrary to their belief, national 
governments have continued to be able to control the integration process in full, 
which also allowed them to set limits, if they thought it to be necessary. In Milward's 
opinion, the expected transfer of control over the fundamental decisions on the future 
of integration did therefore not take place. As an example, Milward mentions the 
'empty chair-crisis' of 1965, in which French president DeGaulle asserted the right to 
maintain national control over the future development of the Community (Milward 
and Sorensen, 1993, p.15). The conclusion for Milward is thus that even in a 
European framework of growing institutional complexity, the different national 
preferences of member states remain 'of crucial importance in understanding why the 
history of European integration has been one of fits and starts rather than of linear 
progression' (Milward, 1993, p.21). 
Nevertheless, in this context Milward criticises both neofunctionalism and Stanley 
Hoffmann's classic realist intergovernmentalist approach of coming to unrealistic, far-
reaching conclusions about the integration process. 
While neofunctionalists tend to predict that in the long run, the Communtiy level will 
deprive the nation state of more and more of its functions, Hoffinann's approach 
argues that the chances are slim that the integration process will ever expand into 
substantial areas of national sovereignty. From Milward's point of view, both of these 
approaches are too rigid in their determination of the outcomes of integration. 
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For his own approach, Milward thus limits himself to the analysis of what has actually 
happened since 1945 and remains rather cautious about making long-term predictions 
(Milward, 1993, p.20). He stresses that no integration theory should attempt to predict 
the future shape of the community, as it will be determined by a variety of 
continually changing national preferences: 
'While we start from the realist position that the modem nation-state is still the 
ultimate arbiter of its own destiny, our hypotheses are open-ended about the 
implications of such a statement for European integration ( ... ) We, in contrast, 
assume the European Community to be an international framework constructed by 
the nation-state for the completion of its own domestic policy objectives - a 
hypothesis that allows for an episodic development of European integration 
reflecting changes in domestic politics rather than the incremental progression 
postulated by other integration theories.' (Milward, 1993, pp. 20-21). 
While Moravcsik and Milward both still focus primarily on the nation state as the 
crucial actor in the integration process, other intergovernmental approaches tend to go 
further in their appreciation of the changes the nation state undergoes in the process. 
One example is W olfgang Wessel's approach, which is still based on the notion that 
states remain the principal pace-setters of the integration process (Rosamond, 2000, 
p.140). Wessel's analysis nevertheless already tends towards multi-level models of 
European integration, as he accepts that the nature of state sovereignty has 
fundamentally changed in the course of European integration. 
As Wessels argues, the member state governments of the European Community 
accepted the fact that they had to transfer a growing number of competences to the 
Community level in order to be economically successful in an increasingly 
interdependent world. It was the only way for them to provide for the welfare of their 
citizens and consequently to maintain their domestic electoral support (Wessels, 1991, 
p. 135). For Wessels, as a result of the increasing transfer of competencies from the 
national to the Community level, the EC has acquired state-like characteristics, while 
member states have been downgraded to 'co-decisionmakers' in a 'political game of 
two levels' (Wessels, 1991, pp. 136-137). 
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Wessels compares this new system of co-decision making between the national and 
the community level with co-operative federal political systems such as the United 
States and Germany: 
'But the transfer of real powers to the EC and their extensive use by the Council 
(which in its decision making and interaction style points at an amalgamation of 
national systems) make actual practice closer to a federal system of co-operative 
federalism such as that in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.' 
(Wessels, 1991, p. 137). 
As can be seen, Wessel's approach remains basically intergovernmental, because he 
sees the Council, the Community institution in which member states negotiate, as the 
body in which 'vital decisions for the future of the Community are normally taken' 
(Wessels, 1993, p. 145). What makes Wessel's approach more far-reaching than, for 
example, that of Moravcsik and Milward, is his definition of the Council as an 
institution which is itself part of a supranational institutional framework, and not 
simply a forum for intergovernmental bargains between national government 
representatives. By accepting the Council as a forum for interstate bargaining, 
member states therefore agree to negotiate under the conditions of a supranational 
institution. The Council consequently turns into the 'major control mechanism through 
which states give up autonomy for well-guaranteed access and influence' (Wessels, 
1991, p.137) 
By comparing the Hoffmann thesis with the more modem approaches, it can be seen 
that the intergovernmentalist strand of European integration theory has tried to keep 
up to date with the developments of the past fifty years. However, the question 
remains as to how far intergovemmentalists manage to fully account for the 
complexity of the institutional and procedural system of the EU. The more recent 
approaches tend to appreciate the fact that, at least the day-to-day policy-making 
processes take place among a multiplicity of actors and different levels. 
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Yet many intergovernmental accounts still lack a profound analysis of how these 
processes might actually change the traditional role of the nation-state as the pace-
setter of the integration process. Intergovernmentalism consequently remains 
vulnerable to critics who accuse it of being too narrow-minded in its state-centric 
focus. The question remains, if intergovernmentalists do not show a tendency to 
neglect the analysis of areas in which the supranational level produces outcomes, 
which had not been intended by the member state governments. In a Community in 
which the institutional and procedural setting has become increasingly complex since 
the passing of major integrative treaties in the 1980s and 90s, it is increasingly 
doubtful that national governments will be able to fully control the limits of the 
integration process CHix and Goetz, 2001, p.8). Although most decisions still have to 
be approved by the Council, it is therefore possible that the supranational Community 
institutions such as the ECJ and the Commission interpret them in a way which 
produces policy outcomes that had not been intended by the national governments 
(Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998, p.26). Many critics of intergovernmental ism thus argue 
that it is a theory which has had its time and no longer provides an adequate analysis 
of the present setting of the Community. Ben Rosamond probably gets to the heart of 
this criticism when he sums up the flaw of the intergovernmentalist approach, which 
in his opinion is 
'C ... ) to conclude that because the organs of supranational governance have not 
developed into nation-state-like repositories of power and authority, it follows that 
there has been no meaningful displacement in the authority of the member-states 
( ... ) In dejure terms they are sovereign (Le. free from external restraint). Yet in de 
facto terms, there appear to be multiple challenges to states' authority - of which 
the EU is but one instance. CRosamond, 2000, p.154-155), 
The validity of intergovernmental approaches in terms of the analysis of the major 
developments on the macro level of the integration process, such as at the crucial 
Council meetings and at IGCs, where major decisions are being made, remains. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the micro level of community policy-making on a day-
to-day basis probably needs an approach which goes further than 
intergovemmentalists tend to do. In order to understand how these policy processes 
take place and why certain outcomes happen, a broader approach will be needed. 
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That is the case because, as Michael O'Neill puts it, intergovernmentalists tend to take 
a point of view 'which emphasises national interests as the sole priority of the EU to 
the exclusion of the supranational dimension, continues to offer an unbalanced 
account of the regional process.' (O'Neill, 1996, p.135). 
1.4. Multi-level governance 
In this respect it is interesting to look at theoretical approaches which especially focus 
on the weaknesses of intergovernmentalism, and try to account for the actual 
institutional and procedural framework of the EU by characterising it as a system of 
power sharing between multiple levels. These multi-level governance approaches do 
not fundamentally reject the intergovernmental claim that nation state representatives 
still play an important part in shaping the development of the integration process. 
Instead, multi-level governance theory stresses the limitations of the 
intergovernmentalist point of view with regard to the explanation of the outcome of 
decision- and policy-making on the Community level. By trying to modernise the 
neofunctionalist argument that the integrational 'spill-over' inevitably weakens the 
function of the nation state as the principal actor, multi-level governance theory tries 
to establish a modem alternative to intergovernmental theories of integration. 
Multi-level governance theory does not argue that the national autonomy of member 
states would be threatened by the integration process. However, from its point of 
view, the integration process has created such a complex institutional and procedural 
network that the nation state inevitably becomes one actor among many, although 
admittedly a very important one. 
As Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Kennit Blank argue, a complete analysis of the 
European integration process hence must not be limited to state actors: 
'The multi-level governance model does not reject the view that state executives 
and state arenas are important, or that these remain the most important pieces of the 
European puzzle ( ... ) but, according to the multi-level governance model, one 
must also analyse the independent role of European level actors to explain 
European policy-making.' (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1998, p.276). 
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From the point of view of multi-level governance theorists, the development of 
European integration has led to a Community system in which the domestic political 
level is no longer the only level on which crucial decisions are made. 
On the contrary, supranational institutions have increasingly managed to secure their 
influence on the decision- and policy-making process. This would demand that 
analysts of European integration need to look beyond the state level in order to 
understand how policy outcomes are achieved in the community. From a multi-level 
governance point of view, the fundamental weakness of intergovernmental ist accounts 
is therefore 'the separation between domestic and international politics, which lies at 
the heart of the state-centric model' (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1998, p. 277). 
Analysts who favour the multi-level governance approach also adopt the 
neofunctionalist concept of the 'spill-over' of the focus of interest group lobbying 
from the national level to the supranational institutions. They argue that in a network 
of multi-level policy-making on the Community level, the increasing interaction 
between national elites and supranational institutions is an inevitable consequence. 
The result of this would be the development of a 'transnational society', in which 
interest groups increasingly focus on the supranational institutions (such as the 
European Commission). This would consequently strengthen the authority of the 
latter (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998, p. 6). Although the concepts of multi-level 
governance remain rather sceptical about the neofunctionalist notion that loyalties 
would indeed be transferred from national to the supranational level, they still agree 
with the essential neofunctionalist concept of 'spill-over' (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998, 
p.6). 
Multi-level governance approaches are therefore more cautious about coming to hasty 
conclusions about the fate of the nation state. On the contrary, most of these accounts 
stress that the member states and their governments remain crucial actors with regard 
to the determination of the integration process. However, from a multi-level 
governance point of a view, the EU in its present shape has to be characterized as a 
system in which a 'complex balancing act between Council, Parliament and 
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Commission' takes place, whereby each of these institutions is equally important for 
the outcome of the legislative process (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1998, p.285). 
In a globalised environment, state representatives would thus gradually have to come 
to terms with the fact that they are no longer able to maintain national control over 
each and every single issue. 
Multi-level governance theorists therefore argue that national governments willingly 
transfer powers to supranational institutions such as the Commission, in order for 
them to implement decisions independently. State representatives would rather choose 
to give away parts of their sovereign control than to accept failure, 'because the 
political benefits outweigh the cost of losing control' (Hix, 1999, p.365). 
This would not mean, however, that the nation state as an entity has been made 
redundant, as states would remain strong enough to resist any substantial threat to 
their existence. At least in this respect, multi-level governance continues to rely on the 
basic argument of intergovernmental ism: 
'Multi-level governance does not confront the sovereignty of states directly ( ... ) 
State-centric theorists are right when they argue that states are extremely powerful 
institutions that are capable of crushing direct threats to their existence ( ... ) One 
does not have to argue that states are on the verge of political extinction to believe 
that their control of those living in their territories has significantly weakened.' 
(Hix, 1999, p.365). 
Multi-level governance theorists have definitely made an important contribution to the 
theoretical debate on European integration, as they clearly stress that the policy-
making process of the Community can no longer simply be described as one of 
intergovernmental bargaining. Member state governments have indeed voluntarily 
transferred an increasing amount of formerly national tasks to the institutional level of 
the Community. Supranational institutions such as the Commission have therefore 
become increasingly independent in certain policy domains in which the national 
governments have accepted the executive powers of the Commission. 
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Multi-level governance supporters have thus been right to criticise intergovernmental 
approaches for being too narrow, especially in terms of the analysis of day-to-day 
policy-making processes on the micro level. The definition of the EU as a network of 
power sharing between various multiple levels has one major weakness however: 
Although it claims to be a modern alternative to both neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism, it provides analytical completeness only for the micro level of 
policy-making. Multi-level governance approaches fail to determine, if the 
supranational institutions of the Community will continue to gain power from the 
national level, which would consequently make the national level less important than 
it is today. The multi-level notion of a 'transnational society' therefore remains rather 
vague. 
With regard to the actual decision-making process on the macro level, where the 
major decisions on institutional and procedural developments still mainly depend on 
the consent of national government representatives, such a concept would be hard to 
verify. In this respect, multi-level governance is definitely leaning too closely towards 
the supranational integration theory school in order to provide a balanced view on the 
future of European integration. 
1.5. Conclusion: What kind of Europe? 
The debate about the definition of the integration process will go on as long as the 
process of development for the institutional and procedural framework of the EU 
remains in flux. As has been shown by this assessment of the major integration 
theories, the last fifty years of theoretical discussion have been dominated by mutual 
accusations of presenting an unbalanced view, made on all sides of the analytical 
spectrum. The continuing institutional and procedural changes of the Community 
framework, which have become ever more complex due to the major treaties of the 
late 1980s and 1990s (SEA, Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice), have not 
made it easier for analysts to achieve a common analytical basis. Because of the 
complexity of the European integration process, all strands of integration theory have 
made more or less valid contributions to the analytical debate and all have shown 
strengths and weaknesses. 
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Intergovernmentalists are right to insist that it would be premature to write off 
domestic preferences as the crucial basis for the integration process. Neofunctionalists 
have made an important contribution to the debate when they pointed out that in the 
course of the integration process, non-state actors have increasingly managed to 
influence the decision-making process. 
Although still controlled by the member states, the impetus for the deepening of the 
integration process has therefore very often been fundamentally influenced by 
transnational actors, a point which is often neglected by state-centric approaches. 
The more recent explanations of the Community as a system of multi-level 
governance have developed this neofunctionalist notion further. They have shown that 
national governments have had to accept the fact that they would no longer be able to 
control each and every aspect of policy outcomes on the micro level of policy-
making. For a study which intends to examine the significance of member state 
preferences for the development of the integration process in general, it is of crucial 
importance to establish how far these preferences still matter in the present setting of 
the EU. The question therefore is, to what extent individual member states are still 
able to influence crucial decisions which determine institutional, procedural and 
major policy developments. 
At present, the general consensus among most analysts in this respect seems to be that 
one has to differentiate between the micro-level of day-to-day policy-making and 
implementation, as well as the macro-level of decision-making in terms of 
fundamental integrative steps and institutional changes. On the micro level, member 
state representatives are undoubtedly no longer the only crucial actors. As member 
states have voluntarily agreed to transfer growing parts of their formerly sovereign 
national policy-making powers to the Community institutions, the micro level of 
policy-making (Le. excluding fundamental decisions) can be characterised as one of 
shared competencies among multiple actors. On this basic policy-making level, 
member state representatives in the Council co-operate with the European Parliament, 
the European Court of Justice and the Commission, the latter of which has gained an 
increasing scope to act independently in a number of policy areas. 
XXXII 
At least in terms of the micro level of policy-making, it would hence probably be wise 
to adapt the notion of 'post-sovereignty' (Wallace, 2000, p.532) or 'autonomy' 
(Rosamond, 2000, p. 155) with regard to the status of member states. On this level of 
day-to-day policy-making and implementation, member state representatives still 
have a crucial say, but they have to accept that the outcome of the process will be 
significantly influenced by other supranational players on the Community level. 
Consequently, it would be wrong to suggest that this multi-level process of EU 
policy-making leaves member states in an equally sovereign position to the one they 
were in before they entered the integration process. The fact that Community policies 
and law have to be implemented by the member states, once the policy-making 
process has been completed, shows that member states possess only semi-sovereign 
authority in this respect. It is also important to note that Community law even takes 
precedence over national law, which means that member state governments have to 
abide by the rulings of the European Court of Justice in terms of treaty and policy 
interpretations (Weiler, 1999, p. 67 and pp. 190-201). 
Member states have therefore accepted that the pooling of sovereignty as part of the 
European integration process includes the fact that 
'the institutions of the Community have the right and power, accorded to them by a 
treaty concluded for an unlimited period, to make directly applicable law within a 
broader sphere of competence, law which takes precedence over the law of the 
member states.' (Forsyth, 1994, p.57) 
On the other hand, the macro-level of EU decision-making shows a different picture. 
Contrary to the expectations of the supranational accounts of European integration, 
the member states are still in firm control of the fundamental decisions with regard to 
the future of the integration process. None of the supranational EU institutions has the 
power to implement changes in the Community treaties or make fundamental 
decisions on EU policies, without the unanimous consent of (at least a majority of) 
member state representatives in the Council. Therefore, neither the Commission, the 
EP, nor the ECJ can expand their own powers if member state governments do not 
agree. 
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The Community institutions have so far only gained increasing powers, because 
member state governments were ready to grant them as part of major integrationist 
treaties, like the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. Any future changes 
towards the further deepening of integration, which might make the institutions more 
powerful will therefore depend on the member states' consent. 
Contrary to the neofunctionalist assumption, so far member states have not been 
willing to hand over the control of the integration process to the supranationallevel. 
Even if they have agreed to decide an increasing number of issues by Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV) and have agreed to the institutionalisation of a growing 
number of policy areas on the Community level, they remain fmnly in charge in terms 
of major developments. As Stephen George puts it, 'states possess formal sovereignty, 
and only the recognised legitimate representatives of the state can agree to surrender 
or "pool" that sovereignty' (George, 1996, p.54). Simon Hix stresses that 'the EU 
governments set the long-term policy agenda ( ... ), they also control the delegation of 
powers to the European level and between the EU institutions' (Hix and Goetz, 2001, 
p.6). Joseph Weiler goes even further by hinting, that apart from the consent of the 
member state governments, treaty changes also have to be ratified by all member 
states' national parliaments, which stresses that the domestic arena remains important 
even beyond the national government preferences (Weiler, 1999, p.80). 
While the micro level of policy-making demands a multi-level perspective, which 
takes the variety of state and non-state actors into account, the macro level, on which 
the major developments of the Community framework is decided, is still mainly 
driven by a process of interstate bargaining along the lines of Moravcsik's approach. 
In order to determine the future direction of the integration process in terms of the 
various essential decisionss, a profound analysis of the preferences, which are 
developed at the domestic level of each member state, still offers the most valid 
results. The various interests which influence the formation of national government 
preferences on the domestic level of each member states, which does certainly include 
non-state actors such as transnational business groups, have to be considered. 
S These include institutional and procedural reform, enlargement, institutionalisation of major policy 
area such as defence and security, asylum and border controls and taxation. 
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Only by taking them into account, one will be able to fully grasp why states put 
forward certain positions in the interstate bargaining process at Intergovernmental 
Conferences (IGCs) and in the Council. 
William Wallace therefore rightly stresses that while the increasingly complex policy-
making process is no longer fully controlled by the member states, the general 
strategic decisions remain firmly in the hands of the member states: 
'A macropolitical perspective on EU policy-making offers a broad landscape of 
strategic decisions, agreed among political leaders. A micropolitical perspective, in 
contrast, offers a crowded and confused picture of multiple activities: a Breughel, 
rather than a Monnet.' (Wallace, 2000, p. 528). 
Contrary to the widespread discussion about a 'federal Europe', in which more and 
more powers would be transferred from the member states to the Brussels 
bureaucracy6, the EU in its present form can be best described as a confederation of 
basically autonomous member states. 
Although the member states of the EU have agreed to the partial pooling of 
sovereignty in certain policy areas and have also accepted that supremacy of EU law 
over national law, the EU has not developed into a full federal state. As John Pinder 
argues, a federal state structure would demand that the 'institutions would likewise 
have to be reformed beyond what is provided in the Maastricht Treaty in order to be 
able to exercise their powers effectively and democratically' (Pinder, 1993, p.62). 
Neither the Amsterdam nor the Nice treaty have provided such steps. The EU in its 
present setting remains a confederation of member states, which have partially pooled 
their sovereignty in an institutional framework. This can be best shown by the 
weakness of the European Parliament. Although the Commission increasingly takes 
on the shape of a European executive, the European Parliament does not possess the 
independent legislative powers most national parliaments have. 
6 Jacques Vandamme stresses that the debate about a 'federal Europe' very often misinterprets the term 
'federal' which 'does not require everything to be centralised. On the contrary, the essence of 
federalism lies in the decentralisation of authority and the distribution of the broadest possible powers 
to the lowest possible levels ( ... ).' (Vandamme, 1998 , p.146). 
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The legislative powers rest with the member states in the Council and the European 
Parliament still only has weak advisory functions in the legislative process. As 
Murray Forsyth argues, the weak standing of the European Parliament is typical for a 
confederation (F orsyth, 1981, p. 187). 
The development of the EU into a fully federal government would therefore demand 
the removal of the still predominant intergovernmental element in the shape of the 
Council as the principal decision-making body. 
As Jacques Vandamme explains, 
'the creation of a federal state would involve the transfer of all of the most 
important components of national sovereignty, with compulsory means of 
implementation at the level of the central authority. This would include such vital 
policy areas as foreign and defence policy.' (Vandamme, 1998, p.l52). 
Member states may in the future decide to restrict their own influence and grant the 
supranational institutions of the EU far greater powers, which would then give the EU 
state-like qualities. In its present setting however, the EU's political system is hardly 
more than a confederation with a system of co-operative policy-making among 
various multiple levels. The final say on strategic decisions rests with the member 
states. Apart from the institutional changes such a federal system would require, one 
must also not overlook the cultural aspects such a step would demand. The citizens of 
the EU member states do not share a common language, which would be a 
prerequisite for the foundation of any functioning state. 
In order to create a functioning European federal 'superstate', which would then have 
to be based on the loyalties of the people of Europe, it would be indispensable to 
share a common language. It could then act as a bond in order to overcome the still 
predominant cultural differences between the different nations (Forsyth, 1981, p.241). 
As Harry Siedentop warns, 'the experiences of federal states which have attempted to 
combine different "official" languages are far from reassuring' (Siedentop, 2000, 
p.12). 
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The future of the EU remains in transition and coming developments might turn it into 
a completely different entity than the one we have to consider now. At present, 
however, national aspects are still crucial for the development of European 
integration. For that reason a major part of the analysis of European integration 
continues to focus on the national interests and government preferences of the 
member states. They are the ones who hold the key to modernize the integration 
project and who expand it successfully to the aspiring accession candidates in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
As Ben Rosamond remarks, for any analysis of European integration this means that 
the national level must remain a crucial factor: 
'The formal institutions and policy-making processes of the EU might represent 
the emergence of a new and complex polity, but most analysts ( ... ) find it difficult 
to factor the state out of their framework completely. Indeed, a large proportion 
still regards the state as the primary actor in the development of European 
integration. (Rosamond, 2000, p. 130) 
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Appendix 2 
Telephone interview with Rt Hon John Redwood MP (Conservative) 
7 February 2001 
1. Which, in your opinion, would be the necessary reforms the European Union 
has to undertake? 
• It needs to tax less, regulate less and generally deregulate 
• It is wrong to undertake projects which deepen the political integration of the EU, 
like e.g. CFSP and EMU 
• Nevertheless, it is not the position of the Conservative party to argue for Britain 
leaving the EU, no matter what the circumstances are 
2. Do you see any perspectives for enhanced co-operation between Britain and 
Germany within the EU (especially if you think about the recent problems in the 
Franco-German alliance)? 
• We are of course very happy to be friends with Germany / if Germany goes along 
with our proposals to deregulate there might of course be a greater perspective for 
co-operation 
3. What is your main criticism of the British government's European policy since 
1997? 
• The government has put forward a pathetic agenda on European issues 
• It does not fight for British interests and simply goes along far too much with the 
agenda of the Franco-German axis 
4. What would be the alternative approach of the Conservative Party? 
• The Conservative Party would negotiate from the British point of view and would 
make sure that British interests are safeguarded 
5. Are there any circumstances under which you can you ever see Britain joining 
the Euro? If not, what would be the alternatives? 
• No, I can't imagine any circumstances at all under which Britain would ever join 
the Euro 
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• We are an independent country and we simply want to keep control of our 
currency 
• If there would be a chance to join NAFTA, it would of course be a good thing for 
6. How quickly, in your opinion, should the European Union enlarge eastwards? 
• The European Union should enlarge as quickly as possible 
• Further reforms can be undertaken at the same time as new countries join, they 
don't have to be done before 
• But: if you need reforms at all, then towards further deregulation of the EU 
• The Nice summit has again missed the opportunity to prepare enlargement and to 
finally push it through 
7. Do you think that Germany's position in Europe has changed since German 
reunification? If yes, in what respect? 
• Germany is certainly more powerful than before 
• It is one of the leading economic countries in Europe 
• Nevertheless, I would not consider it to be the leading nation of Europe 
• But one can already see Germany's increased power or status when one looks at 
the problems within the Franco-German alliance 
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Appendix 3 
Interview with David Whineray, Desk Officer, Enlargement section, 
Foreign&Commonwealth Office 
26 February 2001 
1. In his recent speech at the Polish stock exchange, the Prime Minister caUed for 
the EU to be developed into a "superpower not a supentate". I would therefore 
like to ask you what the government's priorities concerning the reform of the EU 
are. 
No answer, because this question does not fall into my area of responsibilities. 
2. Should these reforms be completed before any new memben join or would the 
government rather think that they can be done in the coune of enlargement, 
maybe even afterwards? 
Should there be another IGC on EU reform before the enlargement process 
begins? 
• There is no need for another IGC before enlargement because the EU is 
institutionally ready for enlargement after Nice 
• There should be no more delays and one should not impose another set of artificial 
criteria upon the prospective new members 
• The UK government is basically in favour of further reforms for the EU but it 
does not see any special needs to reform the EU regarding the enlargement process 
• To undertake another set of structural reforms before enlargement would take too 
long 
• The government generally is not against another IGC on reform but it would only 
agree to it if this would not slow down the process of quick enlargement 
• Basically, the government does not see any urgent need for further reforms before 
enlargement, although it is likely that CAP will be reformed before new members 
join 
• Further demands on the prospective members would be unfair, the EU rather has 
to show some flexibility by trying to adapt its post-Nice structures to a larger 
number of member states after enlargement 
• Nevertheless, the UK has nothing against the continuation of the reform 
discussion as long as it does not affect the process of swift enlargement 
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3. How quickly should the EU enlarge in the government's opinion? 
• It should enlarge as quickly as possible but certainly in order to hold the 2004 
elections for the European Parliament with new members 
• The Nice summit has set out a roadmap for the conclusion of the accession 
negotiations with the most advanced applicants by 2002 - this target date should 
be met 
4. Does the government think that all applicants for EU membership can join in 
one wave or does it support two or three waves of countries joining? 
• Each country should be allowed to join when it is ready to do so 
• Countries will definitely join in blocks or waves 
• There will be a certain differentiation with regard to the process of enlargement, 
e.g. for historical reasons, Gennany will probably press for Poland to be one of the 
members to join the EU in an early first wave 
5. Which countries should join first? Which ones should have to wait? 
• Some countries are of course more ready to join than others (e.g. Romania, 
Bulgaria) 
• Because of its size, one important issue will be when Poland is ready to join, so 
the EU (especially Gennany) is waiting for Poland to fulfill the accession criteria 
• Greece will probably not agree to EU enlargement without Cyprus joining at an 
early stage 
6. Where does Britajn see the limit of EU enlargement? Should countries such as 
e.g. Turkey or even Russia become members one day if they wish to do so? 
• Turkey remains a principal candidate for EU membership 
• There is no official government line on where EU enlargement should end or 
which countries should not belong to the EU 
• The question is not on the agenda at present anyway because countries such as 
Russia have not applied for membership and will probably not do so in the future 
- if they would one would have treat them like any other candidate for accession 
• The government does not share some EU members' principal concerns about a 
possible membership of countries such as Turkey 
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7. Should there be any transitional arrangements for the new members, such as 
for example a transitional period of up to 10 years concerning the free movement 
of workers as it is discussed in Germany at present? German chancellor 
Schroder has demanded a transition arrangement of 7 years, the Bavarian Prime 
Minister Edmund Stoiber has even demanded 10 years. 
• This is an issue that is mainly for the candidates to decide by their own pace of 
transition ability 
• The British government is not in favour of a transition period for the free 
movement of workers because this would lead to the developent of a second class-
membership status for the applicants 
• Nevertheless, there will of course be transitional arrangements on certain issues 
simply because other EU member states will demand them 
• If Schrl>der manages to get a transition period of 7 years concerning the free 
movement of workers, he will probably be able to neutralise the issue in a German 
election campaign 
8. In your personal opinion, what are the most profound challenges the EU faces 
with regards to the enlargement process? 
• The most profound challenges will be: 
-CAP 
- free movement of people 
- free movement of capital 
- the budget (who pays what in the future) 
- Justice and Home Affairs (especially immigration and border controls) 
- environmental issues 
• Generally, anything that affects the EU's borders and its budget will be of 
importance 
9. The EU has been facing a leadership problem in the last couple of years: the 
Franco-German alliance is in trouble since the departure of Helmut Kohl and 
Francois Mitterand and so far no new alliances have emerged which could give 
the EU the necessary impetus. 
Do you think Britain could take on a leading role in the European Union and if 
so which countries would be Britain's preferred partners in leadership? 
• The Franco-German axis will stay because the alternative of an Anglo-German 
axis is unlikely at present simply because Britain is not seen as being pro-
European enough 
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• As long as Britain is not in EMU, it will not be able to realize its leadership 
ambitions 
• The French would certainly oppose the formation of an Anglo-German alliance 
• The Germans have the problem that although Fischer has proposed a federal 
vision for the EU in his Humboldt speech, Nice has shown that the EU is still very 
much an intergovernmental organisation 
• The main problem for Europe now is that it is looking too much too itself - it 
cares more about institutions than about issues 
• Another problem is that France opposes many things within the EU 
• Germany will become the centre of an enlarged EU, which means that the Franco-
German axis might be weakened further after enlargement 
• A new generation of politicians governs Germany now 
• After enlargement, there is a likely shift from French influence to growing 
German influence in the EU. The reason is that whereas the past enlargements of 
the Community southwards have strengthened French influence (southern 
countries are rather francophile), the future eastward enlargement will strengthen 
Germany because these countries have strong ties with the Germans 
10. Why does Britain want to become a leading player in Europe? Is it just in 
order to increase its own importance as a partner for the United States or is the 
British government really interested in positioning Britain at the heart of 
Europe? 
• The Prime Minister thinks that in a globalised world a country cannot afford to 
remain isolated 
• He wants to encourage co-operation between Europe and the V.S. and therefore 
intends to maintain both the traditional ties with the V.S. but also wants to deepen 
Britain's commitment to Europe 
• Every country tries to take care of its special relations, therefore nobody should 
blame Britain for trying to maintain its strong ties with the Americans 
• He is genuinely pro-European in his beliefs 
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11. When do you expect a rmal assessment of the 5 economic tests on British 
EMU participation? 
• Definitely within the first two years of the next parliament 
12. Should the government decide to promote Britain's entry into EMU, how will 
it try to convince the British public to vote "yes" in a referendum? 
• There is no definite plan but it may focus on the benefits, such as extra trade and 
costs for Britain if it stays out of EMU 
• The government will also encourage the formation of an all-party alliance of pro-
euro advocates 
13. Should the government come to the conclusion that it would be economically 
unwise to recommend EMU membership, what could be the alternatives? Would 
the government then go along with Tory proposals to seek membenhip of 
NAFTA? 
• Definitely not, a new assessment of the five tests at a later date would be possible 
• Membership of the Eurozone and NAFT A is impossible as it goes against the 
regulations set out for EMU 
• The government will encourage closer co-operation between the Community's 
single market and NAFT A 
• A majority within the Tory party secretly wants Britain to leave the ED. They 
don't do so because they dislike other European countries but because they fear 
that within Europe they could not realise their right-wing free market economic 
policies. They rather go along with the American free market view of the economy 
and therefore advocate NAFTA membership as an alternative to the Eurozone. 
14. On defence: Do you think that the government can convince the U.S. to think 
over its plans for a missile defence system and then also convince the other 
European partners and Russia to take part in it? 
Can't answer. 
15. Could Britain ever agree to the development of the European Rapid Reaction 
force into a coherent Common Foreign and Security policy for the EU, provided 
close links with NATO are maintained? 
• Quite possible but only if the link with NATO is maintained. 
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16. What will be the government's priorities with regard to European policy in a 
second term in office? Do you think its promise to push through a more radical 
agenda will also apply to its European policy? 
• The government will probably more radical in its European policy in a second 
tenn, especially regarding the Euro 
• They have not done enough on the Euro yet but they will have to do so if they 
want to push forward any leadership ambitions within the ED 
• Blair believes in EMU membership but has to act cautiously because of the 
sceptical domestic circumstances (especially the misinfonnation in the Murdoch-
owned press e.g. The Sun, The Times) 
17. Finally, in your personal view, what were the main changes this 
administration has introduced with regards to European issues compared to the 
previous administration? 
• This government is genuinely pro-European 
• It has clearly shown that it is ready to integrate further than the prevlOus 
administration. 
• One example was its readiness to take part in the European Defence Initiative. 
Blair wanted to do that because of his general pragmatic approach to Europe: the 
Balkan experience had shown that there was need for stronger European 
engagement on defence issues (especially if the D.S. would not be ready to 
become involved in future conflicts) and that is the reason why he did it 
• Concerning euro membership, if there were no economic differences between the 
DK economy and those on the continent, the government would already have tried 
to led Britain into EMU 
• The government also was the main driving force behind the Lisbon agenda which 
set out the course for swift enlargement 
• Blair gave the Warsaw speech after Chirac's and Fischer's speeches because he 
wants to have a say in Europe 
• His European policy is based on pragmatism and on genuine pro-Europeannes 
• He sees Europe as an interlinked entity in a globalised world 
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Appendix 4 
Interview with Dr Ingo Friedrich MEP (CSlD. Gunzenhausen. Germany 
31 March 2001 
Beginnen wurde ich gerne mit den Strukturen der europiischen Union. Vor 
alien Dingen mit der Reformdiskussion, die ja jetzt nach Nizza noch nicht 
beendet ist. Ich wiirde Sie gerne fragen, ob Sie der Ansicht sind, daB der EU-
Gipfel in Nizza die notwendigen Voraussetzungen mr die Reform der EU-
Institutionen in Bezug auf die bevontehende Ostwerweiterung gebracht hat? 
Die formellen Voraussetzungen was die Zahlenspiele betriffi, Zahl der Abgeordneten, 
Zabl der Kommissare, Mehrheitsentscheidungen, die formellen Aspekte sind in Nizza 
in der Tat erreicht worden. Insofem ist die europiUsche Union beitrittsreif, aber 
natilrlich auf dem untersten Level, wie man es sich uberhaupt vorstellen kann 
Zum Beispiel die Form der Mehrheitsentscheidungen neuer Art ist so kompliziert, daB 
es eher schwieriger werden wird Mehrheitsentscheidungen zu finden und die 
verhangnisvolle Tendenz, auch in Bereichen, in denen Mehrheitsentscheidungen 
ausreichen wUrden, das man eigentlich trotzdem auf die Einstimmigkeit schielt, diese 
Tendenz ist sicher immer noch nicht iiberwunden. 
Also, insofem keine Begeisterung, aber es ist zumindestens so, daB der Gipfel von 
Nizza die notwendigen Dinge erreicht hat. 
Welche weiteren Reformschritte wiren Ihrer Ansicht nach dennoch notwendig, 
um die EU wirklich handlungsflhig zu machen, falls neue Linder beitreten? 
Ich sehe da vor allem zwei Aspekte, nfunlich die Losung der Erleichterung der 
Mehrheitsfindung. Wir haben ja jetzt im neuen Verfahren mehr oder weniger drei 
Hilrden aufgebaut, das sollte wieder reduziert werden auf eine Hilrde, oder man kann 
sagen zwei Hilrden, naInlich daB die Mehrheit der Staaten und die Mehrheit der 
Bevolkerung hinter einer Entscheidung steht. Dieses mUBte ausreichen fiir die 
Findung einer Mehrheitsentscheidung. 
Und der zweite Aspekt mUBte eine bessere Losung des Sprachenaspekts darstellen. 
Weil ohne eine Vedinderung der Sprachenproblematik Uiuft die europiUsche Union 
Gefahr, daB eine Art babylonisches Sprachengewirr entsteht. Eine Entflechtung der 
Sprachenproblematik, oder konkreter zu sagen, eine Reduzierung der Sprachen in die 
alles iibersetzt werden muS, die se Reduzierung scheint mir bitter notwendig und die 
ist natiirlich noch nicht beschlossen worden. 
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Worden Sie dann fordem das Deutsch eine der Amtssprachen wird? 
la natiirlich, das ist klar, das Deutsch nicht nur eine der Amtssprachen wird, sondem 
Arbeitssprache sein muS. Mit den an sich nun fast 120 Million Deutschsprechenden, 
das ware ja absurd, wenn das anders ware. Aber natUrlich kann Deutsch nicht die 
alleinige zweite, dritte Sprache sein, sondem ich gehe mal davon aus, daB es sinnvoll 
ware in der zukiinftigen EG oder EU zwar alle schriftlichen Dokumente in alle 
Sprachen zu ubersetzen, aber beim milndlichen Dolmetschen si ch zu beschrlinken auf 
die Halfte oder noch weniger. Ich kOnnte mir vorstellen, daB sechs Sprachen, in die 
alIes ubersetzt wird, ein KompromiB ist, mit dem man leben kann. 
Wenn man die Reformen insgesamt betrachtet, milssten die schon vor dem 
enten Erweiterungsschritt beendet sein, kHnnte man die mHglicherweise 
gleichzeitig durchfiihren, oder am Ende ent danach? 
Nein, es so lIte natiirlich angestrebt werden, daB schon bei der geplanten Nachfolge-
Regierungskonferenz, die bisher ja fiir 2004 vorgesehen ist, ich mOchte an sich, daB 
die auf 2003 vorgezogen wird, unter anderem auch wegen der Europawahl, die Mitte 
des lahres 2004 stattfmden wird. Das also spatestens bei dieser Regierungskonferenz, 
die jetzt noch fehlenden Schritte, die ich jetzt skizziert habe, daB die dort beschlossen 
werden, damit sie dann, vielleicht noch nicht ratifiziert, aber schon beschlossen, noch 
vor dem Beitritt der ersten neuen Staaten GUltigkeit werden kOnnen. 
Das heiBt also, die Osterweiterung soUte Ihrer Ansicht nach schon begonnen haben, 
bevor die nachste Europwahl stattfindet? 
Richtig. 
Welche Liinder wiirden Sie als geeignet ansehen, zu diesem Zeitpunkt schon der 
EU beizutreten? 
ledes Land hat dabei den Marshallstab sozusagen selber in der Hand. Es fuldem sich 
auch oft die Reihenfolgen. Eine zeitlang war Polen weiter hinten, jetzt ist es 
anscheinend nach den neuesten Daten wieder we iter vom. Also ich rechne mal mit 
einer ersten Beitrittsmoglichkeit innerhalb der 12 Staaten, sozusagen mit vier, roof, 
sechs Staaten im lahre 2004. Das halte ich fiir verkraftbar bzw. die Frage ist nicht nur, 
ob es fiir die europaische Union verkraftbar ist, sondem die Frage ist, wieviel Staaten 
es schaffen, die Beitrittsfithigkeit der Staaten zu erreichen. 
Bundeskanzler Schroder hat sich ja beziiglich der wichtigen Frage der 
Freiziigigkeit der Arbeitnehmer dafiir ausgesprochen, eine Ubergangsfrist von 
sieben Jahren festzusetzen. Peter Hintze, der europapolitische Sprecher hat 
dagegen nur drei Jahre gefordert. Micb wiirde interessieren, was Ihre 
personlicbe Position, aber aucb was die offlzielle Position der CSU in dieser 
Frage ist. 
Es gibt keinen Beschluss zu diesem Thema, aber eine FeststelIung im Parteivorstand 
der CSU, der nicht widersprochen wurde. 
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Da wurde auch von sieben Jahren gesprochen und sicher muB man in der heutigen 
Zeit der Ausdifferenzierung so ein biBchen diese sieben Jahre Ubergansfristen, was 
die Freiziigigkeit betrifft versuchen, ein wenig aufzugliedern. Das ist vielleicht filr Hi-
Tech-Leute anders zu sehen, als filr Biirger aus dem Bereich der Landwirtschaft, das 
ist filr Hochschulkrafte anders zu sehen wie fUr Facharbeiter. Also, wir werden diese 
Ubergangsfristen mit der Orientierung sieben Jahre praktisch Uinderspezifisch ein 
wenig genauer anschauen mtlssen und mtlssen uns da ein biBchen die Arbeit machen, 
klarer abzugrenzen, in kleineren Segmenten. Das ist keine zusa.tzliche Biirokratie, 
weil die Ubergangsfristen ja ohnehin irgendwann auslaufen, das ist ein typisches, im 
Augenblick vielleicht komplett aussehendes Regelwerk, was aber an dieser Stelle die 
Komplexitlit durch Auslaufen automatisch verliert. 
Sollten auch in anderen Bereichen, z.B. bei der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik oder 
auch bei den Strukturfonds Ubergansfristen festgesetzt werden, oder auch in 
anderen Bereichen? 
Ein eindeutiges ja, wir werden, ob es uns geflillt oder nicht, z.B. im Agrarbereich gar 
nicht darum herumkommen, daB wir eine zeitlang unterschiedliche 
AgrarilirderungsmaBnahmen diskutieren werden mtlssen. Nehmen Sie das Thema 
Ausgleichszahlungen, wenn z.B. polnische oder tschechische Landwirte diesselben 
individuellen betriebsspezifischen Ausgleichszahlungen beldimen wie die Mittel- und 
Westeuropliischen Landwirte, dann WOrden diese Landwirte plotzlich zu den sehr gut 
oder sogar bestverdienensten Schichten dieser Llinder zlihlen. Mit der Konsequenz, 
daB natiirlich die Abwanderung aus der Landwirtschaft automatisch gestoppt wlire 
und wir die Strukturen, die auf Dauer vollig untragbar sind, nlimlich, daB bis zu 27 
und 30 Prozent der Erwerbstlitigen in der Landwirtschaft tlitig sind, das wiirde 
natiirlich dann nie gelindert werden, so daB wir auch in der Agrarpolitik und sicher 
auch in manchen Flitlen der Strukturpolitik Obergangsfristen brauchen, bis sich die 
Dinge mehr angenlihert haben. Umgekehrt wird sicher auch unvermeidbar sein, daB 
die beitretenden Ulnder in einigen Bereichen, sei es Umweltbereiche, sei es Kauf von 
Land, auch urn gewisse Ubergangsfristen nachsuchen mtlssen, also das Instrument der 
Ubergangsfristen muB beiderseits der Grenzen und auch sehr flexibel angewendet 
werden und das hat nichts mit zweierlei Europa zu tun, nichts mit 
Klassenunterschieden, auf Dauer mUssen identische Politikentscheidungen getroffen 
werden, aber Ungleiches muB auch ungleich behandelt werden, das ist ein alter 
Grundsatz, der sich aus dem deutschen Gleichheitssatz ergibt. 
Was sind Ihrer Ansicht nach insgesamt die drlingensten Herausforderungen, die sich 
fUr die EU angesichts dieses Projektes stellen? 
Das drltngenste ist, daB wir damit rechnen mUssen, daB der wirtschaftliche 
Aufholungsprozess llinger dauern wird, als wir alle gehofft haben. Das liegt zunlichst 
einmal an der Dimension der Hilfen, die gegeben werden, wenn man die finanziellen 
Dimensionen vergleicht mit dem, was bei der frUheren DDR gemacht worden ist, 
dann sieht man, daB das nur ein Bruchteil ist. Dementsprechend wird es auch llinger 
dauern und sogar bei den immensen Hilfen fUr die neuen Llinder Deutschlands hat es 
sehr lange gedauert und da dauert es auch jetzt noch an, d.h. wir werden uns 
vergegenwlirtigen mUssen, daB vieles llinger dauert, bis es ein bestimmtes Niveau 
erreicht, d.h. der Schwachpunkt wird noch lange Jahr bleiben, daB die wirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung dramatisch noch lange Jahr sehr auseinanderklaffen wird. 
XLVIII 
Ein besonderer Fall: die Tilrkei. Hier wUrde mich Ihre Einstellung interessieren, 
sollte die Tilrkei Ihrer Ansicht nach jemals eine realistische Chance bekommen, 
Mitgliedstaat der Europiischen Union zu werden und wenn ja, unter welchen 
Voraussetzungen? 
Also, man kann in der Politik nie 'nie' sagen. Deswegen kann man auch bei der 
Tiirkei nicht sagen, daB sie niemals Mitglied werden kann. Aber fUr alle absehbare, 
kalkulierbare Zeit sehe ich eine solche Chance nicht. Der Hauptgrund ist die Frage der 
Menschenrechte und ein Aspekt, der meines Erachtens bisher viel zuwenig 
berucksichtigt wird, daI3 auch durch die kulturelle Differnziertheit innerhalb der 
Tiirkei ein Beitritt der Tiirkei sogar zu einer Art Auseinanderdriften der TUrkei selber 
fiihren konnte. Ein dritter Grund, der dafUr spricht, daI3 es noch lange, langc 
Jahrzehnte brauchen wird, urn so eine MogHchkeit Uberhaupt in Angriff zu nehmen, 
Hegt darin, daB natiirlich an der Tiirkei an die 50-60 Million tUrkisch sprechende 
verwandte Volker dranhiingen, die natiirlich dann auch kommen wollten und wo man 
natiirlich gar keine echte Grenze ziehen konnte. Dann wiirde das alles nicht mehr 
kalkulierbar, ja nicht mehr regierbar. 
Sehen Sie auch hinsichtlich der Sicherheitslage Probleme, weil die TUrkei ja 
auch an Linder grenzt, die die Sicherheit Europas nicht unbedingt stlrken. 
Das ist ja auch ein Grund, daD die Amerikaner Interesse an der Mitgliedschaft 
der Tiirkei haben. 
Das wiirde ja eher fUr eine noch ehere Anbindung und Zusammenarbeit der Tilrkei 
sprechen, urn die Sicherheitsaspekte zu berUcksichtigen ist eine enge Zusammenarbeit 
mit der Tiirkei auf alien anderen Feldem, also nicht nur NATO, Westeuropllische 
Union, auch innerhalb des Europarates, bis hin zu bilateralen Abkommen zwischen 
der EU und der Tiirkei, bis hin zum Schengener Abkommen, alle anderen Formen der 
engen Zusammenarbeit sind anzustreben. Was aufDauer sehr schwierig sein wird und 
was noch lange Jahre nicht geht, ist die Hereinnahme der Tiirkei in dieses feingliedrig 
austarierte System der Europ1iischen Union und 1ihnliche Problematiken wOrden 
entstehen, wenn man die Ukraine, WeiBruBland, oder gar RuBland aufnehmen wOrde. 
Wo wiirden Sie die Grenze ziehen bezUglich der Erweiterung? Irgendwo muD es 
ja mal eine Grenze geben fiir die Erweiterung der EU. 
Es muB Prozesse geben, die eine enge Zusammenarbeit erlauben, aber die Grenze fUr 
die Grenze fUr die Integrierbarkeit sehe ich in der Ostgrenze Po lens und der Ostgrenze 
Griechenlands. 
Nach Meinung vieler Experten hat der Nizza-Gipfel etwas gezeigt, was sich 
schon seit lingerem angedeutet hat, das nimlich die deutsch-franz6sische Achse, 
die ja die europiische Integration ilber Jahrzehnte angetrieben hat in groDe 
Schwierigkeiten geraten ist. Die EU ist deswegen im Moment praktisch 
filhrerlos, es formieren sich stindig neue Fiihrungskonstellationen zwischen den 
Staaten, aber es fehlt ein permanentes Fiihrungsduo. Stimmen sie dieser Ansicht 
zu und wenn ja, welche Alternativen wiirden Sie zur deutsch-franz6sischen 
Kooperation in Zukunft sehen? 
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Die Konstruktion der Europaischen Union mu6 so gemacht werden, daB sie auch ohne 
so ein Filhrungsduo nicht in eine krisenhafte Situation kommt und daB die weitere 
Entwicklung in einer natilrlichen Form m6glich bleibt, auch wenn so ein Duo nicht 
zur Verfilgung steht. Ein solches Duo erleichtert sehr viel, deshalb ware es sicher 
erstrebenswert, daB die beiden KernUinder Deutschland und Frankreich eine solche 
Funktion wahrnehmen k6nnten und weiterhin intensive Formen der Zusammenarbeit 
praktizieren und damit beispielhaft fUr die anderen wirken. 
Wenn diese Achse wirklich mal ganz auseinanderbrechen wtirde, ware dies schon 
sehr hinderlich fUr die weitere Entwicklung. Wir mussen aber trotzem, durch bessere 
Vorbereitung der Regierungskonferenz 2004 versuchen, das auszutarieren, daB es ein 
solches Filhrungsduo im Augenblick nicht gibt. Das ist keine Katastrophe, es ist 
allerdings sehr hinderlich und das bestehen eines solchen Duos, oder auch Quartetts 
ware sehr hilfreich. 
Ich sehe keine Chance der Abl6sung der deutsch-franzosischen Achse durch and ere 
Achsen. Die sind aUe weniger natllrlich angelegt. Deutschland und Frankreich sind 
durch Geschichte und durch verschiedenste Aspekte so aneinander gebunden, daB sie 
die namrliche FUhrungsachse in Europa wmen. Ich sehe"eigentIich keine Chance, daB 
eine deutsch-englische, oder eine franz6sisch-englische oder eine deutsch-italienische 
Zusammenarbeit diesel ben Vorteile brachte, wie Deutschland und Frankreich. 
Insofern mu6 man die filhrungslose Zeit durch entsprechende seriose Politik der 
normalen Gremien uberbrucken, in der Hofihung, daB es wieder zu einer solchen 
Struktur kommt. SoUte es nicht dazu kommen, mu6 die Zusammenarbeit zwischen 
den exisitierenden Organen so intensiviert und professionalisiert werden, daB man 
dann auf Dauer auch ohne so eine FUhrungsachse auskommt. 
Warum denken Sie ist die deutsch-franzosische Achse iiberhaupt in solche 
Schwierigkeiten gekommen? Konnte es daran liegen, daB die beiden LAnder seit 
der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands eine andere Idee von Europa verfolgen? 
Ich denke der Hauptgrund ist darin zu sehen, daB sich die natiirliche Rangordnung in 
Europa durch die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands verl:indert hat. Vor der 
Wiedervereinigung war in keinster Weise hinterfragt, wer die Nummer eins ist, eben 
Frankreich. Die Nummer 1 hat dann auch jede weitere Integrationsstufe akzeptieren 
konnen, weil in einem noch mehr integrierten und zusammenwachsenden Europa 
wiederum die Nummer 1 die Nummer 1 bleibt. 
In dem Moment, wo si ch die Nummer 1 ein StUck mehr Richtung Deutschland 
verlagert hat, ist es automatisch schwieriger fi1r Franzosen, eine weitere Integration 
Europas zu akzeptieren, weil damit wieder automatisch die neue Nummer 1 auch die 
neue Nummer 1 innerhalb des integrierten Europas sein wird. Hinzu kommt sicher die 
schwierige personliche Chemie zwischen den neuen FUhrern in Deutschland und 
Frankreich. Der Hauptgrund liegt in der Verlinderung der Rangordnung durch das 
gr6Bere Deutschland und des Aussprechens des gr66eren Gewichtes. 
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Finden Sie es richtig, daB die jetzige Bundesregierung verstirkt selbstbewuDt 
auftritt? 
Es war unvenneidbar. Die verfutderten Fakten milssen irgendwann akzeptiert werden 
und dadurch fuldert sich auch die Politik. Trotzdem ware jede Fonn von Arroganz 
unklug und vielleicht sogar geflihrlich, in der Fonn muB die Diplomatie gewahrt 
werden, vor allem gegenilber Frankreich. Man muB gerade nach der 
Wiedervereinigung mit der Sprache vorsichtig agieren, aber dennoch sind die Fakten 
so, daB Deutschland aufgrund seines gewachsenen Gewichtes z.B. mehr Abgeordnetc 
im Europ~ischen Parlament verlangen muB. Im Rat ist das nicht ganz so dramatisch, 
weil es da eine gestaffelte Stimmengewichtung gibt, obwohl man es auch dort an sich 
berilcksichtigen h~tte milssen. 
Glauben Sie, daB die Bundesrepublik ein enger Partner fUr GroBbritannien im 
Bezug auf die Forderungen des britischen Premierministers nach der Reform 
der EU in Ricbtung 'a Europe of the people' werden ktinnte? 
Die EU konnte verschlankt werden und die Korridore der nationalen Bandbreiten 
vergroBem. Es ist aber unrealistisch zu erwarten, daB durch eine solche Verbreiterung 
der nationalen Bandbreiten Europa zu einem Europa der V olker werden wilrde. Auch 
dann gibt es bedingt durch die geographische Lage oft unterschiedliche Interessen, die 
gehen auch durch mehr Bandbreiten nicht weg. 
Auch cin verschlanktes Europa wird nicht immer auf ein einhelliges positives Echo 
stoBen. Europa wird immer ein Stilck Erkllirungsbedarf haben, vor allem im Zeitalter 
der zunehmenden Globalisierung. Das Problem, daB manche Entscheidungen aus 
nationaler Sicht unpopular sein werden, aus globaler Sicht aber notwendig sind, 
werden wir auch in den nachsten 50 Jahren nicht losen konnen. 
Sehen Sie iiberbaupt irgendwelche Bereiche fUr eine Zusammenarbeit zwischen 
Deutschland und GroBbritannien? 
Im Bereich der Sicherheit, im Bereich der Konzeption eines schlanken Europas. 
Es gibt schon Felder, wo Deutschland und England besser kooperieren konnen als 
Deutschland mit Frankreich. Auch bezilglich der Vereinigten Staaten, die Frankreich 
immer geme von Europa abkoppeln wilrde. Das Gleiche im Bezug auf eine 
Verschlankung Europas hin zu einer klaren Kompetenzbegrenzung und schlieBlich 
die Zusammenarbeit im Bereich Sicherheit, so daB eine gemeinsame AuBen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik innerhalb der NATO wahrgenommen wird. Und schlieBlich noch 
im Bereich der Wirtschaft, wo es darum geht, das Deutschland und England die 
globale Wettbewerbsflihigkeit als einen wichtigen Faktor betrachten, w~rend man in 
Frankreich vielleicht ein wenig darauf sich vom harten globalen Wettbewerb 
abpuffem zu konnen. Es gibt also durchaus Felder einer gemeinsamen Analyse, auch 
bei der gemeinsamen europ~ischen W~g. 
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1st das britische Streben nach einer FiihrungsroUe in der EU realistisch, vor 
allem im Bezug auf den noch immer nicht erfolgten Beitritt GroBbritanniens zur 
Wirtschafts- und Wihrungsunion? 
GroBbritannien hat natUrlieh das Image eines Bloekierers, der am Rande steht. Ein 
Spagat zwisehen der Bloekierer-RoBe und der Teilnahme an der Filhrungsspitze ist 
sehr, sehr sehwierig. In der EU ist es sehr sehwierig gleiehzeitig in der Lokomotive 
und im Bremserwagen zu sitzen. Solange dieser Spagat besteht, wird GroBbritannien 
nieht zur Kemfllhrungsgruppe der Europiiisehen Union zahlen konnen. 
Solange aus England immer nur der Ruf nach Bremsen kommt, wird man einer 
solehem Mitgliedsstaat keine Filhrungsfunktion zutrauen. 
Wiirden die Chancen auf eine Fiihrungsposition steigen, wenn es der britischen 
Regierung geUinge, die britische Bev61kerung davon zu iibeneugen, an der 
Wihrungsunion teilzunehmen? 
Nur, wenn in dieser Frage Opposition und Regierung gemeinsam an einem Strang 
ziehen. Das Einziehen in das Ftlhrerhaus hangt nieht von einer der zentralen Fragen, 
der Wlihrung ab. Ein milhsam zusammengesehustertes 'ja' wird nieht ausreiehen, urn 
eine FtlhrungsroIle einzunehmen. In ein paar Grundentseheidungen bezilglieh Europa 
mUssen Regierung und Opposition Ubereinstimmen, ansonsten bleibt ein negativer 
Beigesehmaek filr das Ansehen des gesamten Landes. Das Vertrauen zu einem 
solchen Land mit einer FilhrungsroIle haben diejenigen, die gefiihrt werden soIlen nur 
wenn Regierung und Opposition vergleichbare Signale senden, wie in vielen anderen 
europiiischen Uindem. 
Wie beurteilen Sie die Veranderungen in Deutschlands RoUe in Europa seit der 
Wiedervereinigung. Teilen sie die Auffassung, daB Deutschland mittlerweile zur 
fflhrenden Nation geworden ist? 
Schroder hat manchmal ein sehr robuste Sprache, die diesen ProzeB manchmal eher 
erschwert als erleichtert. Nicht alle unsere Nachbam sind darUber begeistert, aber 
diese RoBe war unvermeidbar, wenn auch nieht angestrebt. Wenn man diese RoUe 
nicht wahmehmen wfude, wfu"e das auch eine MiBaehtung der Nachbam. 
Mit dieser Mittellage, der Zahl der BUrger und der Wirtsehaft miissen wir diese 
filhrende RoBe annehmen und viele unserer Nachbarn haben dies als normal 
akzeptiert, wenn auch oft mit wenig Begeisterung. Die meisten Naehbam akzeptieren 
diese Filhrungrolle und sehen Deutsehland als geleutert dureh die Erfahrungen der 
Nazi-Zeit und trauen diesem geleuterten Deutschland zu, diese FilhrungsroIle in einer 
ft1r die Nachbam akzeptablen Form wahrzunehmen. 
Wie soUte sich Deutschland verhalten, um eventuellen Bef"drchtungen im 
Hinblick auf die Osterweiterung entgegenzuwirken? 
Ganze deutsche Politikergenerationen haben es in Fleiseh und Blut verinnerlicht, daB 
man als filhrende Nation in Europa diese Rolle in einer sanften Form wahmimmt. 
Die Deutschen sind durch ihre Geschichte gezwungen worden, eine sanfte 
FUhrungsmacht in Europa zu sein. 
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Sehen Sie ein Problem in der wachsenden Skepsis der deutschen Bev61kerung 
gegeniiber der beiden zentralen europapolitischen Projekte, Osterweiterung und 
der Wiihrungsunion? 
Das Problem steekt vor allem im Tempo der Entwieklung. BezUglieh der Sehaffung 
eines einheitliehen Deutsehen Nationalstaates wurde schon 50 Jahre vorher diskutiert, 
bei der europaischen Einheit ist es gerade umgekehrt. Da Uiuft die RealiUtt permanent 
dem Denken der Menschen vorher. 
In dem Moment, wo sich der Euro als dauerhaft erweist, sehe ich sehr schnell eine 
Akzeptanz wachsen, vor allem wenn die die Mensehen mit der W§hrung vertraut sind. 
BezUglich der Osterweiterung exisiert eine standige Diskrepanz zwischen den 
Berichten Uber negative Auswirkungen und dem eigentliehen Projekt. Die 
Zustimmung zu Europa ist traditionell niedrig. deshalb gibt es immer extra 
Erklarungsbedarf. Deshalb kann nur die Zeit und die ErkUlrung die Wunden heilen 
und die Hoffnung, daB dann in 10-20 Jahren die Fakten durchdringen. nKmlich daB 
die Europaische Union zur attraktivsten Wirtschaftszone der Welt gemaeht wurde. 
Es gibt keine attraktivere Wirtschaftszone in der Welt und das ist nur durch die 
Zusammenarbeit erreicht worden. Man muB deshalb die Fakten klarmachen und die 
einzelnen Beispiele, bei denen sich die Unzufriedenheit der BUrger zeigt durch 
Erklarung abfangen. 
Tellt die CSU die BefUrchtungen, daD die geplante europlische Eingreiftruppe 
den Zusammenhalt innerhalb der NATO geflhrden k6nnte? 
Nein. Rein organisatorisch ist eine extra EU Struktur natilrlich schwierig. Wir mUssen 
deshalb akzeptieren. daB die Organisation der NATO durch einen europliischen 
Pfeiler schon schwieriger wird. Andererseits muB die Organisation die RealiUlt 
widerspiegeln, deshalb mUssen der europaische und der amerikanische Pfeiler unter 
dem NATO-Dach effizient zusammenarbeiten. 
Sollte man diese Eingreifstruppe zu einer eigenen europlischen AuDen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik ausbauen, vor allem unter dem Gesichtspunkt der geringeren 
Bereitschaft der Amerikaner, sich bei Krisen in Europa zu engagieren? 
Eine Sicherheitspolitik ohne RUcksprache mit den Amerikanem wilrde ich als 
gefiihrlich erachten. Die Europaer waren deshalb gut beraten, sieh bei Aktionen erst 
einmal bei den Amerikanem abzusichem. Die Amerikaner sind einerseits froh, daB 
diese halberwachsenen Europaer ihnen Aufgaben abnehmen, aber wenn sie beginnen, 
eigene Ideen zu entwickeln, sorgen sie sich, wohin das ruhren wird.Man muB das 
durch praktische Erfahrungen einspielen, die Vemetzung von Eigenstlindigkeit und 
Zusammenarbeit unter dem Schirm der NATO und mit den Amerikanem. 
Welches Modell halten sie fUr das Richtige fUr die Zukunft Europas? 
Die Formel ist klar: soviel Europa wie n6tig und soviel nationale Differenzierung wie 
m6glich. Es fehIt eine klare Rechtslehrsauffassung zu diesem Problem, deshalb fehlt 
den Politikem die Orientierung. Vertrage sollten natUrlich immer durch die nationalen 
Parlament ratifiziert werden, jedoch muB die abgegebene SouverliniUit von den 
Nationalstaaten akzeptiert werden. 
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Die Nationalstaaten sollten die Herren der Vertragsmderung bleiben. Die EuropAische 
Union bekommt jedoch immer mehr Zustmdigkeiten und man muB die Entscheidung 
uber weitere Zustmdigkeitsverlagerungen von Fall zu Fall entscheiden. Keines der 
ModeUe, das wir im Kopf haben, wird ausreichen, urn zu erkUiren, was wir machen. 
Was halten Sie von AuOenministers Fischers Modell eines gewlhlten 
Kommissionprisidenten? 
Meines Erachtens nach sollte der Kommissionspdisident Europaparlamentarier sein, 
soUte auf den Listen bei den Europawahlen draufstehen. Die Europaischen Parteien 
sollten ihren Spitzenkandidaten benennen bei der nlichsten Europawahl, von dem sie 
dann sagen, wenn wir die Chance dazu haben, kommt der in die Regierung bzw. die 
Kommission. Es ware am besten, wenn die EuropAische Volkspartei oder andere 
Parteien jeweils einen Kandidaten benennen wllrden. Insofem wiire der 
KommissionsprHsident dann schon mehr oder weniger direkt gewAhlt. Die Frage 
wfu"e, ob wir einen StaatsprHsidenten brauchen. 
Was wir als nachsten Schritt brauchen, wfu"e ein Verfassungvertrag, der gemdert 
werden kann, aber nur durch Ratifizierung in den Mitgliedstaaten. Weil die 
Europaische Union keinen Staatscharakter erhalten soIl, sollten wir von 
Verfassungsvertrag und nicht von Verfassung sprechen. Er soUte drei Elemente 
beinhalten: Die Grundrechtecharta, die Kompetenzabgrenzung und eine Kurzfassung 
der bisherigen Vertragsgebilde. 
Welche Kritik haben Sie an der Europapolitik der rot-griinen Bundesregierung 
ond was wurde eine Unionsgeffihrte Regierung indem? 
Die Regierung verwendet zuwenig Herblut, der grundlegende Wertebezug frUherer 
Regierungen ist einer pragmatischen Einstellung gewichen und ich befilrchte, daB das 
auf die Dauer nicht ausreicht. Ein groBer Fehler war das Nachgeben gegenuber 
Frankreich bezllglich der Reform der Agrarpolitik. Man konnte sich auch ein wenig 
mehr an Anstrengung aus Berlin erwarten, die deutsch-franzosische Beziehung wieder 
wichtiger zu nehmen und trotzdem mit England eine Art Dreieck zu bilden. England 
ware eigentlich die natllrliche dritte Macht im Bundes, es liegt nur an der genannten 
Problematik. Das anzustrebende ware natUrlich eine Art sanfte Dreierbeziehung und 
das fehlt mir bei der Regierung. 
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Wie beurteilen Sie die Ergebnisse des EU-Gipfels von Nizza, sind Ihrer Ansicht 
nach die notwendigen Reformen, vor allem bezOglich der Osterweiterung, wenn 
neue Mitglieder in die EU kommen, beschlossen worden, auch bezOglich der 
Institutionen und natiirlich der Entscheidungsverfabren, oder sehen Sie noch 
Nachbesserungsbedarf irgendwo? 
In Nizza sind die Staats- und Regierungschefs eindeutig zu kurz gesprungen. Was da 
beschlossen worden ist, reicht nicht. Das sehen die Staats- und Regierungschefs selbst 
ja auch so, sonst hatten sie nicht gesagt, man brauchte einen Post-Nizza-Prozess. 
Den braucht manja nur, weil man eben nicht fertig geworden ist. 
Meine Hauptkritikpunkte sind: Es ist nur das Minimum gemacht worden, bei der 
Besetzung der Kommission hat man lediglich gesagt, die groBen Staaten sollen nicht 
mehr zwei haben, sondern nur noch einen. Aber die eigentliche Frage, ob mit 
zunehmender Zahl von Mitgliedstaaten jeder einen Kommissar haben muS oder nicht, 
der ist man ausgewichen und hat das verschoben auf die Zeit nach der ersten 
Erweiterungsrunde. Wenn irgendjemand meint, das die Neudazugekommenen, wie 
z.B. Polen auf einen Kommissar verzichten werden, dann irrt man sich. Also, was die 
15 jetzt nicht gelost haben ist mit 20 nicht leichter zu Itssen. Das gleiche gilt fUr die 
Bereiche, die in der Uebereinstimmigkeit verblieben sind. Je mehr Teilnehmer es an 
einem Entscheidungsprozess gibt, der einstimmig ist, desto geringer ist die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, daB man die Einstimmigkeit bekommt. Auch da ist es mit 20 
schwieriger als mit 15. 
Und drittens, ich glaube, daB gerade bei den Beitrittsstaaten eine Europaische Union, 
die wenn sie bei sich selber einen Beitrittsantrag stellen mill3te, nicht aufgenommen 
wUrde, weil die demokratischen Strukturen nicht stimmen. Das die Akzeptanz fUr 
sowas gerade bei den neuen Staaten mit ihrer Vorerfahrung kommunistischer 
Diktaturen etwas sehr problematisches ist. Es gilt nach wie vor der Schritt, daB fast 
aUes nach dem Prinzip der Mitentscheidung geht und daB nur ganz wenige, die dann 
in der Einstimmigkeit verbleiben k5nnen, tatsachlich ohne Beteiligung des 
Parlamentes stattfinden. Zu diesen Bereichen zahlt leider Gottes auch Agrar, da 
entscheidet der Ministerrat alleine, das Parlament hat nur beratende Funktion, das 
kann auch nicht gutgehen. 
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Sie sind also der Meinung, man hltte das liingst vorher machen soDen. Es 
herrscht ja jetzt die allgemeine Meinung vor, daB man das im Zuge der 
Erweiterung machen kiinnte, sie haben es ja schon angesprochen. Sind Sie der 
Meinung, daB das noch funktionieren kann? 
Es wird nur sehwieriger mit mehreren. 
Es ist ja im Augenblick eine alIgemeine Debatte unter den Mitgliedstaaten Uber die 
zukUnftige Gestalt der EU im Gange. Der britische Premienninister BIair hat zum 
Beispiel gefordert, daB die EU nieht zum "Superstaat" werden dilrfe, aber eine 
"Supermaeht" werden kOnne, wenn sie si eh weiterentwiekelt. Die Franzosen fordem 
weiterhin die Erhaltung des Nationalstaates, obwohl sie fUr die Vertiefung eintreten. 
Und die SPD hat in ihrem Leitantrag zur Europapolitik ja eine eher fOderale Vision 
fUr die EU entworfen, was bei den Franzosen, aber aueh bei den Briten auf wenig 
Gegenliebe gestoBen ist, wenn aueh aus untersehiedliehen Grilnden. 
Ich wilrde Sie geme Fragen, ob Sie denken, daB die SPD in diesem Entwurf 
etwas zu weit gegangen ist, vor allem wenn man an eher europaskeptische 
Staaten wie GroBbritannien denkt, die aber unter der neuen Regierung Blair 
doch europafreundlicher sind und anstreben, in eine F6hrungsposition in 
Europa einzutreten. 
Das Problem ist im Grund ganz einfach: Wenn man sich dafUr entscheidet, daB man 
einen TeiI der eigenen Souverwtlit aufgibt und gemeinsam mit anderen anpackt. Die 
EU ist ja niehts anderes als der Vorrang, das Mitgliedstaaten freiwillig ein Teil ihrer 
Souvedinitiit abgeben und gemeinsam mit anderen anpacken. Wenn man das tut, dann 
darf man es nicht so tun, daB es praktiseh nicht funktioniert, also, wenn, dann muB 
Ubertragen werden. Ich kann mir eher vorstellen, daB Bereiche, fUr die die EU 
zusUindig ist, wieder rUekverlagert werden. Aber das, was auf die europaisehe Ebene 
kommt, das gehOrt demokratisiert und da muB dann klar sein, daB dort entsehieden 
wird, ohne wenn und aber. Sonst wird das auf die Dauer scheitem. 
Die Probleme, die es da bei GroBbritannien und Frankreich gibt, sind teilweise 
semantiseher Art. Das Wort FOderalismus hat im Englischen ja eine ganz andere 
Bedeutung, das meint den Zentralstaat. Da niemand im Kopf hat, der emsthaft an der 
europapolitischen Debatte beteiligt ist, die Nationalstaaten absehaffen zu wollen, wir 
werden sie noch lange brauchen, geht es eigentlich nur urn die Frage, wenn man ein 
StUck Europa macht, macht man es konsequent oder nicht? Es geht nicht urn die 
Frage europaischer Zentralstaat versus Nationalstaaten, die dann nichts mehr zu sagen 
haben, sondem es geht urn eine sauber vereinbarte Arbeits- und 
Zustmdigkeitsverteilung. 
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Aber denken Sie nicht, daB, weil man eben weiB, daB das Wort FHderalismus 
z.D. in GroBbritannien einen negativen Deigeschmack hat, man vorsichtiger sein 
mii8te bei der Formulierung der Thesen. Denn wenn man die Reaktionen 
betrachtet, die waren ja wie immer sehr hysterisch. Es wurde sogar mal wieder 
vom "Dritten Reich" gesprochen. Es ist dann hilfreich, die Debatte, die in 
GroObritannien im Moment darum geht, sollen wir uns Europa annlhern oder 
sollen wir weiterhin unseren alten skeptischen Weg gehen, so zu unterstUtzen? 
Man kommt ja gar nicht darum herum, wenn man ein bestimmtes Bild, wie Europa 
gebaut werden solI, im Kopf hat, dafi man das sauber aufschreibt. Die britische Presse 
wird auf alles und jedes, was man aufschreibt, so reagieren, Uberreagieren, weil sie 
die Funktion einer normalen Presse, jedenfalls teilweise, Ulngst verloren hat. 
Und was ein britischer konservativer Abgeordneter vor der Wahl sagt, nehme ich 
auch nicht emst. Im Grunde muB man es sich so vorstellen: Europa ist ja nicht 
deshalb gemacht worden, weil die Nationalstaaten es lieben, dafi man einen Teil der 
Souverarutat abgibt. Europa ist geboren worden aus der Notwendigkeit heraus, dafi 
man bestimmte Dinge miteinander tun muI3, weil man sonst in einer sich 
globalisierenden Welt sich nicht mehr durchsetzen kann. Der Ursprung war ein 
anderer, der Ursprung war, die Deutschen einzubinden und unter Kontrolle zu halten. 
Das hat sich Uingst gewandelt, heute stehen wir vor der Frage, tun wir uns zusammen, 
oder werden wir passives Material der Geschichte. 
Dieses Obertragen von Souveranitiit ist immer dann vorgenommen worden, wenn die 
Probleme auf der Welt so gestaltet waren, dafi man allein sie nicht mehr ordentlich hat 
losen konnen. Wir hatten die europAische Wahrung schon vor 15 Jahren einfUhren 
konnen, das es jetzt kommt, hat etwas zu tun mit der weltwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung auf dem Finanzmarkt und mit der Globalisierung der Wirtschaft. 
Aehnliches gilt fUr das Vorhaben der gemeinsamen AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik. 
Und irgendwann wird man auch den Widerspruch 15sen mUssen, dafi man immer 
mehr an Zustandigkeiten nach Europa Ubertragt, aber gIeichzeitig so tut, aIs wUrde 
dort nun nichts stattfinden und man mUBte es auch nicht demokratisieren. Also, 
irgendwo ist ein Punkt erreicht, wo die Menschen das auch nicht mehr mitmachen. 
Von daher kann man das erwarten. Das hat nichts mit Befindlichkeiten von Politikem 
oder von einzelnen Leuten zu tun. 
Es zeigt sich ja insgesamt, in ganz Europa, wenn man die Umfragen betrachtet, 
eine zunehmende Ablehnung vor allem der Gr08projekte. Z.D. gibt es ja jetzt in 
Deutschland leider eine Mehrheit, die gegen die EU-Ostwerweiterung ist. Und 
auch gegeniiber der Wiihrungsunion ist die Einstellung ja auch nicht gerade sehr 
positive Wie konnte man den Ihrer Ansicht nach dieser anti-europlischen 
Tendenz entgegenwirken, durch welche konkreten Schritte der 
Demokratisierung der Strukturen? 
Also, bleiben wir mal bei den Sachthemen. Es ist nicht so, daB die Menschen gegen 
die Osterweiterung sind. Es ist so, daB sie Angst davor haben. Und wenn man ihnen 
nicht plausibel macht, wie die damit verbundenen Probleme ordentlich gel6st werden 
konnen. Gegen das Vorhaben, daB man die aus Mittel- und Osteuropa in die EU 
nimmt, gibt es emotional keinerlei Vorbehalte, anders als bei der TUrkei. 
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Aber es gibt die Frage, was passiert mit meinem Arbeitsplatz, was ist wenn 
Handwerker hier billiger anbieten, was wird mit meinem Handwerksbetrieb. Und 
meine Erfahrung ist, wenn man das ordentlich anbietet und LOsungen aufzeigt, dann 
gibt's kein Problem damit. 
Beim Euro haben wir die Schwierigkeit, daB die meisten Menschen Geld haben, aber 
sie nichts davon wissen, wie Geld funktioniert. Die Stabilitiit einer Wlihrung ist fl1r 
viele Leute etwas gewesen, was mit Glauben zu tun hat. 
Jacques Delors hat einmal gesagt, nicht alle Deutschen glauben an Gott, aber alle 
Deutschen glauben an die Bundesbank. 
Und diesen Skeptizismus werden wir, weil nicht jeder lernt, was die RoUe einer 
Zentralbank ist und wie man Geld stabil halten kann, werden wir bis zur Einfilhrung 
von Scheinen einfach nicht loswerden. Wenn sie jetzt hinsehen, das ist eine beinhart 
stabile Wlihrung mit Inflationsraten von zwischen 1 und 2,5 %, das hatte man zu 
besten Zeiten der Markt. Aber das wird man mit nichts auf der Welt loskriegen, 
Werbekampagnen hin oder her, da muJ3 man auf den 1. Januar warten, dann werden 
die Menschen feststellen, daB das eben keine Wlihrungsreform ist und daB es keine 
h5heren Inflationsraten gibt. Und irgendwann wird man auch begreifen, daJ3 das 
AuBenverhHltnis zum Dollar nichts ist, was die Binnenkraft (inaudible). Das kann 
man nur aussitzen. 
Jetzt zu Ihrer Frage, was kann man denn tun. Solange die Regierungen und die 
Mitgleider nationaler Parlamente durch die Welt laufen und den Menschen eI7lihlen, 
sie sind die eigentlich Entscheidenden, solange kann man ein Projekt wie die 
europaische Union nicht rechtfertigen. Die Wahrheit ist, kein Staat auf der Welt, auch 
so ein groBer wie Deutschland nicht, wird mit seinen Problemen alleine fertig. 
Solange das nicht zugegeben wird, solange, das ist gerade in Deutschland die Debatte, 
es so aussieht, als ware Europa ein Gefallen, den wir anderen tun, so nach dem Motto: 
wir k5nnten es eigentlich alles alleine, aber urn den lieben Friedens Willen machen 
wir diese Veranstaltung mit. Solange das so ist, daB die eigene nationale Politik nicht 
klar macht, wo der Mehrwert ist von Europa, solange werden wir keine Zustimmung 
kriegen. Und das mull von der nationalen Politik ausgehen, weil wir sonst von 
europHischen Politikern gesagt wird: 'na ja, das mUssen die', als Selbstrechtfertigung 
der eigenen Existenz. 
Auch da landen wir wieder dabei, daB mit zunehmender Europaisierung, wenn das 
nicht stattfindet, eine weitere Europaisierung nicht mehr moglich ist, weil die 
Menschen es nicht mehr mitmachen. 
Wie kiinnte man es denn institutionell verbessern, welche Aenderungen wlren 
notwendig? 
Also, das eine ist, Demokratisierung dadurch, daB man mit ganz wenigen 
Entscheidungen, die dann In der Einstimmigkeit verbleiben, alles der 
Mehrheitsentscheidung im Rat unterwirft und das es auch ein 
Mitentscheidungsverfahren gibt. Also ein Gesetz braucht eine Mehrheit der Staaten 
im Rat und eine Mehrheit der Vertreter im Parlament, bei den Vertretern des Volkes. 
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Zweitens: Oeffentliche Ratssitzungen. Es gibt kein Parlament auf der Welt. das 
geheim tagt, so etwas gab es nur frUher in der Sowjetunion. Der Rat ist aber eben 
nicht nur eine Veranstaltung von Ministem, sondem ist Teil der 
Gesetzgebungsmachinerie. Das gibt es nirgends, das so etwas nicht lSffentlich tagt. 
Also, wenn der Rat als Gesetzgebung tagt, mtlBte er lSffentlich tagen. 
Sollte das Parlament dabei volle Gesetzgebungskompetenzen bekommen? 
Das amerikanische Parlament ist weiB Gott ein richtiges Parlament und da ist es auch 
so, daB die eine Mehrheit fUr ein Gesetz im "House of Representatives" haben mUssen 
und im Senat. Solange wir noch Nationalstaaten haben und keinen europiiischen 
Zentralstaat und das wird noch lange so sein, glaube ich nicht, daB es irgendeine 
funktionierende Konstitution gibt, die nicht einrechnet, daB beide Teile der 
Gesetzgebung gleichberechtigt nebeneinander stehen. Das ist auch nicht ein 
Parlament minderer Qualitat. 
Viele sehen dennoch die Stlrkung des Europaparlamentes als Allheilmittel. 
Es gibt eine doppelte Debatte. Die einen sagen, es solI so werden, daB das Parlament 
den Rat ilberstimmen kann, das kann ich mir vorstellen filr eine Zeit, in der ich nicht 
mehr in der Politik sein werde. Im Augenblick ist das unvorstellbar. Aber 
Mitentscheidung wilrde natilrlich vlSllig reichen. Wie gesagt, eine Demokratie wie 
Amerika hat genau dieses System. Da kann man nicht sagen, daB sei 
unparlamentarisch oder undemokratisch, oder nur ein halbes Parlament. Das ist nicht 
so. Der viel groBere Streitpunkt, wir haben es ja in wichtigen Teilen der 
Gesetzgebung jetzt schon so, Wirtschaftsgesetzgebung, Umweltschutz, es geht eher 
darum, daB es auf Bereiche ausgedehnt wird, wo es jetzt noch nicht nach dem 
Verfahren der Mitentscheidung geht. Beispiel Agrarbereich. Beispiel die 
Strukturfonds. Da mull das Parlament zustimmen, mull der Rat zustimmen und zwar 
einstimmig, dann kommen solche faulen Kompromisse heraus wie beim Gipfel in 
Berlin, wo sie keine grilndliche Agrarreform hinkriegen und keine ordentliche Reform 
der Strukturfonds, weil irgendeiner immer 'nein' sagt und si ch das dann irgendwie 
abhandeln muB. 
Also das eigentliche ist Mehrheitsentscheidung. Und zwar Mehrheitsentscheidung 
ausgedehnt auf alle Gegenstiinde, ich wilrde ein paar Ausnahmen machen. Das eine ist 
Steuem, oder sagen wir mal die Hohe des Geldbeitrages, den die Staaten an die EU 
abgeben milssen. Es muB eine Versicherung geben, daB nicht eine Mehrheit von 
Armen sagt, jetzt reichem wir die Solidarmechanismen in der EU so an, daB es uns 
richtig gut geht. Also bei der Frage, wieviel Prozent des Bruttoinlandsproduktes kann 
der EU-Haushalt sein, das wilrde ich immer einstimmig regeln. Das andere sind 
Entscheidungen liber Krieg und Frieden, aber das war es dann eigentlich schon. 
Wobei, wie gesagt, wenn es urn die Frage geht, daB die EU als EU sich an 
irgendwelchen militllrischen Uebungen beteiligt, dann hiitte ich es auch geme aIs 
Mitentscheidungsverfahren, so daB die Volksvertretung 'nein' sagen kann, aIs man 
darf keine Soldaten schicken. Aber urngekehrt mull man natUrlich auch sagen, daB 
mull im Rat dann auch einstimmig gehen, mit der Moglichkeit des 'opting out', daB 
ein Staat sagt, 'gut, ich widersetze mich dem nicht, aber ich schicke meine Jungs nicht 
hin'. Sowas Sensibles, Krieg oder Frieden, da kann ich's verstehen. 
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Und Beitritte vielleicht, Beitritte und, sagen wir mal, Anderungen des Vertrags. Aber 
das war's dann.Dann kriegen Sie vemiinftige Entscheidungsgeschwindigkeiten, dann 
kriegen Sie soviel politischen Druck auf die, die das entscheiden. DaB das 
Agrarsystem so ist, wie wir es jetzt haben, hangt damit zusammen, daB es nicht an 
einer parlamentarischen Mehrheit, sondem an einer Mehrheit im Rat liegt. 
Aber es ist liegt ja auch am Widerstand der Franzosen. 
Das ist genau der Punkt. Und sowas miissen sie halt glatt uberstimmen koennen. 
Dann kommen wir gleich zum nichsten Punkt: Die deutsch-franziisische 
Zusammenarbeit. Viele Experten sprechen ja jetzt nicht nur von einer 
Verschlechterung der Zusammenarbeit, sondern sogar vom Zusammenbruch 
der deutsch-franziisischen Achse, die ja bisher die EU vorangetrieben und 
dominiert hat. Koennen Sie sich vorstellen, dass es nach Nizza jetzt zu neuen, 
kurzfristigen Fuehrungsallianzen unter den Mitgliedstaaten kommt, die aber 
auch mehr sachbezogen sind, wie z.B. im Bereich Agrarpolitik zwischen 
DeutschlaDd uDd GroBbritannien, im Bereich Verteidigungpolitik zwischen den 
Franzosen und den Briten, Deutschland und Spanien in der Wirtschaftslpolitik? 
Das haben wir ja schon. Die Frage der gemeinsamen Au6en- und Sicherheitspolitik 
ist ja schon in der Hand von den Franzosen und den Briten, nicht von den Deutschen. 
Also, das ist nichts Neues. 
Aber teilen Sie die Auffassung, dass die deutsch-franziisische Achse praktisch 
beeDdet ist? 
Das kann man so nicht sagen. Die Deutschen haben die Franzosen immer gebraucht, 
weil sie nie als die groBen Starken in Europa auftreten durften. Und die Deutschen 
haben die Franzosen immer gebraucht wegen ihrer Okonomischen Stiirke. Also, es ist 
ein VerhaItnis, daB nicht auf einem LiebesverhaItnis grilndet. Dazu kommt, daB 
gerade wenn man in einer Zweckehe ist, spielen bestimmt Dinge z.B. ob das 
Fiihrungspersonal miteinander kann oder nicht, eine relativ wichtige RoUe. 
Da hatten wir unhistorisch oft Glilck, zweimal. Der Helmut Schmidt konnte mit dem 
Giscard d'Estaing ausgezeichnet, obwohl der von der anderen Seite war und der Kohl 
mit dem Mitterand. Undjetzt der Sch<>der, kann weder mit dem Priisidenten, noch mit 
dem Ministerpriisidenten besonders. Das sind auch Mentalitats- und 
N aturellgeschichten. 
Aber glauben Sie nicht auch, daB ein Grund fOr die momentanen 
Schwierigkeiten ist, daB die Franzosen sich mit dem gewachsenen Gewicht 
Deutschlands sehr schwer tun? 
Ja, das spielt auch eine RoUe. Es gibt einige, die glauben, es sei so. Letztendlich ist es 
auch wahrscheinlich so. Ich wilrde nur jedem raten, sich genauso zu verhalten, wie in 
der Vergangenheit auch. Wir sind nach wie vor in einer Mittellage in Europa, wir 
haben ein paar mal im letzten lahrhundert und in diesem lahrhundert die Situation 
gehabt, daB der Rest Europas sich gegen uns verbilndet hat. 
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Das ist immer zum Schaden unseres Landes gewesen. Und das Dfunmste, was 
Deutsche tun konnen und das Schlimmste, was uns passieren kann, ist, wenn das 
nochmal kommt. Man muB ja nicht in Sack und Asche gehen, aber normal sein. 
Die Deutschen miissen begreifen, daB es unser eigenes Interesse ist. 
Wurden Sie dann auch das anfingliche Auftreten von Schr6der eher kritisch 
sehen, wo er eh er selbstbewuBter war als es bisher der Fall war in der deutschen 
Europapolitik? 
Ich denke mal, das hat gar nichts mit der verlinderten RoUe Deutschlands zu tun. Wir 
haben seit 1990 die Einheit, Schroder ist gerade mal zweieinhalb Jahre im Amt. Das 
ware unter Kohl auch moglich gewesen. Das ist ein Mentalitlltsunterschied. Das eine 
ist, der Kohl hat eine systematische Scheckbuchpolitik betrieben, das heiBt, er hat 
Probleme auf diese Weise gelost, daB er gesagt hat, dann zahlen wir halt mal. 
Das geht angesichts der Verschuldung, in der wir stecken nicht. Und eine wachsende 
Staatsverschuldung geht auch nicht, weil wir den Stabilitlltspakt unterschrieben 
haben. Deshalb war es relativ konsequent, daB der Schroder ziemlich deutlich 
gemacht hat, es ist jetzt SchluB mit dieser Scheckbuchpolitik. Das ist das eine. Das 
andere, es ist auch ein wenig ein Mentalitatsunterschied. Der Kohl hat systematisch 
auf die Zusammenarbeit mit den Franzosen gesetzt. 
Schroder ist nicht frankophil, auch nicht anglophil. Die Zuneigung zu der 
Zusammenarbeit mit den Franzosen hat er an dieser Stelle nicht. Das macht sich dann 
auch ein wenig bemerkbar. 
Vermehrte Zusammenarbeit Deutschland-GroObritannien, wie wurden Sie das 
beurteilen, gibt es Chancen dafur in bestimmten Bereichen, vor allem, wie 
wurden sich die Chancen veriindern, wenn die Blair-Regierung es schafft, die 
Briten in die Wiihrungsunion zu fiihren? 
Es gibt einen bekannten Witz: 'fog in the channel, the continent is isolated'. Das 
bestimmt bis heute das Verhaltnis zum Vereinigten Konigreich. Letztendlich ist es so, 
daB GroBbritannien einen FuB in Europa hat und den anderen auf der anderen Seite 
des Atlantik. Das wird es immer schwierig machen, mit diesem Land europliisch 
zusammenzuarbeiten. 
Das zweite ist der Mentalitatsunterschied. Es gibt zwei europaische Staatengruppen, 
bei denen die Mehrheit der Bevolkerung immer noch glaubt, sie gehorten zur Gruppe 
der Weltmachte. Sowohl wie Frankreich seit der verlorenen Schlacht von Vichy keine 
Weltmacht mehr ist und GroBbritannien seit dem zweiten Weltkrieg keine Weltmacht 
mehr ist. Nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg haben die Amerikaner die Briten systematisch 
gestllrkt. Das britische Selbstverstlindnis ist aber immer noch, sie seien eine GroB- und 
eine Weltmacht. Britannia rules the world. 
Und solange es in GroBbritannien bei der Mehrheit der BevOlkerung so ist, und es ist 
so meiner Beobachtung nach, wird sich jede britische Regierung, so sehr sie vielleicht 
selber die Einsicht haben konnte, daB es im besten Interesse des Landes ware, daB 
man bestimmte Dinge europaisch macht, daran halten. 
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Die Franzosen gehen mit diesem Konflikt anders urn. Die erz3hlen ihrer BevBlkerung 
nach wie vor, sie seien die 'grand nation' und leisten sich sowas wie ihre 
Mittelstreckenraketen, die genau bis zur deutschen Grenze gereicht haben und in die 
DDR hinein. Aber das ist das, wie man nach atillen operiert. 
Wie hat sich nach Ihrer Ansicht genereU das Gewicht Deutschlands nach der 
Wiedervereinigung verindert? 1st Deutschland schon zum mhrenden Staat in 
Europa geworden, wie es manche Analytiker behaupten, oder sehen Sie es eher 
im wirtschaftlichen Bereich? 
Es ist so, daB Deutschland durch die Einheit okonomisch schwiicher geworden ist. 
Das wird noch Jahre dauem, bis das aufgeholt ist. Das hat durch die 2+4-Vertriige 
formal ein StUck mehr Souveriinitiit bekommen, weil das Land nicht mehr geteilt ist. 
Das war ja immer eine Achillesferse der deutschen Politik. Aber das fOr die 
Deutschen die Biiurne in den Himmel wachsen, das ist auch nicht der Fall. 
Es ist auch logisch, weil die Europiiische Union ist keine hegemoniale Veranstaltung. 
Das ist eine Veranstaltung auf gegenseitigem Nutzen, die nur funktionieren kann, 
wenn es auf gegenseitigem Nutzen weiter beruht und wenn die GroBen die Kleinen 
nicht fressen. Eine Europiiische Union, in der fUr die Kleinen kein Platz ist, in der sie 
nichts zu sagen haben, nichts zu entscheiden, geht nicht. Das ist kein Kolonialreich. 
Schon deshalb wird, auch wenn Deutschland jetzt groBer ist, wirtschaftlich starker 
wird es immer sein, wird das nicht dazu fiihren, daB sich die Grundstrukturen in 
Europa iindem. 
Also keine deutsche FiihrungsroUe? 
Eine Fiihrungsrolle kann man in Europa intellektuell haben, indem man vorangeht, 
indem man VorschUige macht. Eine Ffthrungsrolle, so wie es die Vereinigten Staaten 
von Amerika fUr die ganze Welt anstreben, wer sowas fOr Europa als Mitgliedstaat 
der EU beansprucht, muB damit scheitem. 
Die Mechanismen sind anders. Sie haben ein Analogon in den Vereinigten Staaten 
von Amerika, da gibt es einen Bundesstaat. Aber in diesem Bundesstaat haben die 
groBen und die kleinen Staaten die gleichen Stimmen. Jeder Staat hat zwei Stimmen, 
zwei Senatoren. Ob es ein Riesenstaat oder ein Zwergstaat ist, alle haben zwei 
Stimmen. Das hAngt von der Gleichberechtigung der Staaten ab. Und wir haben es 
zwar nicht so krass bei dem Gewicht der Stimmen, aber wir geben den Kleinen 
natilrlich mehr Rechte, als sie ihrer GroBe nach haben wOrden. 
Das tun wir, weil es nicht anders geht und weil man sowas in Europa nicht anders 
machen kann. Also von daher, wenn, dann kann es nur urn geistige FUhrerschaft 
gehen. Ich glaube, da muB man abwarten, was sich entwickelt. Nicht jeder Kirchtum, 
der si ch der Weltpolitik widmet, wird auch ein Leuchtturm. 
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Nun konkret zur Osterweiterung: Wo bestehen Ihrer Ansicht nach die 
Hauptschwierigkeit in dem Prozess der Heranfiihrung der osteuroplischen 
Staaten an die EU? 
Wenn man das vemiinftig vorbereitet und sauber macht, dann gibt es wenig Probleme, 
die man nicht losen kann. Wenn man also festlegt, daB es Beitritte nur geben wird, 
wenn die notwendigen Reformen, sowohl innerhalb der EU, als auch in den 
Beitrittsstaaten abgeschlossen .sind. Und wenn man die Tatbestande aus dem aquis 
communautaire, fUr die man Obergangsfristen gewahren will, wenn man die auf die 
F~ille begrenzt, wo man das ohne Schaden tun kann, dann sieht die Sache schon 
anders aus. 
Urn ein Beispiel zu geben. Im Umweltschutzbereich ist es wegen der technischen 
Laufzeiten und der Kosten ist es wegen der Kosten der NachrUstung der 
Beitrittsstaaten so, daB die das in n!lchster Zeit nicht konnen. Das stort weder die 
gesamte Europaische Union, noch den Binnenmarkt, wenn die Entschwefelung und 
Entstickung nicht sofort so ist, wie wir das in der EU vorschreiben. 
Und umgekehrt, was wir wollen, diese Siebenjahresfrist, damit wir den Zugang zu 
den Arbeitsmarkten noch kontrollieren konnen, auch das geht, ohne daB der 
Binnenmarkt auseinanderbricht. Wenn man jetzt aber, weil man einen bestimrnten 
Zeitplan im Kopf hat, wieder anfangen wiirde, Obergangsfristen in Bereichen zu 
gewIDrren, wo es zu zentralen Storungen des Binnenmarktes kommt, dann wird es 
schwierig. 
Also, Sie wollen keine anderen Ubergangsfristen fOr die Beitrittskandidaten? 
Es gibt auch andere. Aber wo es zum BeispieI nicht geht, ist beim Lebensmittelrecht. 
Die Sekunde, wo ein Staat Mitglied der Europ!lischen Union ist, darf er seine 
Produkte ohne wenn und aber reinliefem. Und wenn dann Sorten aus Polen in 
Regensburg im Regal stehen, dann muB ich aIs BUrger, der kauft, sicher sein, daB das 
europaische Lebensmittelrecht eingehalten ist. Und wenn's noch nicht umgesetzt ist, 
dann geht's halt nicht.Oder ein anderes Beispiel aus dem Bankenbereich. Es gibt eine 
Mindestreserve, die die Bank halten muB, ft1r einen Kredit. Wenn das nicht umgesetzt 
ist, wandert das Kreditgeschaft in der EU tlber Nacht ab. Also Tatbestande, die was 
mit dem Binnenmarkt zu tun haben. Oder mit Gesundheitschutz, VeterinHrrecht, 
Pflanzenschutz, usw. 
Das muB beigebracht sein, weil man sonst keinen europllischen Binnenmarkt hat. Das 
geht nicht anders. Auch die Landwirtschaft, das ist das gIeiche. Wllhrend in anderen 
Bereichen, oder bei der Statistik, das macht zwar die geringsten Probleme, das ist ein 
Kapitel, daB mit alIen Staaten abgeschIossen ist. Aber wenn Sie nicht eine 
gemeinsame Grundlage fUr Statistik haben, konnen Sie nicht zllhlen, konnen Sie keine 
Statistik in der Landwirtschaft machen, nichts. 
Also, da konnen Sie auch nicht sagen, da machen wir eine Ubergangsfrist, Ihr zllhlt 
noch ein paar Jahre anders. Das geht nicht. Das ist allerdings ein Beispiel. Es gibt 
durchaus noch Kapitel, wo sie nicht fertig sind. 
LXIII 
Meine eigentliche Sorge ist, daB groBe Bereiche von den Staats- und Regierungschefs 
aus politischen Griinden beschlossen werden, ohne, daB sie si ch darum scheren, ob 
die Sache reif ist. Also, der SUndenfall ist eingeleitet. Der ist mit Nizza eingeleitet, als 
sie gesagt haben, bis zum Jahr 2004 soIlen die ersten dabeisein. Der Schrt>der hat das 
miihselig eingefangen, indem er gesagt hat, das wichtigste ist nicht das Datum, 
sondem das wichtigste ist, das tats!ichlich diese Sachen umgesetzt sind. 
Und da liegt die eigentliche Schwierigkeit. Da habe ich auch Angst davor. Das ist 
etwas, wovor ich Angst habe. Also, da ist ein Problem, daB sie sagen: 'Jetzt muB es 
sein' . 
Sie Sie dann schon der Ansicht, daB die Enveiterung in mehreren Schritten 
erfolgen sollte? 
Das sowieso. Im Grunde, das logischte Verfahren ware zu sagen, wir verhandeln die 
Sachen mit den Staaten durch, wir beobachten die Entwicklung und der erste, der 
fertig ist, der kommt rein. Und dann der n!chste, der fertig ist, kommt rein. Das ist das 
logischte Verfahren. Das geht schon wegen Polen nicht, weil die Ungam schneIler 
fertig sind als die Polen und die Polen WOrden rot sehen, wenn sie nicht bei der ersten 
Welle dabei sind. Also muB man, ob man will oder nicht, aus auBenpolitischen 
GrUnden ein Geleitzugverfahren machen. Aber nicht alle gleichzeitig. 
Halten Sie den Zeitplan mr zu friih? 
Ich haIte das entschieden fUr zu frOh. Wenn ich mir den Stand der Verhandlungen 
jetzt ansehe, haIte ich es fUr zu frOh und zwar nicht nur jetzt im Interesse der 
Europruschen Union und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten. Es wird ganz wenig bei uns darilber 
diskutiert, daB die Sache auch ihre Schatten- und Kehrseiten fi1r die Beitrittsstaaten 
hat. 
Bei uns haben die Leute immer im Kopf: 'So, die wollen rein, weil sie bei uns auf die 
Arbeitsm!irkte dr!iogen woIlen'. Das bedeutet, daB fi1r ein Land wie die tschechische 
Republik oder Polen die Zeit einer rationalen Wirtschaftspolitik vorbei ist, weil das 
unter den EU-Regeln verboten ist. Und daB sie dann liber Nacht den Regeln der 
Marktwirtschaft ausgesetzt sind. Das Ubersehen viele. Mit das Schlimmste, was uns 
passieren kann ist, wenn wir die zwar als Mitglieder haben, die Wirtschaft dort aber 
dem Konkurrenzdruck nicht standMlt und sie dann eine BetriebschlieBung nach der 
anderen haben und ein wachsendes Heer von Arbeitslosen. 
Das wenn passiert, dann tun wir uns keinen Gefallen. Das interessiert aber Leute wie 
Fischer nicht. 
Also sollte der ProzeB insgesamt praktischer verlaufen? 
la, und das predige ich se it Jahren. Es wird auch angeblich gemacht. 
Es hieD ja frflher immer, zunichst Reformen und dann Enveiterung. Jetzt heiDt 
es plotzlich umgekehrt: Enveiterung und dann Reformen. 
Das kann man nicht machen. 
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Wo wiirden Sie denn die Grenzen der Erweiterungsfllhigkeit sehen? Es gibt ja 
Diskussionen, daB RuBland sogar eines Tages Mitglied werden k6nnte und dann 
haben wir no ch das Problem der Tftrkei. Wie sollte die EU denn damit 
verfahren? Sollten die Staaten aufgenommen werden oder sollte Ihnen 
signalisiert werden 'Ihr kiinnt nie Mitglied werden'? 
In beiden Fallen sage ich, das gibt keinen Sinn. Weder im russischen, noch im 
tiirkischen Fall. Ich glaube nicht mal, daB es Sinn macht, daB wir die ganzen 
Balkanstaaten reinnehmen. Nur ich fiirchte, daB die groBen FUhrer es im Kopf haben, 
daB der Balkan komplett dazukommt. Das wird eine Europaische Union geben, die 
unregierbar ist. Wir sind mit dem jetzigen Vorhaben, zehn dazuzunehmen an der 
Grenze. Mir ist das im Grund schon zuviel. Ich wQrde beim Balkan was anderes 
machen, innerhalb des Balkans wQrde ich Bulgarien und Rumanien dazunehmen. 
Aber jetzt zum Fall RuBland und zum Fall TUrkei. Beide haben zunachst etwas 
gemeinsam, was gegen eine Mitgliedschaft spricht. Wenn man mit amerikanischen 
Politikem redet, dann legen einem die immer die Mitgliedschaft der TUrkei in der EU 
an. Die sagen, die sind doch auch in der NATO. Und denen sage ich dann immer, 
wenn wir in Europa das Gesellschaftsmodell hatten, daB Ihr in den Vereinigten 
Staaten von Amerika habt, dann ware es gar kein Problem. Weil Ihr habt kein 
Solidarmodell. Wenn wir nur ein Freihandelszone hatten, ohne Solidarmechanismen, 
dann ware es egal, dann konnen Sie jeden nehmen. 
Wenn das was die Europaische Union ist in einer gewissen Art und Weise abbildet, 
was wir an gesellschaftlichem Verstandnis in den Mitgliedsstaaten haben, dann ist es 
zumindest in den Mitgliedstaaten auf dem Kontinent so, das Vereinigte Konigreich ist 
ein Grenzfall, daB die Arbeiterbewegung und ihre Forderungen und der soziale Teil 
des Christentums in das gesellschaftliche Denken integriert worden sind, in Form der 
sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Und dann ist es eine Frage je nachdem wer regiert, wie sehr 
das Soziale betont wird, oder weniger betont wird. Aber es gibt im deutschen 
politischen Spektrum niemand, der einen Manchester-Kapitalismus haben will. 
Und das ist eigentlich in den meisten europaischen Staaten so. Deshalb haben wir 
abgebildet auf der Ebene der EU auch Solidarmechanismen. Nicht jetzt bezogen auf 
den Einzelnen, denn Krankenkasse und dergleichen sind eine nationale 
Angelegenheit, aber bezogen auf die Staaten. Der Agrarhaushalt ist, obwohl er einen 
anderen Namen tragt, in Wahrheit ein Teil des Ausgleichs zwischen den Armen und 
den Reichen. Wir haben also sowas wie Solidarmechanismen. Wenn man 
Solidarmechanismen nicht hat, wie in Amerika, dann ist es anders. Wenn man 
Solidarmechanismen hat, dann landet man vor der Frage der politischen Akzeptanz 
des Solidaritatstranfers bei der Bevolkerung. Wir haben ja hier in Deutschland schon 
Schwierigkeiten, dem Bauem im bayerischen Wald klarzumachen, warum er die 
Rente fiir jemanden in Wanneeikel zahlen soIl. Das haben sie noch urn eines versUirkt, 
wenn es urn Geldtransfer zwischen europaischen Staaten geht. Und sie haben es 
nochmal verscharft, wenn es urn Geldtransfer ginge mit Staaten, die die groBe 
Mehrheit der Bevolkerung nicht als Staaten ansieht. Das heiBt, die TUrkei in der 
NATO ist kein Problem, die TUrkei in einer Freihandelszone ware kein Problem, die 
Tiirkei in einer Europaischen Union mit Solidarmechanismen, die von der 
Bevolkerung getragen werden muB ist ein Problem. 
LXV 
Das kann man richtig finden oder kann man falsch finden, aber die groBe Mehrzahl 
der Menschen und nicht nur in Deutschland, auch in anderen europruschen Uindem, 
betrachtet die Tllrkei nicht als europrusches Land. 
Es kommt ja auch noch die Menschenrechtslage dazu. 
Wir reden jetzt nicht vom Ist-Zustand. Jetzt haben wir teilweise die verlogene 
Situation, daB die TOrkei betrogen wird, indem man sagt, wir k()nnen mit Euch nicht 
verhandeln, weil die Menschenrechtslage da ist und weil Ihr nicht demokratische seid. 
Ich rede von einer TOrkei, die voll demokratisiert ist. 
Und es gibt einen zweiten Grund, der gleichermaBen jetzt fUr RuBland und fUr die 
Tilrkei gilt. Man kann in die europrusche Union nur Staaten packen, die von ihrem 
Wertesystem zu dem passen, was an Wertebasen in unseren Gesellschaften bestehen. 
Wenn man auf eine Kurzformel bringen will, was das ist, ich beschreibe das immer 
so: Europa ist eine gelungene Mischung aus den Werten des Christentums und der 
AufkUirung. Beides. Uinder, die den ProzeB der AufkUirung nicht durchlaufen haben, 
oder ihn erst seit kurzem begonnen haben, werden immer Schwierigkeiten haben mit 
dem Wertesystem bei uns. Es ist gar keine religi()se Frage. Bei RuBland haben sie halt 
das ortodoxe Christentum, wenn sie dort ilberhaupt Religionen haben. Das ist kein 
Problem. Das Problem ist, daB RuBland nie eine AufkUirung gehabt hat und das, was 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
bezeichnen. 
Also, daB, was wir muhselig gelernt haben uber Menschenrechte, wenn Sie heute 
einen Mitteleurop§er fragen, wie ist das mit der Sklaverei, dann sagt er, das geht 
nicht. Wenn Sie ihn das vor 300 Jahren gefragt h§tten, Mtte er das nicht gesagt. 
Sie haben sehr lange gebraucht fUr ganz einfache Dinge. DaB der Mensch auch wenn 
er kein Geld hat ein Recht hat, das wird nie realisiert. Diese Phase der Aufkl§rung 
gibt es auch bei der Tilrkei nicht. Die Tilrkei hat ihre Demokratisierung begonnen 
1920 mit Cemal Attatiirk. Das ist jetzt bald eine Generation her. 
Das ist ja auch die allgemeine Diskussion, ob Europa eine Wertgemeinschaft ist. 
Es ist gar keine Alternative. Die Frage ist ja nicht, ob Europa eine Freihandelszone ist, 
dann brauch ich das mit den Werten nicht. Dann bildet sie aber die Gesellschaften 
nicht ab, dann wme auch schwer denkbar, daB dort eine verbindliche Gesetzgebung 
geschaffen wird, was der Fall ist. So wie die EU jetzt verfasst ist, ist sie bereits mehr 
als eine Freihandelszone. Und wenn man sie nicht zu einer einfachen Freihandelszone 
ohne Solidarmechanismen, ohne Gesetzgebung, h()chsten intergovemmentaler 
Vereinbarungen machen will, wenn man sie dazu nicht zurUckentwickeln will, dann 
bleibt gar keine andere Alternative als daB wir ilber Werte reden. Dann landen wir bei 
dem Problem, von dem ich gesprochen babe. 
In der Frage RuBlands kommt noch was dazu, ein Europa vom Atlantik zum Ural 
wme ein Schrecken fUr den Rest der Welt. Das wme ein Schrecken fUr den Rest der 
Welt. Stellen Sie sich vor, die europrusche Union ist ja heute schon die gr6Bte 
Wirtschaftsmacht der Welt. Und technologisch in den meisten Bereichen genauso 
weit wie die Amerikaner. 
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Wenn Sie das kombinieren mit dem russisehen Nuklearpotential, mit den riesigen 
Rostoffvorraten, die es in diesem Land gibt und mit dem teehnisehen und 
wirtsehaftliehen know-how, daB es bier gibt, dann kommt eine Supermaeht raus, die 
so niemand mehr ertragt. Also, daB ware fUr mieh eine Schreckensvorstellung, weil 
wir eine Bedrohung fUr den Rest der Welt waren. 
Den letzten Punkt, den i~h geme anspre~hen wUrde ist die AuBen- und 
Si~herheitspolitik. Konnten Sie si~h vorstellen, daB die europiis~he 
Eingreifstruppe langfristig zu einer eigenstindigen europiis~hen 
Si~herheitspolitik, die eventuell dann auch unabhlngig von der NATO operiert, 
ausgebaut werden klinnte. Die zweite Fnge wire, was halten Sie von den 
amerikanis~hen PUinen, den ABM-Vertrag hinflllig zu machen, um ein 
europiis~hes Raketenabwehrsystem zu entwickeln. Sollten sich die Europler 
daran beteiligen? 
Ich halte von letzterem nichts. Es ist zwar richtig, daB mit dem Ende des kalten 
Krieges die bisherige Strategie der Politik des Gleiehgewiehtes beendet ist. 
In einer mulitpolaren Welt ist eine solche Strategie sehwierig. Nur daraus jetzt den 
SehluB zu ziehen, ich mache mich jetzt unangreitbar, das funktioniert nur unter der 
Logik der Abschreekung. Die Wahrheit wird sein, daB die neue Strategie auf das 
Einsehmuggeln von Atomwaffen setzen wird, wie auf lautlose U-Boot-Angriffe. 
Also diese Idee stabilisiert nieht, die destabilisiert. 
Es gibt keine Notwendigkeit fUr die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika sowas zu tun. 
Die, die sie da im Auge haben, wie den Iran oder den Irak, die haben keine 
entwiekelten Interkontinentalraketen. Die sind zwar manehmal irrational aber nicht so 
extrem. Es gibt iiberhaupt keinen Grund, es sei denn, man will eine noeh gr~Bere 
Supermaeht sein, als man ohnebin schon ist. Und es ist genauso wie dieses 
Verteidigungssystem gegen Angriffe aus dem Cyberspaee, es ist ein riehtiges ABM-
Programm fUr die amerikanisehe Wirtsehaft. Die amerikanisehe Wirtsehaft hat immer 
von Riistung gelebt. 
Die europaisehe Eingreifstruppe wird zu dem Zweek gemaeht, daB die Europaer 
unabhangig, im Rahmen der eigenen AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik kooperationsflihig 
sind, ohne die NATO bzw. die Amerikaner zu brauehen. Das hat Grenzen, wenn es 
urn Nuklearwaffen geht, weil die Spielzeuge der Franzosen und Briten keine 
glaubwiirdige Absehreekung darstellen. Solange es in dem AusmaB keine 
unabhangigen Atomwaffen gibt, wird man an einer Nukleargarantie der Amerikaner 
nicht vorbeikommen. Die Ideallosung ware die Versehrottung dieser Waffen, aber 
soweit sind wir noeh nieht. Das werden wir lange nieht l~sen. 
Das andere, was aueh gelost werden muB, das halte ieh fUr l~sbar, das ist die Frage 
einer eigenen Satellitenkapazitat. Man kann heutzutage nieht militarisehe Operationen 
durehftihren, wenn man nieht eine saubere Aufklarung hat. Das geht nur mit 
Satelliten, am besten Eehtzeit. Wir haben zwar ein Satellitenaufklarungszentrum der 
WEU, das in die EU iiberfilhrt worden ist, aber wir brauehen einen europliisehen 
Satelliten, denn man im Zweifel aueh dirigieren kann. 
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Die abschlieBende Frage wire, wie sich die Europapolitik der jetzigen 
Bundesregierung im Vergleich zur Vorglngerregierung Kohl verlndert hat. 
Welche Prioritlten wurden gesetzt? 
Das konnen sie im Leitantrag zum SPD-Parteitag prAzise nachlesen. Auf die 
Kurzformel gebracht, es ist auf der einen Seite ist es realistischer, z.B. man kann sich 
vorstellen, daJ3 Zustlindigkeiten zurUckkomrnen. Auf der anderen Seite ist es ein ganz 
klares Bekenntnis zur Demokratisierung. 
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Appendix 6 
Interview with Professor Jiirgen Meyer MdB (SPD), 
vice chairman of the Bundesta, committee on European Union issues, SPD 
Bundesparteitag, Nuremberg 
20 November 2001 
Sind Sie der Ansicht, dass der EU-Gipfel von Nizza bezueglich der 
institutionellen Reformen die notwendigen Schritte gebracht hat? 
Der Gipfel hat das Mindestnotwendige gebracht. Die Ergebnisse sind alles andere als 
schon. Beispielsweise ist die Feststellung einer qualifizierten Mehrheit rnehr fUr 
Computer maBgeschneidert als fUr die Personen, die abstimmen. Auch die Grosse der 
Kommission ist ja ein ungelostes Problem. Es ist eher eine ObergangslOsung, aber 
jedenfalls sind die unbedingt zu diskutierenden institutionellen Fragen, urn die 
Erweiterung moglich zu rnachen, jetzt vorerst gelOst. Aber ich bin ftberzeugt, dass der 
zweite Konvent, der den Gipfel 2004 vorbereitet, auch zu diesen Fragen bessere 
VorschUige machen kann und machen sollte. 
Sind Sie der Meinung, dass diese Reformen noch vor der ersten geplanten 
Erweiterungsrunde durchgefiihrt werden mOssten oder kUnnte man sie 
eventuell, wie manche Mitgiiedstaaten argumentieren, noch wlhrend dieser 
Erweiterungsrunde (oder am Ende erst danach) durchfiihren? 
Der Zeitplan sieht ja so aus, dass die Beitrittsverhandlungen mit den 10 
aussichtsreichen Kandidaten, von den Zwolfen haben ja nur Bulgarien und Rum~ien 
schlechte Karten, also mit 10 Kandidaten bis Ende 2002 abgeschlossen sind und das 
dann moglichst viele Beitrittskandidaten auch an der Europawahl 2004 teilnehmen. 
Die ist Im Fruehjahr oder Sommer 2004. Ich halte es filr terminlich schwierig, die 
Regierungskonferenzen mit den angesprochenen Korrekturen vorher zum Abschluss 
zu bringen. Ich flinde es wftnschenswert, meine aber nicht, dass man dieses geradezu 
zur Bedingung machen sollte. Ich gehe davon aus, beide Verfahren laufen parallel, 
konnte mir aber vorstellen, class die korrigierenden Entscheidungen tatslichlich erst 
nach der Europawahl moeglich sein werden. Denn nach abgeschlossener 
Regierungskonferenz muss ja dann noch das Ratifikationsverfahren, wie jetzt zu 
Nizza, in alien MitgliedsUindern durchgefuehrt werden und das erfordert seine Zeit. 
Welchen Zeitpunkt wuerden Sie folglich fiir geeignet halten, um mit der ersten 
Erweiterungsrunde zu beginnen? Denken Sie, dass es 2004 Oberhaupt schon 
miiglich ist, die EU zu erweitern? 
Ich bin davon uberzeugt und ich koennte mir sogar vorstellen, dass es nicht 
ausgeschlossen ist, dass 10 Uinder nach vollzogener Erweiterung bereits an der 
Europawahl 2004 teilnehmen. Die Korrekturen, die Weiterentwicklung der 
institutionellen Entscheidungen von Nizza, die wftrden dann sicherlich erst im Laufe 
des Jahres 2005 in Kraft treten konnen. 
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Wie denken Sie, wird sich die aktueUe international Krise bezuglich all dessen, 
was nach dem 11. September passiert ist, auf den Erweiterungsprozess 
auswirken wird. Denken Sie, er wird sich eher verlangsamen oder denken Sie, 
dass gerade aufgrund der Notwendigkeit, neue Partner im Kampf gegen den 
Terrorismus zu f"mden, der Erweiterungsprozess eventuell schneller ablaufen 
bzw. forciert werden wird? 
Ich gehe davon aus, dass das zweite der Fall sein wird. Nicht zuletzt wegen des 
erh5hten Interesses der Beitrittskandidaten, in einem Staatenverbund zu sein, der auch 
mehr Sicherheit bietet und das man ausserdem erkennt, wie wichtig es ist, in einem 
solchen Staatenverbund eben auch zur Not Hilfe zu bekommen. Diese Einsicht wird 
sich meines Erachtens jetzt rascher durchsetzen als vorher. 
Sollte es beziigJich des Erweiterungsprozesses ab lingerfristigen Prozess eine 
Grenze geben? Manche Mitgliedstaaten argumentieren, Russland kiinnte 
niemals Mitglied der EU werden, well es einfach den geplanten institutionellen 
Rahmen der EU sprengen wuerde. 
Nach meiner Auffassung soUte die Grenze nicht geographisch, sondern inhaltlich 
genauer durch den Inhalt der Grundrechtecharta bestimmt werden. Die Uinder, die 
si ch zu dieser europaischen Werteordnung nicht nur bekennen, sondem, was ja 
~enauso wichtig ist, sie auch in ihrem Land verwirklichen, die gehoren nach meiner 
Oberzeugung in die Europaische Union. Das ist eben ein grosses Problem mit der 
Tuerkei und wOrde sicher auch ein grosses Problem mit Russland sein. Insofem ist 
das Beispiel Russland zur Zeit noch Utopie, aber nicht aus geographischen Griinden. 
Also, es sollte Grenzen geben. 
Es soUte Grenzen geben, aber solche, die durch die gemeinsame Werteordnung 
bestimmt werden und ich finde die Konkretisierung dieser Werteordnung durch die 
Grundrechtecharta wichtig, denn im Blick auf die Tilrkei geht's halt jetzt nicht mehr 
nur urn Todesstrafe oder Minderheitenschutz oder Folterverbot, sondern urn z.B. das 
Lebenselement der Demokratie, urn Presse- und Rundfunkfreiheit und vieles andere 
mehr. Da ist sehr deutlich gezeigt, was wir unter Demokratien und Rechtsstaaten 
verstehen und nur solche Lander in die EU aufgenommen werden. 
Zu einem ganz anderen Thema innerhalb unseres Themenbereiches: Die 
Entwicklung innerhalb der jetzigen europaeischen Union im Bezug auf die 
Fiihrungskonstellation. Viele Analytiker, die sich mit der Europapolitik und der 
EU befasse, argumentieren, dass der Nizza-Gipfel einen Prozess offenbart hat, 
der schon seit laengerer Zeit unter der Decke geschwelt hat: naemlich, dus das 
ehemalige Fuehrungstandem zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich eben nicht 
mehr so gut funktioniert wie frueher und das man jetzt, wenn man die EU 
betrachtet, wie sie arbeitet, wie sie gefiihrt wird, eh er auf eine EU der multiplen 
Fuehrungskonstellationen blickt und nicht mehr auf das eine Duo zwischen den 
ehemals fuehrend Staaten Deutschland und Frankreich. Denken Sie, dass diese 
Analyse korrekt ist, oder denken Sie, dass das zu weit geht? 
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Also, sie hat schon Richtiges an sich. Ich fiinde es aber wilnschenswert, wenn z.B. 
Grossbritannien vielmehr als in der Vergangenheit, statt zu bremsen, eine 
Filhrungsrolle iibemehmen wuerde, wie Tony Blair das heute in seiner Ansprache ja 
auch angedeutet, bzw. angeboten hat. Was Nizza angeht, muss man allerdings sehen, 
dass der Vertrag von Nizza ganz gewiss kein Ergebnis deutsch-franzoesischer 
Filhrungskunst gewesen ist. Man koennte auch, urn die Betonung klarer zu machen, 
franzosisch-deutscher Fiihrungskunst. Aber, die Grundrechte-Charta, die ja auch in 
Nizza zu behandeln war und dort feierlich proklamiert worden ist, die waere nicht 
moglich geworden ohne die enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen Delegierten aus 
Frankreich und Deutschland. Zurn Beispiel ist das Kapitel soziale Grundrechte, die 
Personifizierung des Grundsatzes der Solidaritlit, das mir eben auch als Delegierter 
sehr wichtig gewesen ist, zurllckzufuehren auf einen gemeinsamen Antrag von Guy 
Brebon, dem Delegierten der franzosischen Regierung und von mir. Das hat Guy 
Brebon, ich hab' das nicht so sehr in meinem Sprachschatz, eine deutsch-franzosische 
Achse genannt. Aber das ist eben nur ein einzelnes Beispiel und je mehr sich an einer 
solchen Filhrungsrolle beteiligen, urnso besser und konsenstriichtiger finde ich die 
Politik der europaischen Union. 
Die offlZiele Position der britischen Regierung ist ja, im EndefTekt die deutsch-
franzosische Achse zu erginzen und sie zu einem Ftlhrungstrio zum machen. 
Denken Sie also, Grossbritannien konnte das unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen 
erreichen und wenn Sie dem zustimmen, unter welchen Voraussetzungen? 
Beispielsweise ist der Euro-Beitritt Grossbritanniens eine zwingende 
Voraussetzung, um Grossbritannien zu einem fllhrenden Mitgliedsstaat zu 
machen? 
Der Euro-Beitritt ist eine ganz wichtige, geradezu zwingende Voraussetzung. Ich 
kann mir nicht vorstellen, dass ein Land eine FUhrungsrolle spielt, dass in dieser 
wichtigen Frage vor der TUr steht. Aber aus meiner Sicht waere es auch sehr wichtig, 
wenn Grossbritannien die Vorbehalte gegenllber der Verbindlichkeit der 
Grundrechtecharta aufgibt. Denn, wie ich eingangs sagte, diese Grundrechtecharta 
beschreibt die europaische Werteordnung. Und das sollte nicht eine blose 
Versprechung, sondem ein verbindlicher Normenkatalog sein. Ich bin zuversichtlich, 
das mit einer gewissen zeitlichen Verzogerung Grossbritannien auch filr die 
Verbindlichkeit dieser Charta sein wird, die ja zu definieren hilft, welche Laender 
nach ihrer Werteordnung zur europaischen Union gehoren. 
In welchen Bereichen denken Sie denn, kiinnte entweder Deutschland mit 
Grossbritannien kooperieren od er die EU generell von einer fllhrenden Rolle 
Grossbritanniens profitieren? Beispielsweise wenn wir den ken an groessere 
Tranzparenz, die Punkte die Premierminister Blair heute angesprochen hat. 
Meinen Sie, dass die Briten hier eine etwas dominierende RoUe bezueglich der 
Demokratisierung und Transparenz der EU spielen konnten? 
Also ich denke zuerst mal an die Absicht, eine gemeinsame Aussen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik der EU zu entwickeln und erst dadurch, dass Grossbritannien dabei 
auch eine filhrende RoUe llbernimmt wird deutlich, das richtet sich nicht gegen die 
USA. Denn das Grossbritannien die enge Freundschaft mit den USA je verlassen 
wuerde, ist ja auBerhalb jeder Diskussion. 
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Also hier fande ich die RoUe von GroBbritannien ausserordentlich wichtig, aber es 
gibt eben auch, wenn man an die Aussenpolitik der europaischen Union in Richtung 
ehemaliger KolonialUinder denkt, eine ganz wichtige Aufgabe, die Grossbritannien 
viel besser spielen kann, als die Bundesrepublik. Im Ubrigen denke ich, dass man in 
einer Diskussion Uber Globalisierung, da wiederhole ich mich ein bischen, mit 
Grossbritannien zusammen, das deutlich machen muss, was Tony Blair ja heute auch 
angedeutet hat, es geht auch wn die Globalisierung von Menschenrechten. 
Denken Sie, das Grossbritannien auch vor aUem im Bezug auf die Beziehungen 
zwischen den USA und Europas eine fiihrende RoUe spielen kiinnte? 
Es hat eine ganz wichtige Briickenfunktion und die Aufgabe, dieses Bnndniss Europa-
USA stabil zu halten und vor jeder Art von Missverstlindnissen zu schuetzen. 
Kommen wir wieder zu Deutschland zurueck: Wie denken Sie wird sich das 
Gewicht Deutschlands nach der erfolgreichen Erweiterung in Richtung Mittel-
und Osteuropa veraendem. Wird Deutschland dadurch zum dominierenden 
Mitgliedstaat in der EU, wie es manche unserer Nachbarlinder befuerchten? 
Also geographisch ruckt Deutschland zweifellos weiter in die Mitte. Ich meine 
allerdings nicht, dass dadurch die politische RoUe Deutschlands sich dramatisch 
verfutdert. Eher, und das ist ein Aspekt, der ein biBchen in den Windschatten geraten 
ist, eher wird sich die RoUe von Berlin veraendem. Berlin wird so eine Art neuer 
Metropole fuer die europaische Union sein und dadurch nach meiner Einschatzung 
ein ahnliches Gewicht bekommen, wie es jetzt schon Paris und London haben. 
Aber dass sich die RoUe Deutschlands dramatisch veraendert, sehe ich eigentlich 
nicht, gerade, weil ich eben auch wichtig finde, dass die Fiihrung der europaischen 
Union von mehr als zwei Lfutdem, geschweige denn nur von einem ausgeUbt werden 
solI. Aber Berlin hat da grosse Chancen. 
Aber die Angste bestehen ja und man hiirt gerade im Bereich des 
wirtschaftlichen von den Angsten bestimmter Nachbarstaaten, vor aUem der 
Franzosen, dass Deutschland eben seine starken Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zu 
Mittel- und Osteuropa ausnutzen koennte, um auch politisch zu dominieren und 
politisch den Ton im mittel- und osteuropaeischen Bereich in der erweiterten EU 
anzugeben. Was meinen Sie, mOsste die deutsche Europapolitik tun, um solchen 
Aengsten entgegenzuwirken? 
Ich kl)nnte mir vorsteUen, dass wenn die wirtschaftlichen Probleme, auch die 
Probleme mit der Arbeitslosigkeit, die Deutschland ja nach der HersteUung der 
deutschen Einheit im besonderen Masse nach wie vor hat, wenn die geringer werden, 
dass Deutschland dann auch aufgrund dieser Wirtschaftskraft mehr im Bereich der 
EU als sogenannter Nettozahler zu leisten haben wird. Aber das bedeutet nicht, dass 
si ch das politische Gewicht dadurch dramatisch veraendem wuerde. Das ist ja nun 
auch durch die Idee, zwar nicht mehr einstimmig aber doch mit qualifizierter 
Mehrheit zu entscheiden, gewaehrleistet. Kein Staat alleine kl)nnte es zu einer 
Mehrheit bringen und es ware fatal, aber durchaus ml)glich, dass dann ein 
Hauptzahler permanent uber das eigene eingezahlte Geld entscheidet. Und es waere 
dumm von Deutschland, wenn es auf Hinweis auf wirtschaftliche Stlirke dann ohne 
Riicksicht auf andere agieren wuerde. Die Gefahr sehe ich jedoch nicht. 
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Ich meine, dass Deutschland, das galt fUr die alte und gilt auch fUr die neue, jetzige 
Regierung, ein besonders europafreundliches Land ist und deshalb Beftlrchtungen 
llberhaupt nieht am Platze sind. 
Wie beurteilen Sie die Bereitschaft der jetzigen Regierung, gr6ssere militlrische 
Verantwortung im internationalen Bereich zu uebernehmen. Teilen Sie die 
Auffassung Gerhard Schroeders, das damit ein neues Kapitel in der deutschen 
Aussenpolitik beginnt, naemlich der Abschied von dem zwar ftlhrenden Part in 
Europa, aber nicht immer ganz an allem teilhabenden Part in Europa, eben auch 
bezuglich der Verantwortung? 
Also, Deutschland war bisher ein wirtschaftlicher Riese und ein militllriseher Zwerg. 
Ein volliges Gleiehgehen in dieser zweiten Hinsieht kann es sehon deshalb nieht 
geben, weil wir die Besonderheit des ParlamentsvorbehaItes haben. Also, 
Militltreinsaetze der Bundeswehr ausserhalb des NATO-Gebietes bedUrfen der 
Zustimmung des deutsehen Bundestages. Das ist eine Gewlhr dafUr, dass 
Deutsehland in diesem Bereieh zwar in Situationen wie derzeit mitmaehen kann, aber 
immer ein biBchen zurllekhaltender sein wird als ihre europAisehen Partner und es ist 
das Ende einer Sonderrolle, aber die grosse ZuIilckhaltung im militArischen Bereich, 
wie auch die Debatten in der SPD zeigen, die ist noch IAngst nicht ueberwunden und 
ieh finde das aueh gar nieht so schlecht. 
Wieder zurueck zur Ostenveiterung. Ich wuerde Sie gerne zu einem Problem 
befragen, dass immer wieder auftritt. Wenn man die U mfragen der letzten 
Monate (Eurobarometer etc.), erkennt man einen starken ROckgang der 
iiffentlichen Unterstiitzung in der Bundesrepublik filr die beiden grossen 
wichtigen Projekte in der EU, zum einen die Ostwenveiterung und zum anderen 
auch die europiische Wihrungsunion. Denken Sie, dass dieser RUckgang in der 
iiffentlichen UnterstUtzung fuer diese beiden zentralen Projekte langfristig zu 
Problemen im Integrationsprozess fuehren wird? 
Das glaube ieh nieht, denn diese beiden ganz wichtigen politisehen Entscheidungen 
sind, was Deutsehland angeht, ja gefallen und die kllnftige Einschaetzung in der 
offentliehen Meinung wird sieh naeh den Erfahrungen riehten, die man dann eben 
machen kann. Wenn sieh die Deutsehen an die neue WAhrung gewohnt haben und von 
der geliebten DM Absehied genommen haben und der Absehiedssehmerz eine Weile 
verarbeitet worden ist, werden die Deutsehen sieh mit dem Euro problemlos 
anfreunden koennen, sowie die alten Vorbehalte keine RoUe mehr spielen werden. 
Was die Osterweiterung angeht, wird die von manehen befUrehtete Wanderung von 
Billigarbeitskraften nach meiner Uberzeugung nieht einsetzen und dann wird es ein 
grosses Aufatmen geben, man wird sehen, das war aueh fuer Deutsehland eine gute 
Entseheidung und nieht eine zusatzliehe Geflibrfung des Arbeitsmarktes in 
Deutschland. 
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Seben Sie keine Gefabr, dass das eventuell zu einem Wablkampftbema werden 
k6nnte und recbte Parteien die Aengste der BOrger ausnutzen k6nnten? 
Nein, also es gab dafilr AnsHtze zu einer sehr kritischen Haltung in der CDU/CSU und 
das wHre tatsHchlich dann geflihrlich geworden, aber Stoiber hat hier heftig 
zUIilckgerudert und da sehe ich die Gefahr eines Wahlkampfthemas Osterweiterung, 
die noch im vergangenen Jahr nach meiner Beobachtung bestanden hat, jetzt nicht. 
Selbst wenn es keine Gefabr gibt, was mOsste die Bundesregierung generelHun, 
um dies en Befuercbtungen entgegenzuwirken? SoUte sie mehr informieren, soUte 
sie anders argumentieren? 
Nach unserer Auffassung ja, das haben wir auch als Bundestagsfraktion immer wieder 
nicht nur seIbst versucht, sondern auch von der Bundesregierung verlangt, und ich 
gehe davon aus, das verstanden worden ist und die Vorturteile, die auf 
FehIeinschHtzungen und FehIurteile beruhen ausgeraeumt werden koennen. Da ist 
noch heftig zu arbeiten. Aber nochmal, ich bin jedenfalls froh dass das, zumindest 
zwischen den beiden grossen VoIksparteien, kein WahIkampfthema sein wird. 
Noch eine andere Frage zur schneUen Eingreiftruppe: SoUte die EU diese 
schneUe Eingreiftruppe langfristig zu einer wirklichen gemeinsamen Aussen-
und Sicherheitspolitik ausbauen? Das ist ja ein Vorschlag, der vor aUem in 
Grossbritannien heftig diskutiert wird. 
Das ist ein VorschIag, der mit der ktlnftigen gemeinsamen Sicherheitspolitik der EU 
zusammenhHngt und aus deutscher Sicht ist es weniger heikel eine EU-Eingreiftruppe 
zu haben aIs eine der Bundeswehr, die dann Uberall in der Welt womlSglich fuer 
Ordnung sorgen sollte. Wenn man diese EntwickIung skeptisch sieht und das tue ich 
selbst durchaus, muss man sagen ist jedenfalls aus deutscher Sicht eine EU-
Eingreiftruppe das kIeinere Risiko gegenueber einer Bundeswehr-Eingreiftruppe. 
Deshalb meine ich, dass wir dieses Thema eher europafreundlich, also eher EU-
freundlich weiter diskutieren werden aIs aIs spezielle Aufgabe der Bundeswehr. Wir 
haben ja jetzt auch in Afghanistan sehr deutlich gemacht, wir wollen uns nicht mit 
Bodentruppen beteiligen, auch nicht Bomben einsetzen. Das zeigt, welches die 
deutsche Haltung ist. 
Noch generell zur Zukunft der EU: Man Iiest hlufig, dass sich zwei alternative 
Wege gegenOberstehen wuerden: Die einen sagen, wir brauchen ein eher 
intergouvemmentales Europa, wo mebr Kompetenzen an die Nationalstaaten 
zurueckgehen, die anderen sagen, dass der nattlrliche Weg sein wird, dass immer 
mehr Kompetenzen an EU-Institutionen gehen werden. Das ist ja auch in 
Grossbritannien die grosse Angst, immer die grosse Diskussion Ober den 
'Bundesstaat Europa'. Finden Sie, dass der erste Weg, das intergouvemmentale 
Europa, oder der zweite Weg, die immer stlrkere Integration, der bessere wire? 
Ich meine, dass der zweite Weg nicht nur besser, sondern auch schwer vermeidbar ist. 
Besser deshalb, weil Entscheidungen, die nicht intergouvernmental fallen, sondern 
durch die neu zu bildenden und effektiv zu gestaltenden Gesetzgebungsorgane, also 
z.B. ne ben dem europaeischen Parlamant eine Staatenkammer, getroffen werden, 
mehr Vertrauen finden, auch geeignet sind, Europaskepsis zurueckzudrHngen 
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Wenn die Mensehen das Gefiihl haben, dureh Wahlen unrnittelbar mitwirken zu 
kOnnen, an dem, was in Europa passiert, dann wliehst nieht das Misstrauen, wie in der 
Vergangenheit, sondern mehr Demokratie bedeutet naeh meiner Auffassung aueh 
mehr Vertrauen. Intergouvernmentale Prozesse sind ja nicht so demokratiseh, nach 
meiner Auffassung, wie die in einem zusammenwaehsenden Europa. 
Das der zweite Weg sehwer vermeidbar ist und die ja aueh z.B. von Ministerprlisident 
Clement zur Debatte gestellte Renationalisierung bestimmter Bereiehe nicht geht, 
ergibt sieh aus den europaeisehen Vertraegen. Die RUekverlagerung z.B. der 
Landwirtschaftspolitik an die Mitgliedstaaten kOnnte nur einstimmig akzeptiert 
werden, deshalb koennen wir aufhoren, darueber zu diskutieren. Die RUckverlagerung 
der Strukturpolitik wird z.B. von Spanien nie akzeptiert werden. Das zu fordern. 
heisst, einer Illusion nachzujagen. Ieh bin der Auffassung, dass sich die 
Kompetenzen, die nieht zurUekverlagert werden kOnnen, transparenter und 
demokratiseher nutzen lassen. Man sollte aueh sehr sorgflUtig prUfen, ob bisher nieht 
manehe in Bruessel aufgehliufte Kompetenz gegen das Subsidiaritlitsprinzip verstOsst. 
Aber nieht, indem man dann ganze Politikbereiehe zurueekverlagert, sondem sagt, 
diese oder jene konkrete Entseheidung kann besser nur vom Mitgliedsland, also einem 
Nationalstaat geloest werden. Deshalb stelle ieh mir vor, dass in der neuen Verfassung 
so etwas wie ein aus den Gesetzgebungsorganen zusammengesetzter gemeinsamer 
Subsidiaritatsaussehuss gebildet wird, der politisch entscheidet, was Bruessel darf und 
was nicht. Und letztlieh muss das dann der EGH entscheiden, das wird dazu filhren, 
dass BrUssel manche Saehe nieht mehr zu entseheiden hat. Aber ganze Politkbereiehe 
zurUekzuverlagern ist aus meiner Sieht nicht nur nieht sinnvoll, sondem es geht auch 
nieht. 
Sollten diese kleinen Teilbereiche, die dann eventuell zurilckverlagert werden 
aber dann auch, wie Bundeskanzler Schroeder gestern meinte, in der 
Verfassung, in einer EU-Grundrechtsverfassung od er Charta (wie immer man 
sie nennen mag), festgelegt werden? 
Ja, allerdings nicht dureh einen Kompetenzkatalog, wie wir ihn etwa in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutsehland haben, sondern durch ein 
Kompetenzzuweisungsverfahren, wie ieh eben skizziert habe. Denn einig, und darauf 
sollte man aueh kommen, sind sieh alle MitgliedsUlnder, auch alle national en 
Parlamente, ueber die Geltung des Subsidiaritlttsprinzips. Und dieses in einem 
vernUnftigen Verfahren jeweils anzuwenden, dass finde ich aussiehtsreich. Dber einen 
Kompetenzkatalog konnte man 10 Jahre und Uinger streiten und er ktime trotzdem 
nieht zustande. 
Meine letzte Frage wire: Teilen Sie die Auffassung, dass unter einer neuen 
Generation von Politikern wie Bundeskanzler Schr6der und 
Bundesau8enminister Fischer, die nicht mehr zur unmittelbaren 
Nachkriegsgeneration geh6ren, fuer die Europa also nicht wie filr frilhere 
Generationen unbedingt Krieg oder Frieden bedeutet, unter Filhrung dieser 
Politiker die Europapolitik pragmatischer geworden ist, man also eher bereit ist 
auch mal in Sachfragen mit den Nachbarstaaten und den Partnern in der EU zu 
streiten und nicht immer nur darauf aus ist, Integration um jeden Preis 
voranzutreiben, nur weil es eben eine Frage von Frieden oder neuen 
U nstimmigkeiten ist? 
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Also, pragmatiseher sehon, aber jede pragmatisehe Entseheidung sollte immer aueh 
betraehtet werden als ein Sehritt in die richtige Richtung, sollte also weitergedacht 
werden und deshalb freue ich mich sehr ueber die jetzt ja immer lebhafter werdende 
Debatte tlber die Zukunft der EU und darilber, dass man zunehmend erkennt, dass die 
EU dureh eine Werteordnung, wie sie in der Grundrechtecharta formuliert ist, nicht 
nur ihre Legitimation findet, sondem auch ihre Grenzen. Und das ist ein Bezug, den 
man bei all em Pragmatism us, den ieh bei konkreten Entseheidungen unverzichtbar 
finde, nicht vergessen sollte. Und tlbrigens, mit Krieg und Frieden hat Europa schon 
nach wie vor zu tun, stellen Sie sieh vor, Ex-Jugoslawien w§re vor 20 Jahren sehon, 
eine Utopie, Mitglied der EU gewesen, dann hatten wir diese grassliehen Kriege in 
Ex-Jugoslawien nieht gehabt. Also, dass die EU aueh Frieden siehem kann, dass ist 
naeh wie vor meine Oberzeugung. Europa sollte weniger dureh Drohungen bestimmt 
sein, als dureh gemeinsame Oberzeugungen. Aueh von vemilnftiger Wahmehmung 
eigener Interessen. Und deshalb finde ieh es aueh richtig, dass man, wenn es jetzt 
gegen Terrorismus geht, nicht immer nur sagt, man tlbe Solidaritat und zwar 
selbstverstlindliehe und aueh uneingesehrlinkte mit den USA, sondem gleiehzeitig 
aueh immer betont und dieses liegt auch in unserem Interesse. Das ist ein 
pragmatiseher Ansatz, den ieh richtig finde. Der Sehachzug ist der beste, der mehrere 
Funktionen erftlllt. Das heisst, wenn Sie einen Zug mit einem Springer oder Bauem 
machen, der nicht nur Verteidigungsfunktion hat, sondern auch Angriffsoptionen, 
dann ist das vermutlich ein besserer Zug als ein einsilbiger. Also pragmatisehe Politik 
kann ja auch in diesem Sinn eine mehrfunktionale sein. 
LXXVI 
Appendix 7 
Interview with Gary Titley MEP (Labour), Manchester (Radcliffe) 
1 March 2002 
The Convention on the Future of Europe has started working this week, 
yesterday actually. The first question is, if you were a participant in the 
Convention, what recommendations would you give in terms of institutional and 
procedural reform? 
The most important thing is the point which is least likely to be addressed. We need 
reform in the way the Council of Ministers operates. At the moment there is just too 
much time being spent by politicians on administrative matters. The General Affairs 
Council tends to be poorly attended and is insufficiently focused. The European 
Council meetings of the heads of state, we saw in Nice, has got so much on the 
agenda. I think what we need is to have a General Affairs Council which is made up 
of representatives of their Prime Ministers, politicians whose job it will be to deal 
with weekly events in the EU. Leaving foreign ministers, in the Foreign Affairs 
Council to look at foreign affairs and trying therefore also to only hand over to the 
European Council, at six monthly summits, the essential points. It seems to be the 
biggest weakness of how the Council operates. 
Beyond that, we need things which will guarantee more effective delivery- we need 
more Qualified Majority Voting, there has to be a ... the subsidiarity debate is one 
which is very difficult. I think that the issue is as much about subsidiarity as about 
proportionality. It is exactly not so much where powers lie but in fact where they are 
exercised at different levels of government. And in many ways the subsidiarity 
argument is a red herring in that sense. It's more about authorities in different areas. 
So I think these clearly are the main needs, but what we also have is a sense of trying 
to reach a conclusion about exactly where we're going. You know, what is the 
ultimate objective of the European Union. Because in many ways, the Treaty of Nice 
represents either the beginning of the end of the European Union or the end of the 
beginning. So its either that we've reached the end of that stage, we move on to 
another stage or really the European Union's coming to an end. Full stop. 
Do you think that these reforms you described should be implemented before the 
first new members states are able to aeeeed the European Union or do you think 
this could be done during the process or even afterwards? 
It could be done during the process. You musn't tie the two things together, there is 
no reason why this can't be done at the Intergovernmental Conferences which are 
dealing with enlargement. So I think it's important not to say 'we must have these 
changes before enlargement' as a delaying tactic. 
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Do you think that it would be realistic that, as for example the British 
government and other European governments argue that already for the 
European Parliament elections in 2004, the first group of countries should be 
enabled to participate in this European Parliament election, or is this too early? 
My view is always that the next wave of enlargement will happen on the 1st of 
January 2005. That's always fairly inconsistent, because of course there's nothing 
really stopping, if everything's agreed for these countries to participate in the 
European elections to elect people whom they know once they join in. So, I think 
there will be a bit of a European fudge on this, but the date is essential, because this 
thing went on for a long time and you got to have a fixed date in mind. 
People underestimate the extent to which the European Union needs pressures in 
order to make progress. 
Which countries do you think should be part of the first group of accession 
candidates? 
The logical thing now is for the ten which were named in the last Commission report 
to be brought in, provided that Poland of course, is able to make progress on its 
application. The problem we've got is that Poland thinks that the European Union 
can't enlarge without it and therefore it doesn't have a sense of urgency like other 
countries have. But it's quite clear that Hungary, Estonia, the Czech Republic, 
Lithuania has made an enormouse try, as indeed has Latvia and Slovenia are ready to 
come in. I think the stumbling bloc at the moment is whether Poland's going to be 
ready and the reality is, if you've got small countries like Lithuania, like Latvia, who 
are not quite ready the logic is to accept the at the same time because if you are going 
to enlarge again in two years time you might as well get them in now. 
Where do you see the major problems for the enlargement process as a whole? 
Should there for example be transitional periods concerning the free movement 
of workers or, for certain countries, in order to be able to take part in the 
Common Agricultural Policy? 
I think it's probably just one word: money. And now that's what we're talking about. 
The problem we've got is from which angle you look at the problem. For example, 
transitional arrangements on free movement. As you know, the situtation that you've 
got up to seven years for individual member states. Firstly, the problem about the 
freedom of movement of labour is that the right in the EU talk about the influx of 
immigrants. You have the same in Spain and Portugal. It never happened, in fact what 
actually happened was the Spanish and Portugese economies expanded with the 
amount of people that already lived in Spain. So it's really about reassuring the public 
not to get distracted about this red herring and therefore if some countries get 
transitional periods that makes it more likely that they will accept enlargement and 
that's a good thing. The same is about the current furore about agricultural policy. 
If you look at it from the applicant countries point of view, it appears as if they're 
being treated as second class citizens. But on the other hand, if you say, how much of 
this money could you spend then it wouldn't be very much different from out 
Commission proposals, certainly not to a large amount. 
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And on agriculture as well, the main problem would be, if you were to put in 
Common Agriculture Policy as it stands to Central European countries, particularly 
Poland, prices would go through the roof and undermine the economy and you've also 
got no incentives then to farmers to reform or modernise. And it would become 
impossible thereafter to reform the agricultural policy. So, if you look at it from the 
angle, yes we're being treated as second class citizens, it's not (inaudible). If you look 
at it from the angle of actually how much can you spend, time and time again I come 
up against this issue, people say, we need so much on the budget, so actually how 
much are you able to spend. Again, it's one of those very difficult arguments. 
I think the Commission should come forward with what is a sensible compromise 
position and a realistic one. And the reality is, if you try to impose the Common 
Agricultural Policy on the existing level, you need 15 member states to support it, but 
they can't afford it. 
Do you think that there should be a general geographical limit to the 
enlargement process in the longer term. Would you for example say that a 
country like Russia should not become part of the European Union, or countries 
like Turkey where you have the big discussion about if it is really part of Europe 
and its culture as we know it? 
There is a geographical limitation in that you've got to be European. And that's why 
we said no to Marocco. However, of course Cyprus is east of Kiev and south of Tunis. 
There is a very broad definition of what is Europe. I don't think at this stage we have 
that debate. Turkey is part of the European family. So, I don't think that debate's a 
problem at the moment. Russia is a very, very big country and it's questionable if the 
European Union as it exists at the moment could bring in Russia. But we have to have 
a seperate set of relationships with Russia. But Russia being ready to join the 
European Union is so far away anyway that I think it's a bit of a sort of academic 
debate because history will evolve and the situation will change. Ukraine is clearly 
European but the Ukraine is in such a mess that it wouldn't be able to join the 
European Union. 
Let's just go back to the discussion some politicans put forward: Should it be a 
Christian Europe or should it be a Europe which combines lots of different 
religions and cultures? 
I think that debate is a nonsensical debate. Religion has got no role to play in this. 
Britain is a strong supporter of the enlargement process, alongside Germany and 
other countries. What would you say are the United Kingdom's main interests in 
the enlargement process? 
I think it's seen very clearly as a project of security. A way of securing both political 
and economic security in Europe. I think the United Kingdom sees that very, very 
clearly. It's trying to deal with the aftermath of things like the wars in former 
Jugoslavia. It shouldn't have been allowed to happen in the first place and European 
Union membership is the best guarantee against that. I think the United Kingdom also 
believes in any case that if you've got the European Union it should be a generally 
European-wide union. The United Kingdom sees it very clearly as a security project. 
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Would you say that the government sees it more as a project to reunite a Europe 
which had been divided by the Cold War and less, like the Conservatives, as an 
attempt to slow down the deepening of integration. Do you think this government 
is less interested in slowing down the deepening of any political integration in 
Europe? 
In any case, if anybody thinks that it would be very stupid because every enlargement 
has also been accompanied by deepening. Because that is the only way you can 
actually enlarge. So I think that argument is one which has died off with the 
Conservatives really. I think this government sees it very much as a security project. 
And also as an economic opportunity. 
Let's look on to Germany. We all know that Germany has always had special 
relations with the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and with Russia. 
Would you see a danger that Germany might become more powerful once the 
Central and Eastern European countries come into the European Union? 
Would you agree to these views about a growing sphere of influence in Central 
and Eastern Europe after enlargement? 
No, that might become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If other countries stop to get 
involved then Germany will become very influential. So it's up to other countries to 
get involved. Let's be blunt: Chancellor Kohl was very clear that he wanted Germany 
fully integrated into Europe as a way of stopping Germany from becoming dominant. 
And that was what the European Community was about in its origins. I don't see that, 
because it can move both ways. Countries could resent the influence of Germany as 
patronising. The side effects of the euro is of course that many countries, particularly 
in former Jugoslavia use the German mark as their currency. Now, in a sense that's 
also counting against German influence. 
I don't see this as an issue, I think it's one of those sort of scare stories people have. 
Gennany is tied up into the European area. Gennany is a very big and powerful 
country, so it is going to have a strong influence, but the suggestion somehow that the 
Poles, the Hungarians and the Czechs are all going to be subservient to the Germans is 
rather patronising really to them because they're not really going to be. In a lot of 
ways they have a lot more in common with the United Kingdom government than 
they have with the German government. No, I don't think that this is an issue. This is 
a bit of a scare story that people have from time to time. 
The German Chancellor SchrHder has recently announced that Germany would 
be opening up a new chapter in its foreign policy, meaning that he would like 
Germany to take over greater international responsibility. He would also like 
Germany to be more self-confident towards its neighbours. Do you think that 
this would be a good development, Germany coming back into the family of 
'normal' nations? 
I think it's more for France and Germany than for anybody else. Because I know that 
the debate has actually been an extremely painful one in Germany, just talking to 
German colleagues. Clearly nobody wants to go back to the days of neutralization in 
Germany nor anywhere else. It's a response in fact. 
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The Cold War has come to an end. Therefore the security scenario which was about 
defending Germany or Western Germany no longer exists. And our armed forces have 
got to adapt to the fact that now what it's about is peacekeeping operations, 
peacemaking operations, firefighting operations. We've got to be mobile and 
Germany has got to play a role in that. It's therefore an entirely healthy situation. that 
Germany is involved is making its weight clear through its foreign policy. Germany 
does have a specific perspective on all this. In a way Germany has got to follow all 
this without forgetting what has been going on. 
Of course we did have in Kosovo an international force with a German command. 
There will clearly always be a question mark in the back of people's minds but 
German military is under civilian control. These traditions are different. I don't really 
see that. I'm slightly more worried about the prospect of Prussia being revived in this 
Berlin saga, it probably has bad connotations for people. But, of course the reality of 
Prussia is that they were great reformers originally. Religious tolerance as a way of 
encouraging immigration. I think Germany is part of the international alliance but it's 
a strong country and it's got to pull its weight. 
Britain has undoubtedly become more positive in its stance towards Europe 
under the Labour government. There's only the difficult issue of the euro. 
A lot of Britain's partner's, such as Germany, have repeatedly said that if 
Britain isn't part of EMU it can't really be a leader in the European Union. 
Would you agree with that or would you say that Britain could even lead on 
certain issues without being part of the euro? 
They're right and wrong. There is certainly, the whole European defence agenda has 
changed dramatically since Tony Blair took a lead in that. That is an area of course, as 
a main contributor of military force and a NATO member, Britain has quite a big 
contribution to make on that. But ultimately it has to be recognised that in the long 
term if you're not in the euro, you're not part of the most important discussions. 
Increasingly, the general affairs Council is really the motor of the European Union, 
the finance ministers. There are times when we're not in the room. At the moment, of 
course, we've got a Chancellor of the Exchequer who has got a very high reputation 
and who is a very dominating sort of person. But he's not going to be round forever 
and the longer we're out the more, gradually, we get excluded from these main issues. 
Still, you can lead on the defence on maybe other areas but the core of the European 
Union is the euro. In spite of that, in the end you will gradually lose influence. 
When do you expect the government to announce the official outcome of the five 
economic tests on the euro and when do you consequently expect them to 
announce a public referendum? Do you think that there will be one before the 
next general election? 
I think the important point to bear in mind is that economic tests are very, very 
serious. This is not as people claim a bit of window dressing. Our problem is that 
there was no official preparation under the Conservatives to join the euro. And we 
have to be sure that joining the euro is going to be a positive thing for the United 
Kingdom. It it was going to be a negative thing, the whole project could be 
undermined. 
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So we can't really say when these economic tests will be met. On the other hand, my 
personal view is now that we have had challenge to change over to the euro, which 
has gone very smoothly in comparison to what others predicted, and when the Brits 
start going on holiday this year will start becoming familiar with the euro. If the euro 
is able to respond to the recession we've got at the moment and shown to be 
sufficiently flexible to deal with the problems of Germany, where you've got 
recession, the problems of Ireland, where you've still got quite a booming economy, if 
it shows it can deal with those things then i think by this time next year there will be 
clear pressure on the British government to make a decision where we're at and to go 
for a referendum. So I think a referendum before the next general election is more 
likely than not. But it does depend greatly on how the European economy goes in the 
next nine or ten months. 
What do you think the government has to do in order to convince the largely 
Eurosceptic voters on the issue. Do you think it takes especially the Prime 
Minister to lead on the issue? 
It will take the Prime Minister to lead on it. The most important thing is that there 
should be no suspicions that there is some sort of fudge on the five economic tests. 
In that sense, we're slightly trapped because it's almost self-fulfilling that it makes 
people say 'it's a fudge'. That's why it's very important, the continuing position of 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer is taking in public, very important. What we clearly 
need is leadership from the Prime Minister. If you look at the entire history of United 
Kingdom relations with Europe, you will see that people have been most positive 
towards the European Community or the European Union, when the goal was clear. 
People follow the lead of the government and people do often distinguish between 
what they like and what they think may be good for the country. And this may be well 
one of the issues. I think it's leadership, it's not fudging the issue and it's really what 
happens to the euro in the next twelve months. If it performs well, if it is seen to be on 
the one hand flexible, but on the other hand a serious currency, then I think the 
atmosphere will change. But it's not so much what the government can do on this, it's 
more how the euro does perform in the next twelve months. 
What, in general terms, would you see as the major changes the Labour 
government has introduced in its European policy, in comparison with its 
predecessors? 
Where do I start? You've got to understand that the British will always be slightly 
awkward members of the European Union. Because, the British are naturally 
pragmatic and very suspicious of grand ideas. And we see this in the debate about 
constitution. We don't have a written constitution, we make it up as we go along. 
Then there's countries of course, where after war, revolution or something say, 'let's 
start again' and have a consitution. So, different traditions. 
We're also very much based on concrete. We want to know exactly what and how it's 
going to happen. And most importantly, we always count the costs. We are a nation of 
shopkeepers, after all. So we will always have this questioning attitude. However, 
that's very different from the negative attitude we certainly have from the 
Conservatives. 
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The real change has been the change in atmosphere, as much as anything else. So we 
don't see Europe constantly as the enemy. We see Europe as part of the solution and 
not as part of the problem. The government's been prepared to get stuck in and argue 
its case and recognise that some battles you win and some you lose. But you've got to 
keep in mind the overall vision, I mean, my favourite quote, the one I always liked is 
Chancellor Kohl once saying 'Europe's in Germany's interest, even when it's not in 
Germany's interest'. We never get to that degree, but that has been a change of mind. 
The difference between 1997 and the previous Conservative period was, the first 
twelve months was still engagement in a confident way. Now, we've got a major 
person, Sir Stephen Wall, who used to be Britain's ambassador in the EU, now as the 
Prime Minister's advisor on Europe in the Cabinet Office. You've got a very senior 
British figure as European minister in Peter Hain. All these things are a sign that the 
government is very serious about Europe. And the other thing which is done, which 
has changed the mentality of the British is very simply: The British view is that you 
come to a summit, you argue on an issue. Of course, the continental view is very 
simple, you reach a decision before you even have a summit. And we had to come to 
terms with this. But we have now. 
And you can see now, we spend a lot of time now developing relationships with other 
countries, sometimes controversially like between Blair and Berlusconi. And 
ministers are told they must do this. When they go abroad on visit, they are also 
expected beyond their ministerial responsibilities to actually produce a link with their 
sister party. So this much greater understanding for the need of building alliances then 
there was before. 
A lot of people argue that the Franco-German relationship, alliance, axis, 
however you want to call it, which has dominated the European Union for so 
many years, has started to, if not to disintegrate, to stutter at least and has 
changed the nature of the EU leadership in terms of developing it more towards 
a multiplicity of different alliances between various countries on certain issues, 
like Britain and France on defence, Britain and Germany on agriculture for 
example. Would you agree to this view that there has been a major change in the 
leadership and if so, what would this mean for Britain's role in the future? 
In part I don't agree, in part I do agree. I think the Franco-German axis will always be 
at the centre of the European Union, if only, to put it bluntly, because France and 
Germany keep each other in this bearhug and both are afraid to let go the other one. 
So they both need each other. 
But it has changed, hasn't it, with Germany becoming more powerful within this 
relationship? 
It has changed. In a sense the European Union is now much more complicated. There 
are many more countries in it than there were originally, with the six, which evolved 
around the Franco-German axis. And issues are bound to be much more complex. 
Military issues, with of course Germany always being described as having a weak 
spot on that front and there is always going to be a Franco-British push. But I think 
it's a mistake to claim that now the Franco-German axis would not continue to exist, 
because they both need it. 
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But of course you've got a change in personalities. Kohl and Mitterand were both 
products of the Second World War and what their vision was, that should never 
happen again. Kohl used to have to have a travel permit to go to the next village and 
now you go around Europe without a passport. And Mitterand was the same. 
You've got different personalities. Schrlider is of the newer generation and more like 
Blair, so that much is in common. Chirac is a bit of a (inaudible) politician to quite fit 
in. So is everybody else. If you have a different leader in France again, that might 
change the dynamics. If you have different leader in Germany, that might change the 
dynamics of it. I think it's partly that the European Union is now moving on to the 
new generation leaders, who look at Europe about value added, what does it produce 
for us, what does it give us, rather that emotional attachment to the European Union 
as a way of stopping wars. So I think all of that is part of it as well, it's not as if 
they're loose in their ties, it's just that the European is changing and the personalities 
are changing. But the Franco-German axis will be as always a bit of a dance. If France 
and Germany benefit from working together, they benefit. If Germany thinks it can 
get better advantage out of the UK, it will work with the UK and vice versa. It's a bit 
of a complex dance, really. 
Could you see any special areas where especially Britain and Germany could 
work closer together in such a more multiple European Union? 
Clearly the economy is a major area. Although we have such a different approach to 
economic reform, the way in which companies are structured and are taken over. 
But clearly on the military, where Germany has taken a different role. But really the 
main area is the economy, 
And in terms of reform, I mean both countries seem to have a very different 
approach from France .•. 
The problem about that is that the reality is, if you come to the reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, the real problem for this agricultural policy has actually been 
Germany. And the real problem in Germany is Bavaria. Because the Bavarian 
weekend farmers, who work for Mercedes during the week are the problem. And 
they've resisted before and Bavaria's got such a strong influence. And of course, if 
Stoiber wins the election, Bavaria will have an even stronger influence in Germany. 
Although France does make a lot of noise about agricultural reform, it is in its interest 
to have reform, in particular in relation to its cereal production. And it needs to have 
better access to the world markets, not only reform within the WTO. Where I think 
it's changing is, Germany is now so committed to enlargement, that it's prepared to 
make sacrifices on the agricultural front. But now you've also got the Green 
agriultural minister and all the sagas about foot and mouth are now opening up a new 
debate about food quality and that sort of thing. I think that's changing the German 
position. I think if Germany's changing, then CAP reform is much more likely. 
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You've already mentioned that the Prime Minister helped to initiate this Rapid 
Reaction Force in 1999 in co-operation with France. Do you think it should be 
developed in terms of really developing it into a proper Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. If you agree, how independent from NATO should it be? 
Again, it comes said to what I've said before. Yes it should be developed further, but 
at the moment we haven't developed it yet. And we are still seriously short of the 
capabilities required to have an effective Rapid Reaction Force. We've got more than 
two million people in uniform and can get less than two per cent of them into Kosovo. 
Again, the British point of view is very much: let's make it work and then see where 
that leads next. We do need, and it's accepted a European defence and security 
identity. We do need to take responsibility more for our own theatre. But when we 
talk about the independence from NATO, even if you wanted to be independent from 
NATO, we can't, we don't have the resources. I think that's where all the arguments 
are such a red herring, because even if we wanted, we couldn't. 
And it will involve using NATO assets, which really means American assets. 
So we know that it won't be independent. We will have a greater degree of autonomy. 
not even autonomy, a greater ability to do things ourselves. But very much reliant on 
NATO. And it's not actually in our interests to have divisions with NATO, because it 
just becomes a security system. And NATO, new NATO, part of our strategy is 
including Russia as well. NATO will change, NATO is changing, but I think this 
point about independence is a bit of a (indaudible). 
But France seems to want more indepence ... 
French rhetoric and French actions aren't always the same. And France needs to 
become part of the military dimension of NATO. That's part of the French approach 
to things, I mean is France prepared to spend the money to become independent from 
NATO, I don't think they will. 
The next question is connected to the security issue. Do you think that Britain 
sometimes goes to far in literally standing 'shoulder to shoulder' with the United 
States? If you think especially about the reports that there might be secret 
negotiations going on between America and Britain on a possible attack on Iraq. 
Apart from that issue, how do you think that the UK should develop its relations 
with America in the future, in order to, as Blair said, act as a bridge between 
American and European interests? Because that's definitely what Britain could 
provide for the European Union. 
I'm not sure 'bridge' is the right word to use on these things, but first of all, the whole 
of Europe stood 'shoulder to shoulder' with America on the 11 th of September. 
If you think about the headlines that all Americans now. So it's not just that Britain 
does that. I think what Blair's particularly identified with Bush, you see, Clinton was 
very pro-European, the Bush administration are much more prickly and what he's 
identified is this: better end up talking to them then making outrageous statements and 
antagonizing them. It's better to have a dialogue there. I think he's right to do that. 
Basically, throwing stones at the Americans is leading nowhere. 
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Clearly, Iraq is another matter. We are of course involved with the Americans in 
policing the bo-fly zones over Iraq and I've been there with the RAF and looked at it. 
This would be the new dimension, which I suspect would cause considerable 
difficulties. Negotiations go on all the time between the British and the Americans 
over the no-fly zone. I was in the area on September the 11 th and British pilots had 
come under fire on that day in Iraq. So, there are issues there, but an all-out war with 
Iraq would cause problems with Saudi Arabia, this is an area that concerns us all. 
But diplomatic pressure on Iraq is to be welcomed. 
Do you think that British-American involvement in Iraq would endanger the 
European Union? 
It would of course cause big problems. 
Let's come back to the reform discussions. In the last few years the European 
Union has definitely failed to gain public support. There's this repeated talk 
about the democratic deficit, the lack of transparency. As a result, public 
support has decreased and you can especially see it in the participation of people 
willing to vote in the European parliament elections. Do you think that this lack 
of support will become a danger for the integration process a whole and what 
could be done to win back public support? 
It poses a danger for democracy. Full stop. And it's not just in European elections you 
have a decline, generally in Europe there have been declines in turnouts for the 
elections. And that's, as I say, is a danger to democracy. Since the Maastricht Treaty, 
.there has been less of a democratic deficit in the European Union, much less. 
But the discussion started there, if the European Union really wanted this 
Maastricht Treaty. 
Yes, that started that debate. And that's what the Convention about the Future of 
Europe is about. And one thing I forgot to mention, that is relevant here. The 
European Union has no future, unless we find a way to ensure that national 
parliaments are closely involved. Cause part of the problem is, you see, it's very easy 
to blame the European Union for things. If you go and get it right they say it's 
because of them, if they get it wrong it's because of Europe. The same happened in 
national parliaments. And we've got to get national parliaments much more involved. 
How you do that is a difficult one. But that's what you've got to try to do. 
And I think if you get national parliaments involved that will hav a beneficial effect 
on the democratic input and democratic interest. Clearly, in the Convention we have 
got to try and make the European Union simpler to understand. But it's never really 
been that popular in a sense that what most people are concerned about are things like 
litter in the street or schools. The European Union is bound to set out general 
paramters, which are much less interesting to people, they affect people, but it's not 
easy for them to see how it affects them. In a sense, I often feel that if there was very 
high turnout in the UK in the European elections, they might be something wrong. 
It is a sign that its interfering too much with people. The difficult one is, we've got to 
get much more involved with the national parliaments and more involved with the 
people in it. 
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One final question on the general future of the European Union: Do you think 
that the European Union will inevitably develop towards a superstate with a 
federal government, as a result of the continuing economic integration, or do you 
think that it can still become a confederation of nation states, where the basic 
power rests with the member state governments. Would the latter be the better 
way? 
Again, if you wanted a superstate, you could achieve it. We're talking at the moment 
about 15 countries, 15 different cultures, 15 sets of a 1000 years of history and many 
different languages. And you can't turn that into some sort of single state. 
Clearly, with economic integration we end up pulling more and more in the same 
direction and you realise that it's actually not very good to make decisions, which go 
against the flow of everybody else. But still, the decisions in terms of hospitals, 
schools remain with the nation states. 
We're having this debate between intergovernmentalism and federalism, but some of 
it misses the point. What we've actually got is something in between. We have some 
sort of supranational intergovernmentalism. Because, even when governments are 
taking the decisions, they are taking them in a supranational context. That is to say 
they agree by majority voting, or they agree even unanimously. So I get less excited 
about these debates, because I think what we've got is something different to what 
people argue about. There isn't going to be a superstate, it is still going to be based on 
sovereign nation states. The European Union can only do what the nation states agree 
to do. The only difference between the European Union and something like NATO is 
that we bind ourself, once we've actually agreed on something, we actually do it. 
The reality is we will get much closer and closer in terms of our thinking, how we 
want to co-operate, but we still remain individual nation states and you can't have a 
superstate. You can't. I find it impossible to concede to something operation in 
Brussels or wherever. 
Would it then be a positive thing to have a legally binding constitution or would 
it be a step towards a superstate? 
I can't quite understand this problem because all sorts of organisations have 
constitutions, it doesn't make them states. And in a sense we've got a legally binding 
constitution already, in the treaties. They are legally binding. All that may change, 
instead of having all these treaties, we put them altogether. I don't believe, on the 
other side, that you can actually have a fixed constitution, because it will always 
evolve and constitutions tend to change in the future. So I don't get excited about this 
worry about constitutions. 
In a sense the European Union has grown up in the way the British believed it would 
do. You can never actually make the perfect structure for any problems that come up 
in the future and therefore I'm quite sceptical about the idea of a constitution in a 
sense that people believe you could finally define what is the European Union. 
We don't know what the problems will be in ten years time. I don't understand what's 
the difference, because we've got legally binding laws. 
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Appendix 8 
Telephone interview with Nick Clegg MEP <Liberal Democrats> 
21 March 2002 
The Convention on the Future of Europe has recently started working. If you 
would be a member in this Convention, what would be your recommendations in 
terms of institutional and procedural reform of the European Union? 
In no particular order of priority, it would be to make the purpose of the European 
Union more clearly understood. That of course requires agreement on what the 
purpose of the European Union is. I would focus most of my energy on that in order 
that the European Union is forced to select priorities on the number of things it is now 
involved in. Because in my view the European Union has lost its focus, it has become 
active in far too wide an area of policies, some of which are unnecessary. And it is 
inactive in many other areas where it should be more active. 
So, for instance I think that there is a strong case, and this was indicated by Romano 
Prodi in the opening session of the Convention, the EU stops being active in some 
peripheral areas like parts of social policy, media, tourism, all that kind of stuff, in 
order to focus its attention on the big issues, the big strategic issues people do want 
answers from on the European level - the environment, macroeconomics, currency 
matters, foreign policy, defence, internal security and so on. I think really is to clarify 
what the European Union is for and to make tough choices on what the European 
Union should focus on in the future. 
And then there's the institutional stuff - but, frankly, the mechanics are all fairly 
obvious, we need a bit more QMV in order that after enlargement decisions do not get 
paralyzed. You need a smaller streamlined European Commission. You need a much 
more transparent Council of Ministers. You need reforms to the EU presidency 
system. You need internal reforms of the European Parliament to make it a more 
political body. I'm personally not very keen on the idea of electing the European 
Commission president, because I think it would paralyse the deliberate political 
ambiguity of the European Commission, which is partly an executive administration 
and partly a political body. So most of the institutional suggestions I would make are 
partly related to improving the efficiency and transparency of the institutions rather 
than any great revolution in the way in which it's structured. 
Do you think that any of these changes would have to be made before any of 
those countries from CEE actually become members of the European Union? 
I think they need to be agreed before, yes. 
So they couldn't be done in the process of enlargement or afterwards, as some 
governments argue? 
They can be implemented, definitely. But I think they need to be agreed upon in 
principle before. 
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Do you think it would be realistic that already by the year 2004, so by the time of 
the next European Parliament election takes place, the first countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe will become member states of the European Union? 
And if you think so, which countries should be part of this first group of 
accession candidates? 
I am not going to answer the second part of your question, because I cannot sit here 
and simply decapitate different countries. 
I think it is absolutely essential. It may not be completely realistic in every aspect and 
detail of the acquis communautaire and how it has been adopted by different 
countries. This is an absolute priority, which has to be met. But I think for very good 
reason. There'll always be reasons why you could argue that enlargement should not 
take place. There'll always be reasons to say why the candidate countries are not 
ready. There'll always be reasons to say why the European Union is not ready. So I 
think it is very important that there should be a sort of guillotine at the end of this 
process. I think the 2004 date serves as a guillotine. But of course, it will create big 
problems, because it is obvious that the EU and the candidate countries won't have 
done all their homework for that date. 
Do you also think that there should be transitional periods for certain areas, for 
example the free movement of workers? 
Yes, absolutely. And there will be. I have no problem about that. That is a pragmatic 
response. 
We all know that Britain is a strong supporter of swift enlargement. What would 
you say are the UK's main interests in the process? 
Other than the honourable ones and the honourable ones are obvious, which is that 
these countries have been waiting for a long time, they have been very sincere in their 
efforts to apply, because in the past the European Union has extended its membership 
to countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain in order to consolidate their 
modernisation, exactly the same applies here. That are all the honourable answers. 
The less honourable answers are that the UK has traditionally though that by 
enlarging the European Union will become more amenable to its own interests and 
will become less introverted and less dominated by particularly French priorities and 
interests. I think that is probably broadly correct. 
Do you think that the present government still thinks in this traditional way, or 
would you say that there's a bit of a change on the issue? 
The previous Conservative administrations rather stupidly hoped that enlargement 
would somehow stop the European Union. That is obviously not the case. If you look 
at the comments from Margaret Thatcher this week, she has realized that, you know, 
that widening also goes together with deepening. So to that extent there has been a 
change, if people recognise you can't just enlarge without also deepening internally. 
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But, I think there is a general feeling that a wider more diverse European Union, even 
if the internal procedures have been deepened and reformed, will still be a more sort 
of Anglo-Saxon type arrangement than it presently is. 
Would you see any danger that Germany might become too powerful in an 
enlarged European Union, as some member states, especially France, fear? 
I see it as a fact rather than a danger. Germany is the most powerful member state. 
It is not really a question if it will become more powerful, it is and it will be even 
more. It's just a question what it does with that power. 
So you think it has to be careful not to abuse its central position in an enlarged 
European Union? 
I have every confidence that Germany won't abuse that position. But I also have a lot 
of sympathy with some German politicians, who say that Germany should not always 
just accept what is decided at the European level, even against its own interests. 
I think it is perfectly reasonable. 
So you agree with the recent stance of the Schroder government? 
I think the manner in which he is doing it is aggressive and shrill and unnecessary. 
But, I still think, in the long run it's probably quite a healthy corrective, yes. 
Would you also agree that, as many argue, if Britain really wants to become a 
leading partner, a leading member state in the European Union, as the Prime 
Minister always claims as his main aim in his European policy, that it is 
inevitable that Britain has to join Economic and Monetary Union? 
Yes, absolutely. I don't think you can be half in and half out of a club for very long. 
Do you expect the government to announce the outcome of the economic tests 
within this parliament or do you think this will take a longer time? 
Only Tony Blair and Gordon Brown know that and I doubt they even had a discussion 
with each other. I hope they will, I think they should do it more quickly, I think it 
would be a great blow to Tony Blair's credibility and a great blow to the United 
Kingdom, if we don't proceed this side of the next election. But of course, you know, 
it's very easy to identify many, many economic and political reasons, which could 
serve as excuses not to do it. 
Would you agree in general terms, as many argue, that the European Union is 
less dominated by the Franco-German relationship, axis, alliance, whatever you 
want to call it and is more dominated by short-term, issue-related alliances 
between different member states nowadays? 
Yes, it is, but that's principally because France and Germany do no longer know what 
the Franco-German alliance actually means. If France and Germany were to agree on 
a substantial set of objectives, I have no doubt that they would pretty well suceed. 
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It's not a question of other priorites or other alliances taking precedence, it's just a 
question of the Franco-German alliance not really being quite as focused as it used to 
be. 
So could this then give a more prominent role to Britain on certain issues such as 
economic reform and also institutional reform? 
Yes, I mean, the stuff that Blair has been doing, various papers and announcements 
with different member states is a very good thing. But I don't think we should 
exaggerate it, it doesn't amount to a great act of British leadership. Not at all. Far 
from it, it's more a sort of promiscuous opportunism. It's better than being utterly 
negative. But I don't think we should have any illusions, it's not exactly, it's not 
Britain playing a leading role, it's just Britain being totally promiscuous in the 
relationship which it builds with different countries. 
A question on the Rapid Reaction Force: Do you think it should be developed 
into a proper Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union and if so , how 
independent from NATO should it become? 
It is part of the Common Foreign Security Policy, the Rapid Reaction Force is an 
expression of it. I think it should be able to act independently from NATO, but 
obviously not do so either in conflict with NATO or if NATO's better placed to 
undertake action. You need to have some procedure to make sure that you first check 
whether NATO is able or willing to take an action before you decide whether the 
Rapid Reaction Force is better placed. 
Do you think that Britain sometimes goes to far, as they call it, in standing 
'shoulder to shoulder' with the United States? Especially if you think about the 
recent reports about possible negotiations about an attack on Iraq between the 
United States and Britain. 
Yes, I think so. I don't think it's possible to be best friends with Europe and America 
at the same time. I think you do, at some level, need to make a choice. And I think 
Blair is living under the comfortable illusion that you can be America's closest ally in 
Europe and also trusted in Europe. I don't think that's right in the long run. 
So you don't think you could develop this idea of acting as a bridge between 
Europe and America, as a member state of the European Union? 
You can, I suppose just, but then, I think it's very difficult to act as a bridge if you do 
what Blair has recently been doing, which is that you seem to take such an uncritical 
position towards what Bush proposes to do in his fight against terrorism and in his 
approach towards Iraq. If you appear to be uncritical and unqualified in your support, 
like Blair is, then of course you lose the support and the loyalties of your colleagues 
in Europe. Ifhe wants to be a bridge, I don't think he's doing it very cleverly. 
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Since the Maastricht Treaty the European Union has had to face an ongoing 
discussion about this lack of transparency, the so-called 'democratic deficit'. 
And as a result, public support for European integration has not increased but 
has rather decreased in many member states. You can also see an obvious 
reluctance to participate in European parliament elections, as you know. 
Would you see this decline in public support as a possible danger for the 
European Union in general and what do you think could be done to win back 
public support for the integration process? 
I think it is a great, an enormous danger. And I think it's a specific danger for the 
European parliament. I don't see how parliament can last in the long run on an ever 
decreasing turnout of voters. And I think the danger is made worse by the fact that the 
response of many people in European Union governments, in the European Union 
institutions is to spend more and more time reforming the European Union. As if the 
extension of QMV is going to sort of make the European Union all the more 
interesting or more loveable to European voters. 
I think it is a grave mistake, this idea that you can reform the European Union in a 
way that it will suddenly become more interesting and more attractive to voters. In 
fact, by endlessly involving ourselves in internal reform we end up making the 
situation worse by appearing to be introverted and by speaking a language about 
institutions, IGCs and conventions, these institutional battles and all that kind of stuff 
that the large majority of European voters simply don't recognize. 
I think there's a danger in the reaction. The best recipe for the European Union to 
recover the standing amongst its voters is just time. We need a lot of time for 
European Union to get on quietly and deliberatly with what it is best doing at, instead 
of continuously wave it under voters noses. Once we know that we've got something 
in the European Union that is worthwhile, which does its job properly, which deals 
with the issues we say instinctively belong to the European level, they don't 
continually want to be bothered about it. And I don't like the sight of grown men and 
women having very obscure arguments which they don't understand. I think there is a 
real danger in the constitutional and institutional restlessness of the European Union. 
I think it could be quite self-defeating. 
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Appendix 9 
Interview with Gisela Stuart MP <Labour) at the House of Commons, London 
25 July 2002 
The first question would be concerning your role as representative in the 
Convention on the Future of Europe: What would be the recommendations you 
would want the Convention to give, once it has finalized its work? 
I'm in a sort of a kind of dual position, because I'm a House of Commons rep, so 
clearly a representative as a national parliamentarian, but I also sit on the presidium. 
And I think it'd be foolish to assume that you even don't take up a much wider view 
of what you come up with. Very concrete, just looking at national parliaments, I think 
if what we come up with as national parliamentarians and it might sound a bit strange 
to some of the continental ones, but it's certainly the problem here that we end up 
starting saying - 'they' have done, instead of 'we'. And therefore what you need to 
strengthen is the national parliament to have a part in the EU architecture and not just 
only be represented by governments. And there were some people on the extremes of 
it, saying why have you been on a working group on the role of national parliaments? 
Europe is essentially run by the ministers. There's a difference. So the bottom line is 
that they say 'we' than 'us'. I think we hope to come up with a new treaty because I 
think, again, people have to know who made what decision and where, how are we 
going to hold them to account. And much more important is that at the moment, 
people have no ... they don't know how to get rid of people at the European level. 
They think that Europe is something that is done to them. And national parliaments, 
they don't like it. 
These steps towards greater transparency and reform, do you think these could 
be done or should be done before the first wave of accession can join the EU, or 
do you think this could be done afterwards or in the process of enlargement? 
Given that there's some changes, I very much welcome the Solana paper which was 
discussed in Seville, any change that the Council of Ministers is bringing about if it 
doesn't require treaty changes, go ahead. But if you consider the kind of time 
constraint, you shouldn't get to bogged down with that. The significant thing is that 
all the candidate countries are there in the Convention, including Turkey. That's why 
I always keep stressing, I know that there's some kind of level of where they're just 
holding back accession negotiations, but the Commission has made it absolutely clear 
that these two things are completely seperate. So they need to really say now how. 
And some of the things, I hope, can be done without requiring future treaty changes. 
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Do you think it's realistic to already bring in the first wave of accession 
candidates to take part in the 2004 European parliament elections, because it's 
now the official both of the German government and the British, do you think 
it's realistic? 
Well, the great skill of politics is that you push the boundaries of what's possible. I 
very much hope so, because I think. it's important that we don't lose the momentum. 
And I just think we should keep aiming for that. I think there might be an almighty 
row in December. But I think in all parts of life when you drop an agenda there's 
always going to be an item to say: 'and now we're going to have a big row'. 
But right now I can't really see anything which would make me think that we would 
fail with that. 
Which countries would you think are, now, or at least by 2004 ready to join. 
Which countries would you think should be part of the fIrSt group? 
I would go for the ten. All of them. I think the key is, you can't have enlargement 
without Poland. 
Should Turkey come it at a later stage? 
That's an interesting one. Because, if you look at the history of the EU, there's only 
been one stage in the past where the nature of the union changed because of an 
accession and that's when Britain came in. That changed the nature of the EU. 
Because you brought in a completely different legal system, you brought something to 
the table which meant it wasn't just an institution that got bigger. 
The same would or will happen when Turkey comes in. Turkey is the key player who 
will change the nature of the union. Because again of its culture, because of the sheer 
map. In ten years time it could have a population larger than Germany. All the 
assumptions one has about QMV ... 
I personally and I know that I'm probably in a minority with that view have deep 
misgivings about the hypocracy to be very happy to have Turkey in NATO but 
ambivalent about Turkey as an EU member. If you look at the whole history of that 
country, ever since Attaturk clearly said, we want to be part of the West, the whole 
secularisation happened. I personally want them in, but I also know that there are 
huge hurdles. The whole issue of human rights, the Copenhagen criteria, I think, are 
absolutely essential. And it's not just the kind of human rights which you enshrine in 
statue law. There's a big question mark over the role of the army, which actually we 
in the West misunderstand, because it makes us feel very uncomfortable and think. 
I do not subscribe to the view that the army is irrelevant but the option to join the 
European Union needs to be a realistic one. It's the biggest driving force for a 
continued modernisation. So, under no circumstances say no! I'm glad they were 
there, I was also twice instrumental in e.g. making sure that the Turkish foreign 
minister is there as an observer, that he attends the meetings. 
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I mean, a classic thing: EPP. The motherland party would be politicaly part of the 
EPP. But a member of the EPP has to subscribe to Christian values. But I also realize 
that I'm probably in a minority. 
In interviews with German MEPs (espcially from the CSU) it always becomes 
obvious that they think that there's a limit to how far we should go. They prefer 
to define the EU as a 'Christian coalition', so it's quite interesting to work out 
the difference here. 
Where would you in general see the main problems with regard to the 
enlargement process? 
I personally have never understood how you can widen and deepen. You can't. 
If you were to create a federal state, a 'United States of Europe', like you did with the 
United States of America, you can do it, it would become a new country . But this is 
the baggage of 2000+ years of history and therefore the huge tensions are going to be 
to respect individuals liberties, nationalities. I mean the trick to pull off, which you 
managed to do in the German federal structure, the Bavarians don't understand why 
for the Brits the word federalism is such a bogeyman. They say: I retain my 
individuality in that structure, where's the problem? 
But what makes a federal system work is the huge transfer of resources that you've 
got mobility of labour and all this allows you to do it. The EU's regional policy does 
transfer resources, but it's 0.9 per cent of the national GDP. so it's peanuts in that 
sense. If you look at the United States, they do about 20% of that. 
We also don't have a kind of mobility of labour. I remember recently sort of looking 
at the north of Prague, saying they couldn't even get work within a few kilometres. 
The other real difficulty, I think, is going to be that a lot the democracies are very 
fragile and to suddenly impose a lot of (indaudible), to impose the Charta of 
Fundamental Rights on them, you have to trim it down a bit more. 
And I give you the example - if you go to Hungary and you speak to the main party 
politicians, I go to Hungary and I sort of say 'Where's my sister party?' , I can find 
one, the structures are there. If I go to Latvia, and my mission was to find the same 
sort of sister party in Latvia, there isn't one. We have elections in October, where they 
expect that the majority of the votes will go to the governor of the former Latvian 
Central Bank. His total party manifesto is - we are not the others. At the last election 
you had a German who actually got the vodka and banana vote- he didn't even speak 
Latvian. So party structures- it's huge. You know, when we deal with the negotiations 
with the EU team, how many more are there - that's where the real problems are. 
Everybody knows that Britain is a strong supporter of swift enlargement -
always has been - what would you define as the UK's main interests in the 
process. Why is it such a strong supporter? 
In the final debate on the Treaty of Nice, there's a Tory MP called Robert Jackson, 
who had always been extremely pro-European but who never actually stood out and 
voted against the Tories when it came to the crunch. 
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He did that for the first time. Because he said - and there's a huge sort of current here 
- this is about repaying historic debt. If you go to the Baltics, they will tell you that 
enlargement is about undoing the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact. 
And for the Brits it's about bringing back into Europe countries who they've always 
felt rightfully belonged to Europe. Particularly if you talk about Poland and the Czech 
Republic - it's about redefening Europe again 
Would you agree to the general view that the Blair administration has, in 
contrast to the Conservative predecessors, seen enlargement more, as you said, 
as a process of actually reuniting Europe, rather than as a process of slowing 
down the deepening of political integration? 
No, he's never seen it as such. The very curious thing is, say last year, if you did a 
quick assessment of your EU leaders, Blair would probably come out as one of the 
most pro-European ones. And in terms also of having a kind of vision, having a 
longer view. He clearly has that, there's no doubt about it. It's very genuine and for 
him certainly. 
To me that's the big idea, even 10-20 years ago, that has always been the big idea 
behind the Union, with the back against the Berlin Wall. I had to explain to my kids-
what's so important about it - is to make enlargement happen. 
Let's look at Germany quickly: We all know that Germany has established strong ties 
with Central and Eastern Europe, especially during the Ostpolitik in the 1970s. Would 
you share the widespread view in Britain, but also in a lot of other countries, like e.g. 
France, that once the EU has enlarged eastwards Germany might become too 
powerful, might actually dominate the whole proceedings of the EU? 
This has always been the storyline, irrespective of enlargement. If you remember 
when Nick Ridley had to go and so on. You see, this is the classic thing: When the 
Berlin Wall fell and the papers are available now, I went over to Dresden for the 10 
year-celebration of German reunification, everybody hailed the French as the great 
heroes, they were the great friends. And there were the Brits, those nasty people and 
the best thing was that nobody mentioned them, because everybody reminded them of 
Margaret Thatcher. 
But the French were exactly the same. You could argue that the French bought 
German reunification and the price was the Deutschmark and the Bundesbank. That 
was the political reality of it all. So this notion that it's just the Brits, you know ... 
And the other thing was ... Kohl was the huge visionary, he was driving this thing 
through and he thought it was a price worth paying. The biggest achievement of 
Schroder is that he's jumped the generation. Schroder is the first post-war German 
Chancellor who no longer carries a chip on his shoulder and says 'careful folks, we 
must be careful not to upset the others - Germany is to powerful' . 
And this is why I've got a real horror of Stoiber and a lot of people tend to 
misunderstand that - they say 'you admire SchrlSder, because he's a socialist' - no-
it's because he's part of a new generation. 
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And Stoiber will turn the clock back. Schauble, whom I really like as a person, I've 
met the man on a number of occasions - that's the old guard. 
With regard to what the real achievements of Schroder were - there is also the change 
of the nationality law. Because what happened is, and again, people forget that, since 
1989 it is for the first time in the entire history of the Gennan nation that its 
boundaries are concurrent with its aspirations. You finally put an end to the thinking 
that there were bits of Gennans or even Austrian Gennans. Gennany were the 
boundaries, which meant that they could really move away from defining nationality 
by bloodline. And you put an end to this, to me, idiotic thing where - I'm British, I no 
longer have a Gennan passport. My children have that and they have a right to 
Gennan passports, because of their mother's bloodline. I've lost it, it's really neither 
here nor there, but I can pass it on. You know, you are a citizen of that because you 
define yourself by its institutions and you acquire this right. 
Coming back to Britain: We've already mentioned that Britain has become more 
positive towards Europe under Labour, but there is still the important issue of 
the Single European Currency, the question of when to join. Would you agree 
with the view of many of Britain's partners that if Britain would decide to stay 
out of the Eurozone it cannot really be a leading partner, a leading nation in 
Europe? Because Blair has always said 'we want to be a leader in Europe', Cook 
in the beginning even said 'we might want to come to form a leadership triangle 
with France and Germany'. Would you also see this as a major hurdle or would 
you think that Britain could lead on other issues and then gradually work its way 
towards the leadership? 
The first thing is: rightly or wrongly we've committed ourselves to a referendum. 
I was here in '75, the last referendum. The first thing you should remember about the 
referendum is that to dislodge the status quo requires a very short, a very sharp and a 
very deep campaign. In '75, it was easier because we were asking people to stay in, so 
yes meant maintaining the status quo. And there you had all the opinion polls in the 
early stages saying 'no, it's wrong in the end', because companies like 
Marks&Spencers came out and said it means loss of jobs and there was an 
incontrovertible case. So you had two things - an incontrovertible case to say 'yes' 
and a 'yes' was maintaining the status quo. Here, a much much more difficult story, 
because we are asking to change the status quo. 
On the basis of as it stands right now, where you could not make the case that it was 
economically better. Now it may well be shifiting, but over the last seven or eight 
years we were sort of consistenly outperfonning the other European states in tenns of 
the exchange rate and all that kind of stuff. The opposition towards the Euro on the 
Labour side is actually a social one. We had a debate recently within the 
parliamentary Labour Party just on the Euro and the opposition came from the 
traditional left because they thought that the Stability and Growth Pact would actually 
prevent us from investing in our public services. The Gennans now say 'it may be 
unsustainable', but what you do have is, for us to say 'at one point we will' - no 
Prime Minister goes into a referendum if he thinks he loses. 
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So when people say 'when are you going to do it?', you've really got to say to them 
that there is no doubt a commitment that we wish to join but to find that window is 
going to be a fairly narrow one and then you sort of go. (INAUDIBLE) Remember, 
after enlargement there will be more countries outside the Eurozone than inside. 
So you think that Britain could still take on a leading role, even if the British 
people voted to stay outside? 
Britain will be a leading player in the European Union as long as the economy 
remains alright. And what is diminishing Germany's role at the moment? The 
economy. You need Germany, France and Britain as the engines of economic 
performance. And provided that these engines are occuring and producing, then you 
are a political player. 
What would you say have been the most important changes under this 
government concerning European policy, especially if you compare it to the 
ThatcherlMajor era? 
You are starting off with a quite unequivocal commitment from the top towards 
Europe. There are things like incorporating the Social Charta, with regard to 
legislative changes. The fact that you have a ministerial committee that meets on a 
monthly basis, where you establish who's been to where, you really go through and 
say 'we establish face-to-face' contact with ministers. As a party we've got twinning 
arrangements with individual MPs responsible for contacts with other countries, 
you've got key figures. It's been all-out and genuine political engagement. 
When the Convention on the future of Europe came together and I looked through the 
list and because I'd been on the Labour party House of Commons committee for co-
ordinating with the MEPs, I could go through and there was the question of voting for 
the presidium, a place on the presidium there were people like Einem from Austria 
who said: 'it would be a distaster to have a Brit on the presidium'. But I looked 
through this list and half of the fellow European MPs I either knew or knew of or they 
knew one of my colleagues. So I could just pick up the phone and it's this sort of ... at 
every level a really much closer co-operation. 
And the real achievement, I regard it as a real achievement. The Socialists are having 
a meeting at the end of August to decide on a common position for the Convention 
and they are coming to Birmingham. They had the choice of Greece and Italy and the 
South of France and Spain! 
On the question of the Franco-German alliance: Would you agree with the view 
of many analysts, and I personally take this view as well, that the Franco-
German alliance has dramatically declined in recent years. Whereas it had been 
the driving force for European integration in the first three decades after the 
war, you now see an increasing drift between French and German interests and 
you rather look at rather look at short-term, issue-related alliances between 
various states. Would you agree that there is a new pattern of coalitions, which 
goes away from this dominating, bilateral relationship, controlling most of the 
important issues? 
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Almost by definition that changed because you get larger. You can't maintain it, I 
mean, if you look at the original six, France and Germany were dominating and the 
rest were players. The Franco-German relationship started it all, assuming it would 
always be the core. It then changed and the way it's changing is numerically, but there 
will always be certain relationships which you will fall back on. I remember making a 
phone call to the Spanish or Portugese health minister about some issue of cattle or 
something and they were very helpful. And yes, you can say, it doesn't matter, that 
self-interest prevails but I think that you should never forget the history ... (inaudible) 
Germany and France will always be very close but changing - to what extent the 
German children learn French and so on. 
Could you see any areas already coming up, where Britain and Germany could 
work more closely together? 
Economic reform. The whole Lisbon agenda, reforming the Labour market. Because 
what happens, and again you have to know a bit of history. There was a debate about 
trade in the UK, about five to ten years ago people like Will Hutton were saying, you 
know (indaudible). And I just say - hold on, how was Germany rebuilt? The 
patricharial industrial figureheads, the small business - that was its engine. Now, 
these are retiring, the small ones are taking over, you get amalgamation - the world 
changes. It's neither good nor bad. Audi in Ingolstadt will have its (indaudible) 
workers drive into the Bayerischen Wald and pick up (inaudible) - that will stop 
because the next generation doesn't want the same life. And that's where I think 
we've got something important by saying, we've been there, done it, got the T-shirts. 
Do you think that the British and Germans will come together and oppose the 
French on CAP? 
That will all depend on the outcome of the German election because the almighty row 
on CAP reform is going to happen in Copenhagen. And what the German position 
will be we don't know. 
A look at security: the Rapid Reaction Force. Do you think that the Rapid 
Reaction force should be developed into a proper Common Foreign Security 
Policy for the European Union and if so, how independent from NATO should it 
be? 
When we have a little (inaudible) in the North of Marocco, although the European 
Common Foreign Security Policy is so highly developed, we still need agreement 
from Colin Powell. So it's one of those areas where it can actually get me really, 
really angry. And the reason why I do is because there is a lot of posturing going on. 
There was in the Convention an intervention by and Austrian who said: 'I refuse to 
give the right to the big countries to make decisions on defence, simply because of 
their ability to act'. And I felt like turing round, sort of saying: 'So would you say, 
I've got the soldiers and the tanks, but because I'm a hig one, I'll ask the little ones 
what to do with them'. 
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So you know, get real here. NATO's changed much in its relationship anyway, you've 
now got NATO in other countries, hugely important. I mean I've attended a three day-
workshop where we had about 20 of the top Russian military guys over, it was 
workshop explaining to them how NATO makes decisions, a huge culture change. 
NATO has been written off as dead too often, when they were saying, you know, the 
Americans, post September 11th, one lessons they've learned that you can't fight wars 
with allies and all that stuff. I've seen that kind of talk before. To my mind, NATO 
will always be the cornerstone. 
What the Europeans will now have to get up to is to get real on this thing. Which is 
one thing - start coming up with finances, anything like in the German case, it 
necessary to have Bundeswehr reform but get on with it. 
Is the end of the WehrpOicht necessary? 
I think most of the countries are moving away from it. You need a professional army, 
you need to co-ordinate, so there is a real European defence policy. All the evidence 
shows to me that when it really comes to the crunch, Europe has not found the 
mechanism of having a view, no matter on which issue. 
Do you think that the British government has found the right balance between its 
commitment to Europe and its relationship with America, especially if you 
consider the Iraq issue? Can it really act as a bridge between Europe and 
America without alienating the other European member states? 
I think that's the price you have to pay for it. We come back here to the issue of 
history as much as much as to geography. I've only justed picked up the front page of 
Le Monde on Monday about Chirac supporting Putin on the issue of Kaliningrad. All 
this sort of thing, you know, there are the Brits and they are going off and supporting 
their cousins and not being good Europeans. Well, if ever there was an issue which 
has to be resolved on the European level than it's actually Kaliningrad as part of 
enlargement. What Britain's got, there is a special relationship and, as far as I'm 
concerned it's not the United States right or wrong. Yes, they make mistakes. And I 
disagree with them. 
But I'm a quite unashamed Transatlanticist. If push comes to shove, the last 100 years 
have told me that if you're a Brit, that is the ally you rely on. The biggest mistake we 
could make in the wake of enlargement is if we define being European in opposition 
to America. I give you an example. We've got the working tax credit, which we 
introduced when we came into power, which introduced benefits. I remember going to 
this conference in 1997 and I remember somebody saying 'This is bloody Bismarck'. 
And I remember saying this is indeed the model of the Bismarckian state. And these 
kind of European or American values, the roots are largely in 17th century Europe. It 
is not in opposition, but at a different stage. And we would be very stupid to do that. 
This is where I'm not buying an opposing view that the purpose of the Union was a 
power bloc in opposition to one alternative route. 
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The last question on the democratic deficit: This has been going on for years now. 
Public support has declined, both for the integration process as a whole, if we look at 
public support for enlargement or even for the euro before it was introduced and also 
for the institutions. More and more peope distrust the European Union institutions. 
What would you propose to do against such developments? Do you see it as a danger 
and what would your ideas be to prevent this from going on? 
Surely, it's a bit hilarious when they're talking about democratic deficit. I can't 
remember which, I think it was one of the larger candidate countries and they said: 
'Where is the democratic deficit?'. It exists? What is it? Particularly if you come from 
the German tradition, you've always accepted dual legitimacy, because if I'm right 
the German consitution says 'we, the Umder', not we the people. So, you've always 
accepted that there's a democratic deficit in terms of an individual mandate. 
It's nonsense that the European institutions are not democratically legitimate. But 
what it is, people have a sense of that there is this steamroller out there, which, 
because it operates so much slower, which sort of grinds on relentlessly and says 
'don't worry, things will only come into force in ten years time'. So it's lack of 
transparency and how the decisions are made. What is very important that you stop 
saying 'they have'. But when people quote the drop in figures it is much more a 
reflection that people don't have political ideas at the moment. Look at our election in 
2001, we said: look at the last three years, you get a bit more in the next three years. 
The Tories said: we'll do the same, but it'll cost you less. The Lib Dems said: we'll 
do the same, but we're putting taxes up for it. So, that kind of public disengagement is 
more prominent when you don't have the attraction of big ideas. 
Do you think that in the European Union it's also more, it's not so important if I 
vote for my local MP, so I can rather go there and punish the government of the 
day, just to show them: I don't agree with your policies? 
And there's also, you know, WahlmUdigkeit. The only thing Stoiber has to be 
congratulated for is that he mobilised the opposition against the Bavarian senate. But 
you know, to actually abolish an institution is great. 
There is a natural solution to it and that is if the European Union found more of an 
external voice. Because when you think about it, there's a real paradox. On the one 
hand we say we want to bring Europe closer to the people. On the other hand we say, 
we want subsidiarity, decisions have to be made more at the local level. 
By the same nature you could argue that at the point when Europe is closer to the 
people, Europe is doing something it shouldn't be doing. So what is the function of 
Europe? It is the big headline stuff, it is your external relations, it is the WTO, it is 
defence. So maybe the time has come for the whole machinery to stop and engage in 
some navel gazing. So that's where my theoretical solutions lie. 
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